Tractatus de vera et legitima concordia liberi arbitrii creati cum auxiliis gratiae Dei

1. — With the foundation supposed concerning which, as I judge, there cannot be controversy among theologians, namely that the aid of God is the actual influence into a preexisting thing by which the thing is ordered to operation, let the first division of divine aid be into natural aid and supernatural aid. Natural aid indeed is aid ordered to the natural operations of man or of other natural things. For the divine government, insofar as God is the author of the universe, extends itself to every creature, from the highest to the lowest, moving each according to the mode of its nature; concerning which matter it is treated in 1 p. from q. 103 on. Whence it is established that government is not the mere conservation of things, but the ordered motion of them according to the rule which is in the account of divine providence.

Hence it follows that, since man is the noblest creature, insofar as through reason and free choice he is more assimilated to God the author than the remaining corporeal creatures, so in a more excellent way the author of nature governs and aids man to his proper operations.

According to this doctrine, the first natural aid which God confers on man coming to the use of reason is not the conservation of man, nor of the natural light, which is a connate power, nor even the conservation of the will or of the faculty of free choice; for all these follow upon the existence of the thing as properties due to nature, as we said in the preceding chapter. But the first aid which God confers on man pertaining to the order of nature is the actual illumination by which man is illuminated to cognition of the true, whether speculative or practical. In which illumination God confers nothing on man by way of a principle constituting the intellect in first act. For through the intellect endowed with natural light, man is sufficiently constituted in first act for understanding those intelligibles into whose cognition he can come through sensibles. But nevertheless, «however perfect any creature … is posited to be, it cannot proceed to its act unless it is moved by God», as St. Thomas says in 1. 2, q. 109, a. 1. But what that passive motion of man already perfect in first act, newly imparted to the creature, is, the metaphysical theologians inquire all too laboriously.

And the same is the difficulty concerning the first operation of the will, which we attribute to the author of nature, who by His motion draws our will from not willing the end to actually willing, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas in 1. 2, q. 9, a. 4. Concerning which doctrine I do not understand there to be controversy among the recent theologians. For all confess that our will is disposed passively in the first volition of its object. Not because that volition is not an action elicited by the power of the will, for it is a vital action, but because that volition is not an operation of man insofar as he is man. Since not insofar as rational and insofar as master of his actions discoursing from some principle; but it is altogether an operation of the will as it is a certain nature, and an inclination to its natural proper object. With respect to which the will needs no other formal principle imparted to it, but the extrinsic principle suffices which is in the intellect, the natural light showing and proposing the good which is the object of the will, with the motion of the first cause intimately existing.

2. — This supposed, I say the same to that troublesome question in which it is asked what that passive motion is by which the will is moved by the author of nature only when it passes from not willing to willing good in common: whether it is some quality imparted to the will by way of principle for eliciting vital action concerning its proper object. And I answer that it is not any superadded quality by way of principle, since the will itself according to itself is a sufficient principle for eliciting vital action concerning its proper object proposed by the intellect. But that it be proposed by the intellect now, and that the will now actually tend to it, neither comes about without the divine premotion. Which premotion is not the mere conservation of the powers; otherwise the intellect and will would always be in act, since they are always conserved by God. But I confess that I do not understand what else that divine premotion, if considered passively, is, than the very faculty of intellect placed in complete act by the author of nature, who operates in all things according to the account of His providence.

But if premotion considered actively, as it is in God, I understand it to be nothing other than the divine will, which is intimately present in all things, effecting in them all things which come about, insofar as they have the character of to-be and of goodness. But why it moves now and did not move before, that divine will itself, which is the first cause of all things which come about, no reason can be reduced except to the account of divine providence, which has so disposed according to the counsel of its will. For it is never to be conceded by a wise philosopher and theologian that the divine concurrence which is called natural and general is determined by creatures, just as the concurrence of the celestial bodies is determined by lower causes, above all by man, who through free choice dominates even the stars. But the general concurrence of the divine will, since it is according to the account of divine providence, intimately reaches all causes and all effects, determining all things and determined by none. It is called the general concurrence of God, since it is not limited to one effect, but without exception disposes and governs all things according to the mode of the nature of each thing.

All this doctrine is expressly that of St. Thomas in 1 p. q. 19 throughout, and q. 22 throughout, which is on divine providence, and likewise let q. 105 be seen. Which doctrine, if certain of the moderns had penetrated it, they would not so frequently reduce contingent effects, above all those which have their root in the free choice of man, to divine foreknowledge only, but would reduce all things to divine providence, to which are to be reduced all things which come about, whether good or evil: good indeed as effects directly willed and ordered according to the account of divine providence; but evil things of fault as permitted, as Augustine says in the Enchiridion, cap. 95 and 96. For the permission of sins is good and orderable by God to the last end. Otherwise divine foreknowledge would not have infallibility, unless the things foreknown were reduced to the decree of the divine will. Concerning this natural concurrence more could be said, but for brevity of time let these suffice.

3. — Let us now pass to defining and dividing supernatural aid.

It is to be noted first, lest we labor in equivocation, that there is a difference between aid and concurrence, if we speak properly. For aid properly bespeaks influence into the principal cause, even if it be secondary; but concurrence bespeaks influence into the produced effect, whether by a cause or by an instrument, for producing which effect there concurs at once with the cause, or with the instrument, that cause which influences the effect, aiding the cause or elevating the instrument. This is proved from the common mode of speaking; for to aid or to assist bespeaks a relation to the cooperating cause. Hence we shall not properly say that the artificer aids the instrument for effecting the artifact, since the instrument is not properly a cause, but we say that the artificer moves and elevates the instrument, and concurs with it for effecting the image; and similarly we say that God concurs with water for producing grace in the soul, but we shall not properly say that God aids water that it may produce grace.

From which doctrine it follows that there can be given aid which is not concurrence, and there can be given concurrence which is not aid, and there can be given aid which is at once concurrence. An example of the first: when God infuses the habit of grace and the habits of the infused virtues, He bears aid to man. For the infused habits themselves are aids of God, ordered indeed to operation, but it is not necessary that they operate at once. But that a habit is aid, St. Thomas teaches in 1. 2, q. 109, a. 9 where he says that «man for living rightly needs the aid of God in two ways: in one way as to some habitual gift through which human nature is healed and elevated …; in another way man needs the aid of grace that he be moved by God to acting». The infused habit itself therefore is an aid of God, which is given to little ones in baptism before they operate; indeed also to adults when by power of the sacrament with attrition alone they are justified, this habitual aid is given, when they do not yet have the act of charity. Indeed also, as St. Thomas teaches where cited above in answer to the first argument, the very conservation of the habit is an influence into a preexisting thing and is ordered to operation.

An example of the second: God concurs with water for sanctifying the soul, and yet does not aid water for the production of grace, since water has no formal principle proportioned to the effect that it be properly said to be aided to operation, but is a mere instrument of God. From which it follows that the priest has no need to ask for the aid of grace that he may absolve, that he may consecrate, but that he may worthily exercise this ministry. And the same seems to be said concerning saints working miracles, with whom God concurs for working miracles; but He is not properly said to aid them for working miracles, since they have only the character of an instrument. And finally, if it were to be spoken properly, when some partial cause influences only the effect of another partial cause, it would not be said immediately to bear aid to the other cause, since it influences nothing into it, but into the effect caused by both at once. Whence neither immediately aids the other, but both at once in the character of causing are made one cause with respect to one effect, as happens when two men lift a stone which neither can lift.

Finally the example of the third is manifest. For when God moves the just man that he may use the infused habits and operate, it is certain that by the same aid of motion He aids the just man to operation, and concurs in it.

4. — With these things thus established, when henceforth we make mention of the aid of the first cause, we shall understand the influence of God not as He concurs with the instrument for the effect, but as He is the assistance of the principal cause in order to operation. And speaking in this way, we made the first division of aid into natural aid and supernatural aid. Natural indeed is what is conferred for operation or motion to a natural end, or to good in common, which is the natural object of the will. And this aid is what is commonly called the general aid of the first cause.

5. — Nevertheless this generality is understood differently by the authors of the new concord and by the Thomists. For the authors of the new concord understand by general aid nothing other than the conservation of second causes and the immediate concurrence in the operations and effects of them. We however by this aid understand the actual motion of the first cause, without which the second cause, however conserved, cannot operate. And the reason which moves us is this, that every second cause is perfected through its operation, especially if the operation is immanent. For concerning transeunt action it is not so manifest, although to me it is most certain. Since every active power of the creature is intrinsically and essentially ordered as to its proper end and complement to its proper operation. Therefore when it operates, it has the complement of its species. And this is the reason why the divine action is not properly transeunt, since the power of God is not essentially ordered to the operation of any effect outside Himself; for this would be an imperfection in God.

But that the power is perfected through immanent action is most manifest, since the action itself is the complement of the actuality of the power, just as sight is really more perfect when it sees than when it does not see, and intellect when it understands than when it does not understand. Therefore when every power passes from not operating to operating, it is necessary that it be moved by a cause which is in act.

6. — Now supernatural aid is aid ordered to a supernatural end through supernatural operations. And I suppose that now we speak of supernatural aids intrinsic and ordered to the good of the recipient himself, that we may exclude graces freely given, which are rather called supernatural concurrences of God for the utility of the Church, than aids of the operator himself ordered to his proper good which consists in adherence to God, as St. Thomas teaches in 1. 2, q. 111, a. 1. All the divine influences therefore into the soul accommodated to this end are supernatural aids of God.

Again supernatural aid is divided by St. Thomas where cited above, art. 2 and 3, first indeed into operating and cooperating grace; secondly into prevenient and subsequent. Whose doctrine, when we interpreted those articles, we greatly commended as useful for the present treatise. This however is especially to be recalled, that just as St. Thomas there divides grace whether as it is a habitual gift, or as it is the divine aid by which God actually moves us to willing well, so also we now divide supernatural aid into the habitual gift divinely imparted to us, and into the actual motion of God by which the mind is moved by God, whether according to intellect or according to will. For all these are called aids of God by St. Thomas. For as we said, in 1. 2, q. 109, a. 9 he expressly calls the habitual gift of grace an aid; but the remaining motions and influences ordered to the supernatural end, in q. 111, a. 2 he expressly calls aids. And we in what follows shall call it actual grace, that we may distinguish between habitual aid and the aid of actual motion.

7. — But since our whole dispute is concerning actual aids, it is still necessary to divide actual aid into aid wholly prevenient to our freedom, or rather to the use of our freedom, and into aid with which we already exercise our freedom. Of the first kind aid is a certain sudden illumination and arousing of God calling and inviting the soul to good. And they are wont to be called divine inspirations, which come about in man earlier in time, regularly speaking, than he himself deliberates to adhere to God. And concerning inspirations of this kind it is said in the Council of Orange, can. 20: «many good things come about in man which man does not do». Concerning the same it is also said in Prov., 1 (v. 24): I called and you refused, that is, after you adverted to my call, and refused. Concerning those also can be understood that of Is., 50 (v. 4): The Lord raises up in the morning, in the morning He raises up my ear that I may hear as a master. It is to be noted however that aids of this kind wholly prevenient are indeed identified with the vital actions of intellect and will. But since they come about from the motion of God wholly prevenient earlier in time than the use of our freedom, therefore the council says, «many good things come about in man which man does not do». And similarly theologians say that in receiving them then we are disposed merely passively. For they speak of man as he is the moral cause of his actions and master of deliberating or not deliberating. And in this part there is no difference between the fathers of the Society and the Thomists.

Of the second kind we said aid to be, with which standing, we exercise our freedom. And this can happen in two ways. In one way so that, with that arousing persisting which was wholly prevenient, now man adverting and knowing and prudent resists God calling and arousing. And then the aid of the grace of God is converted into anger, from the malice of the recipient, according to that of the Apostle ad Rom., 2 (vv. 4-5): Do you not know that the benignity of God leads you to penance? But according to your hardness and impenitent heart, you treasure up to yourself anger in the day of anger. In another way man is wont to exercise his freedom by consenting to God calling and arousing. And concerning this turns the whole difficulty and controversy between the Preacher fathers and the fathers of the Society. Wherefore in the following chapter we intend to dispute the special question: whether that same prevenient aid with nothing else added suffices for the consent of free choice and conversion to God; or whether another aid accedes by which the mind of man actually consents to God and is converted to Him.