Tractatus de vera et legitima concordia liberi arbitrii creati cum auxiliis gratiae Dei

1. — The principal question therefore is whether it is the same and one aid which, with respect to the conversion of the mind to God, whether through faith or through charity, is called sufficient and efficacious.

It is argued first for the affirmative side. For if there is always another efficacious aid by which man consents to God, distinct from every other which he received before he consented, it follows that no other beforehand had been sufficient. The consequence is patent, since if every other still needs another efficacious aid, it was not sufficient for effecting.

2. — It is argued secondly. Since if every man who is not converted does not receive that efficacious aid necessary for conversion, he would be excused from sin. The sequel is proved. Since no one can be bound to the impossible; but it is impossible for man to be converted without that aid: therefore as long as that aid is not given to him, he will be excused from sin.

But you will say: by his fault he does not have that aid. On the contrary it is proved that not having that aid is not a new fault. Since it is not in his power to obtain it, but it is only in the power of the divine mercy freely to confer it on those whom He efficaciously converts to Himself: therefore it is not denied to man by his fault.

And it is confirmed. God has decided not to give to the man who is not converted that efficacious aid: therefore it does not stand through man that he does not have it.

3. — Thirdly it is argued. Since it seems cruel to bind man to an act for exercising which he has no necessary principle, nor is it in his power to do anything by which he may obtain it. Nor does it avail to answer that he ask from God, for even for that prayer he needs efficacious aid. Therefore either there must be process to infinity, or it must be said that he already has a sufficient principle for eliciting the act without another efficacious aid; but that sufficient aid will become efficacious through the consent of free choice.

4. — It is argued fourth from that celebrated testimony of Matthaei (11,21): Woe to you Bethsaida, woe to you Corozain, for if in Tyre and Sidon there had been done the mighty works which have been done in you, they would long ago have done penance in sackcloth and ashes. From which testimony I argue thus: if the divine aid which was given to the Jews did not suffice so that with it alone the Tyrians and Sidonians would be converted, but another aid which is called efficacious were necessary, the conditional uttered by Christ the Lord would not be verified. For neither would the Tyrians and Sidonians have done penance any more than those cities which the Lord reproaches. For Corozain and Bethsaida could have answered: if to Tyre and Sidon You had given nothing more than to us, neither would they do penance.

5. — Finally it is argued from the testimony of St. Augustine in the book On Predestination and Grace, ch. 15, where he compares Pharaoh with Nabuchodonosor, and makes them equal as to all things, both on their part and on the part of God, and concludes: «What therefore made their ends diverse, except that one, feeling the hand of God, groaned in recollection of his own iniquity, while the other with free choice fought against the most merciful truth of God?»

And it is confirmed from St. Gregory in the homily on those invited to the wedding, where he refers the difference why some came to the wedding and some did not come to the diversity of the effects of those who were invited, not to the difference of the calling. Which St. Augustine also seems to confirm in the book of the Eighty-three Questions, q. 68 near the end where, speaking of those called to the supper (Luc., 14,16-24), he says thus: «For to that supper which the Lord says in the Gospel was prepared, neither did all who were called will to come, nor could those who came have come unless they were called. Therefore neither ought those who came attribute it to themselves, since being called they came; nor ought those who refused to come attribute it to another, but only to themselves, since that they might come they were called in free will». So much for Augustine. Where he seems to hold that the aid of the calling of the grace of God was equal to both.

Further it is confirmed from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 4, where it is defined: «If anyone shall have said that the free choice of man, moved and aroused by God, cooperates nothing by assenting to God arousing and calling, whereby it disposes itself to obtain the grace of justification, nor can dissent if it wills, but … is disposed merely passively, let him be anathema». Hence it is argued: therefore with any aid whatever standing, it can stand at once that man dissents; and consequently there is no efficacious aid of God distinct from the sufficient, but that same aid will be efficacious if man consents, and not efficacious if man does not consent.

6. — This question demanded more time than is available to us in a few lectures. Let what we said be seen On the First Part, q. 23, a. 3, doubt 3, and in the Second of the Second, q. 10, a. 2, doubt 2, document 3.

Now proceeding summarily, let the first conclusion be: A distinction of the aid of the grace of God into sufficient aid and into efficacious aid is necessary. This distinction the authors of the new concord also admit, at least in word. And although this distinction is not found expressly in St. Thomas, nevertheless it is found virtually both in St. Thomas and in St. Augustine. For St. Augustine says most often that to the first man it was given to be able to persevere, but not to persevere, and it was given that he could not sin, but it was not given that he would not sin. It has a foundation also in the similar speech of theologians concerning the merit and redemption of Christ.

For they say that Christ the Lord satisfied for the sins of all men as to the sufficiency of merit and satisfaction, yet He did not merit for all that it be applied as to efficacy; since for many in fact the satisfaction and redemption of Christ has not been applied, and for fewer as to the salvation of eternal life. For in this way only for the predestined has the redemption of Christ the Savior been applied, according to that: Father, those whom You gave Me, I have lost none of them (Ioan., 18,9). And of sheep of this kind He said: No one shall snatch them from My hand (Ioan., 10,28). In this way of speaking the Apostle said of Christ that He is the Savior of all, especially of the faithful (I Tim., 4,10). By which words he declares both the universal sufficiency of the redemption of Christ and the efficacy in some. Which efficacy is also explained by the words of our theme when Paul says: But may the God of peace fit you in every good, that you may do His will, doing in you what is well-pleasing before Him. Let Augustine be seen in the book On the Predestination of the Saints and On the Gift of Perseverance.

But that this distinction of aid be better understood, it is to be noted that then aid is called efficacious when it has a concomitant effect. I do not say because it has, but when it has, and in this all agree. But that effect can be twofold: for sometimes it is with the consent of free choice, but sometimes it is not with the consent of free choice. Now our distinction is understood of efficacious aid in the first way, with which standing, man freely either believes or is converted to God.

For if it is understood in the second way, let the second conclusion be: Every aid of the grace of God is efficacious for some effect to which it is sent from the absolute good pleasure of the divine will. E.g., sudden illuminations and inspirations of the mind have some effect, while man is aroused and invited by certain vital actions to the supernatural end. This doctrine is that of St. Thomas in 1. 2, q. 112, a. 3, where he says that preparation can be considered in two ways. And he says that if it is considered according as it is from God moving, it has necessity for that to which it is ordered by God, not indeed of coercion, but of infallibility, since the intention of God cannot fail. Whence if it is from the intention of God moving that the man whose heart He moves obtain grace, he infallibly obtains it; and such aid is called by us efficacious.

7. — Note secondly that when we distinguish sufficient and efficacious aid we speak of a sufficiency which is not yet conjoined with the free effect, although of itself it is ordered to it. For otherwise the division would not be good.

Speaking therefore thus of sufficient and efficacious aid, let the third conclusion be: Efficacious aid is really distinguished from sufficient.

This conclusion is against Molina and Suarez. Against Molina indeed, who expressly holds in his Concordia, p. 232, that «the division of the sufficiency of aid into efficacious and inefficacious is taken from the effect»; and that the same aid, «whether greater or less, which is sufficient, is called efficacious when with it choice for its freedom is converted»; and that it is in our free power to render the divine aids efficacious, by consenting and cooperating with them, or to render them inefficacious by withholding consent.

Similarly against Suarez, who in bk. 3 On Aids, especially from ch. 14, posits nothing real intrinsic in sufficient aid that it become efficacious, and at length concludes in ch. 20 that the same really identical aid of grace is called greater because it is given at an opportune time. But he considers this opportuneness of time on the part of the individual, insofar as God foreknew that that singular man, if at that time he received aid, would consent and operate with it. And there he defends Molina, who said absolutely that one man with equal aid operates and another not; since among the wise that assertion is understood of equal powers on the part of the principle, and not on the part of the concurrence of God, which he thinks to be the very action of man. They hold therefore that between sufficient aid and efficacious there is no real difference, but only a moral one, which comes from the opportuneness of time, on the supposition of the foreknowledge of God, who foreknew that man constituted in such a time with such aids would operate, and mercifully willed to constitute him in such circumstances.

Nevertheless our conclusion is proved from that egregious testimony of the first ad Cor., 4 (v. 7): For who distinguishes you? But what do you have that you did not receive? And if you received it, why do you glory as if you had not received it? In which place, as St. Augustine says in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 5, the Apostle speaks most evidently against human pride, «lest anyone glory in man, and consequently not in himself, but in the Lord». And he says: «Is it through these gifts which are common to all men that men are distinguished from men?» As if he said, not at all. And he subjoins: For the Apostle said: For who distinguishes you? And because inflated man could say, «my justice distinguishes me, my faith, or if anything else», meeting such thoughts the good doctor added: But what do you have that you did not receive? From whom except from Him who distinguishes you from another, to whom He did not give what He gave to you?». So much for him. From which I argue thus: if the aid of efficacious grace is not really distinguished from sufficient aid, it follows that he who is converted can glory in himself, saying: nothing real more has been given to me than to another, but I have added something real by which I distinguished myself from another. Therefore the good use of sufficient aid he does not receive from the grace of God, but from the powers of his free choice. He has used that sufficient aid well, and consequently he really distinguishes himself, and is not really distinguished by God.

8. — But they say that God distinguishes him morally, insofar as He gave equal and sometimes less aid really and entitatively at the opportune time, in which He foreknew from the property of his free choice that he would consent and use the sufficient aid well.

But on the contrary is what Augustine at once says in ch. 6: «Many hear the word of truth, but some believe, others contradict. The former therefore will to believe, but the latter refuse. Who is ignorant of this? who denies this? But since for some the will is prepared by the Lord, for others it is not prepared, it must in any case be discerned what comes from His mercy, what from His judgment».

From this it is patent that it does not suffice to posit opportuneness of time, that God be said really to prepare the will of one and not of another. Nor again does it avail to answer that that aid given at the opportune time in which God foreknew that man from the property of his choice would use it well was a greater mercy. First indeed since this opportuneness and that foreknowledge does not argue a real distinction of those men on the part of God, and consequently we have our point, that God does not really distinguish the believer from the non-believer; and consequently he alone who wills to believe really distinguishes himself from another through the powers of free choice alone, and will be able to glory in himself and of himself. Nor finally will it avail to answer that free choice itself at once with sufficient aid is given and reserved by God the author of nature and of grace: both because that answer was partly that of Pelagius, and also because in that which is to have free choice the believer is not distinguished from the non-believer. But in that which is to conserve sufficient aid in one and not in another, they give no reason on the part of God, but on the part of man.

There is another egregious testimony of St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, ch. 32, where explaining that of the Apostle ad Rom., 9 (v. 16), Therefore it is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy, he himself moves the question how the Apostle says it is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy, «when without doubt, if a man of the age now to use reason cannot believe, hope, and love unless he wills, nor arrive at the palm of the supernal calling of God unless the will concur». And he answers that therefore it was said not of him who wills nor of him who runs, because the will itself is prepared by God. And that he may more explain this solution of the question, he refutes a certain false solution, namely that «therefore it was said, not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy, because it comes about from both, that is from the will of man and the mercy of God, so that the sense be, not of him who wills nor of him who runs, that is the will of man alone does not suffice, unless there be also the mercy of God». Which solution is that of Anastasius of Nicaea in the book of Questions on Scripture, q. 55, and of Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 31. See Suarez bk. 3, ch. 9, n. 7.

But Augustine replies against this solution: «If therefore it was said not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy, because the will of man alone does not fulfill it, why shall it not rightly be said also on the contrary, it is not of God who shows mercy, but of man who wills, because the mercy of God alone does not fulfill it?» Augustine therefore concludes that, «just as no Christian will dare to say, it is not of God who shows mercy, but of man who wills …, it is necessary that therefore it be rightly understood to have been said, not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy, that the whole be given to God, who both prepares the good will of man to be aided, and aids it having been prepared», so indeed that the good will be counted among the gifts of a merciful God, according to that of Ps. 58 (v. 11): His mercy shall go before me. So much for Augustine.

In whose doctrine note first, that he calls the good will the very good action of free choice by which it uses the aid of God well.

Note secondly how he distinguishes between the preparation, and this good will, and the assistance of God for it. For he says, that the whole be given to God showing mercy, not as to the creator conserving free choice, but as to the savior who both prepares the good will of man to be aided, and aids it having been prepared. Behold he distinguishes preparation and assistance, two different aids. Otherwise if it is the same aid, we could say He prepares what is to be prepared, and aids what is aided. But surely by the name of preparation he understands the aids which are given by way of sufficiency for perfecting the power itself in first act. But when he says, He aids it having been prepared, he understands the divine efficacious motion of the consent of free choice. And in this way the whole is given to God who effects the whole in the very faculty of free choice, not only by illuminating the intellect and proposing the object, but also by really and efficaciously moving free choice, that deliberating it may consent.

Finally note how far this Augustinian doctrine stands from the doctrine of those who posit no greater physical and real efficacy on the part of God, but only on the part of the natural property of this free choice. But to God Himself they attribute only a certain moral efficiency in the execution of the good human will, which consists in this, that since God by natural and necessary knowledge apart from a decree, or rather apart from what is decreed, by the divine will knows this conditional: if this man be constituted in such a time and with such aids and circumstances, he will consent by believing in God and loving above all things, etc. In which knowledge indeed He shows no mercy to this man, since it rises from the natural comprehension of the divine essence and in it of all creatures, as Molina philosophizes. See Suarez Metaphysical disput. 30, n. 33.

9. — The whole mercy of God therefore they constitute in this, that God willed to create that man and to place him in those circumstances and in that opportuneness of time, and for this man will be able to give thanks to the divine mercy. But that, with those circumstances supposed, man applied himself to good consent, he has from the property of his free choice, and consequently concerning this application he will not be able to give thanks to God the savior, but perhaps to the creator and conserver of the faculty of free choice. For these modern doctors posit no other concurrence on the part of God, except the conservation of the faculty of free choice with sufficient aid, with which God concurs, not by influencing it, but only into the substance of the effect. And consequently the whole will not be given to God, if He does not prepare the will of man to be aided, nor aid it having been prepared; but they distinguish the whole sufficiency and real efficacy so that the sufficiency be from God, but the effecting be attributed to the nature of this free choice, which equally pre-aided by a real aid, which they call physical, distinguishes itself from another, which had received an equal or perhaps greater aid, and nevertheless does not consent to God calling and arousing.

Behold the whole difference between the Thomist and Augustinian theologians on one side, and between certain modern inventors of the new concord on the other. They indeed are convicted by the arguments made, in that they say they cannot understand how the property of the faculty of free choice is preserved with such real efficacy of the grace of God. We however with Augustine much less can understand the omnipotence of the divine will and of the good pleasure of God, «if, as Augustine says in the Enchiridion, ch. 95, God willed to do something which He did not do; and what is more unworthy, therefore He did not do it, because lest what the omnipotent willed come about the will of man impeded it». And thus «the very beginning of our confession, in which we confess to believe in God the Father omnipotent, is endangered». So much for Augustine. But how with this certain efficacy of the grace of God the condition of the faculty of free choice is preserved is explained in the solution of the arguments and in what was said in the first part of this treatise.