Book One

Prooemium: division of the whole work

Disputatio I: Whether the Pelagians ever admitted that any inward grace, or any supernatural help from God, is divinely given for salvation or for fulfilling the precepts of the law

Disputatio I: Whether the knowledge of God is suitably divided into the knowledge of simple understanding and the knowledge of vision.

Whether the knowledge of God is suitably divided into the knowledge of simple understanding and the knowledge of vision.

I. The first opinion is Gregory’s, in 1. d. 26. q. 1, where he does not admit in God knowledge of simple understanding, but only knowledge of vision; and by this knowledge, he says, God knows all possible things that will never be. Master Zumel seems to hold the same opinion, 1. p. q. 14. art. 5. disp. 1, in the response to the first argument. In its favor,

First, Gregory argues as follows. That cognition between which and the object nothing intervenes is intuitive; but nothing intervenes between God’s knowledge and any object known by him; therefore all God’s cognition is intuitive, and consequently there will be no knowledge of simple understanding in him, which is manifestly abstractive. The minor premise is proved: nothing intervenes between God and creatures; therefore neither does anything intervene between God’s knowledge and creatures, for God’s knowledge is the divine being itself.

Second, divine knowledge is the principle by which all things are known most perfectly; therefore it is intuitive. The consequence is clear, for intuitive knowledge is the most perfect of all.

Third, creatures do not terminate divine cognition in themselves, but in the divine essence, which is the immediate object of God’s knowledge. Therefore they terminate divine knowledge in the same way, whether they exist in themselves or not. Therefore, for God’s knowledge with respect to creatures to be intuitive, they need not actually exist in themselves; consequently, God’s knowledge by which he knows possible creatures will be intuitive, or knowledge of vision. Therefore there is no knowledge of simple understanding in him.

This is confirmed: otherwise God would not have intuitive cognition of future things, especially contingents, except when they actually exist in themselves—which is contrary to St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 14. art. 9.. The consequence is proved as follows: future things do not yet exist; therefore, if the knowledge by which God knows possibles is not intuitive because they do not exist, knowledge of future things likewise will not be intuitive, because they do not exist.

Fourth, Master Zumel argues as follows. For intuitive awareness of an object, it is not necessary for it to be known as existing in itself; it is sufficient for it to be known in another object known intuitively, in which that thing is represented and contained eminently and virtually, much better than in itself. But all created and creatable things, even if they are never to be produced, are contained representatively and eminently in the divine essence, as in an object previously known intuitively; therefore God knows all things, even possibles, intuitively. Therefore there is no abstractive knowledge in God.

Fifth, if a twofold knowledge were to be distinguished in God, namely, knowledge of simple understanding and knowledge of vision, it would follow that God’s knowledge ought to be signified in the plural, not the singular. The consequence is proved thus: ideas are named in the plural in God because they are many; likewise, the reasons of things are called plural in God because they are many. Power, however, is named in the singular because it is one. Therefore, if there are many knowledges in God, knowledge should be named in the plural, like ideas. Yet this is contrary to the common opinion of theologians and to St. Thomas, 1. d. 36. q. 2. art. 2. ad 4.

II. The second opinion is held by those who think that a third member must be added to the aforesaid division. For they say that, in the divine intellect, according to our way of understanding, a threefold knowledge is found: the first is knowledge of simple understanding, the second knowledge of approval, and the third knowledge of vision. Durandus holds this, in 1. d. 36. q. 1, as does Asturicensis, in his Relection on the Grace of Christ, q. 6. dub. 1. p. 617. In favor of this opinion,

Sixth, an argument is made from the authority of St. Thomas, q. 3. de verit. art. 3. ad 8, where he expressly posits these three members and says that knowledge of approval adds to simple knowledge an ordering of the will toward producing the things known; knowledge of vision, however, adds the existence of things. And in 1. p. q. 14. art. 8, he says that God’s knowledge, which is the cause of things, is customarily called knowledge of approval.

Seventh, knowledge of approval and knowledge of vision have distinct objects; therefore they are distinguished as two knowledges, at least eminently, and consequently there is a threefold knowledge in God. The antecedent is proved. Knowledge of approval is directed toward good things that will have being in some division of time; for it cannot be directed toward evil things, since God does not approve but reproves them, according to the saying, The impious man and his impiety are hateful to the Lord.¹ Knowledge of vision, however, is directed toward all things that have being in some division of time, whether good or evil, including moral evil. Therefore.

Eighth, knowledge of approval is the cause of things, as will be clear below; knowledge of vision, however, is not the cause of things, since it presupposes their existence as its object and consequently presupposes that the things have been produced. Therefore knowledge of approval is distinct from knowledge of vision, and consequently a threefold knowledge must be posited in God.

This is confirmed: knowledge of approval is practical in God; knowledge of vision, however, is not practical, properly speaking. Otherwise God would be the cause of sins, since he knows them through knowledge of vision. Therefore knowledge of vision is distinct from knowledge of approval.

III. The third opinion affirms that between knowledge that is merely natural, or knowledge of simple understanding, and knowledge that is merely free, which is knowledge of vision, a certain middle knowledge must be posited. Some call it conditional knowledge, or knowledge of conditional future things; however, it will be treated in the following disputation.

The fourth opinion, which is more common among Thomists and, in our judgment, is explicitly St. Thomas’s, consists in two propositions.

For the explanation of this, note that, as St. Thomas teaches, q. 2. de ver. art. 9. ad 2, knowledge of simple awareness and knowledge of vision imply no difference in God on the part of the knowledge, but only on the part of the thing known; for knowledge in God is called knowledge of vision by likeness to bodily sight, which beholds things placed outside itself. Hence God is said to know through knowledge of vision only those things that are outside him: things that are present, past, or future. But knowledge of simple awareness also extends to things that neither are, nor will be, nor have been, and God does not know the one class differently from the other. Therefore, although God knows his essence, existence, all the attributes, and the divine persons intuitively, and in a general sense such cognition, insofar as it terminates in what is formally in God, could be called knowledge of vision, nevertheless, when St. Thomas and the Scholastic Doctors divide divine knowledge into knowledge of simple understanding and knowledge of vision, they speak of God’s knowledge in relation to its secondary objects, namely, in relation to creatures.

IIII. Note secondly that things that are, were, or will be in some division of time can be considered in two ways. First, according to the quiddity of existence itself and of all accidents. Second, insofar as they exercise the act of existence in some division of time. According to these two distinct considerations, they can pertain to distinct knowledge in God. For if they are considered insofar as, in exercised act, they have or will have actual existence in some division of time, they are known by God through knowledge of vision. But if they are considered according to their quiddity, they are known by God through knowledge of simple understanding. St. Thomas teaches this in 3. sent. ad Annib. d. 14. q. unic. art. 2. in corp., where he says: In the Word, or in God, a twofold cognition is distinguished: one called knowledge of vision, by which God sees as present all things that are, will be, and have been; the other is called knowledge of simple understanding, by which he knows not only those things but also all things he can make. He says the same in q. 2. de verit. art. 8. in corp. ad 2. By these words he plainly supposes that God also knows through knowledge of simple awareness things that are, were, or will be; this must be understood according to their quiddity, for insofar as they exercise the act of existence, they are known through knowledge of vision. This is proved because (as all Thomists teach, 1. p. q. 34. art. 3) the divine Word proceeds not only from knowledge of the divine essence, all its attributes, the persons, and all possible creatures, but also from knowledge of creatures that will have being in some division of time, since it proceeds from comprehensive knowledge of the divine essence and from the most perfect knowledge that can belong to God. Therefore the Father knew all creatures through knowledge of simple understanding, or natural knowledge—not only possible creatures, but also those to be produced, though considered according to their quiddity. The consequence is clear: before the production of the Word, there could not be in God free knowledge of creatures, which is called knowledge of vision, because, as St. Thomas teaches, 1. p. q. 33. art. 3. ad 1, things that signify a relation in God to existing creatures, such as knowledge of vision, presuppose the notional acts and the produced persons. Further, knowledge of vision presupposes a free decree of the divine will, but before the production of the divine persons there was no free decree of his will in God; therefore, before the production of the divine persons, knowledge of vision with respect to creatures is not understood to be in God. Since, then, the productive cognition of the Word extends to all creatures, it follows that God knew, through natural knowledge or knowledge of simple understanding, all creatures existing in some division of time according to their quiddity.

V. First conclusion. God’s knowledge is sufficiently divided into knowledge of simple understanding and knowledge of vision. First, this is proved because St. Thomas divides God’s knowledge in this way in many places, especially 1. p. q. 14. ar. 9.; 3. p. q. 10. ar. 2. ad 2 and ar. 3. in fi. corp.; q. 13. ar. 1. ad 2; 1. con. Gentes. c. 66 and 69; ad 11 quodl. 3. art. 3. in corp.; de verit. q. 8. ar. 4 and q. 20. ar. 4; 1. d. 38. q. 1. ar. 4; 3. d. 14. q. 1. ar. 2. q. 2; and 4. d. 49. q. 2. ar. 5.

Second, between being and nonbeing there is no middle, since they are contradictorily opposed; therefore neither is there a middle between the object of knowledge of vision and that of simple understanding. The consequence is clear: the object of knowledge of vision is a being actually existing in some measure or in some division of time; the object of knowledge of simple understanding, however, is a nonbeing, or what does not exist in any division of time. Therefore there is no middle knowledge between knowledge of vision and knowledge of simple understanding. For it is impossible that there be a middle knowledge without a middle object, since knowledge is specified by its object.

This is confirmed: as St. Thomas teaches in the places cited above, through knowledge of vision God knows all beings that have being in some division of time, whether present, past, or future, for all these are present to God in eternity. Through knowledge of simple understanding, however, he knows things that have no being, nor will have any, in any division of time or in any measure. Therefore, through this twofold knowledge, God sufficiently knows all knowable things. The consequence is proved because, as was said, there is no other middle object between what exists and what does not exist.

Third, this is proved as follows. In us there is no middle awareness between intuitive and abstractive awareness; all our awareness is sufficiently divided into intuitive awareness, which is of a present thing, and abstractive awareness, which is of an absent thing. Therefore, similarly, in God knowledge is sufficiently divided into knowledge of vision, which terminates in things existing in eternity, and knowledge of simple understanding, which terminates secondarily in possible things and in others that do not exist in eternity and will not have being in any measure.

Fourth, as theologians commonly teach, 3. p. q. 10. arts. 2 and 3, Christ’s soul sees in the Word all things that God knows by knowledge of vision. Therefore, if by knowledge of vision God knows not only things actually existing in some division of time but also all possibles, it would follow that Christ’s soul would see all things God can make, and thus would comprehend God’s power and knowledge, which is contrary to St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 12. ar. 7. and 3. p. q. 10. cited above. Therefore only a twofold knowledge is to be distinguished in God, namely, knowledge of simple understanding and knowledge of vision.

VI. Second conclusion. Knowledge of approval is not distinct from knowledge of vision, not only on the part of the knower, but also on the part of the object known.

First, this is proved because St. Thomas sometimes divides God’s knowledge into knowledge of vision and simple understanding, as in the places cited above, but sometimes divides it into knowledge of approval and simple understanding, as in q. 7. de verit. art. 8. in corp. He therefore holds that knowledge of vision and knowledge of approval are not distinguished within the genus of knowledge.

Second, by the very fact that God has determined by an efficacious will that something will be future, it becomes present to him in eternity, even if it is future with respect to our time. Therefore he knows it by knowledge of vision, or intuitive knowledge. The consequence is clear: for cognition to be intuitive, it is sufficient and necessary that it terminate in an object existing in the measure by which the cognition itself is measured. Since, then, God’s knowledge of approval is measured by eternity, in which all future things actually exist according to their proper existences, it follows that, on the part of the object known, God’s knowledge of approval that regards future things is knowledge of vision.

Third, as St. Thomas teaches, q. 3. de verit. art. 3. ad 8, the ordering of the will toward producing the things known, which knowledge of approval adds to knowledge of simple understanding, lies outside the genus of cognition. Therefore it cannot be a per se difference dividing God’s knowledge and contracting it, even according to our way of understanding, to a particular species. The consequence is clear: a difference that divides a genus per se must add something contained under that genus. If an argument is made against this reasoning—namely, that it would follow that knowledge of vision is also not distinguished in God from knowledge of simple understanding, because the actual existence of things, which knowledge of vision adds to knowledge of simple understanding, lies outside the genus of cognition, as St. Thomas expressly teaches in the same response ad 8; hence knowledge concerning a rose does not vary, whether or not the rose exists—the reply is that, as St. Thomas teaches, q. 2. de verit. art. 9. ad 2, knowledge of simple understanding and knowledge of vision are not distinguished in God on the part of the knower, but only on the part of the thing known. For knowledge in God is called knowledge of vision by likeness to bodily sight, which beholds things placed outside itself; but knowledge of simple awareness is of things that neither are, nor have been, nor will be. Thus God’s knowledge is suitably divided, on the part of the object known, into knowledge of vision and knowledge of simple understanding. The reply, therefore, is that the argument only concludes that these two members do not divide God’s knowledge on the part of the knower, but on the part of the object known.

VII. To the first argument², it is replied that for knowledge of vision³ it is not sufficient that nothing intervene between it and the object known; rather, it is required that it terminate in an object actually existing in the measure by which the knowledge itself is measured.

To the second, it is replied that divine knowledge, insofar as it is considered on the part of the knower, or of the knowledge itself, is a most sufficient principle for knowing all creatures intuitively; but because of the object known, which does not actually exist in any measure, it follows that cognition of such an object is not intuitive.

To the third, it is replied that, on the part of the knower, God knows all creatures only in himself, because he knows them through his essence and not through their own proper and adequate species, as St. Thomas teaches in 1. p. q. 14. arts. 5 and 6. ad 3, and q. 2. de verit. art. 2. ad 2. But on the part of the object known, he knows creatures not only in himself but also in themselves, as St. Thomas teaches, 1. p. q. 20. ar. 2. ad 2. Hence creatures stand differently in relation to God’s knowledge when they exist and when they do not actually exist.

To the confirmation, those authors who deny that future things actually exist in eternity according to their proper existences consequently say that God has no intuitive knowledge of creatures except when they actually exist in their own measure. But this opinion will be refuted in disputation 8, where we shall show that all future things actually exist in eternity according to their proper existences. The reply to the argument, therefore, is that for a cognition to be intuitive it is sufficient that it terminate in an object existing in relation to the measure by which the cognition itself is measured. Thus, for God to know future contingents intuitively, it is sufficient that they actually exist in eternity, by which divine cognition is measured. Since, then, things that are merely possible and will never be have no existence in their own measure or in the measure of eternity, they are not known intuitively by God, but by knowledge of simple understanding. By this same reply we answer the fourth argument, denying the antecedent.

To the fifth, with St. Thomas, in 1. sent. d. 36. q. 2. art. 2. ad 4, it is replied that the divine essence is one and most simple, whereas relations to creatures are many. Therefore what names only the divine essence cannot be signified in the plural. Such is knowledge, which pertains more to the knower, as his perfection. A reason, however, pertains more to things; an idea has an intermediate character, because it signifies the divine essence and the character of being imitated, which is according to relations to creatures. Hence both reasons and ideas can be signified plurally in God, but knowledge cannot, just as divine power cannot.

VIII. To the sixth argument for the second opinion, it is replied from what has been said: although knowledge of approval signifies a relation and ordering of the will toward producing the things known in their proper measure, those things are nevertheless present to God in eternity from eternity. Hence the object of knowledge of approval is truly known by God through knowledge of vision, and consequently these are not distinguished in the account of knowledge on the part of the object known.

To the seventh, it is replied that knowledge of vision, even in relation to evil things, has the character of practical knowledge—not by positively causing evils insofar as they are evils, but by permitting or preventing them;⁴ hence St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 14. ar. 16. in corp., says that evils, although they are not things God can bring about, nevertheless fall under his practical cognition, just as good things do, insofar as he permits, prevents, and orders them; just as illnesses fall under the physician’s practical knowledge insofar as he treats them by his art. Therefore we must say that, although God does not approve evils by knowledge of approval, he does approve their permission.

A second reply is that, although God does not approve evils absolutely speaking, he nevertheless approves and wills every account of good found in evils; for every good by participation, insofar as it is good, is caused by God and consequently willed by him, as will be clear below:⁵ for how would anything exist unless he himself had willed it?

To the eighth argument, it is replied that knowledge of vision does not presuppose the existence of things in their proper measure, but causes them, although in eternity the knowledge of vision and the existences of the things to be produced are simultaneous, as was said.

To the confirmation, the reply is by what has been said to the seventh argument.

Book One

Prooemium: division of the whole work

Disputatio I: Whether the Pelagians ever admitted that any inward grace, or any supernatural help from God, is divinely given for salvation or for fulfilling the precepts of the law

Disputatio II: What grace the Semi-Pelagians admitted as necessary for salvation, and where their view agrees with or departs from the error of the Pelagians

Disputatio III: What the Manichaeans formerly held, and the Lutherans and Calvinists hold in our time, about the necessity of grace and the natural powers of our free choice

Disputatio IV: What certain Catholic Doctors hold about the natural powers of free choice and its concord with divine foreknowledge, providence, predestination, and the efficacy of the helps of grace

Disputatio V: How much authority Saint Augustine’s teaching has concerning predestination and grace, and whether it is permissible to depart from it

Book Two

Introduction

Disputatio I: Whether the knowledge of God is suitably divided into the knowledge of simple understanding and the knowledge of vision.

Disputatio II: Whether the knowledge of God is sufficiently divided into knowledge that is merely natural and knowledge that is merely free; or whether, besides both, middle knowledge must be posited in God with respect to conditional future things that depend on the human will.

Disputatio III: Whether all future things are actually present in eternity according to the proper existences they will have in their own measure.

Disputatio IV: Whether God certainly knows future contingents because of their real presence in eternity before they come to be, and whether an existence of this kind contributes anything to the certainty and infallibility of the divine knowledge.

Disputatio V: Whether God certainly and infallibly knows all future contingents in the decree, or predetermination, of his divine will.

Disputatio VI: Whether God certainly and infallibly knows future sins in some decree of his divine will.

Disputatio VII: Whether God certainly and infallibly knows future contingents in the predetermination of secondary causes, especially when the secondary causes are free.

Disputatio VIII: Whether, setting aside every predetermination of the divine will and existence in eternity, another ground for the certainty of divine knowledge can be assigned, namely, on the part of the truth of the object.

Disputatio IX: Whether God certainly knows future contingents before the decree of his will, as future, in their ideas.

Disputatio X: Whether there is in God a conjectural knowledge of what, in particular, a created will will do if placed in such circumstances.

Disputatio XI: Whether this causal proposition is true: “Because this is future, it is foreknown by God”; or, conversely: “Because God foreknows something to be future, therefore it is future.”

Disputatio XII: Whether God produces things outside himself immediately through his knowledge, that is, through his intellect; or whether, besides intellect and will, a third executive power must be posited in him, through which things are produced immediately.

Book Three

Introduction

Disputatio I: Whether God’s actual motion, which all secondary causes need in order to produce their effect or operation, is an immediate influx into the secondary cause itself; or whether instead it is only an immediate influx, together with the secondary cause, into its effect.

Disputatio II: What that prior motion is by which God moves and applies secondary causes to act.

Disputatio III: Whether God’s general concurrence, by which he helps secondary causes constituted in first act through supernatural forms to produce supernatural acts, is supernatural; or whether it is of the same order as general concurrence with merely natural acts.

Disputatio IV: Whether God’s general concurrence, especially with respect to acts that depend on created free choice, is indifferent of itself.

Disputatio V: Whether, by an absolute and efficacious decree of his will, God truly predetermines as an efficient cause all secondary causes, both natural and free, to their operations after the manner of a physical cause, while preserving their nature and freedom.

Disputatio VI: Whether, by a prior motion inhering in the created will, God moves, applies, or predetermines it after the manner of a physical cause to all its good acts in particular, while preserving its freedom.

Disputatio VII: Whether, by a prior motion, God truly premoves as an efficient cause free choice after the manner of a physical cause to the act of sin, insofar as it is an act and insofar as it is a being.

Disputatio VIII: Whether all contingent and free acts predetermined by God necessarily occur with the necessity of infallibility, or with necessity on the supposition of the predetermination of the divine will.

Disputatio IX: Whether the first root of contingency is the efficacy, or omnipotence, of the divine will.

Disputatio X: Whether any effect can be called formally contingent in relation to God’s causality, especially when it is produced immediately by him.

Book Four

Introduction

Disputatio I: Whether God has providence not only over all genera and species, but also over all individuals in particular, according to all circumstances of place, time, etc.

Disputatio II: Whether the evils of punishment are willed by an absolute and efficacious will, and predetermined in particular, through divine providence, or are only permitted.

Disputatio III: Whether the nature of divine providence includes not only the ordering of means to an end, but also the attainment of the end intended by God.

Disputatio IV: Whether contingent and free secondary causes can withdraw themselves from, or depart from, the order assigned to them by divine providence.

Disputatio V: Whether created free choice can resist almighty God, or strive against the order of divine providence.

Book Five

Introduction

Disputatio I: Whether all the explanations that St. Augustine gives of those words of the Apostle, “God wills all human beings to be saved,” are legitimate.

Disputatio II: What God's antecedent will is, what his consequent will is, and whether antecedent will formally entails some conditional act or wish in God.

Disputatio III: What predestination is, and in which act it formally consists: an act of the will, or rather an act of the intellect.

Disputatio IV: Whether the good use of the aids of grace, insofar as it proceeds from free will, is an effect of predestination.

Disputatio V: Whether the good use of free will, proceeding from the aid of grace, is a cause, reason, or necessary condition of predestination in adults.

Disputatio VI: Whether the predestination of infants depended on, and presupposed, foreknowledge of the good use of the free will of their parents or of others through whom they came to the grace of baptism.

Disputatio VII: Whether the foreseen merits of Christ are the cause of our predestination with respect to its entire effect.

Disputatio VIII: Whether the grace of the state of innocence was conferred on Adam through the merits of Christ.

Disputatio IX: Whether predestination, with respect to the attainment of its effects, is certain and infallible with the certainty of the order and causality of the means.

Disputatio X: Whether anyone, apart from divine revelation, can know with infallible certainty that he or another is among the predestined, or infer this from certain signs.

Disputatio XI: Whether, at least among the faithful, there are more elect than reprobate.

Book Six

Introduction

Disputatio I: Whether the children of Adam contract original sin through seminal propagation, such that it truly and properly has the character of guilt in them.

Disputatio II: Whether through original sin man was only deprived of original justice and supernatural gifts, or also wounded in his natural powers.

Disputatio III: What wounds man incurs through original or actual sin.

Disputatio IV: Whether free will in fallen nature, apart from the aids of grace, has the same natural powers for good that it would have had if it had been created in a state of pure nature.

Disputatio V: Whether man can, by the powers of nature alone and without the aid of grace, know every truth pertaining to the natural order.

Disputatio VI: Whether man can, by the powers of nature alone, assent to all the supernatural mysteries proposed and explained to him as revealed by God, with assent that is certain and firm on the believer’s part.

Disputatio VII: Whether, without the aid of grace, man in fallen nature can perform a moral act that is truly good in relation to the ultimate natural end and is an act of true virtue.

Disputatio VIII: Whether man in fallen nature can, by the powers of nature alone together with God’s general concurrence, elicit an absolute, purely natural act of loving God above all things, with an absolute resolve to please him in everything.

Disputatio IX: Whether free will, with general concurrence alone, can elicit attrition or contrition with respect to the substance of the act alone.

Disputatio X: Whether man can, by the natural powers of free will, restore the good connatural to him that he lost through sin.

Disputatio XI: Whether fallen man can, without the aid of grace, keep all the commandments and resist, at every moment, all the temptations he encounters, even the gravest, which must be overcome to keep the natural law.

Book Seven

Introduction

Disputatio I: Whether man can, without the aid of grace, dispose himself at least remotely to obtain grace by asking, seeking, knocking, and so forth.

Disputatio II: Whether those who do all that lies in their power by nature alone receive from God, infallibly and according to a fixed law, the aids of prevenient grace by which they carry it out as required for salvation.

Disputatio III: Whether greater effort of free choice obtains greater or more intense aids of rousing and prevenient grace.

Disputatio IV: Whether someone who does all that lies in his power with the earlier aids of prevenient grace receives subsequent aids infallibly and according to a fixed law.

Disputatio V: Whether someone who does all that lies in his power with efficacious aid, that is, who elicits an act of charity and contrition, receives justifying grace infallibly and according to a fixed law.

Disputatio VI: Whether acts of charity equal to the preexisting habit, or even less intense acts, obtain an increase of habitual grace, charity, and essential glory infallibly and according to a fixed law.

Disputatio VII: Whether deadened merits obtain for the penitent, infallibly and according to an established law, greater habitual grace and a right to more intense essential glory.

Disputatio VIII: Whether greater effort or influence of free choice, with equal aid of assisting grace, obtains for one person greater justifying grace than for another.

Disputatio IX: Whether a naturally more perfect intellect, with equal light of glory, produces a more intense act of beatific vision than another.

Disputatio X: Whether the beatific vision, insofar as it is formally a vital act, is efficiently caused by the light of glory as the principle by which it is produced, or by the intellect alone according to its innate power.

Disputatio XI: Whether acts of believing, hoping, and loving God as the author of grace are supernatural in substance and in the being of nature, or only in their manner and in the moral order.

Disputatio XII: Whether the final disposition to habitual grace proceeds by way of efficient causation from grace itself, or from actual aid alone, that is, from the will elevated by that aid.