De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Whether the Pelagians ever admitted that some inward grace or some supernatural help from God is given for salvation or for fulfilling the precepts of the law.

I. Some said that Pelagius admitted no inward grace, whether on the part of the intellect or on the part of the will; rather, by the name of grace, which he inserted frequently in his writings, he understood only free choice freely created by God; or the external law and teaching, that is, the preaching of the Gospel, through which he shows us what we ought to do and what we ought to avoid; or even the example of Christ the Lord, as Augustine reports in his book On the Grace of Christ Against Pelagius and Celestius, ch. 2, where he says: They are accustomed to tell us that Christ provided help for not sinning in this respect: that, by living justly and teaching justly, he himself left an example. These authors also affirm that Pelagius denied every actual concurrence of God, not only that which precedes the operations of secondary causes but also that which accompanies them, even with respect to natural acts; and that he admitted only that, at their creation, God conferred on them a power by which afterward they could act by themselves, without God's operation and cooperation. All these claims can be supported by the following arguments.

First. Because St. Augustine, speaking of the Semi-Pelagians, says: But these brothers of ours, for whom your pious charity is solicitous, have come to believe with the Church of Christ that the human race is born subject to the sin of the first man, and that no one is freed from this evil except through the righteousness of the second man. They also admit, concerning infants, that human wills are preceded by God's grace, and agree that no one can suffice for himself for any good work, whether to begin it or to complete it. These retained points, then, at which they have arrived distinguish them greatly from the error of the Pelagians.¹ In these words he teaches quite plainly that the Pelagians denied all prevenient grace and asserted that, for every good work, not only one to be begun but also one to be completed, a person's free choice suffices for itself without God's grace. For he says that in this respect the Semi-Pelagians differ greatly from the Pelagians; they would not differ if the Pelagians had conceded that God's prevenient grace is needed for a good work, whether to begin it or to complete it.

II. Second. Pelagius denied that the grace is necessary which the Supreme Pontiffs, the sacred Councils, and the holy Fathers—especially Augustine and Jerome—taught to be necessary when condemning Pelagius's error. But in condemning Pelagius's error they taught that an inward, prevenient, supernatural grace is necessary. Therefore Pelagius professed no inward, actual, supernatural, prevenient grace.

This is confirmed. For in the Council of Carthage it is said of Pelagius and Celestius: They leave no room for the grace of God by which we are Christians. And again: They claim that God's grace is to be reckoned in this: that he established and created human nature such that, by its own will, it could fulfill God's law.² Likewise, in the Council of Milevis it is affirmed: These men say that one can attain such perfection of righteousness without the help of the Savior's grace that it is unnecessary to say, “Forgive us our debts.”³ Again, Augustine, speaking of the Pelagians, says: They say that the grace of God, without which we can do nothing good, is nothing other than free choice, which our nature received from him without any preceding merits of its own, with his help directed only to this: that through his law and teaching we learn what we ought to do and what we ought to hope for; but not through the gift of the Holy Spirit, so that we do what we have learned ought to be done.⁴

III. Third, the argument is as follows. Pelagius denied the grace given to us through the ministration of the Spirit, as St. Augustine reports in book 1 of On the Grace of Christ, ch. 2, where he says that Pelagius thought we are saved with help, not through any ministration of power, but by the powers of our own will. And in ch. 34 he adds: Nor could I anywhere find that he, namely Pelagius, professed this grace, by which not only the natural capacity of the will and action—which he says we possess even when we neither will nor do what is good—but also the will and action themselves are helped through the ministration of the Holy Spirit. And in Letter 95, which is from the five bishops to Pope Innocent: For whether he said that grace is free choice, or that grace is the remission of sins, or that grace is the precept of the law, he says nothing that pertains, through the ministration of the Holy Spirit, to conquering desires and temptations. Therefore he admitted no inward grace, but only nature freely created, external preaching, the law, and other such things, which can come about without the ministration of the Spirit.

This is confirmed. For Pelagius asserted that grace is given according to our merits, as is clear from what Augustine writes against him.⁵ Therefore he admitted no true grace. The consequence is clear, for it is contrary to the nature of grace that it be given on the basis of merits, as is clear from the passage in Romans 4: To the one who works, the wage is not reckoned according to grace but according to debt.⁶ And in chapter 11: But if it is by grace, then it is no longer from works; otherwise grace is no longer grace.

Fourth, it is proved that Pelagius denied the necessity of God's actual concurrence even for the works of nature. For St. Jerome, in Against the Pelagians, tacitly reports the Pelagian error under the name of Christobulus, arguing as follows: If we must use God's help in each thing we do, then unless God helps us we will be unable to trim a pen for writing, smooth it with pumice once trimmed, fit the hand to the letters, be silent, speak, sit, stand, walk, run, eat, fast, weep, laugh, and do the other things of this sort.⁷ And in his Letter to Ctesiphon, against the Pelagians, reporting their error, he says: They place God's grace in such a way that we do not rely on his help and are not guided by it in each act, but refer the matter to free choice and the precepts of the law, setting down that saying of Isaiah: “For God appointed the law as a help”; so that thanks are to be referred to God on the ground that he made us such that by our own choice we can both choose good and avoid evil. Those who say this do not understand that the Devil hisses an intolerable blasphemy through their mouths. And a little later: Listen, I ask you, listen to the sacrilegious man: “If, he says, I wish to bend a finger, move a hand, sit, stand, walk, run about, spit, clear the mucus from my nostrils with two fingers, relieve my bowels, or pass urine, will God's help always be necessary for me?” After a few intervening words: Free choice itself, as we have said, leans on God's help and needs his aid at every step, which you do not want; rather, you want the person who once has free choice to need no help from God.⁸

IIII. The resolution of this difficulty must be drawn principally from St. Augustine's writings against the Pelagians. To explain it, we must assume first that although Pelagius admitted some inward grace, whatever it may be, he ultimately destroyed it in fact, since, as St. Augustine reports, he asserted that grace is given according to our merits. For if it is from works, then grace (as the Apostle says) is no longer grace; but specifically, in book On the Grace of Christ Against Pelagius and Celestius, ch. 31, Augustine says: You say that grace, whatever you think it may be, is given to Christians themselves according to their merits, ⁹

Second, it must be observed that the heresy of Pelagius had four stages. In the first he denied every supernatural help and every inward grace of the supernatural order, both sufficient grace, which grants the ability, and efficacious grace, which infallibly grants pious action; he affirmed that the natural powers of free choice suffice for fulfilling all the commandments and for meriting and attaining eternal salvation. In the second stage he admitted that God's grace is bestowed on people to do his commandments; yet he asserted that this help consists in the external law and teaching, or even in Christ's example, and that it is necessary only so that a person might fulfill more easily through grace what he could do simply by nature. St. Augustine reports these two stages: The heresy of the Pelagians, he says, is the most recent heresy of our time, having arisen from the monk Pelagius, whom Celestius followed as his teacher so closely that their followers are now called Celestians.¹⁰ They are strenuous enemies of the grace of God by which we have been predestined to adoption as sons through Jesus Christ unto himself, and by which we are rescued from the power of darkness so that we may believe in him and be transferred into his kingdom;¹¹ for this reason he says, ‘No one comes to me unless it has been granted to him by my Father’; and of the love that is poured into our hearts so that faith works through love.¹² They are such enemies of it that they believe a person can do all the divine commandments without this grace, although, if that were true, the Lord would seem to have said in vain, ‘Without me you can do nothing.’¹³ Finally, Pelagius, rebuked by the brothers for attributing nothing to the help of God's grace in doing his commandments, yielded to their correction to this extent: he did not place grace before free choice, but with faithless cunning put it beneath free choice, saying, ‘Grace is given to people for this purpose: that what they are commanded to do by free choice they may fulfill more easily through grace’.

By saying that they may do it more easily, he certainly wanted it to be believed that people can, though with greater difficulty, still carry out God's commands without grace. But they say that the grace of God without which we can do nothing good is nothing except free choice, which our nature received from him without any preceding merits of its own, solely for this purpose—with his help through his law and teaching—that we may learn what we ought to do and what we ought to hope for; but not through the gift of the Holy Spirit, so that we may do what we have learned must be done. And so they confess that knowledge is given to us by God, by which ignorance is driven away; but they deny the love of God, by which one lives piously. Thus, although knowledge, which without love puffs up, is God's gift, they claim that love itself is not God's gift, even though it builds up so that knowledge may not puff up. ¹⁴

V.

The third stage of the Pelagian heresy was this: after long disputes with St. Augustine and the other Fathers, Pelagius at last admitted an inward grace that grants ability, namely, an internal illumination of the intellect and an internal prompting of the dormant will. Yet he always denied the grace by which God would bring it about that we will, and he always remained in the same error, believing that the inward grace he admitted as granting ability was not absolutely necessary, but only enabled a person more easily to fulfill the divine commandments through it. This third stage will become clear from what is to be set out in the first and second points concerning the Pelagian heresy.

The fourth stage of the Pelagian heresy was the one it had under Celestius. For, as will be clear in the third point, he admitted that the inward grace which Pelagius conceded in the third stage as granting ability was absolutely necessary—not indeed for beginning works of virtue, but for completing them. In this respect he moderated Pelagius's error to some extent; nevertheless, because he wished no inward grace to be necessary for beginning, he did not depart from the doctrine of Pelagius, who asserted that grace is given according to our merits.

Thus Pelagius, in certain statements, explained his final opinion, although concealing himself in hiding places by covering the old heresy with deceptive words rather than professing the true grace of Christ. Hence, by cleverly equivocating, he misled the judgment of many bishops at the Council of Palestine, as Augustine reports: He deceived the Palestinian judgment, he says, and for that reason there he seems to have been cleared. But he could not deceive the Roman Church in any way, where you know he is very well known. Although he tried both things, as I have said, he did not succeed at all.¹⁵ And again he says: The more artfully he explains these matters, the more secretly he deceives the judges.¹⁶ And after a few intervening words he adds: Finally, observe how he answers, and see how the hiding places of ambiguity prepare refuges for falsehood, casting darkness over the truth, so that even we, when we first read these things, almost rejoiced that they were right or corrected.¹⁷

And in book 1 of On the Grace of Christ Against Pelagius and Celestius, ch. 37, he reports these words of Pelagius.

Let them also read, he says, what we wrote in the East to the holy virgin of Christ, Demetrias, and they will find that we praise human nature in such a way that we always add the help of God's grace.

Considering this, St. Augustine says there: I certainly read that, and it had almost persuaded me that he professed this grace at issue, although in many places of that little work he seemed to contradict himself. But when other writings came into my hands, which he composed later and at greater length, I saw how he could have named grace even there, hiding what he thought beneath an ambiguous generality; yet by using the word “grace” he broke down hostility and avoided offense. ¹⁸

Hence Pelagius, as the same Augustine noted, exalted himself and boasted arrogantly and deceitfully that he had been cleared of his errors at the Council of Palestine. Yet it is absolutely certain that he covered himself by means that were more false than true, denying some things and turning others through false interpretation.¹⁹ Sometimes, too, as St. Augustine reports, he complained in letters about the Catholics, which he sent to Pope Innocent of blessed memory, saying that people were defaming him by claiming that he denied the sacrament of Baptism to infants and promised the kingdoms of heaven to some without Christ's redemption.²⁰ That crafty man did this so that he could easily answer the charge brought against him while preserving his own doctrine. But setting aside Pelagius's craftiness, let us set out his statements by which he seemed to cloak his heresy.

VI.

First, Pelagius conceded that an inward grace sent by God illuminates the intellect by showing what should be done and what should be avoided, and, on the part of the object, awakens a stunned will by attracting and persuading it. Nevertheless, he denied that this grace is absolutely necessary for fulfilling the precepts of the law; he said it gives a person only this: to fulfill more easily through grace what he could, simply though with difficulty, fulfill by nature. This is shown only from Pelagius's own words, which survive in St. Augustine's books. For Augustine reports that Pelagius says in one place: Here the most ignorant of men think that we do an injury to divine grace because we say that it does not bring holiness to completion in us without our will, as though God had commanded something of his grace but did not also supply the help of his grace to those whom he commanded, so that what people are commanded to do by free choice they might fulfill more easily through grace. And, as if about to explain what he means by grace, he went on and added, saying: We confess that grace is not, as you think, in the law alone, but also in God's help.²¹ Considering these words of Pelagius, St. Augustine says: Who would not want him to show what he wishes grace to be understood as? For above all, for this reason we ought to expect him to say what he says: that he confesses grace to be not only in the law. But while we are held in suspense by this expectation, observe what he has added. “God helps us,” he says, “through his teaching and revelation, when he opens the eyes of our heart; when he shows us future things, so that we are not occupied with present things; when he lays bare the snares of the Devil; when he illumines us with the many-formed and ineffable gift of heavenly grace.”²² Then, concluding his opinion with something like an absolution, he says: “Does the one who says this seem to you to deny grace? Or does he confess both human free choice and God's grace?”²³ From these words St. Augustine concludes that Pelagius professes the grace by which God shows and reveals what we ought to do, not the grace by which he gives and helps us to do it.²⁴ And elsewhere Pelagius says: He works in us the willing that is good, the willing that is holy: when he sets us, devoted to earthly desires and loving only present things like mute animals, on fire with the greatness of future glory and the promise of rewards; when, through the revelation of wisdom, he awakens the dormant will to desire God; when he persuades us of everything good—which elsewhere you do not hesitate to deny.²⁵ By these words he plainly concedes a grace that illuminates the intellect and moves the will by persuasion. That he is speaking of inward illumination, which comes from the Holy Spirit, is clear: for in the following chapter 11, when St. Augustine explains the Apostle's words, Lest the greatness of my revelations should exalt me, a thorn in my flesh was given to me, an angel of Satan to buffet me,²⁶ and that saying, Charity is not jealous, it is not puffed up,²⁷ he says: This charity, then, is still being renewed day by day even in the holy Apostle, surely to be perfected where it could no longer be puffed up. But then his mind was still in a state where it could be puffed up by the greatness of revelation, until it was filled by the solid structure of charity; for he had not yet grasped, by arriving at it, that toward which he was running through being perfected. By these words the holy Doctor refutes what Pelagius had said: namely, that God works in us to will and to bring to completion when, through the revelation of wisdom, he awakens the dormant will to desire himself, and when he persuades us of everything good. Augustine concludes that this revelation would also have puffed up the Apostle Paul unless charity had built him up. He therefore holds that Pelagius admitted an inward revelation of wisdom by which God himself shows what must be done and what avoided, but denied the grace by which he gives and helps us to do these things. Hence, in chapter 10 of the same book, St. Augustine says: It pertains to teaching also when wisdom is revealed; it pertains to teaching when one is persuaded of everything good. And if there seems to be some difference between teaching and persuading—or rather, exhorting—even this is included within the general meaning of teaching, which is conveyed in any words or writings. For the sacred Scriptures both teach and exhort; and human activity can also play a part in teaching and exhorting.²⁸ There he teaches clearly enough that inward revelation, by which the Holy Spirit inwardly shows what should be done and avoided without human ministry or activity, is included generally under the name of teaching. He also shows this in his writing to Vitalis and against Pelagius, arguing as follows: If, then, God were to prepare and work the human will in such a way that he applied only his law and teaching to that person's free choice, and did not by that high and secret calling so move his understanding that he directed his assent to that same law and teaching, then without doubt it would suffice to read it, or to understand it by reading, or even to explain and preach it.²⁹ But this argument would prove nothing against Pelagius unless he had conceded a revelation of wisdom not only external, through reading or preaching, but also internal, which comes immediately from God alone. For the meaning would be: If God worked in us to will only by persuading us through external teaching, it would suffice to read it, understand it through external reading, or likewise explain or preach it externally. It is clear that this argument would contain a useless repetition, by which St. Augustine would attack the same thing by means of itself.

VII. This is established still more explicitly by what the same Augustine wrote against Pelagius and Celestius in the same book, chapter 41. For, among other things that must be considered, he says: The help itself, by which he claims that natural capacity is helped, he places in the law and teaching, which he admits is also revealed to us by the Holy Spirit; for this reason he grants that the Holy Spirit ought to be worshiped.³⁰ From these words the strongest argument is drawn. Adoration is not owed to one who reveals the law and teaching only externally, for this can be done through the ministry of a human being or an angel. Since Pelagius confesses that the Holy Spirit is to be worshiped because he has revealed the teaching to us, it follows that he is speaking of an inward revelation, by which God alone teaches inwardly what we ought to do and what we ought to avoid. A little earlier in the same chapter Augustine had said: But in these four books too, whatever he seems to say in favor of grace, by which we are helped to turn from evil and do good, he says it in such a way that he never leaves the ambiguity of his words, which he can explain to his disciples so that he believes there is no help of grace by which natural capacity is helped except in the law and teaching. Thus he thinks that prayers themselves, as he most plainly affirms in his writings, are employed for no other purpose than that teaching be disclosed to us also through divine revelation, not so that the human mind be helped to complete through love and action what it has learned should be done. Let us examine the words “also through divine revelation”: they clearly indicate that Pelagius admitted an inward divine revelation. Hence Augustine himself concludes against Pelagius and Celestius as follows: Let them, then, read and understand, consider and acknowledge that God works in human hearts not by a law and teaching sounding outwardly, but by an inward, hidden, marvelous, and ineffable power—not only true revelations, but also good wills.³¹ Let us also examine the words “not only true revelations,” for they assume that Pelagius admitted true revelations and denied that good wills are brought about by God through the help of grace, making people willing instead of unwilling. This will become clearer from what is said below.

VIII. Second, Pelagius admitted an inward grace superadded to nature that grants ability. St. Augustine reports this; after citing some words of Pelagius, he explains his meaning as follows: Whenever we read or hear him confess the help of divine grace, so that we may turn from evil and do good, whether in the law and teaching or wherever else it has been established, let us understand what he is saying, and not err by understanding him otherwise than he thinks. For we must know that he does not believe either our will or our action is helped by divine aid, but only the capacity for willing and acting, which alone among these three he affirms we have from God, as though this were something weak that God himself placed in nature. But the other two, which he wanted to be ours, are so firm and strong and sufficient in themselves that they need none of his help; and so he does not help us to will, nor help us to act, but only helps us to be able to will and act.³² And in chapter 14 of the same book he adds: Pelagius places the ability to come in nature, or even, as he has now begun to say, in grace, whatever he may understand it to be. In the preceding words, to attack this teaching of Pelagius, he had set forth the following argument: For if this grace helped only our ability, the Lord would have said: “Everyone who has heard from the Father and learned can come to me.” But he did not say this; rather, he said: “Everyone who has heard from the Father and learned comes to me.”³³ In this Augustine clearly assumes that Pelagius admitted a grace that confers ability and denied the grace that confers coming to Christ and doing good. Moreover, the same point is proved as follows: in book On the Grace of Christ, ch. 25, St. Augustine proves against Pelagius and Celestius that God helps us by his grace and grants us not only the ability to do good but also the willing and the doing themselves. And in ch. 26 he says: Let him distinguish thought and love as they are to be distinguished, since knowledge puffs up and charity builds up, and knowledge does not puff up when charity builds up. And since both are God's gifts, though one is lesser and the other greater, let him not elevate our righteousness above the praise of our justifier, attributing to divine help what is lesser of these two, but what is greater let him claim as his own by human free choice. And in ch. 11 of the same book, On the Grace of Christ, explaining what grace Pelagius must confess if he does not wish to depart from the teaching of the Catholic Church, St. Augustine says: But we want them at last to confess that grace by which the greatness of future glory is not only promised but also believed and hoped for; wisdom is not only revealed but also loved; and not only is everything good recommended, but people are also persuaded of it. And below: Whose faith it is, and who are persuaded to come to him, he himself showed clearly enough when he said: “No one comes to me unless the Father who sent me draws him.” And a little later, when he was speaking of those who do not believe: “I told you,” you say, “that no one can come to me unless it has been given to him by my Father.”³⁴ Pelagius ought to confess this grace if he wishes not only to be called a Christian but also truly to be one. And in ch. 47 the same Augustine, identifying the difference between himself and Pelagius concerning the help of grace, speaks as follows: If, then, he agrees with us that not only a person's ability—even if he neither wills nor does good—but the will and action themselves are helped by God, so that without that help we will and do nothing good; and that this is the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord, in which he makes us righteous by his righteousness, not ours, so that our righteousness, which comes to us from him, is true righteousness, then, as far as I can see, no controversy between us will remain concerning the help of God's grace. Therefore it is a sign that Pelagius admitted inward grace that grants ability, but denied the help by which God brings it about that we will.

IX. Third, Celestius, Pelagius's disciple, said that grace which confers ability is absolutely necessary for the works of nature to reach the completion of virtue; by this means, moderating Pelagius's error to some extent, he thought he preserved a place for grace. This is clear from St. Augustine, who says: They thought this was to be brought against us: that we say God inspires in a person who is unwilling and resisting the desire not merely for any good, but even for good itself in its imperfect form. Perhaps, then, at least in this way they preserve a place for grace: they think a person can have a desire for good, though imperfect, without it; but that a desire for perfect good is not merely had more easily through it, but cannot be had at all except through it. Yet even so they say that God's grace is given according to our merits, a claim which Pelagius condemned in the East for fear of being condemned by ecclesiastical proceedings. For if desire for good begins in us by ourselves, without God's grace, the beginning itself will be a merit to which grace comes as help due, as if by debt; and thus God's grace will not be given freely, but our merit will be paid.³⁵ And elsewhere, arguing against Julian, who located the beginning of a good work in nature but attributed its perfection and completion to grace, Augustine says: Since, then, a person is helped by God, he is helped not merely to attain perfection, which is what you posited—wanting, of course, it to be understood that he himself begins without grace what grace completes—but rather in the way the Apostle speaks: “May he who began a good work in you bring it to completion to the end.” For in the very respect in which you would have a person, as you put it, be stirred by impulses of a generous heart to something praiseworthy, you do not want him to boast in the Lord but in free choice; and in this way he gives first so that it may be repaid to him, and grace is no longer grace, because it is not given freely.³⁶³⁷ Nevertheless, as was said above, although at the third stage of his heresy Pelagius admitted an inward illumination and prompting of grace that grants ability, he never wished to concede that it was absolutely necessary for fulfilling the commandments, but only that it made this easier. St. Augustine expressly attests this in book 2 of Against the Two Letters of the Pelagians, ch. 8, when he says: These men, namely Julian and Celestius, want the desire for good to begin in a person by that person himself, so that the merit of this beginning may obtain even the grace of completing it—if indeed that is what they want. For Pelagius says that what is good is fulfilled more easily if grace helps. By this addition—that is, by adding “more easily”—he indicates that this is his view: even if the help of grace is absent, a person can fulfill what is good through free choice, though with greater difficulty.

X. Hence, wherever St. Thomas reports Pelagius's error, he explains it only by saying that Pelagius thought the beginning of acting well comes from us, but its completion and perfection come from God, as may be seen in 1. p. q. 23. art. 5. in corp. 2. 2. q. 6. art. 1. in corp. 3. contra Gent. c. 149. quodl. 1. art. 7. in corp. ad Rom. 7. lect. 3. in fin. et 2. ad Cor. 3. lectione 1. in fin. et ad Ephes. 1. lect. 1. etiam fine. ³⁸

XI. Fourth, the Pelagians, at least Julian, admitted divine grace as help subsequent to the determination of created free choice, in such a way, namely, that a person begins first in the order of nature and the help of grace follows later in the order of nature, through which the person is helped by God in the very act. This is proved from Julian's own words, which St. Augustine reports: We defend man as the work of God, and say that he is not compelled by that power to begin either evil or good, but by his own will either to do good or evil; in a good work, however, he is always helped by God's grace, while in evil he is incited by the Devil's suggestions.³⁹ In reply, the holy Doctor says: But you think a person is helped by God's grace in a good work in such a way that you believe that God does nothing in arousing his will to that very good work, as your own words make clear. For why did you not say that a person is stirred by God's grace to a good work, just as you said he is incited to evil by the Devil's suggestions? Instead, you said that in a good work he is always helped by God's grace, as though a person who began a good work by his own will, without any grace of God, were now helped divinely in the work itself on account, evidently, of the merits of his good will, so that grace owed is repaid, not given as an unowed gift; and thus grace is no longer grace.⁴⁰ The same point is clear from other words of those same Pelagians, which the same St. Augustine reports in book 2 of Against the Two Letters of the Pelagians: These, he says, are your words: we confess that Baptism is necessary at every age, and that grace also helps each person's good purpose, but does not instill zeal for virtue in one who resists, because there is no favoritism with God.⁴¹ And again he says: They say that they confess that grace also helps each person's good purpose, but does not instill zeal for virtue in one who resists. They say this as though a person has a good purpose and zeal for virtue from himself, without God's help, and by the preceding merit of these is worthy to be helped by the grace of God that follows.⁴²

XII. From these points the Pelagians inferred their fifth dictum, namely, that this causal proposition is true: because I first willed, God willed; because I will, God helps me.⁴³ But this proposition is false: because God wills, I will; because God helps a person, the person wills. In this way they always assign the prior role to free choice and leave the later role to God. St. Augustine reports this dictum in writing to Vitalis, when he says: You recognize, I think, that among the things I said we know, I did not wish to mention everything pertaining to the Catholic faith, but only those things that pertain to this question about God's grace being debated between us: whether this grace precedes or follows the human will—that is, to put it more plainly, whether it is given to us because we will, or whether through it God also brings it about that we will.⁴⁴ Hence, attacking this Pelagian assertion in book 3 of the Hypognosticon, he says: In every holy work, then, God's will is prior and free choice's is later; that is, God works and the human being cooperates. But if you say, as you are accustomed to say, “Because I first willed, God willed,” you already make this a merit, so that grace is no longer grace from works, but a reward. As will be clear below, the Semi-Pelagians also maintained this causal proposition.⁴⁵ In what sense they understood it will be explained in disputations 99 and 100.

XIII. Pelagius's sixth dictum is this: if it is asserted that God's grace precedes human merits and makes the unwilling willing, then by such grace the freedom of human choice is destroyed and fatal necessity is introduced. Pelagius often brought this objection against St. Augustine, as is clear from book 2 of Against the Two Letters of the Pelagians, ch. 5, where St. Augustine replies to Pelagius's calumnies: We do not assert fate under the name of grace, because we say that God's grace is preceded by no human merits. A little later, after repeating some words of the Pelagians cited above, he adds: From these words of theirs I understood why they either think or want others to think that we assert fate under the name of grace: because we say God's grace is not given according to our merits, but according to his own most merciful will, who said, “I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will show compassion to whom I am compassionate.”⁴⁶ Speaking against Julian, he says: You say that we claim people are made good by fatal necessity under the name of grace. A little later he adds: You falsely accuse me of saying that no effort should be expected from the human will, contrary to that Gospel where the Lord says: “Ask and you will receive; seek and you will find; knock and it will be opened to you.”⁴⁷⁴⁸ And Jerome, writing to Ctesiphon, says: As for your tossing about the claim that we destroy free choice, hear in reply that those destroy the freedom of choice who misuse it against the benefaction of the giver.⁴⁹ Who destroys choice? The one who always gives thanks to God and refers whatever was in his own little stream back to its source? Or the one who says, “Depart from me, because I am clean; I do not need you: for you once gave me the freedom of choice to do whatever I wish”? Why do you thrust yourself in again, so that I can do nothing unless you complete your gifts in me? You fraudulently put forward this pretext so as to refer God's grace to man's creation and avoid seeking God's help in each work, lest you seem to lose free choice, while, scorning God's support, you seek the help of men.

This was always the Achilles of all the Pelagians, by which they boasted that they triumphed over the defenders of grace and by which they tried to cloak their heresy: under the pretext of defending the rights of human freedom, they declared an internal war against the grace of God through which we are freed from death. But how ineffective their argument is will become clear below.

XIIII. Pelagius's seventh dictum is this: when the Apostle says that God works in us both to will and to accomplish, this is understood as an operation through the illumination of the intellect and the awakening of a stunned will, by which God persuades it of what is good. This is proved only from Pelagius's explicit words, which St. Augustine reports in his book On the Grace of Christ Against Pelagius and Celestius, ch. 10, where he says: For in another place, after asserting at length that a good will is produced in us by ourselves, not by God's help, Pelagius posed a question against himself from the Apostle's letter and said: “And how will that saying of the Apostle stand? For it is God who works in us both to will and to accomplish.”⁵⁰ Then, to resolve this objection, which he saw was strongly contrary to his doctrine, he went on and added: “He works in us the willing that is good, the willing that is holy: when he sets us, devoted to earthly desires and loving only present things like mute animals, on fire with the greatness of future glory and the promise of rewards; when through the revelation of wisdom he awakens the dormant will to desire God; for he persuades us of everything good—which elsewhere you do not hesitate to deny.” Pelagius interprets other similar passages of Scripture in the same way, passages in which the conversion of a human being is attributed to God, such as John 6: No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him.⁵¹ And Isaiah 26: You have done all our works for us, and other such passages.

XV. From this dictum the Pelagians inferred that God works in us to will as far as lies in him; but to consent or dissent to him is so much our own that, if we will, it happens, whereas if we are unwilling, we bring it about that God's operation benefits us in no way. St. Augustine reports this dictum in referring to and refuting the Pelagian error, saying: What, then, is the meaning of the Apostle's saying, “God works in us both to will and to accomplish”? You reply that God works through his law and Scripture so that we will, through the Scripture that we either read or hear. But our consenting to it or not consenting is so much our own that, if we will, it happens; if we do not will, we make God's operation of no use to us. For he works, you say, as much as lies in him, so that we will when his sayings are known to us; but if we do not wish to acquiesce in them, we make his operation of no benefit to us. If you say this, you surely contradict our prayers. ⁵²

XVI. The Pelagians' eighth dictum was that the cause of divine predestination is on our side, namely, merits foreseen and begun by the powers of nature. St. Augustine attributes this error to the Pelagians, saying: He foresaw, therefore, (Pelagius says) who would be holy and spotless through the free choice of their will; and therefore, before the foundation of the world, in his own foreknowledge he chose those whom he foresaw would be such. “He chose them,” he says, “before they existed, predestining as sons those whom he foresaw would be holy and spotless”; he himself did not make them so, nor foresee that he would do so, but foresaw that they would be so.⁵³ And St. Thomas, reporting the same error of the Pelagians, says: There were others, then, who said that merits existing beforehand in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians held that the beginning of doing good comes from us, but its completion comes from God; and so it happens that the effect of predestination is given to one person and not another, because one made a beginning by preparing himself and the other did not.⁵⁴ It is true that Pelagius asserted that the effect of predestination is bestowed on the predestined because of a foreseen future good use of free choice arising from the faculty of nature alone, and not from the efficacious help of prevenient grace. Yet in the end he admitted inward teaching and revelation through which God would persuade a person what ought to be done and what ought to be avoided, as was said above.

All these matters will be refuted below, and the mind of the Pelagians will at the same time be made clearer.

XVII. The ninth dictum contains the twelve articles charged against Pelagius at the Synod of Palestine; if he had not anathematized them, he himself would surely have been anathematized. The first is that Adam would have died whether he sinned or did not sin. The second, that Adam's sin harmed Adam alone and not the human race. The third, that newborn infants are in the state in which Adam was before his transgression. The fourth, that neither through Adam's death or transgression does the whole human race die, nor through Christ's resurrection does the whole human race rise again. The fifth, that even unbaptized infants have eternal life. The sixth, that baptized rich people, unless they renounce everything, are not credited with any good they may seem to do and cannot possess the kingdom of God. The seventh, that God's grace and help are not given for each individual act, but consist in free choice or in the law and teaching. The eighth, that God's grace is given according to our merits. The ninth, that people cannot be called children of God unless they have been made entirely without sin. The tenth, that free choice does not exist if it needs God's help, since each person has it in his own will to do something or not to do it. The eleventh, that our victory comes not from God's help but from free choice. The twelfth, that pardon is not given to those who repent according to God's grace and mercy, but according to the merit and labor of those who through penance have become worthy of mercy. St. Augustine reports these errors of Pelagius in Letter 106, where he also shows that such assertions contradict the teaching the Catholic Church has always held, as will become still clearer from the course of this work.

In reply to the first argument, it is answered that Pelagius did indeed admit an inward grace that conferred a certain ability, but denied that it was absolutely necessary for fulfilling the divine commandments. Pelagius's followers, Julian and Celestius, however, as was shown above, conceded that this inward illumination of the intellect and awakening of the will were absolutely necessary for the perfection of a work. Nevertheless, there still remains that in which the Semi-Pelagians, of whom Augustine spoke in ch. 1 of On the Predestination of the Saints, are distinguished from them.

For the Pelagians, as was said above, placed in nature the first beginning of faith and good works, attributing only their completion and perfection to divine grace. But the Semi-Pelagians distinguished between faith and the good works that follow faith, and said that the first beginning of faith comes from us but the beginning of good works comes from grace—which they nevertheless asserted is given to believers on account of the merit of faith. This is clear from St. Augustine in the same book On the Predestination of the Saints, where he expressly shows against the Semi-Pelagians that even the first beginning of the faith by which we are Christians comes from God, not from us.⁵⁵ They also differ in this: the Semi-Pelagians, as Augustine says in ch. 1 of the same book, confessed with the Church of Christ that the human race is born subject to the sin of the first man, and that no one is freed from this evil except through the righteousness of the second man. Pelagius and Celestius, however, stubbornly denied this, as Augustine himself makes clear in the books published against them. In these matters, then, Augustine teaches that the Semi-Pelagians differ greatly from the error of the Pelagians. But this will be discussed more fully in the next disputation, where we shall report the statements of the Semi-Pelagians.⁵⁶

In reply to the second point, the distinction assigned concerning the four stages of Pelagius's heresy must be applied. Against the first stage, the Councils and Fathers determined that grace must be admitted as necessary for salvation, and that nature alone does not suffice to fulfill all God's precepts. Against the second stage of the same heresy, they taught that the help of grace by which God helps us to fulfill his commandments does not consist in the law alone, or in external teaching, or in the example Christ the Lord left us, but that inward grace must be admitted. Against the third stage, they determined that this inward grace is necessary absolutely, not merely for a better state or for acting more easily. Against the fourth, they decreed that inward grace is absolutely necessary, not only to show and teach what should be believed or done, but to grant and help us to do it. St. Prosper calls this grace pre-operating grace;⁵⁷ in common usage it is called efficacious prevenient grace, through which God actively and properly causes us to will and to act piously, and from these points the answer to the confirmation is clear. But there is still an argument: the Councils and Fathers say that Pelagius admitted no true grace. Yet inward grace that illuminates the intellect and awakens the stunned will is true grace. Therefore Pelagius did not admit it.

The reply is that, since Pelagius asserted that grace is given according to our merits, even while conceding an inward grace that illuminates the intellect, awakens the will, and helps the ability itself, he truly admitted no grace. Indeed, even if he had admitted efficacious grace, or grace that helps the willing itself, by saying that grace is given according to our merits he would have destroyed the whole nature of grace; for if it is from works, as the Apostle argues, it is no longer grace.⁵⁸ Hence Augustine says in his book On the Grace of Christ Against Pelagius and Celestius, ch. 31: Whatever he thinks grace to be, he says that it is given to Christians themselves according to their merits. By these words Augustine signifies that any grace Pelagius conceded is destroyed if it is asserted that it is given according to our merits.

XIX. In reply to the third point, it is answered that in the first stage of his heresy Pelagius denied the grace given to us through the ministration of the Spirit; but in the second or third stage he admitted an inward grace by which the intellect is illuminated and the will awakened, as was said above. A second answer is that inward grace by which God shows and reveals what we ought to do, but does not give and help us to do it, pertains to the law and teaching, even if they are inward, as St. Augustine shows in the passages cited above; it does not pertain to the ministration of the Spirit, which Pelagius intended to deny.⁵⁹ For although inward revelation and teaching, which shows what we ought to do and what to avoid, takes place in us through the Holy Spirit, who teaches a person knowledge, nevertheless it is included under a certain general heading, under the letter that kills, not under the Spirit who gives life.⁶⁰ But the grace that helps our weakness and gives strength to the will, so that we do what we have learned must be done, pertains to the ministration of the Spirit. Of it the Apostle says: The Spirit helps our weakness, for we do not know what we ought to pray for as we ought, but the Spirit himself intercedes for us, that is, makes us pray, as St. Thomas explains,⁶¹ with inexpressible groanings.⁶² By these words he plainly indicates that the grace which not only teaches what we ought to ask for or do, but also grants that we ask and do, pertains to the ministration of the Spirit. Pelagius always denied this grace, as was said above. Therefore, when Augustine says that Pelagius denied the grace given to us through the ministration of the Holy Spirit, he is speaking of the grace by which God not only shows what we ought to do, but also gives and helps us to do it. This explanation follows from the very context, especially from those words of Augustine cited in the third argument, in which he asserts that Pelagius thought people are saved with help, not through any ministration of power, but by the powers of their own will. If these words are joined to those of St. Augustine also cited in the same argument—namely, that which pertains through the ministration of the Spirit to conquering desires and temptations—it will be clear that grace given through the ministration of the Spirit means the same as grace that supplies strength to conquer desires and temptations. But illumination, or teaching alone, even when inward, and the awakening of a stunned will, which Pelagius admitted, do not give the will strength to fulfill the divine commandments, because they move it only on the part of the object, by proposing and teaching what it ought to do. Hence they do not pertain to the grace given through the ministration of the Spirit. This can be explained by a very apt example. If someone were asleep and also infirm, with no feet, and thus had absolutely no power to walk, and were in great danger from which he could escape only by fleeing, then simply waking him by another person and warning him of the danger so that he might flee and run from imminent death would supply him no strength to flee; with respect to the power of walking, he would remain just as unable to run as if he had not been awakened from sleep and taught about the danger. We must think proportionately about the inward illumination and awakening on the part of the object that Pelagius admitted. This is what St. Augustine meant when he said Pelagius had never conceded a grace by which not only the natural capacity of the will and action, but the will and action themselves, are helped by the ministration of the Holy Spirit. From these words it is quite clear that Pelagius did not deny every kind of grace, but the grace given to us so that we do the good we know:

XX. But there is an argument against this solution. It follows that habitual grace, and likewise the habit of charity, does not pertain to the grace given through the ministration of the Spirit, but to the law and teaching. The consequence is proved as follows: through such habits God does not cause us to act, nor does he work so that we act, since a habit does not determine a power to act. Therefore, if only the grace by which God gives and causes us to act pertains to the ministration of the Spirit, the habits of grace and charity will pertain to the law and teaching, and not to the grace given through the ministration of the Spirit.

The consequence is denied. For through grace and charity the Holy Spirit dwells in us, according to what Christ the Lord says through John: If anyone loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him and make our dwelling with him.⁶³ Although through habitual grace alone, or through the habit of charity, God does not cause us to act, nevertheless he causes us to have spiritual life and grants a sufficient efficient principle of supernatural operation. For through habitual grace he makes us children of God, and through habitual charity he makes us lovers of God; therefore they pertain to the grace given through the ministration of the Spirit.⁶⁴ But the illumination of the intellect and the awakening of the will that the Pelagians admitted accomplish none of these things, nor do they give the will strength, as will be clear in Disputation 75; hence the cases are not similar.

Second, I answer that although habits of grace and charity do not determine a person to act piously, nevertheless, in the very infusion of grace and charity, God moves that person's free choice with efficacious help, so that the person consents and freely cooperates with God, disposing himself by his own act toward his justification, as St. Thomas teaches in Prima Secundae, q. 113, art. 8. Hence habitual grace and charity do not pertain to the oldness of the letter, or to the law and teaching, but to the life-giving⁶⁵ and renewing Spirit.

In reply to the confirmation, I answer: I conclude that the confirmation of itself establishes effectively that Pelagius's opinion involves a contradiction in what he says: since he asserted that grace is given according to our merits, he destroyed the true nature of grace, which, as was said above, he placed in the illumination of the intellect and the inward awakening of the will.⁶⁶ St. Augustine noted this or a similar contradiction in Pelagius's writings, in book On the Grace of Christ, ch. 37, when he says: That letter, certainly, namely the letter to Demetrias, I read, and it had persuaded me that he confessed this grace at issue, although in many places of that little work he seemed to contradict himself. And in ch. 31 of the same book he says: Whatever grace he thinks it to be, he says that it is given to Christians themselves according to their merits. And below: It is clear that he says grace is given according to merits, whatever it may be or whatever he means by it, although he does not express it openly. It is as if he said more plainly: whatever grace Pelagius proposes, he ultimately destroys it when he asserts that it is given according to our merits.

XXI. In reply to the fourth point, it is answered that Pelagius never denied that, for acts of the natural order, God, as author of nature, must exercise his influence together with us when we wish to act. He denied only the necessity of God's help by which God works so that we may work, because he thought the freedom of choice would be destroyed if a person could do nothing unless God moved him beforehand and acted beforehand.⁶⁷ For Pelagius knew very well that if God's help and concurrence were posterior in the order of nature to the determination of created free choice—in such a way, namely, that this causal proposition were true: “Because a person acts, God cooperates”—the freedom of that free choice would not be harmed. From the words of St. Jerome cited above, it is concluded only that Pelagius denied the necessity for our acts of the help by which God works in us and with us so that we may act. This is clearly gathered from the very context, especially the words cited in the sixth dictum: for the Pelagians were calumniating Jerome and Augustine because they said that all our good works must be referred to God as their first author and source, on whom they first and principally depend, and because they preached that a person can do nothing unless God completes his gifts in him. This is clear from those words of the Pelagians reported by St. Jerome: Why do you thrust yourself in again, so that I can do nothing unless you complete your gifts in me? By these words he was trying to remove that help of God from consideration by which God completes the operative power of created free choice, moving and applying it to the exercise of the act; this will be treated expressly in Disputation 18 and the four that follow. The words of St. Jerome in the same letter also indicate this, when he says: They place grace, namely, the Pelagians, in such a way that we do not rely on his help and are not guided by it in each act. And again: Do you think an injury is done to you and the freedom of choice destroyed if you always have recourse to God as author, depend on his will, and say, “My eyes are always toward the Lord, for he will draw my feet out of the snare”?⁶⁸ Hence you even dare to say with reckless tongue that each person is ruled by his own choice. If he is ruled by his own choice, where is God's help? If he does not need Christ as guide, how does Jeremiah write, “A person's way is not in himself, and a man's steps are directed by the Lord”?⁶⁹⁷⁰

From these points it is clear that Pelagius did not deny that the simultaneous concurrence of the First Cause is necessary for the things we do, but only denied the necessity of God's prior help for each of our acts, namely, God's direction and governance—the very thing the Church asks for when it says: Deign, Lord God, King of heaven and earth, to direct and sanctify, rule and govern today our hearts and bodies, our senses, words, and acts in your law and in the works of your commandments, so that here and forever, with your help, we may merit to be always safe and free. For he thought that free choice was injured if it were ruled and governed not by itself but by the Lord.

Hence many learned men, most deeply versed in the teaching of St. Augustine—including Gaspar Casalius of Coimbra, who attended the sacred Council of Trent, in book 1 of On the Fourfold Justice, ch. 36—explicitly admit that Pelagius never denied God's general influx. Casalius's words are these: Pelagius did not deny general influx. A little further below: Pelagius did indeed confess the grace of creation: among human beings, human nature, human will, and the general influx of God common to all agents. And a little later: Did he perhaps deny that general influx is necessary for human beings to act well?

This has not yet been learned, nor is it believed of him himself; for he could not have thought so unless he had first been foolish. How can a secondary cause act without the concurrence of the first cause?⁷¹ Even granting, but not conceding, that Pelagius did not admit God's general concurrence, there can nevertheless be no doubt that he admitted God's subsequent concurrence, or help, after the determination of the created will, as is clear from the passages of St. Augustine cited in n. 11 of this disputation. Hence, in the Enchiridion to Laurentius, ch. 32, Augustine clearly presupposes that the Pelagians thought that this was said for this reason: “It is not of him who wills or of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy”; because it comes from both, that is, from the human will and God's mercy, and so forth. It is as if one were to say: the human will alone does not suffice unless God's mercy is also present. And in the same place the holy Doctor argues that something more must be attributed to grace. This will be treated in Disputation 97, especially n. 6, where we shall examine St. Augustine's words more fully.