De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Whether all future things are actually present in eternity according to the proper existences they will have in their own measure.

I. This is the chief difficulty among those that help clarify the certainty of divine foreknowledge in relation to contingent future things. For if it is once established that all contingent future things exist actually from eternity in the measure of eternity—not merely in known and objective being, but also according to their proper and actual existences—a simple path is opened for explaining the infallibility of that same divine knowledge. There are, then, two opposing opinions on this point. The first is that of many theologians who assert that things are not present to God in eternity in real being and according to their proper existences except when they actually possess them in their own immediate measure. Scotus followed this opinion in Book I, distinction 39, as did his disciples. Aureolus holds the same, as cited by Capreolus; Durandus in the same book, distinction 38, question 3; Gabriel, Ockham, and Palatius there as well. Many more recent theologians defend the same opinion, contending that Saint Thomas also held it. The arguments that convince them are as follows.

First, they argue from passages of Scripture in which it is said that God alone is from eternity, whereas all other things were produced by him in time, as is clear from Genesis 1: In the beginning God created heaven and earth, and Psalm 89: Before the mountains were made, and the earth and the world were formed, from age to age you are God. These passages and similar ones must be understood in their proper sense. Therefore, properly speaking, no created thing has from eternity, in eternity itself, its own actual existence; rather, from eternity it is present to God only in known being, or objective being.

Second, they argue from the authorities of Saint Thomas, in which he grants only a real presence in eternity from eternity according to objective being. For in Summa theologiae I, q. 14, a. 13, he says that future things in time are present to God from eternity, because his gaze is directed from eternity over all things insofar as they are in their presentness. In I–II, q. 91, a. 1, ad 1, he says that things which do not exist in themselves exist with God insofar as they are known and preordained by him. He teaches the same in Summa contra Gentiles I, ch. 66, argument 6. Again, in Summa theologiae I, q. 8, a. 3, he says that God is present to all things and all things are present before his sight because he beholds all things. There Saint Thomas posits no other presence of things in relation to God before they exist than objective presence alone.

Third, future things do not exist in eternity from eternity; therefore, they do not coexist with God in eternity. The consequence is clear, since to coexist with something is to exist at the same time as it. The antecedent is proved as follows. All created things begin to exist in eternity: for they begin to exist in themselves according to their proper measure and, consequently, begin to exist in any higher measure as well. Therefore they do not exist in eternity from eternity.

First confirmation. If things existed in eternity from eternity, it would follow that they were not created by God. This is proved as follows: since creation is the production of the whole of being from nothing, true creation requires that a thing have being after nonbeing. But what exists in eternity from eternity does not have being after nonbeing. Therefore.

Second confirmation. For in the Nicene Council, in the Creed, that impious statement of Arius is condemned: concerning the Son of God, he asserted that “there was when he was not” and that he had a beginning like creatures. But if the opinion asserting that all created things existed in eternity from eternity were true, there would be no difference, as regards eternity itself, between the generation of the Word and the production of creatures according to their proper existences. Therefore.

Fourth, it would follow from the opposing opinion that two contradictories were true in eternity. The proof is manifest. “Peter is white” and “Peter is not white” are contradictories. But these would both be true if future things existed in eternity from eternity. The minor premise is proved as follows. Suppose Peter is white today and black tomorrow. The affirmative is true, since it is now verified in our time that Peter is white; he is therefore also white in the measure of eternity. The negative, however, is proved thus: tomorrow Peter will truly not be white. But according to the opposing opinion, future things exist in eternity according to their proper existences; therefore the statement “Peter is not white” will also be true from eternity in eternity. Thus he will at once be white and not white in eternity.

Fifth, it is impossible for the same thing to be produced twice. But if things existed in eternity before existing in their proper measure, the same thing would be produced twice in reality. Therefore. The minor premise is proved as follows: if Antichrist coexists with God from eternity in eternity itself, then he has already been produced in eternity; for otherwise he could not exist, since he does not have being from himself but from another. Yet Antichrist truly is future; therefore he will have to be produced again, and so the same thing would be produced twice.

Sixth, creatures that are future in our time do not coexist with an angel in the measure of the aevum; therefore neither do they coexist with God in the measure of eternity. The antecedent is proved as follows: otherwise an angel would naturally know all contingent future things before they were produced, because they would be present to it and would coexist with it in the measure of the aevum, by which the angel is measured. The consequence is proved as follows: the aevum is a measure higher than our time, just as eternity is. Therefore, if contingent future things exist in eternity because it is a higher measure, they also exist in the measure of the aevum before they are produced in time.

This is confirmed: God has certain knowledge of future contingents because they coexist with him in the measure of eternity according to that real being which they will have in time. But future contingents also coexist with an angel in the measure of aevity, since that measure is above our time and is unchangeable and wholly simultaneous. Therefore an angel too will have certain knowledge of future contingents.

A seventh argument is made. It is impossible for something to exist in a higher measure according to its real being unless it first exists in a lower measure according to that same real being. Therefore it is contradictory that something have its own existence in eternity unless it has it in its own measure. But future things do not exist in their own measure; therefore neither do they exist in the measure of eternity. The antecedent is proved as follows: things are related to a higher measure only through an intermediate lower measure. Therefore, just as it is contradictory that something be under the heavens as under an inadequate and higher measure unless it exists in some lower place proper and adequate to it, so too it is contradictory that something exist really in eternity before it has being in its own measure.

An eighth argument is made. If things already have being and their own existence in eternity, it follows that no freedom of choice or contingency of things remains. But this must not be said. Therefore. The inference is proved: if things exist in eternity, then all future things have already been produced with all the circumstances they will have in our time. Therefore it will not now be in the power of free choice to do something, or to do it in another way than it was done in eternity. Therefore no freedom remains.

This is confirmed. A future contingent and free thing is in eternity only by the same being that it will have in time. But if it had being in time before it was brought about by free choice, it would be neither contingent nor free. Therefore, likewise, it will not be contingent or free if it has being in eternity before it is produced in time by free choice.

II. The second opinion, opposed to the preceding one, is followed by Capreolus, Sentences I, dist. 36, q. un., art. 1, and dist. 38, q. un., art. 2; Ferrari, Against the Gentiles I, chs. 66 and 67; Giles in Sentences I, dist. 38, q. 1; Cajetan, 1 p., q. 14, art. 13; and all Thomists. It is also the express teaching of St. Thomas, as will become clear below. For its explanation, some points must be presupposed.

First, note that when we say “a future thing is,” or “exists in eternity according to its own existence,” the adverb “now” included in the verb “is” does not denote the now of our time. The sense is not that future things exist in eternity within the measure by which we are measured according to the successive being that this measure has. Rather, “now” signifies only the now of eternity, which is unchangeable and wholly simultaneous.¹

Second, note that eternity is related to our time as a common measure to a particular one.² There is something similar in natural things. For just as the heavens, considered as a place, are related to this hall and to everything contained in it as a common and universal measure to a particular one, so proportionately eternity is related to aevity and to our time. Hence, just as everything contained in this hall is contained under the heavens, and not conversely, so whatever is contained in our time is contained in eternity, and not conversely.

Third, from Ferrari, cited ch. 66, § “It must be considered,” note that, as Aristotle teaches in Physics 4, text 114, two things measured by some duration are said to coexist with one another in one way, and the durations themselves are said to coexist in another way.³ For things measured by a duration are said to coexist with one another when both coexist in the same present measure. Thus two individuals are said to coexist on this day because, in relation to the measure of this day, they have being together. But two measures are said to coexist because one is contained in the other, as the present day coexists with the month of March and the year 1610 because it is contained in them. Therefore, for future things to coexist with God in eternity, it is sufficient and required that God and future things have being together in that measure of eternity by which God is measured, even though eternity is the proper and adequate measure of God, but a common and inadequate measure of other things.

III. Our conclusion, then, is this: future things are present to God in eternity not only according to objective being, or being as known, but also according to the real presence and actuality they will have in our time.⁴ This conclusion is opposed to the authors of the first opinion, but it is asserted by St. Thomas in the cited art. 13 and in Against the Gentiles I, ch. 66, argument 6, where he says that God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as each of them is actually in itself. And in 1 p., q. 14, art. 13, in the body, he says that all things that exist in time are present to God from eternity, not only because he has the ideas of things present to him, as some say, but because his vision is from eternity directed upon all things insofar as they are in their own presentiality.

The authors of the opposing opinion reply that St. Thomas is speaking only of objective presentiality, and not of real presentiality, which is according to a thing’s own being and its own existence.

But this explanation seems to conflict with St. Thomas’s words. For what is present only objectively does not yet have being in itself, or at least is not present insofar as it has being in itself. But St. Thomas plainly says that a future thing is present to God insofar as it actually has being in itself, in relation to the measure of eternity. Therefore. I add that St. Thomas expressly says that future things are said to be present to God in eternity not only because God has the accounts of things present to himself, which pertains to objective presence, but also because each of them has being in eternity, which is wholly simultaneous. And in the cited 1. con. Gen. c. 66, he adds that whatever exists in any part of time coexists with eternity, as though present to it, even if it is past or future with respect to another part of time. He teaches the same in q. 2. de verit. art. 12. in corp.; 1. p. q. 57. art. 3; q. 86. art. 4; and 22. q. 171. art. 6. ad 1 and 2. These passages must necessarily be consulted. St. Thomas explains this teaching further in 1. d. 38. q. 1. art. 5. in corp., where he says: God knows from eternity not only that he knows the causes of things, which is to be in his knowledge; he also sees from eternity, in one intuition, each of the times, and that such a thing exists at this time and is absent at this time.⁵ By these words he plainly acknowledges that future things have presence not only objectively in relation to the divine intuition, but also according to the real presence they will have in their proper measure.

IV. This opinion is proved first from Sacred Scripture, in which our conclusion is indicated not obscurely, especially in Job 14, where it is said: The number of his months is with you. Explaining this passage, St. Gregory says: Because even things that pass away stand with almighty God, he declared that the number of our months is with him.⁶ But months include future and past times; therefore these stand present with God. Likewise, Hebrews 1 says of the divine Word: Through whom he also made the ages. Among the ages some things are past and some future, but all are said to have been made by God, because in eternity all things are present. Isaiah 45 likewise says of God that he made the things to come,⁷ that is, the things that are future; here future things themselves are said to have been made by God because in his eternity all things are present as made, and nothing is future or past with respect to him, although something is said to be past in relation to one part of our time and future in relation to another. Finally, for this opinion note the passage of the Apostle in Romans 4, where it is said of Abraham: I have made you the father of many nations before God, who calls the things that are not as though they are.⁸ By saying “before God”, he explains what he had said in the past tense, “I have made you.” For although that was future, since it was present to God in eternity he said, “I have made you”; and he adds the reason when he says: “who calls the things that are not as though they are.” It is as if he said: for this reason he speaks of the future in the manner of the present, because future things are present to God in eternity, and he sees in the same way the things to be done in our time as those that have been done or are being done. St. Ambrose and many other holy Doctors explain this passage of the Apostle in this way.

Second, this is proved by the authority of the saints, first from St. Augustine, On the Trinity, book 4, chapter 17, where he says: With God, past and future things stand. And in book 5, chapter 16, he says: With God (he says) neither have past things passed away, and future things have already come to pass. He says the same in book 15, chapter 7. But especially notable for proving the same point is a passage of that same St. Augustine in Soliloquies, chapter 26, where he says: Before I was born, I, the son of your handmaid, O Lord, my hope from my mother’s breasts, you foresaw and prepared for me the paths on which I would walk and come to the glory of your house. Before you formed me in the womb, you knew me; and before I came forth from the womb, you preordained whatever pleased you concerning me. What things, and of what kind, are written about me in your book, in the secrecy of your council, I do not know, and therefore I greatly fear; but you know, because what I await through the succession of days and temporal events, from here to a thousand years of this temporal existence, is already accomplished in the sight of your eternity, and what will be future is already accomplished. These words cannot be explained as referring only to objective presence, for future things, if they were present in eternity only objectively, would not be said to have already been accomplished in that same eternity. Jerome also holds this, in his commentary on Ephesians 1, as do Ambrose in the passage cited above and in book 8 of On the Faith to Gratian, chapter 7; Gregory, in his homily for the Sunday of the Passion; Anselm, On the Fall of the Devil, chapters 18 and 20, and On the Harmony of Foreknowledge and Predestination, chapter 1; Isidore, On the Supreme Good, book 2, chapter 6; the gloss on Psalm 89; and St. Prosper, On the Call of All Nations, book 1, chapter 24.

Third, this is proved by reason. God has clear and distinct intuitive cognition of all future contingents; therefore all those things are present in eternity according to their proper existence, and not merely in objective being, or in the being of what is known. The consequence is clear: intuitive cognition is of a present thing insofar as it is present according to its proper existence. The antecedent is proved as follows: God’s cognition of future contingents is most perfect; therefore it is intuitive. Otherwise God’s cognition would change when future things were brought into being, for he would begin to know intuitively what he had previously known abstractively.

It is proved fourth by Ferrari’s argument from the passage cited above. Either Adam and Antichrist coexist with God in the now of eternity according to their own real existences, or they do not. But Adam coexists with God as past, and Antichrist as future. If the first is granted, we have what we intend. If the second is granted, it follows that there is future and past in eternity. For something is called past or future in relation to a duration only if that duration has past and future parts in itself, as is clear in our time. For if there were only one indivisible instant in it, nothing would be past or future in relation to it. But the past and future are incompatible with eternity, as St. Thomas teaches, 1. p. q. 10. ar. 4. and 5. For eternity is indivisible and wholly simultaneous. Therefore.

V. It is proved fifth. Whatever at some time coexists with eternity always coexists with it, since eternity is wholly simultaneous, as was said. But when Antichrist is born, it will be true to say that Antichrist coexists with God in eternity according to his real being. Therefore he has this coexistence in eternity from eternity. The minor premise is granted by the authors of the opposing opinion, and the inference is proved because eternity has no succession.

To this argument someone replies by distinguishing the major proposition. If it is understood of the whole of eternity, insofar as eternity is a certain simple thing made up of no parts, then, he says, the proposition is true: for since eternity in reality lacks parts in itself, it cannot happen that something coexists with eternity and does not coexist with the whole of eternity, according to the reality of eternity itself. But if it is understood of eternity as a whole insofar as eternity can terminate our different concepts, by which it is truly affirmed that eternity itself exists, then the proposition is false.

But this solution does not remove the force of the argument. For let us set aside our concepts and speak of existence itself on the side of reality. For, as this author admits, whatever once exists on the side of reality in eternity coexists with the whole of eternity. Therefore it is the case on the side of reality that Antichrist has actual existence from eternity throughout eternity itself.

Finally, this teaching is proved and explained by some examples. The first example is the one St. Thomas uses in the cited art. 13, ad 3. God’s relation to future contingents is like that of someone standing on a high lookout, from which he sees the whole road and those passing along it. For although one person walks after another and the later person does not see the earlier one, the person on the lookout sees them all together and has them present to him. Therefore in the same way God has all things, past and future, present to him in the lookout of eternity, although the future things follow upon the past. The second example is from the same St. Thomas, Against the Gentiles I, ch. 66, argument 6, where he compares eternity to a center. For just as an indivisible center is present to every designated point on the circumference and to all the lines drawn from that circumference to the center, so eternity, since it is indivisible, is present to all things existing at any difference of time and has them all present to it. The third example is used by St. Anselm in On the Harmony of God’s Foreknowledge and Predestination, ch. 1, where he says that, just as the same now of time, being indivisible, reaches all divisible places and all the things located in them, however far apart they may be, and any duration, however divisible, so likewise eternity, although indivisible and wholly simultaneous, can be present to many divisible durations separated from one another. The fourth example is taken from the rational soul, which is indivisible and yet is present at once, wholly, in several divisible parts of the body separated from one another. All these points will become clearer from the solutions to the arguments.

VI. To the first argument drawn from the passages set out at the beginning, it is answered that the cited passages of Scripture and similar ones teach only that creatures were not from eternity in their own measure, nor did they have being in themselves from eternity in their own measure; only God is from eternity in his own measure, which is eternity. Nevertheless, it remains true that all things to be produced in time, and likewise past things, are present in eternity according to their own existences, as is clear from what was said.

To the second argument from the authorities of St. Thomas, it is answered that the holy Doctor indeed admits that future contingents are objectively present to God in eternity, but in those places he does not deny that they are present according to their own existences. Rather, he expressly asserts this in other places cited above in support of our opinion, and in Quodlibet 12, art. 3, ad 3.

To the third argument the antecedent is denied. In answer to the proof, it is said that for future things to coexist with God in eternity, they need not first exist in their own measure. The reason is that the existence they have in eternity does not depend on the future existence they have insofar as they are future, since eternity is an infinite and unlimited measure in which God can consequently behold the existences of all things before they exist in their own measure. Hence, although future things begin to exist in their own measure, they do not begin to exist in eternity, since eternity has no before and after, being indivisible and wholly simultaneous. Thus we cannot mark in eternity one instant at which a thing is not, and another at which it begins to be, or at which it first is.

But there is an argument against this. At this instant of our time it is true to say, “Now Antichrist coexists with God in eternity.” Therefore the existence of things in eternity depends on the existence they have in their own measure. Therefore it is contradictory for the proposition “Antichrist exists in eternity” to be true in the measure of eternity without also being true in our time and at every instant of it.

With Ferrari, Against the Gentiles I, chs. 49 and 66, it is answered that the proposition “At this instant of our time, future things are present in eternity” has two senses. The first is that the determination “at this instant,” or “in this time of ours,” indicates the measure of the truth of that statement. In this sense the proposition is most true: for it is now true to say that Antichrist is present to God in the measure of eternity; the same statement was true yesterday, and will be true at every future instant. The second sense is that the determination “in this time” indicates not the measure of the truth of the proposition, but the measure of the actual existence of Antichrist or some other future thing. In that case the proposition is false. For its sense would be that in this present instant all future things are in themselves and are seen by God in eternity itself as coexisting with him and having being in their own measure. Cajetan follows this same teaching in the cited art. 13. For he observes that things’ being present in eternity can be understood in two ways. First, the coexistence of temporal things in eternity might be measured by every instant of our time; this sense is false and is not intended by St. Thomas. Second, temporal things might be present to God in eternity itself at every now of eternity; St. Thomas is to be understood in this sense. Since eternity itself comprehends all times, it is therefore verified at every instant of our time that all temporal things are present to God in eternity.

To the first confirmation, it is answered from what was said that creation, properly and absolutely speaking, regards the proper measure in which things are produced from nonbeing into being. The reason is that in time there is before and after, so that in it we can mark one instant at which a thing is not and another at which it begins to be. This has no place in eternity, since eternity is indivisible and wholly simultaneous.

It is answered a second way that, as St. Augustine says in the passages cited above, and as can be gathered from the cited passage in Isaiah, ch. 45, things that are future are said to have been made with God, since in relation to him nothing is future. Nevertheless, one must observe that by the same action by which future things will come to be in time, they are said to have been made in eternity, because a future action is always present in the measure of eternity.

To the second confirmation, it is answered from what was said that the difference established by the Council between the Son of God and creatures in opposition to Arius consists in this: the Son of God did not begin to be in his proper measure, nor did he have being after nonbeing; creatures, however, began to be in their proper measure, since in time they were produced by God from nonbeing into being. Hence this inference is invalid: “Antichrist exists in eternity; therefore Antichrist exists.” For we are arguing affirmatively from what is less restricted to what is more restricted, or from the broader to the nonbroader. Thus it does not follow, “Peter exists, or existed, or will exist; therefore Peter exists.” In the same way it does not follow, “Peter exists in eternity; therefore Peter exists.” For in order to exist in eternity it is enough that Peter have being at some difference of our time, whether in the present, past, or future time. But for the proposition “Peter exists” to be verified, he must exist in his proper measure.

VII. As to the fourth argument, Cajetan, 1 p., q. 14, art. 13, Master Bañez, in q. 10, art. 1, in reply to the last argument, and several other Thomists do not consider it inadmissible that two contradictories be true in the measure of eternity. Their reason is that, according to the opinion of all theologians, that indivisible instant of eternity, although formally indivisible, nevertheless by its eminence contains virtually the succession and different instants of our time. Hence in that measure of eternity one of the contradictories is verified by its relation to one instant of our time, and the other likewise by its relation to another extrinsic instant.

But this solution is open to an objection. For if contradictories are truly contradictories, they must be taken in relation to the same instant. For contradiction is the affirmation and negation of the same thing of the same subject, in the same respect. Therefore it is contradictory for two contradictories to be true, even in eternity.

So, in reply to the argument, those contradictories are not true even in eternity;⁹ for the negative is false. Its sense is that Peter is not white at the instant of eternity insofar as that instant corresponds to every instant of our time; but this sense is false. And if the argument is made, “For Peter is black at the instant of eternity; therefore he is not white at the instant of eternity,” the consequence is denied. For the affirmative is verified if he is black at some instant of our time; but for the negative “Peter is not white in eternity” to be verified, it is required that he not be white at the instant of eternity insofar as it corresponds to every instant of our time. But if one proposition is taken of the instant of eternity insofar as it corresponds to one instant of our time, while the other is taken of the instant of eternity insofar as it corresponds extrinsically to another instant of our time, then they are not contradictories. So too, in relation to our time, these are not contradictories: “Peter is white now”; “Peter will not be white tomorrow.” For both can be true together, or false together.

To the fifth argument, it is denied that future things are produced twice. In reply to the proof, Antichrist is produced only once in time, but his production, which is called future in relation to this day, is present in relation to eternity. For, as was said, eternity coexists as present with our whole time, since it admits no succession.

VIII. To the sixth argument, we answer with Cajetan, cited at article 13 in his solution to Scotus’s third argument, that the angel’s cognition by which it knows contingent future things is not measured by the aevum.¹⁰ The reason is that the actual representation of singular contingent things, which occurs through species given to the angel, is not measured by the aevum, but comes anew when future things are brought into being. It does not follow, therefore, that an angel knows contingent future things before they are brought into being.

But an argument is made against this solution. For that cognition of future things is measured at least by an angelic instant, which is indivisible and wholly simultaneous. Therefore future things can have coexistence in relation to that angelic instant before they exist in their proper measure, and hence an angel will be able to know future things before they exist.

We answer that although an angelic instant admits no variation or succession in the substance of the operation it measures, it does admit them with respect to certain accidents, as Saint Thomas teaches in Quodlibet 9, a. 8, and Ferrariensis in Summa contra Gentiles III, ch. 100, as does Master Báñez in Summa theologiae I, q. 63, a. 6, at the end. Eternity, however, admits absolutely no variation, just as God himself does not. Hence God, without any succession, simultaneously beholds all things insofar as they are present in eternity; an angel, by contrast, knows contingent future things successively, when they exist in their proper measure. There is also another difference: although an angelic instant is a more perfect measure, it is not a measure higher than the measure of our time, nor does it contain that measure, as eternity contains all other measures. Therefore it does not follow that contingent future things coexist with an angel in relation to the angel’s own measure, as they coexist with God in relation to the measure of eternity. This also makes the reply to the confirmation clear.

To the seventh argument, we answer that when a higher measure is finite and limited, nothing exists in the higher and inadequate measure unless it first exists in its own lower and adequate measure, as occurs in the example given in the argument. But when the higher measure is infinite and unlimited, as eternity is, something may well exist according to real existence in the higher measure before it exists in its own lower and adequate measure.¹¹ The reason is that an infinite measure can admit no succession or mutability in itself; hence, in a more eminent way, it contains in a single instant whatever is contained successively in lower measures.

To the final argument, we answer that, on the supposition that God sees presently in eternity some act of our free choice as future at a certain time, it cannot at the same time be true that the act does not occur. Absolutely speaking, however, and in relation to its proximate cause, which is liable to fail, it can fail to occur. Hence, when it is produced by the will in time, it is produced freely and contingently, for the freedom and contingency of things are formally drawn from their relation to their proximate cause. If the argument proved anything, it would also prove that God’s foreknowledge removes the freedom and contingency of things. For, on the supposition that God has foreknown something as future, it is impossible, in the composite sense, that it not be future. This solution is confirmed: for, on the supposition that I see Peter speaking, it is impossible that he not be speaking, yet he speaks freely and contingently. Therefore, in the same way, although God presently sees all future acts of free choice, they are nevertheless produced freely and contingently in their own time. Therefore the existence of things in eternity does not impede their contingency.

To the confirmation we answer that the very same being a contingent future thing has in time it also has in the eternal now. In relation to our time that being is future, but in relation to eternity it is present. Hence, although it is present in eternity, it will nevertheless occur contingently in its own time. And when the argument is made, “If a future thing had being in time before it was produced by its free and contingent cause, freedom with respect to that act would be removed; therefore it is removed as well if it has being in eternity before it is produced in time by its contingent cause,” we answer by denying the consequence. For if a contingent future thing had being in time before it was produced by free choice, free choice would be wholly passive in relation to that act, as Luther said, since it would merely receive an action produced by another and not by itself; hence, in relation to that thing, it would not be a free cause. But this does not follow from the fact that contingent and free future things have being in eternity before they are produced in time. For just as God beholds in his eternity our free act, which will be future at a certain time, so too he beholds in that same eternity the free cause of that act freely producing it, although in relation to our time that production is future.

IX. Nevertheless, one difficult argument remains to be resolved. It would follow from our opinion that there is in actuality an infinite multitude actually present in some duration; the consequent is impossible. Therefore.¹² The consequence is proved as follows: all the future acts of cognition of the blessed are infinite. Therefore, if all of them are actually present to God in the measure of eternity according to their proper existences, there will be an actually infinite multitude in relation to some duration. The minor premise is proved as follows: an actually infinite multitude cannot exist in a limited duration of time, because every multitude consisting of all its parts is proportionable to the species of number and consequently is finite, just as every species of number is finite, since it is specified by its last unit. But this argument also applies to a multitude existing in eternity. Therefore it is impossible for any actually infinite multitude to exist in eternity.

We answer this argument that an infinity can exist in eternity,¹³ because those things are not present to one another, although they are present in eternity. Thus Adam and Antichrist are present to God in eternity and coexist in eternity itself, yet they are not present to one another, since in relation to their proper measure Adam is past and Antichrist is future. The impossibility of an actual infinite applies only to things that are present to one another, for then infinitely many things would be mutually present, and there would be an actual multitude of coexisting things not proportionable to the species of number, which is a contradiction.

But an argument is made against this: things identical with one third thing are identical with one another; therefore, things present to one third thing are present to one another. But Adam, Antichrist, and all the future thoughts are actually present to one third thing, namely eternity. Therefore they are present to one another; consequently, all future thoughts will be actually present to one another, and thus there will be an actual infinite in things mutually present. We answer that the assumed major premise is true only of things identical with one third thing both in reality and in reason¹⁴, but not of those things which, although really identified with one third thing, nevertheless differ from it in reason, as is clear in divine things. For the Father and the Son are really the same as the divine Essence, and yet they are personally distinct from one another: the Father is not the Son. Likewise, action and passion are identified with motion, yet they are distinguished from one another. In proportionate fashion, we say in the present case that although the existence of Antichrist and that of Adam are present in eternity, they are nevertheless not present to one another, since presence to one another is derived from relation to their proper measure, in relation to which they do not coexist. Therefore it does not follow that there is an actually infinite number of things mutually present.