De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Whether God certainly knows future contingents on account of their real presence in eternity before they come to be, and whether this existence contributes anything to the certainty and infallibility of divine knowledge.

I. The negative position is defended by all those Doctors who deny that future contingents exist in eternity in their own real being before they are produced in their proper measure; we cited their passages in the preceding disputation. But many modern theologians in particular now defend this opinion, and they advance all the arguments by which in the preceding disputation we tried to prove that future contingents, before they are produced in their proper measure, exist in eternity only in objective being, and not according to their own real existence.

Moreover, an argument is made. There is truly and formally in God certain and infallible foreknowledge¹ of future things, as is clear from Wisdom 19: For you knew their future; and Romans 8: Those whom he foreknew, he also predestined; and ch. 11: God has not rejected his people, whom he foreknew; and in 1 Peter 1 and Acts 2 foreknowledge is attributed to God. St. Augustine asserts this too, City of God 5, chs. 8 and 9, as does the Master of the Sentences in Sentences I, dists. 36 and 38, who teach that not only knowledge but also foreknowledge is in God. But, formally speaking, foreknowledge signifies certain knowledge of things before they actually exist. Therefore the foreknowledge God has of future contingents is certain and infallible before they are understood to exist, even in eternity. Consequently, such existence contributes nothing to the certainty of divine knowledge as regards future contingents.

This is confirmed. Formally speaking, God infallibly knows future contingents. Therefore he knows them as infallibly future. Therefore the reason why he knows them infallibly is not their existence in eternity; otherwise that knowledge would not formally concern future things, but present things. Therefore such existence is irrelevant to the certainty of foreknowledge of future things.

A second argument is made. The free knowledge of God is the cause of things, or of their existence, as will become clear below:² therefore such certain and infallible knowledge is understood by a priority of reason before contingent things are understood to exist actually, even in eternity. Therefore the infallibility of divine knowledge is not founded on, nor derived from, the existence that contingent things have in eternity from eternity; for what is prior does not depend on what is posterior, nor is it founded on it.

A third argument is made. God in no way receives his perfection from created things. But the certainty and infallibility of divine foreknowledge, by which he knows future contingents, is a great perfection of that knowledge. Therefore he does not receive it from the existence they have in eternity, nor does he presuppose that existence. Therefore God’s knowledge of future contingents is not certain because they actually exist in eternity. Therefore such existence contributes nothing to the certainty of divine knowledge.

A fourth argument is made. God infallibly knows conditional futures that really would be future if this or that condition were posited as obtaining, as is clear from what was said in disputation 7. But such futures have no existence in eternity, because they will never be posited as obtaining in their proper measure. Therefore actual existence in eternity is irrelevant to infallible knowledge of conditional futures. Therefore it will likewise be irrelevant to infallible knowledge of future contingents that are absolutely future.

A fifth argument is made. God can certainly and infallibly know future contingents to be future without their existing in eternity. Therefore such existence will at least not be necessary for the certainty of divine foreknowledge of future contingents. The antecedent is proved: even if we exclude this existence, once an efficacious decree is posited in God by which he absolutely wills a future contingent to occur at a certain time, it is infallibly future. For, as St. Thomas teaches, 1 p., q. 19, art. 8,³ this conditional is necessary: “If God wills something to happen, it will happen.” For God has done whatever he willed in heaven and on earth,⁴ as the Psalmist sings. Therefore, through the efficacy of his divine decree, God infallibly knows that what he decreed to do or permit will happen at a certain time. Therefore the actual existence of future things in eternity is not necessary for the certainty of divine foreknowledge.

This is confirmed. For God to infallibly know future contingents, the truth itself of the future object is sufficient, since God infallibly knows every truth. Therefore the actual existence of future contingents in eternity is posited superfluously for God to know them certainly before they come to be.

II. St. Thomas holds the opposing opinion, 1.p. q.14.ar.13., q. 86, art. 4, in the body; Against the Gentiles I, ch. 67; q. 2, On Truth, art. 10; and Quodlibet 12, q. 3; and wherever he speaks about the certainty of divine knowledge. For he always appeals to the actual existence that future contingents have in eternity in order to show that God knows them most certainly before they come to be. The Thomists commonly follow this opinion, but some points must be presupposed for its explanation.

Note first that the presence of things in eternity⁵ can be considered in two ways: first, on the part of eternity itself; second, on the part of the contingent things that exist in eternity.⁶ For since presence implies a certain relation, things are said to be present to eternity, and eternity is present to all things and has them coexisting and present to itself. For since it is an infinite and indivisible measure, it encompasses all time and every other, lower measure at once, and actually contains all things that will have being in that measure, as was said above.

Note secondly that we can show the certainty of God’s knowledge of future contingents in two ways. First, a priori, or quasi a priori, through the proper cause or ground of that certainty. Second, a posteriori through an effect, from which, by an evident inference, it is concluded that God’s knowledge of future contingents is infallible.

Note finally that the present question may concern the infallibility of divine knowledge insofar as it is infallible knowledge, or the knowledge itself insofar as it is formally called knowledge of vision.

Our first conclusion, then, is this: the actual presence of things in eternity, considered on the part of the divine eternity, is the proper ground on account of which God certainly knows all future things.⁷ This is St. Thomas’s conclusion in the cited places, where he proves that God’s knowledge of future contingents is infallible from the fact that God’s intuition from eternity is directed to all things according as they are in their presence. For eternity, by which divine knowledge is measured, has all future things present to itself because of its eminence and infinite perfection. Therefore the proper ground for the certainty of divine knowledge with respect to future contingents must be assigned on the part of eternity’s own perfection. Nor can St. Thomas be explained as speaking only of objective presence; otherwise he would be proving the same thing by the same thing.

Moreover, the conclusion is proved by the authority of Ecclesiasticus, chapter 39, where it is said: The works of all flesh are before him; he looks upon them from age to age, and nothing is new in his eyes. The reason why God sees all contingent things and certainly knows them all from eternity, so that nothing is new or future with respect to him, is assigned on the part of eternity by which divine knowledge is measured: namely, because eternity has present in itself all things that are future in their proper measure.

The conclusion is also proved by reason. For, as St. Thomas teaches, eternity encompasses all time;⁸ therefore it actually contains all future things in time as present to itself. Therefore, from the perfection of eternity itself, a proper and sufficient ground is assigned on account of which God’s eternal knowledge of future contingents is infallible, although future things in themselves are contingent. The consequence is clear: things that are present to a knower, although contingent in themselves, are already considered as determined and determinately true in relation to the measure in which they are present and to the knowledge by which they are known as present to that knower.

III. Second conclusion. If the presence of future contingents in eternity is considered on the part of the contingent things themselves, it is not a ground why God certainly knows future things; nevertheless, their existence in this way shows a posteriori the infallible certainty of divine knowledge.⁹ The first part of this conclusion is effectively proved by the second and third arguments given at the beginning. It is also proved as follows. The essential perfection of divine knowledge must not be derived from its secondary object, but from its primary object. For the being of knowledge itself is derived from its primary object, and consequently every essential perfection must be derived from that same primary object. But certainty and infallibility are essential perfections of knowledge, for cognition that is not certain is not scientific. Therefore the certainty of divine knowledge must not be derived from creatures themselves existing in eternity, since creatures pertain to the secondary object of divine knowledge. The second part of the conclusion is the express opinion of St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 14. art. 8. ad 1. It is proved as follows: a cause can be demonstrated a posteriori through its proper effect, just as we demonstrate a posteriori through creatures that God exists and is omnipotent. But the existence that things have, whether in time or in eternity, is the proper effect of God’s infallible knowledge, as will be clear in disputations 16 and 17. Therefore. Moreover, the certainty of knowledge, especially divine knowledge, is best inferred from the certainty and determination of the object and its truth. But future contingents, insofar as they are present in eternity, are already considered as determined to one outcome, as St. Thomas teaches, 1. par. quaest. 14. art. 13.. Therefore, from the determination of the truth they have in eternity, it can be inferred a posteriori by an evident inference that God knows them infallibly, since it is evident that no truth escapes God himself.

But an argument difficult to answer is made against the first part of the conclusion. The presence of things in eternity on the part of the things that exist is the reason, or condition, on account of which God’s knowledge is intuitive with respect to contingent future things. Therefore it is the reason for the certainty of intuitive cognition and, consequently, by that existence the certainty of God’s intuitive knowledge can be demonstrated a priori. The antecedent is proved as follows: God’s knowledge with respect to contingent future things is intuitive because it terminates in the actual existence of those same things, which they have in eternity, and this distinguishes it from knowledge of simple understanding, which terminates in possible things. Therefore, from the very existence of things it is demonstrated a priori that God’s knowledge of those same things is intuitive.

The same antecedent is confirmed. For a proof through the proper reason of the thing demonstrated is a priori, and likewise a proof through a necessary condition is reduced to an a priori argument, just as the condition of a cause is reduced to the cause. But the actual presence that things have in eternity is the reason, or condition, why God’s knowledge is intuitive of creatures. Therefore a proof drawn from the existence of things in eternity, in order to conclude that God’s knowledge is intuitive, will be an a priori proof.

We answer by conceding that through the existence of things in eternity it can be shown a priori that God’s knowledge of contingent future things is intuitive. It does not follow from this, however, that the certainty possessed by that intuitive knowledge is proved a priori through the existence of things in eternity on the part of the things themselves. For this is the difference between our vision, or intuitive knowledge, and God’s intuitive knowledge: in addition to the common character of cognition and to abstractive knowledge, our intuitive knowledge adds some real perfection on the side of cognition, namely, greater certainty and greater clarity of the object known.¹⁰ It also adds a real relation of the cognition itself to the known object, for created intuitive cognition depends on the object seen and is measured by it. Hence, in created intuitive cognition, the present object—which is the cause or reason why the cognition is intuitive—is also the reason and condition why that cognition is more certain and clearer. In God, by contrast, the knowledge of vision is neither more certain nor clearer than his abstractive knowledge. Nor does this knowledge of vision imply a real relation to the present or seen object, nor does it depend on that object or take its measure from it. Rather, since this cognition of creatures in God is practical, it causes the very things that exist, as will be made clear in Disputations 16 and 17. The relation of reason to existing creatures that God’s intuitive knowledge adds beyond knowledge of simple understanding depends on the actual existence of those same things as its term; this dependence is reduced to the genus of formal cause. Therefore, although it can be proved a priori through the existence of things that God’s knowledge is intuitive, it cannot be proved a priori through that same existence that God’s intuitive knowledge is certain and infallible.

IIII. Third conclusion. The knowledge God has of contingent future things was intuitive in him from eternity.¹¹ This conclusion is contrary to certain modern authors who assert that knowledge of contingent future things is not intuitive in God before things exist in their proper measure, judging that when they do not exist in their proper measure it is merely abstractive. Their chief reason is this: intuitive knowledge necessarily requires that it terminate in the actual existence of a thing; but created or to-be-created things have no actual existence, even in eternity, before they exist in their proper measure. Therefore God’s knowledge of creatures begins to be intuitive only when things begin to exist in their proper measure. But our conclusion is gathered from Saint Thomas in the passages cited above.

It is proved as follows. For knowledge to be simply intuitive, it is sufficient that it terminate in an object actually existing and insofar as it exists in the measure by which the cognition itself is measured. But all contingent future things exist from eternity in the measure of eternity, as was shown in the preceding disputation. Therefore.

It is proved further. It is incompatible with the perfection of divine knowledge that it begin to be intuitive in time, when a contingent future thing begins to exist. For divine knowledge would change from abstractive to intuitive, and when afterward the object ceased to exist in its proper measure, God’s knowledge would change from intuitive to abstractive. This is shown as follows: although this difference arises from the mutability of the object, it nevertheless passes over into a different mode of God’s cognition itself and of the actual representation that the divine Essence has, as an intelligible species, with respect to contingent future things. Yet that would redound to its imperfection.

V. To the first argument we answer that God has foreknowledge with respect to future things if they are considered according to the being they have in their proper measure.¹² But if they are considered according to the being they have in eternity, God’s cognition of them is not properly called foreknowledge, but knowledge of things present, as Augustine says, quaest. 2. ad Simplicium, and S. Anselm. de casu diab. cap. 21. The reason is that, in relation to eternity, by which God’s cognition is measured, nothing is future; rather, all future things are present, as was said above.

To the confirmation we answer in the same way: God knows contingent future things as future in their proper measure, if the word “as” imports a condition on the side of the object known;¹³ for the object actually known by God is future in its proper measure. Yet he does not know them as future in eternity, but as present according to their actual existence.

We answer that the second and third arguments prove only the second conclusion.

To the fourth we answer that although conditional future things which God knows by free knowledge do not have being of existence in eternity, nevertheless from eternity an actual decree preceded in God to produce them on the hypothesis that the condition had been fulfilled, as was shown in Disputation 7. Hence, by virtue of that decree, they would exist in eternity if the condition were to be fulfilled.

The fifth will be treated fully in the following disputation. For now, we say that, by that very fact that God determines by an absolute and efficacious will to produce something in time, it is actually present to him in the measure of eternity according to its proper existence. Hence such presence is not separable from the aforesaid decree. A second answer is that, although knowledge of future things may be infallible on another ground, God’s knowledge of contingent future things is certain and infallible by the actual presence itself of things in eternity, on the side of eternity itself. And, as we said above, such presence is at least necessary for God’s knowledge of future things to be intuitive from eternity, because it belongs to the nature of intuitive cognition that it terminate in an object present to the knower as present.

To the confirmation we answer that, if we abstract from the divine decree and the actual existence that contingent future things have in eternity by virtue of that decree, no simple proposition about a contingent future thing has, in itself, determinate truth, as will be made clear in Disputation 13. Hence, once the aforesaid decree and existence in eternity are set aside, it is not knowable even by God; nor is the object of that proposition knowable as determinate future, but only as possible.