De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Whether God, by a prior motion inhering in the created will, moves, applies, or predetermines it as a physical cause to all its particular good acts, while preserving its freedom.

I. As I noted at the beginning of the preceding dispute, this question is not about the name “physical predetermination” (although the name itself is very ancient in both its components and, as shown above, has been used by the Fathers and Scholastic Doctors), but about the reality signified by that name. Therefore, so that we may proceed distinctly and without ambiguity or equivocation of terms, both in confirming our opinion and in refuting the contrary one, we must first establish what is understood by the name “physical predetermination,” or “physical motion predetermining free choice to will.”

Some theologians who oppose this kind of predetermination state the question in ambiguous terms and add certain things to the Thomists’ opinion which, if omitted, would make its meaning easier and clearer to understand and make physical predetermination more difficult to attack. For when they explain what is signified by the name “physical predetermination,” they speak as follows: “This physical determination, then, is said to be a certain form impressed upon the will, which together with it completes the proximate principle of the will’s act. This form is said to be a determination of the will not only because it inclines it toward one thing as regards specification, but because it determines it altogether to the exercise of the act.” A few lines later they say: “But this motion, or form, of which we are now treating, which is added above every habit and permanent faculty of the will, is said to be its determination because, once it is posited, the will immediately and infallibly issues into the act toward which it moves or inclines it.” Finally, they say that this determination is called physical, first, to signify and explain that this kind of determination and infallible emanation of the second act from a will thus affected and determined does not proceed from any moral cause, but from the intrinsic and connatural manner of acting of such a form, which, just as it is in its own genus the physical cause of its act, so by its nature is altogether determined to the actual production of that act. Therefore, while it inheres in the will, it determines it at the same time and is, as it were, its intrinsic weight, by which it is altogether determined to perform that same act. This determination is also called physical to distinguish it from moral determination, which does not proceed from a physical and natural manner of acting, but from some moral persuasion or effect; and thus it is not determination simply speaking, nor infallible determination, but determination in a qualified sense. In these words, first, we note that the adverb altogether occurs in none of the Thomists I have seen. For they do not assert that God, by a prior motion, physically predetermines free choice altogether to a determinate operation, much less do they say that the form by which the will is moved is by its nature altogether determined to the actual production of this act. Rather, without that added qualification, they affirm that God truly premoves as efficient cause, applies, and efficaciously predetermines the will by an actual motion physically—that is, as an efficient cause—to such an operation, while preserving its freedom. The pious reader will gather from this how much harm that addition causes: when it is said that God by an actual prior motion physically predetermines the will altogether to consent, it seems to mean that by this same motion God predetermines the will to consent in such a way that the will itself does not determine itself and cannot dissent if it wishes. This is foreign to the sense and opinion not only of the Thomists but of all Catholics. Second, we note that we do not call the prior aid of which we speak a form impressed upon the will, since this name seems to signify a quality constituting the power in first act. Rather, its proper name is an actual motion by which God truly causes through efficient causality free choice to perform a determinate free act, with the true and ready capacity not to perform it if it wishes, as was said in dispute 18, no. 23. Likewise, when the Thomists say that God physically predetermines the will to good acts by his efficacious aid, they do not exclude moral motion, but presuppose it.

Therefore, once we have rejected the expressions that generate obscurity and equivocation and seem to make the Thomists’ opinion harsh and difficult, the clear sense of this dispute is as follows: whether God, not only by the absolute and efficacious decree of his will, which we discussed in the preceding dispute, but also by a prior actual motion inhering in secondary causes, especially free ones, applies them to act and truly through efficient causality and efficaciously causes those same causes to cooperate and perform a particular act—that is, physically determines or predetermines them to act, not by temporal priority, but by priority of reason and causality alone—so that God is the one who truly and efficaciously begins to act before we cooperate with him, and consequently this causal statement is true: Because God acts, our free choice cooperates with him. For this, and nothing else, is signified by the name of God’s motion physically predetermining free choice to perform a particular act. Some theologians call this motion, abstractly, “physical predetermination”; the question, however, concerns the motion that physically predetermines in the concrete. If, then, we agree among ourselves that God by an actual motion premoves and applies free choice in the manner described, and truly through efficient causality and efficaciously causes us to will this or that without prejudice to freedom, as St. Thomas says, we shall care little about the name “physical predetermination.”¹ For once the reality is established, we should not quarrel over the name.

Those theologians, then, who hold that God did not, prior to his middle knowledge of the future cooperation of free choice under a hypothesis, predetermine our free acts in particular by an absolute and efficacious decree—and could not have predetermined them while preserving their freedom, as was seen in the preceding disputation—consequently teach that by his actual motion God does not premove, apply, or physically predetermine free choice to particular good acts. They further add that the actual exercise of that same choice in its operations cannot coexist with such a predetermining motion. Several other theologians defend the same opinion, even some who admit that by an absolute and efficacious decree God predetermines the human will to its acts in particular, while preserving their freedom.

The arguments by which they seek to establish this rest in part on a principle they have persuaded themselves is most evident in philosophy, although it is in fact contrary to philosophy: namely, that God’s general concurrence is not an immediate influx into the secondary cause, but rather concurs with the secondary cause in its effect. We set out and answered their arguments in disputation 18. In part, however, these arguments are drawn from the same principles by which, in the preceding disputation, they tried to prove that external predetermination through God’s absolute and efficacious will removes the freedom of created choice with respect to its actual exercise.

Moreover, they prove their point as follows. Our will, simply as a secondary cause and by its essential subordination to the first cause, does not need this predetermining premotion in order to act. For, as is clear in other secondary causes naturally determined to one outcome, the subordination of any secondary cause to God as first cause is sufficiently preserved by its essential dependence on him, not only in being but also in acting, by reason of the simultaneous or concomitant concurrence that is necessary for it to act. Therefore, this subordination does not require another divine motion predetermining it; hence such a motion is posited superfluously, unless one can assign some special reason why the will needs this kind of predetermination in order to act.

They confirm this as follows. The will is no less powerful in exercising acts connatural to it than other natural causes are in performing their actions. Nor can any special reason be found in the will why this determination should be necessary for acts of the will rather than for the acts of other causes. For the chief reason our opponents give is this: from an indifferent and undetermined cause, precisely as such, no determinate effect can proceed. But the will, once all the requirements on the part of the object, the intellect, and its own powers are in place, is indifferent to eliciting this act or that. Therefore, at least by a priority of nature, before it elicits any act determinately, it must be determined by something. Hence it must be determined by God, since no other cause can determine it, none having efficacy over the will itself; nor can it be determined by itself, since before receiving determination from another it will often be found indifferent and therefore insufficient to make a determination. This argument, however, presupposes something false: namely, that all the indifference of our will is passive and not active, and negative rather than positive. This is shown as follows. If the will, prior to its act, is so indifferent that it cannot determine itself, even when all the prerequisites for willing are in place, unless it is determined by some external agent through a prior motion received in the will, then this indifference is merely passive: it is an indifference to receive this or that determination according to another’s will and choice. Consequently, the will would not be free, not only with respect to its exercise but even with respect to the very faculty of acting. The consequence is proved: with respect to such a determination the will is merely passive, not active, since the determination precedes every act of that will in the order of causality and nature. Further, if that determination were effected by the will, then it would be effected by the will as indifferent, since before the determination it is wholly indifferent. By the same reasoning, then, willing itself, even if determined, could proceed from the will as indifferent.

II. Second, it is argued as follows. A power that is by its very nature actively and passively indifferent, as master of its own act, is able by its intrinsic power, together with the general concurrence of the first cause, to determine itself to its act. Therefore, it does not need to be predetermined by God through a prior motion in order to act. The antecedent is proved: such a power, although formally indifferent in itself, is nevertheless virtually in act because of its perfection and eminent power, through which it has true and proper dominion over its act. Therefore, by a second act it can determine itself formally, just as the divine will, although in itself indifferent with respect to producing this or that effect, nevertheless determines itself; because of its eminent active power, it is virtually in act.

They confirm this. There is no contradiction in the will’s being indifferent in itself in first act and being determined through a second act, since one act does not necessarily include the negation of another. Just as prime matter’s being indifferent in passive potency and being actualized or determined by one formal act are not opposed but rather follow naturally together, so likewise it is fitting for the will to be actively and perfectly indifferent and, by its own choice and intrinsic power, to unfold itself into one act and through that act to be determined formally, both by acting and by receiving that act.

III. Third argument. To be formally and physically determined is nothing other than to will. Therefore such determination can neither come from an external agent without the will itself, nor be anything prior to the act of willing that is its efficient cause. The antecedent is clear: that intrinsic determination of the will, inhering in a human being and in the will, exists only in the will itself as in its subject. Therefore it is either something in the manner of a first act or a second act of the will. But it cannot be something in the manner of a first act, since it is not a habit—for a habit does not determine the will; rather, the will uses it when it wills. Nor, properly speaking, does the will need another first act, especially to elicit acts proportionate and natural to it, since it is sufficiently constituted in first act by itself. Therefore such determination can be nothing other than the second act, which is willing or the action of willing; for no intermediate term between first act and second act can be conceived, and none was ever taught by Aristotle.

This is confirmed. Even if the will needed some other active principle in the manner of a first act for supernatural acts, that principle would nevertheless be subject to its freedom as regards use; for the same reasoning applies to it as to a habit. Therefore, by such a first act the will is not predetermined to will this or that.

Fourth argument. The determination of the will must be voluntary; otherwise the will would not be determined in a free and spontaneous manner, but rather as if it were some lifeless thing. But nothing can be voluntary unless it either presupposes an act of willing by which it is voluntary, or is itself the very act of willing, which is voluntary in itself and intrinsically. Therefore such determination either presupposes an act of willing or is itself the very act of willing; consequently, it does not predetermine that same will to an act of willing.

Fifth argument. Predetermination by a prior motion received in the will before its free influx is incompatible with the freedom of that same will; therefore it must not be admitted. The antecedent is proved as follows: if that determination is necessary for acting in the manner of a necessary influx of the First Cause, then without that influx the will cannot be moved as a proximate and ready power for action, just as fire cannot heat without God's concurrence, nor can a hand move a pen unless it is moved by the will or appetite. For the will is said to depend more intimately and essentially on this motion and determination of God in its operation than the motion of the hand depends on the will. Therefore, for as long as God does not give this determination, even if everything necessary for willing is present, it is still not placed in the will's power to will or act. The consequence is proved: the will has no power either to will without such determination or to have such a determination so that it wills. Therefore willing itself is never in its power unless God first grants this sort of determination, which is solely within his power and choice. Thus a human being's motion and determination could be free for God himself, but not for the human being, just as the motion of the hand is free for the will but not for the hand.

This is confirmed. With respect to that determination our will is not free, for in receiving it the will is purely passive. Once it has received it, however, it necessarily proceeds to act, so that it can no longer fail to act at all. Therefore it never has free use of its operation, nor can it have it; consequently, even the root freedom of created will perishes.

IIII. Sixth argument. Given any help or prior motion of God in the will, the will can dissent and resist that motion if it wishes. Therefore that motion does not efficaciously predetermine it to consent. The consequence is clear: for if it predetermined the will, once that help were given, the will could not dissent, since these two things cannot be true at once: that the motion predetermining it to consent is in the will and that the will dissents. The antecedent, however, seems expressly taught by the Council of Trent, Session 6, on justification, chapter 5 and canon 4, where, speaking of the prior motion by which free choice is aroused and moved by God toward justification, it determines that free choice can reject that motion and dissent from it if it wishes. The Council of Sens also says in its decree of faith, no. 15: “God's drawing help is not such,” it says, “as cannot be resisted, for otherwise it would prejudice free choice.” Here the word “resist” implies the composite sense, for the will does not resist a motion by which it is not touched.

This argument is confirmed: otherwise the Council of Trent would have defined nothing against the heretics of our time who deny freedom of choice. For they would very easily grant that, before God's efficacious motion predetermining consent is in a person, his free choice can dissent and fail to act, provided they were allowed to maintain that, once that motion is in the will, it cannot fail to perform the act to which it is efficaciously predetermined by that motion.

V. Seventh argument. The opinion that posits predetermining help as necessary for the will to act makes God's commandments impossible, contrary to the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 11, on justification, and canon 18, and contrary to the common opinion of the saints, whose testimonies we shall cite below. Therefore it must not be admitted. The antecedent is proved as follows: as the authors of the opposing opinion admit, before foreseeing any works, God, solely by his own will, denies this predetermining help to all those who are not converted or do not act. But without a necessary active principle no one can act or perform anything. Therefore all those who are not converted or do not act truly cannot be converted, act, or fulfill God's commandments, especially since such predetermining help is not in man's power but only in God's, who grants it to whomever and whenever he wills. Consequently, God would command man to do the impossible.

Eighth argument. If, besides sufficient help, another efficacious predetermining help were necessary for acting, it would follow that no help would remain that was truly sufficient. This consequence must in no way be admitted. Therefore, etc. The consequence is proved as follows. Something is said to be simply sufficient for an effect if nothing else is simply necessary beyond it. For someone who had four votes by which he would be elected prelate would not be said to have sufficient votes if four further votes were simply necessary in addition to them. Therefore, if, for a man actually to act, another predetermining help is necessary besides sufficient help, the help called sufficient is not truly sufficient for acting, but will be sufficient in name alone. The falsity of the consequence is proved from 1 Timothy 2: “God wills all men to be saved.” Ecclesiasticus 15: “Do not say, ‘It is through God that it is lacking,’ etc.” Hosea 13: “Your destruction, Israel; your help is only in me.” Isaiah 5: “What more ought I to have done for my vineyard that I have not done?” Psalm 129: “With the Lord there is mercy, and with him abundant redemption.” And it is proved from other passages of Scripture, the Councils, and the holy Fathers, from which we shall show in Disputation 112 that, in due place and time, God denies no adult, especially a believer, sufficient help for acting rightly in this life.

Ninth argument. It would follow from the opposing opinion that no place would remain for divine exhortations and admonitions. But this is contrary to the express passages of Scripture, in which people are often admonished to turn away from evil and do good. The consequence is proved: God does not exhort everyone in Scripture to prophesy, raise the dead to life, or heal incurable diseases because it is not established in men's power and choice to possess or obtain gifts by which they can accomplish these things. Rather, God distributes such gifts solely by his own will, to whomever and whenever he wills. Therefore, if another efficacious predetermining help is required for acting rightly besides sufficient help, and if having this help is not established in our power but only in God's, who grants it solely by his own will to whomever and whenever he wills, then by the same reasoning people should not be exhorted to penance or to other righteous or pious acts.

Tenth argument. For the same reason that predetermining help is said to be necessary for the will to perform good acts, it would also be necessary for it to perform sinful and intrinsically evil acts. Consequently, God would predetermine man's will to evil and would be the first author and cause of sin. But this is contrary to the express passages of Scripture and to the definition of the Council of Orange, canon 25, and of Trent, Session 6, canon 6, which will be examined expressly in the following disputation. Therefore, etc.

VI. St Augustine and St Thomas teach the opposing opinion in the passages cited in the preceding disputation and those to be cited below. All the Thomists and other theologians who have attained a true understanding of the teaching of St Augustine and St Thomas defend it with unanimous agreement. For all acknowledge that God, the Best and Greatest, not only by his eternal and efficacious decree predetermined all secondary causes, even contingent and free ones, to their particular effects and operations in all their circumstances, but also in time, through a motion prior to the determinations of secondary causes—that is, through efficacious predetermining help—predetermined each one according to the condition of its own nature, especially when the causes are free and contingent.

VII. To explain this, we must first examine and recall what we said in Disputation 18, where we showed expressly that God's general concurrence is an immediate influx into secondary causes, whether natural or free and contingent, by which God, as simply the First Agent, efficaciously moves and applies those same causes to acting according to the condition of their own nature. This motion is something incomplete in the secondary causes themselves, produced by God alone as efficient cause and really distinct from the operation of the secondary cause, as we left explained in Disputation 19.

Second, we must presuppose that the middle knowledge invented by some to reconcile freedom of choice with the infallibility of divine providence and predestination does not exist even in God, as we proved at length in Disputation 7. There we showed that it is impossible for God, before any decree of his will, to know certainly and infallibly what a created will in particular would do on the hypothesis that it were placed in this order of things and in these circumstances.²

VIII. Third, one must presuppose what we demonstrated in the preceding disputation: from eternity, by an absolute and efficacious decree of his will, prior in the order of reason to knowing toward which side the created will would turn—or will turn—by its innate freedom, even on the hypothesis that it were placed in such circumstances, God determined all the good acts that it and each secondary cause would perform in time, while the nature and freedom of that cause remained whole and unharmed. For the resolution of this controversy and the true understanding of Sts. Augustine and Thomas depend on these three principles. Let the following, then, be stated.

IX. First conclusion. By that prior motion God efficaciously applies the created will so that it acts freely and infallibly, just as he also applies other secondary causes so that they act naturally.³ The conclusion is taught by St. Thomas, q. 3, On the Power of God, art. 7, at the end of the body, where he says: God is the cause of every action insofar as he gives the power to act, insofar as he preserves it, insofar as he applies it to action, and insofar as every other power acts by his power. And in 1 p., q. 105, art. 5, ad 3, he says: God not only gives forms to things, but also preserves them in being and applies them to acting. He teaches the same in Against the Gentiles III, ch. 63, argument 4, and ch. 70, argument 3. St. Augustine seems to teach it in On Various Questions to Simplicianus I, q. 2, after the middle, where he says: Who would dare say that God lacked a way of calling by which he might also apply Esau’s mind to that faith and join his will to it, in which Jacob was justified? By these words he plainly indicates that through the efficacious help of his grace God applies a person’s will to believing and acting piously, and joins it to himself.

Moreover, the conclusion is proved as follows. A power that regards an end moves and applies the other powers to their operations. For this reason the will moves and applies the other powers with respect to exercise, since it regards the end itself. The same is true of charity with respect to the other virtues: because charity has God as its object insofar as he is the supernatural end, it orders and applies the acts of the other virtues and joins them to that end. But God’s power regards the end of all secondary causes and of the will itself. Therefore, it moves and applies the created will to its operations.

Second. God is the final cause of the application of secondary causes; therefore he is the efficient cause of that same application. The inference is proved: God is the first efficient cause with respect to all things of which he is the ultimate end. This is gathered clearly enough from the words in Rev. 1, I am the α and the ω, the beginning and the end, which signify that God is the first efficient cause of the things of which he is the ultimate end. The argument can be confirmed: otherwise God would be the ultimate end of all things that have being by participation, while something besides God would be the first efficient principle of some being by participation. For that application by which secondary causes are efficaciously applied to acting is not a being of reason but something real existing in the nature of things. Therefore, if God is the ultimate end of that application but not its first efficient principle, it follows that the first principle and ultimate end of all things are not one and the same.

Third, God is the true Lord of all secondary causes; therefore, he uses them when and how he wills. The inference is proved: dominion is the power to use a thing. Therefore, if God has dominion over all secondary causes, he uses them and applies them to their operations.

They confirm this. As St. Thomas teaches in 1.2, q. 16, art. 1: The use of a thing is nothing other than its application to some operation. Hence the operation to which we apply a thing is also called its use, just as riding is the use of a horse and striking is the use of a stick.⁴ For this reason dominion is defined as the proper power of anyone to use a thing for every use permitted by law. Since, then, God has absolute and supreme dominion over the created will, it follows that he uses it and consequently applies it to its proper operations.

X. Some theologians answer that God, as supreme Lord, can use all secondary causes as he wills, but they deny that this use consists in that prior application or determination. To explain their view, they observe that it is one thing for the action itself of a secondary cause to be under God’s dominion—which is always true and essential to every created action insofar as it is a positive thing—and another for a secondary cause, as it performs that action, to act by God’s dominion, or for its action, insofar as it is that cause’s action, to be an exercise of divine dominion by which God, as supreme Lord, wills to use it. Although this often occurs, it is not necessary. For God sometimes permits his creature to act otherwise than he himself would will, as is clear when a human being sins by exercising an evil will. Then the person does not properly perform the service of God as supreme Lord, nor does God then use that will for that action, since he simply does not will the action but permits it. If someone asks what constitutes, essentially, the exercise of God’s dominion over the created will and every other secondary cause, they answer that it consists in two things. First, God does something from a created thing in such a way that he turns one creature into another, as he turned water into wine at Cana in Galilee, or even annihilates it. They say that this is done by an action of God, either positive or negative—the latter being the suspension of the influx by which he preserved it in being, and not by any predetermination. Second, God works something through that same secondary cause; this exercise of dominion takes place through God’s command and through the creature’s own action proceeding from God’s will and command.

XI. This solution, however, is not satisfactory, for it is argued against as follows. Not only the action of the will and of every other secondary cause, but also the very determination by which the will determines itself and applies itself to acting, is under God’s dominion. Therefore, God makes use of this very application of the will; therefore, he applies the will so that it determines itself.⁵ The inference is clear: for, as was said on the authority of St. Thomas, the use of something means nothing other than its application to some operation. This is confirmed as follows: the proper use of an operative power, insofar as it is such, is to operate; therefore, if God uses a created operative power, he applies it to operate. Moreover, according to the solution given, it often happens that a secondary cause, in performing its action, acts under God’s dominion, or that its action, insofar as it is its action, is an exercise of God’s dominion. Therefore, we already have what we intended to show: God often applies the will to acting while preserving its freedom, and consequently this kind of application does not prejudice human freedom. That this is necessary is proved as follows. This application proceeds from God’s supreme dominion; but all secondary causes in all their operations, at least according to every actuality they possess, are subject to God’s supreme dominion. Therefore, God not only often but always applies secondary causes to their operations whenever they act; therefore such application is necessarily presupposed. In answer to the objection brought forward concerning a person who exercises his evil will, we reply that although God does not will that action insofar as it is evil, but merely permits it, nevertheless, insofar as it is an action and a positive being, he wills it simply by his absolute and efficacious will, since as such it is good. Consequently, it comes from God as first cause, and under this aspect God uses the created will under this aspect and applies it to produce that same action insofar as it is an action. By performing that action insofar as it is an action, the will itself properly performs the service of God, as will be clear in the following dispute,⁶ although, when considered as morally evil, the created will does not serve God by producing it, but displeases him, as the authors of the solution we are attacking admit. Further, God’s use of dominion consists in his causing something by his command through a secondary cause, even a free one. Therefore, no secondary cause does anything without God’s prior motion, which applies it to act in this or that particular way. Therefore, it is clearly inferred from God’s supreme dominion over all secondary causes that he applies them to acting.

XII. The conclusion is proved fourth. The actual application of the will to acting is something created, willed and known by God through practical knowledge, and distinct from the will’s operative power, since it can happen that the will has the power to act but is not applied to an operation and does not act. Therefore, God effects this application; otherwise he would not be simply the first cause of all things. Therefore, he applies the will to acting.

They answer that God does indeed apply the will to acting, but not by an application prior to the determination and application by which the will determines and applies itself; rather, they say, the two applications are simultaneous. For they contend that the application of the will is nothing other than the very free act of the will: the created will applies itself by willing and wills by applying itself. Therefore, since God does not produce the created act of willing antecedently to the will’s consent and influx, it remains that he does not apply it to acting by any application prior to the consent and influx of that same will.

This solution, however, is easily refuted. For although the determination by which the will formally determines itself is really the very free act of the will, the prior determination by which God causes the will to determine itself is really distinct from the will’s free act, as was said in dispute 19, no. 8. God applies the will by a prior application, just as by a prior motion he moves it, in accordance with what was said in dispute 18.

XIII. Second conclusion. Through this motion and application, God really changes the will from one thing to another and makes it willing when it was unwilling. This is St. Thomas’s conclusion in Sentences II, d. 25, q. 1, art. 2, ad 1, where he says: God works in the will and in free choice according to its requirements. Hence, even if he changes a person’s will into something else, he nevertheless by his omnipotence brings it about that it willingly wills that into which it is changed. And in De veritate q. 22, art. 8, in the body, he says: God can change the will by necessity. Here the expression “by necessity” does not signify absolute necessity of acting, for that is repugnant to the freedom of the will, but conditional necessity, or the necessity of infallibility, as is clear from what he teaches in Summa theologiae I–II, q. 112, art. 3. The freedom of choice in acting is entirely compatible with this necessity, as will be clear in dispute 25. Explaining how this change can be made by God without doing violence to the will or compelling it, he adds: When God changes the will, he causes one inclination to succeed the previous inclination, so that the first is removed and the second remains. Hence that to which he leads the will is not contrary to the inclination that now exists, but to the inclination that existed before. Therefore it is neither violence nor compulsion. For example, by reason of its heaviness, a stone has an inclination toward a lower place; if, while that inclination remains, it is thrown upward, this is violence. But if God removes from the stone the inclination of heaviness and gives it an inclination of lightness, then its being carried upward is not violent to it. Thus a change of motion can occur without violence. In this way it must be understood that God changes the will without compelling the will. And below he says: Just as the will can change its own act into another, so can God, and much more so. And in the same question, art. 9, in the body, he says: On the part of the will, nothing can change the act of the will except what operates within the will. This is the will itself, and that which is the cause of the will’s existence—which, according to the faith, is God alone. Therefore, God alone can transfer the inclination of the will, which he gave it, from one thing to another as he wills. He teaches the same in other passages to be cited for the fourth conclusion. Nor can St. Thomas be explained as speaking only of a change in the will through the free act that God produces together with the will itself, by which act he also makes the unwilling willing. For, as was shown in dispute 18, God through his actual aid, or efficacious motion, by which he changes the will, acts immediately upon the will as a cause, as is clear from many passages of St. Thomas cited there.

Moreover, by a simultaneous influx God does not change the will so that it acts, nor cause us to will or act; he merely cooperates at the same time if we will. Therefore, some aid must be established by which God so changes the will that he causes it to exert its influence, consent, and cooperate with God who moves it.⁷

XIV. St. Augustine holds the same opinion throughout. In On Grace and Free Choice, ch. 19, he says: I think I have argued sufficiently against those who vehemently oppose God’s grace, by which the human will is not taken away but changed from evil to good, and, when it has become good, is helped. And in book 1 Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, ch. 20, he says: But this God, by his most hidden and most efficacious power, converts and transfers a person from indignation to gentleness—that is, from a will to harm to a will to favor—in accordance with the Apostle’s words: “For it is God who works in you both to will.”⁸ He says the same in On the Grace of Christ, against the Pelagians and Caelestius, ch. 24, a passage we examined in our commentaries on Isaiah above, nos. 11 and 12. Likewise, in On Grace and Free Choice, ch. 16, he says: It is certain that we will when we will, but he makes us will what is good. It is certain that we act when we act, but he makes us act, by supplying the will with most efficacious powers—he who said: “I will make you walk in my statutes, observe my judgments, and act according to them.” When he says, “I will make you act,” what else does he say but “I will take away from you the heart of stone, by which you did not act, and give you a heart of flesh, by which you may act”?⁹ And in book 1 Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, ch. 19, he says: In wondrous ways a person is drawn by him who knows how to work inwardly in human hearts—not so that people believe unwillingly (which cannot happen), but so that they become willing from being unwilling. He says many other similar things in many other passages. This conclusion will be clear from the arguments to be brought forward below for the fourth conclusion.

XV. Third conclusion. By this motion, application, and change, God determines the will to a determinate act while preserving its freedom.¹⁰ This conclusion is plainly gathered from the passages of St. Thomas cited in the preceding dispute, no. 11, but especially 1. p. quaest. 19. art. 3. ad 5, and De potentia q. 3, art. 7, in the body and ad 7.

These and many other similar passages are explained in two ways by the authors of the opposing opinion. First, they are understood to concern a cooperating and simultaneous motion, not a prior and operative one. But this explanation expressly contradicts St Thomas's text. In the cited Question 3 of On the Power of God, Article 7, ad 3, he says: “In the operation by which God acts, moving nature, nature itself does not act.” But when God moves by a simultaneous motion, nature itself acts together with him. Therefore the passage is not understood of a cooperating motion. And in the reply to the seventh objection of that same article, he clearly teaches that through the operation by which God acts, moving nature, he confers on it something incomplete by which it acts actually, in the manner in which the power of an art is in an artisan's instrument. Therefore he is speaking of a motion that precedes the operation of the secondary cause in the order of causality. In Summa contra Gentiles III, chapter 149, argument 1, speaking of divine help that moves our free choice, he says: “Man, then, does not move himself to obtain divine help, which is above him; rather, he is moved by God to obtain it. The motion of the mover precedes the movement of the thing moved in reason and in cause. Therefore divine help is not given to us because we advance toward it by good works; rather, we make progress through good works precisely because we are preceded by divine help.” Here he speaks openly of a prevenient motion. And certainly it is contrary to the nature of the aforesaid application to say that it is merely a simultaneous action. For the application by which God applies a secondary cause to acting is understood as prior in the order of reason and causality to the action of the secondary cause itself, which is applied; for the cause is applied in order to act. From these points it is manifest how those who say that God premoves and predetermines the will to its operations while preserving its freedom speak in conformity with St Thomas: for if he moves, applies, and determines the will prior in nature or causality, then surely he premoves and predetermines it.

XVI. Fourth conclusion. This motion, of which we have spoken in the preceding conclusions, is not merely moral but also physical; that is, it does not pertain only to the object, nor is it a motion merely in the manner of one who persuades, advises, or attracts, or in any way draws inwardly in a moral sense. Rather, it pertains to the power, is received in the power itself, and is a motion in the manner of a cause that truly and properly acts; through it God truly and efficaciously brings it about that the will cooperates and consents.¹¹ To make this conclusion clear, note that, as St Thomas teaches in On Evil, Question 3, Article 3, body, something can be a cause of human acts in two ways. First, “in the manner of one who disposes or persuades inwardly or outwardly, or even in the manner of one who commands, etc.” For the will is moved “from outside, as by an object apprehended: for an apprehended good is said to move the will. In this way one who advises or persuades is said to move it, insofar as he makes something appear good; but an object presented to the will does not move the will by necessity,” since it does not efficaciously make it will. From this the holy Doctor concludes that “no persuasion by necessity,” that is, efficaciously and infallibly, “moves a man to act.” He also infers “that the Devil is not properly the cause of sin, but only in the manner of one who persuades.” Hence one who merely moves another's will toward some act by attracting, inviting, or even inwardly persuading is not the proper cause of the human being's performing that act, but is so only metaphorically. Second, something can be a cause of a human act in the manner of one who perfects it: “A perfecting cause is that by whose action the agent is directly inclined to act,” and the effect follows from it. In this way, St Thomas says that “the perfecting and proper cause of a voluntary act is only that which operates inwardly. But this can be nothing other than the will itself, as a secondary cause, and God, as the First Cause. The reason is that an act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination of the will toward what is willed, just as the natural appetite is nothing other than an inclination of nature toward something. But the inclination of nature comes both from the natural form and from the one who gave the form.” From this he infers that “the movement of the will proceeds directly from the will and from God, who is the cause of the will, who alone operates in the will and can incline the will toward whatever he wills.”

XVII. What we assert in the conclusion, then, is that by the prior motion through which God determines the will to act, he is its cause not merely morally, by attracting, advising, persuading, or in any other way moving it morally from within, but also by perfecting it, or as a truly and properly efficient cause, making the will will this or that particular good. This conclusion, thus explained, is expressly taught by St. Thomas in q. 3, On Evil, art. 3, cited above; he also teaches it in many other places. For in 1 p., q. 106, art. 2, in the body, he says that on the part of the power itself, the will cannot be moved in any way except by God; for the operation of the will is a certain inclination of the will toward what is willed. But only he who bestowed on the creature the power of willing can change this inclination, just as only that agent can change a natural inclination which can give the power that the natural inclination follows. God alone, however, bestows on the creature the power of willing, because God alone is the author of intellectual nature. And in q. 111, art. 2, in the body, he says: The will can be changed in two ways. In one way, from within; and in this way, since the movement of the will is nothing other than the inclination of the will toward the thing willed, only God can change the will, for he gives intellectual nature the power for such an inclination. For just as a natural inclination comes only from God, who gives nature, so a voluntary inclination comes only from God, who causes the will. And in Against the Gentiles III, ch. 88, argument 3, he says: God alone can incline our will toward something—that is, determine or predetermine it. In argument 5 he adds: God alone can move the will as an agent, without violence. To move the will as an agent is truly to bring it about through efficient causality that the will itself moves and acts freely, as is clear from what was established above. For one who moves the will only by attracting, inviting, or persuading does not move it truly through efficient causality and efficaciously on the part of the power, but only on the part of the object and inefficaciously, as St. Thomas teaches in the places cited above. Also, in ch. 89 of the same book, he proves by many arguments against Origen that God causes our willing and accomplishing—not only insofar as he gives us the power of willing, but also because he makes us will this or that. And in q. 22, On Truth, art. 9, in the body, he says: On the part of the will, nothing can change the act of the will except that which works within the will; and this is the will itself and that which is the cause of the will’s being, which according to the faith is God alone. Hence God alone can transfer the inclination of the will, which he gave it, from one thing to another, as he wills. He teaches the same in 2.2, q. 6, art. 1, in the body, and in Quodlibet 1, art. 1.

XVIII. Moreover, the conclusion is proved. If by his actual motion God moved the will only by persuading, attracting, inviting, or in any other way—even by inward moral persuasion—then it would not be proper to God alone to change the created will and move it efficaciously to good acts. For one human being or an angel can move another’s will by persuading, attracting, and inviting; indeed, the devil can in this way premove a person to sin, as St. Thomas shows in q. 3, On Evil, art. 3. If one says that there is a difference because God not only persuades the good on the part of the object, but also truly causes through efficient causality in the intellect pious illuminations or thoughts on the part of the power, and excites the will through indeliberate motions—something one human being or angel cannot directly effect in another’s intellect or will—there is an objection. For St. Thomas says in q. 3, On Evil, art. 4, in the body, that an angel can also invisibly be a cause of a person’s acting. This, he says, takes place by way of persuasion and by way of disposition. It is by way of persuasion when something is presented to the cognitive power as good. This can happen in three ways, since something may be presented to the intellect, to the interior sense, or even to the exterior sense. It may be presented to the intellect because the human intellect can be helped by the angelic intellect to know something by a kind of illumination, as Dionysius says. Although an angel cannot directly cause an act of the will, since an act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination proceeding from within, he can nevertheless impress something on the intellect, whose act consists in receiving from outside; hence it is said that understanding is a kind of undergoing.

Moreover, the same answer is refuted because true efficient causality must be attributed to God as first cause not only with respect to the illumination of the intellect and the excitation of the will through indeliberate acts, but also with respect to the concurrence of that same will in every good free act. Therefore, one must say that by moving the will God truly brings it about through efficient causality that the will acts. But this will be treated more fully in disputations 86 and 91, in the discussion of the efficacious help of grace that works beforehand.

XIX. Fifth conclusion. By an actual efficacious motion, after the manner of a physical cause—that is, truly through efficient causality—God predetermines the human will to good free acts, so that the will, moved by God through this help, freely and infallibly determines itself to produce a second act freely.

To explain this conclusion, note that since it pertains to divine providence to preserve the natures of secondary causes that it moves or predetermines to act, when the secondary causes are natural God predetermines them to act in such a way that he makes them act naturally, that is, by absolute necessity and not freely. But if the secondary causes are free, he predetermines them to act in such a way that he makes them act infallibly, not naturally, that is, by absolute necessity, but freely and contingently in accordance with their own nature. Therefore, when we assert that God, by his efficacious motion, physically predetermines created will so that it freely performs good acts, the word “physically,” as we said above, is not taken to mean the same as “naturally”; rather, it signifies a true and real predetermination, distinguished from that which is merely moral or metaphorical.¹² In this sense the Council of Ephesus, in anathema 3 cited in Disputation 22, no. 2, called the hypostatic union of the two natures, the divine and the human, in the same suppositum of the Word “physical,” that is, true and real, as distinguished from a metaphorical union. In the same way, we assert that God, by his efficacious motion, physically predetermines created will so that the will itself freely and indefectibly determines itself by producing a good act, not by necessity but according to the mode of the will, which consists in an active faculty for either of two alternatives. Free choice always retains this faculty, even when it is actually predetermined and acts, as we said in Disputation 18, no. 23, and as will be clear in Disputations 115 and 116.

XX. The conclusion is proved first by the authority of St Thomas, On Truth, Question 22, Article 8. In that passage, as some authors of the opposing opinion admit, he clearly teaches that God inclines the will to desire something by determining it efficaciously and physically, not only immediately but also through some entity received in the will. They add that, according to St Thomas's mind, God moves all secondary causes and applies them to their operations, so that even when he moves the will, he impresses something on it in the manner of something transient. Once this is posited, in the composite sense the free operation of the will to which God moves it cannot fail to follow. They prove this with many testimonies of St Thomas; those we cited for the preceding conclusions prove it efficaciously.

Second, the argument is proved as follows. Just as it belongs to the essence of free choice to determine itself, so it belongs to its essence to move itself. But created free choice, because it is not simply the first thing to move itself, does not move itself unless it is first moved by God, as St Thomas teaches in many places.¹³ Therefore, likewise, because created free choice is not simply the first free thing or the first thing to determine itself, it determines itself formally through a second act, but is determined prior in the order of nature by God through prior help, by which its operative power is completed in act.

Third, it is proved by St Thomas's reasoning. A determinate operation does not follow from something's being indifferent between either of two alternatives unless it is determined prior in the order of nature by something else that is in act, because there would be no greater reason why one act rather than its opposite should follow.¹⁴ But created will, even when moved by sufficient help, is indifferent between either of two alternatives. Therefore, unless it is determined prior in the order of nature by God, who is pure act, to one particular side, it will produce no determinate act.¹⁵ Therefore efficacious help must be posited that physically predetermines the will to free consent.

XXI. Fourth. As the authors of the opposing opinion frankly admit, physically predetermining help, or physical or quasi-physical predetermination, and efficacious help independently of the cooperation of our free choice signify the same thing. But the help of assisting grace is efficacious independently of the free cooperation of our free choice. Therefore physically predetermining efficacious help of the will must be admitted, so that it may consent. The minor premise will be clear in Disputations 72, 73, and 90, and is proved as follows: the efficacy of a cause does not depend on its effect; rather, the effect depends on the cause's efficacy. But the concurrence and consent of free choice with God, who calls, is an effect of efficacious help, as St Thomas often says.¹⁶ Therefore the efficacy of that same help does not depend on the free cooperation of our choice. Rather, the help of grace has its efficacy as it comes from God and from the absolute decree of his will, which efficaciously wills to convert a man without presupposing middle knowledge of the future cooperation of free choice.

Fifth. As the authors of the contrary opinion admit, by efficacious grace God co-determines, that is, determines free choice at the same instant of time. For God and the will are two causes that concur in consent, but one of them determines the other to concur with it and causes it to cooperate with itself; otherwise they would be joined by chance in producing that effect. Therefore, either the human will by its concurrence determines the divine will to concur with it through the aid of grace in good free acts, or, conversely, the divine will by its efficacious grace determines the human will to consent and causes it to concur with itself. But it cannot be said that the human will by its consent determines the divine will and the aid of assisting grace to concur with it in good free acts. Otherwise this causal statement would be true: “Because the created will acts, God cooperates”; whereas this one would be false: “Because God acts, man cooperates.” Yet that cannot be said, as will become clear in dispute 99. Therefore, it must be said that by his efficacious motion God physically predetermines the created will to concur with him in particular good acts.

Sixth. By his efficacious motion God applies the created will so that it freely consents, in the way an artisan applies a tool to make an artifact, as was shown in conclusion 2. Therefore, he physically predetermines it to that same consent. For this application cannot exist or be understood without physical predetermination. Hence the authors who oppose this physical predetermination consequently say that God does not apply the created will to acting by a prior motion.

This is confirmed by all the arguments with which in dispute 18 we showed that God’s general concurrence is an immediate influx into secondary causes, by which they are moved and applied to their operations according to their proper nature. For since this prior motion and application are efficacious and cause secondary causes to act, they cannot exist without a predetermination inhering in those same causes.

XXII. Seventh. Between a power constituted in first act by an active virtue permanently inhering in it, or by a superadded habit, and the actual operation of that same free power, there is a certain prior motion by which the will itself is perfected in its active virtue. But this motion physically predetermines the will to act freely and infallibly. Therefore, it must be said that by this same motion God physically predetermines the will to act. The major premise was proved by us above in disputes 18 and 19, no. 10. The minor is clear: since that prior motion is transient and concurrent with the act toward which it moves the will, it is impossible for it to be posited in the will while the will does not perform the act toward which God efficaciously moves that same will.

Eighth. By an efficacious motion, excluding middle knowledge, God infallibly effects that the created will performs a particular act. Therefore, by the same aid he physically predetermines it to act. The inference is clear: if the infallibility of a future free act does not rest upon middle knowledge, it must necessarily be founded upon a physically predetermining aid, as the authors of the contrary opinion frankly admit. The antecedent is proved as follows. As we showed at length in dispute 7, the middle knowledge that some posit in God before the actual decree of the divine will determining the created will’s hypothetically future consent does not in fact exist even in God. Therefore, the infallibility of future consent cannot be founded upon this middle knowledge. It must therefore be founded upon God’s actual, physically predetermining aid.

XXIII. Ninth. By his eternal and absolute decree, by which he efficaciously willed that the created will produce such an act, God by extrinsic predetermination predetermines that same will to produce it freely, as was shown in the preceding dispute. But from God’s extrinsic physical predetermination, by an evident inference, follows an intrinsic physical predetermination inhering in the created will, by which God in time effects that the will freely and infallibly performs the act predetermined by God, as the authors of the contrary opinion admit; this too we noted in dispute 21, no. 14. Therefore, the conclusion follows.

Tenth. This same point can be proved by all the arguments with which in dispute 91 we shall show specifically that God by the efficacious aid of grace that works beforehand physically predetermines the created will, so that through its second act it freely determines itself.

Sixth conclusion. These two things are mutually incompatible: that such a predetermining aid is in free choice and that free choice does not perform the act toward which it is moved, although it can always refrain from performing that same act if it wishes. The first part of this conclusion is proved by the clearest testimonies of St. Prosper and St. Thomas, cited in dispute 18, no. 23, which must be cited again in dispute 115, no. 4, and dispute 122, no. 19.

It is proved further. Otherwise God’s absolute will would be inefficacious and would be hindered by the human will, so that what the omnipotent God willed to happen through that divine will would not happen. But this is repugnant to those words of Scripture: All things whatsoever the Lord willed, he did in heaven and on earth.¹⁷ St. Augustine shows this in the Enchiridion to Laurence, chs. 95 and 96, and in On Correction and Grace, ch. 14.

Moreover, the conclusion is proved by another notable testimony of St. Augustine, who expressly teaches our conclusion in On Correction and Grace, ch. 12. Speaking there of efficacious grace, he says: Therefore the weakness of the human will was helped, so that it might be acted upon by divine grace without turning aside and without separation; and thus, although weak, it might not fail or be broken by any adversity. Therefore, according to St. Augustine, these two things are incompatible: that God move free choice to consent by efficacious help and that free choice nevertheless dissent. Otherwise it would not be acted upon by efficacious grace without turning aside and without separation.

XXIV. The second part of the conclusion is found in the Council of Trent, Session 6, on Justification, canon 4: If anyone says that the free choice of a human being, moved and aroused by God, contributes nothing by assenting to God who arouses and calls it, so that it may dispose and prepare itself to obtain the grace of justification, and that it cannot dissent if it wishes, let him be anathema. Behold, the Council plainly defines that free choice, moved by efficacious grace, consents in such a way that it can always dissent if it wishes. St. Prosper and St. Thomas teach the same in the places cited in disputation 18, no. 23.

Moreover, this is proved by an argument drawn from that same Council of Trent. However much the will is moved by efficacious help to consent to God who arouses and calls it, it truly consents freely, not only by a priority of nature but also in the very instant of time in which it elicits its consent, as will be made clear in the disputations cited below. Therefore, in the same instant in which it consents, it can truly dissent if it wishes¹⁸. The inference is proved: as will be shown in disputations 115 and 116, the capacity for opposites belongs to the nature of a free power. Therefore, it is impossible for the will to consent freely without at the same time retaining the true capacity by which it can dissent if it wishes. We will touch in part on the sense in which free choice, while it consents, can dissent if it wishes—whether it can do so in the composite sense or only in the divided sense, and how this composite or divided sense is to be understood—in disputations 25 and 32. The same matter will be treated expressly in disputations 93 and 94.

XXV. To the first argument I answer by denying the antecedent. For in disputation 18, no. 3, we already showed that even natural secondary causes need God’s predetermining motion in order to act actually, because of their essential subordination and dependence in acting on the influx of the first and most universal cause, and for the other reasons adduced there.

To the confirmation I answer that, for the general reason, the will needs God’s predetermining motion in order to act, just as natural causes do; and it needs it also for a special reason, namely, because the will in itself is indifferent to opposites. Consequently, in order to produce one determinate act, it must be predetermined by God, who is pure act.¹⁹ The argument against this special reason is easily answered: as was shown in the preceding disputation, no. 35 and following, and will be explained further in disputations 115 and 116, the will’s indifference with respect to prior help is passive indifference, as the argument proves. But with respect to the free act it produces after being predetermined by such a prior motion, the will’s indifference is active and free.²⁰ Hence it does not follow that the determination produced by the will—namely, the free act—proceeds from a will not predetermined by God through a motion prior to the operation of that same will, nor that the will itself is not free with respect to the very faculty of acting or with respect to its exercise.

XXVI. To the second argument I answer that, as was said in disputation 18, God’s general concurrence is an immediate influx into the cause. Hence, from the fact that a power which is master of its act can by its intrinsic power, together with the general concurrence of the first cause, determine itself to its act, it follows that it needs the predetermination of the first cause. With respect to this, the case of the human will and the divine will is not the same. For God has absolute and first dominion over his act; therefore, he has no other cause prior to his determination, but the divine will itself first freely determines itself to an object to which it has a non-necessary relation.²¹ But as will become clear in disputation 117, because the created will does not have, simply speaking, first and absolute dominion over its act, it is not the first thing that determines itself. Hence it has another cause prior to its determination, namely, God. This is the solution of St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 19. art. 3. ad 5. When it is argued that the created will is in itself virtually in act, I answer that although it is in first act with respect to an operation proportionate to it, it is not wholly in complete first act. Hence, in order to pass into second act, it must be completed and predetermined by efficacious help, for the reasons we assigned in disputation 18.

XXVII. To the confirmation, we reply that although these two things are not incompatible—that the will is indifferent in itself and is determined by a second act—these two things do involve a manifest incompatibility: that the will is indifferent in itself and a contingent cause, yet is simply the first thing to determine itself through a second act. For a cause that first determines itself cannot, in itself, be contingent and indifferent in first act with an indifference that includes potentiality on the part of the power itself, as was shown in the preceding disputation, no. 36, and is gathered from St Thomas in 1. p. q. 19. art. 3., ad 5.

To the third argument, we reply that if we are speaking of the determination of the will in second act, the will's being determined is nothing other than its willing.²² This determination cannot be anything prior to the very act of willing, nor can it be produced by an external agent without the free influx of the will itself. If, however, the discussion concerns the determination of the will in the ultimate completion of first act, that by which the will is determined to act is something really distinct from the operation of the will itself, as was shown in Disputation 19. To the objection we reply that that by which the will is predetermined is formally neither a second act nor simply a first act, but a certain middle term, namely, the ultimate completion of first act, as was said above from St Thomas. To the objection from Aristotle, we reply first that although he did not teach this middle term between first act and second act, he did not deny it; an argument from the silence of an authority is ineffective.²³ Second, we reply that Aristotle clearly taught that completion of first act when he taught that secondary causes need the prior motion of the most universal cause, so that all the effects of those causes may be reduced to it as the simply First Agent, as is clear from his words cited and explained by us in Disputation 18.

XXVIII. To the confirmation, we reply that the supernatural habit by which the will is made capable of producing supernatural operations is subject to the will's use, like other habits, because it does not predetermine the will to act with respect to the exercise of the act. But supernatural efficacious help, by which the will, perfected by a supernatural habit, is moved and applied to consent, is not subject to the use of that same will as a habit is; rather, the will is subject to God as he moves it in this way.²⁴ For by that motion God subjects the human will to himself and brings it about that created will contributes its free influx, as will be clear in Disputations 86 and 87. Hence by the same motion he predetermines the will to will.

To the fourth argument, we reply that the determination of the will by which it is formally determined in second act must be free and voluntary, since it is nothing other than the free operation itself as it proceeds from the will. But the determination of the will in the ultimate completion of first act is not formally free with respect to created will, because it is not produced by that will as efficient cause but by God alone; nor does it necessarily presuppose another free act of that same will. Rather, it is free only causally, insofar as it brings it about that the will, moved by God, freely and infallibly determines itself.²⁵ It can also be called free on the part of the term toward which it is ultimately ordered, namely, because it predetermines that same will to produce a free act and because the will can reject God's motion if it wishes. As to the objection that, after receiving efficacious motion, the will necessarily proceeds to act, so that it cannot fail to act, we reply that, simply speaking, the will does not proceed to act necessarily but freely, even after receiving the motion; and, absolutely speaking, it can fail to act throughout the entire time it has that motion, as will be clear in Disputations 115 and 116. In fact, however, it will act infallibly: for predetermining motion does not take away from the will its proximate power for the opposite act, but only brings it about that a human being freely and infallibly determines himself to one particular act, as was explained in Disputation 18, no. 23.

XXIX. To the fifth argument, the antecedent is denied. Its proof has already been answered expressly in Disputation 18, no. 20, and Disputation 23, nos. 32, 33, and 34, where an altogether similar argument was presented and resolved. The substance of the solution is that efficacious help is not necessary for a man to be able to act absolutely and simply, but is required only for him actually to act. Hence, from the fact that a man does not receive such help, it does not follow that he cannot act, but only that he will not act; nor does it follow that the man is not free, but only that he is not simply the first free cause. The example given of a hand moved by the will is not to the point: for the hand is moved by the will toward a free act in such a way that it does not move itself through an active free principle intrinsic to it. Created will, however, is moved and predetermined by God through a prior motion toward a free act in such a way that, in the same instant of time, it freely moves itself through an active principle intrinsic to it.²⁶ For, as was said from St Augustine, people are acted upon so that they may act, not so that they themselves do nothing.

XXX. To the sixth argument, we answer that, as was said,²⁷ when the efficacious aid predetermining the will to perform such an act is present, the capacity to perform the opposite if it wishes remains simultaneously in that same will. This alone is defined by the Council of Trent, as will become clear below. The opposite act, however, which is opposed to the act toward which the will is predetermined, does not coexist with that efficacious aid; nor do the cited Councils speak in the composite sense, but absolutely and in the divided sense, as will become clear in disputes 92 and 94, where we shall set out the true understanding of the composite and divided senses.

To the confirmation, we deny the antecedent. In answer to its proof, we say that we do not assert that when this motion is in a person, the will cannot dissent from it, as Luther and Calvin impiously asserted. We say only that it will never dissent, because through this motion God powerfully and gently effects that, although the will can then dissent, it nevertheless does not dissent, but freely consents to God who calls and stirs it. The Council of Trent defines that even when efficacious motion is in a person, he can dissent from it, speaking absolutely and in the divided sense; it does not, however, define that he can dissent from it in the composite sense, as will become clear in disputes 93 and 94. What the heretics of our time, who deny freedom of choice, have erred in has already been explained in dispute 3, no. 7 and following, and dispute 22, nos. 30 and 31; it will be treated more fully in dispute 97, no. 11, and dispute 98, no. 10.

To the seventh argument, we answer that a similar argument was raised against St. Augustine by the Pelagians, as is clear from Augustine himself in book 2 Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, ch. 5, and book 4 Against Julian, ch. 8, where he refutes it. The Semi-Pelagians, overcome by the same argument, denied grace that works beforehand, as St. Hilary reports in his letter to St. Augustine right at the beginning, as do St. Augustine in On Correction and Grace, chs. 3 and 4. To the argument, then, we deny the antecedent. In answer to its proof, we answer that efficacious aid is not a necessary principle for a person to be able to act or do something, but for him actually to act, as was said above. Therefore, since through sufficient aid, which is bestowed or offered to all, a person can truly act, when God imposes a command on a person to perform some virtuous act, he does not command him to do anything impossible.

XXXI. Second, we answer that although a sinner who does not fulfill the divine commands does not have the efficacious aid necessary for him actually to act, he can nevertheless, speaking absolutely, have it, and it is through his own fault that he does not have it.²⁸ This possibility is founded upon the mercy of God, who wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth,²⁹ who calls and draws all to the good, and upon the condition of the state of wayfarers, in which free choice is flexible toward good and evil. St. Thomas expressly teaches this in Summa theologiae III, q. 8, art. 3, ad 1, where he says: Those who are unbelievers, although they are not actually of the Church, are nevertheless potentially of the Church; this potentiality is founded on two things: first and principally, on the power of Christ, which is sufficient for the salvation of the whole human race; secondarily, on freedom of choice. Hence this inference is invalid: “For a person actually to act, efficacious aid is necessary; but Peter does not have efficacious aid; therefore he cannot act.” It follows only: “Therefore, he does not actually act.” The point is clear from natural forms: it does not follow that “For Peter to be white, he must have whiteness; but Peter does not have whiteness; therefore, he cannot be white.” For the antecedent is true and the consequent false; what follows is only: “Therefore, Peter is not white.”

XXXII. To the eighth argument, we deny the antecedent, in accordance with what was said in answer to the preceding argument and in dispute 18, no. 20, and dispute 22, no. 34, where the same argument was proposed and answered. For we have said repeatedly, and say now, that this aid is truly sufficient with respect to some effect, beyond which no other principle bestowing the ability to act is required. Nevertheless, it is consistent with this that there be some principle truly sufficient to give a person the ability to act if he wishes, while another actual aid is nevertheless necessary to reduce that power to second act; Ferrariensis explains this very well in Summa contra gentiles III, ch. 155. An example is the visual power, which is sufficient for seeing in the order of first act, because in this genus no other power is required by which a person has a habitual capacity to see. Nevertheless, for this power to be reduced to act, light, the application of the object, and a motion of the power are necessary in addition to it. Therefore, since the motion by which God predetermines through efficient causality free choice to perform such a particular good act is not necessary in order for a person to be able to perform that act if he wishes, but only in order that he actually perform and will it, it follows that a person retains true sufficient aid by which he can truly act piously if he wishes, even if he does not receive within himself the efficacious aid by which God predetermines through efficient causality him to will. In answer to the example brought forward of a person who has four votes, and so on, we say that for a person to be eligible as prelate it is enough that he have no impediment and that the electors be able to elect him; but for him actually to be elected in the case posited, it is necessary that in fact the majority of electors cast votes in his favor. Hence that example proves nothing against our opinion. On the solution of this argument, see Cajetan, Summa theologiae I–II, q. 109, art. 10.

XXXIII. To the ninth argument I answer that by this same argument the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians attacked the necessity of the grace Augustine preached, claiming that it drove people to a kind of despair and did away with the need for admonitions.³⁰ Prosper answers this in On the Calling of All Nations II, ch. 36. We observe that the same argument could be turned against the authors of the opposing opinion. For, as they themselves admit, grace or congruous motion—that is, grace given by God in those circumstances in which he foresees that a person will cooperate—is necessary for that person actually to be converted and cooperate. Since such congruous motion is not in a person’s power but only in God’s, who by his mere will confers it on whom and when he wills, it follows that exhortations and admonitions are useless and deceptive with respect to those to whom God has decided, by his own will, not to confer the aforesaid congruous grace. And if the argument proved anything, it would also conclude that divine predestination is not necessary for human salvation, because it is not within a person’s power to be predestined or not predestined by God, since by his mere will God predestines one person and not another. I therefore answer the argument by denying the antecedent. To its proof I say that the reason sacred Scripture does not exhort everyone to prophesy, raise the dead to life, or heal incurable diseases is not the one touched on in the argument, namely, that it is not in human power and choice to have or obtain the gifts by which such things can be done. The true reason is that doing these things belongs to graces freely given, which are bestowed in the first instance for the benefit of others and not for one’s own benefit,³¹ as St. Thomas teaches expressly in 1.2, q. 111, art. 1. Hence the Apostle says: There are varieties of graces, but the same Spirit; and there are varieties of ministries, but the same Lord; and there are varieties of workings, but the same God, who works all things in all. To each is given a manifestation of the Spirit for the benefit³²—that is, of others—: to one, through the Spirit, is given a word of wisdom; to another, a word of knowledge according to the same Spirit; to another, faith in the same Spirit; to another, gifts of healing in one Spirit; to another, the working of miracles; to another, prophecy; to another, the discernment of spirits; to another, various kinds of tongues; to another, the interpretation of tongues. All these things are worked by one and the same Spirit, distributing them individually as he wills. A little later he asks: Are all apostles? Are all prophets? Are all teachers? Do all work miracles? Do all have gifts of healing? Do all speak in tongues? Do all interpret? Since, then, a grace freely given is not appropriate to everyone, sacred Scripture does not exhort everyone to perform acts of that kind, but only some. But turning away from evil and doing good pertain to each person’s own benefit; therefore sacred Scripture exhorts all to works of virtue. For although there are some acts of virtue that a human being cannot perform by natural powers alone, no act can be identified that he cannot perform at least with the help of grace. That help, indeed, is mercifully given to whomever it is divinely given; to those to whom it is not given, it is not given as punishment for a preceding sin, at least original sin, as St. Thomas teaches from St. Augustine, On Correction and Grace, chs. 6 and 5, in 2.2, q. 2, art. 5, ad 1.

XXXIV. To the tenth argument I answer that even for the act of sin, insofar as it is an act, God’s prior motion is required, predetermining the created will to that same act insofar as it is an act. For although that action is otherwise intrinsically evil insofar as it proceeds from a deficient will, yet insofar as it is a being and an action it is good, and consequently proceeds from the first good as from the first efficient cause, as will become clear in the following disputation.