Tractatus de vera et legitima concordia liberi arbitrii creati cum auxiliis gratiae Dei

1. — Since the etymology of the name is wont to be of use for investigating the very what-it-is of the thing, it is to be noted that aid or assistance bespeaks an order and relation of the aider and assister to another existing thing. For aid is so called as if from increasing and promoting an existing thing. Assistance too is from assisting an existing thing which by itself cannot either be conserved or operate, or cannot operate so perfectly, as when another cause comes to it influencing the thing itself or its effect. Hence that which aids or assists is properly said of the efficient cause which influences a preexisting thing or its effect or both at once. E.g., if some man cannot lift some weight, or lifts it scarcely and with difficulty, then if another comes and applies himself at the same time to lifting the stone, he is said to aid and assist the other, not by conferring strength on him, but by applying his own strength to the effect, and thus each aids the other. And let the example be committed to memory. But the heavens and their concurrence aid each in both ways effectively, by influencing not only the effect, but also conserving by their influence the strength of the limbs and the corporeal motive faculty, and sometimes perfecting it. For with the motion of the heaven ceasing, the motions of lower bodies would cease, as the common philosophy holds. But much more necessary is the influx of the first cause, moving both natural and voluntary causes to their effects, by influencing the cause, or the effect, or both, as will at once be more fully explained.

2. — From what has been said it follows that when God created the world, He is not said to have aided or to have conferred aid. For creation is production from nothing; but aid or assistance presupposes a thing already existing. We can therefore define aid as the influence of an efficient cause ordered to some operation or motion of a preexisting thing. This definition ought to be received by the common consensus of the wise, both because another more fitting one will perhaps not be able to be assigned, and because it is not limited to a particular opinion concerning the mode in which causes concur or influence causes or effects, and finally because it is common to the aids borne whether by the author of nature or by the author of grace.

And since our chief intention is to treat of the aids of God as author of grace and of the whole supernatural order, the difference between each order is to be noted. In the first place the order of grace presupposes the order of nature and perfects it. Wherefore the whole order of grace joined to the order of nature can be called the aid of God elevating and perfecting preexisting nature to supernatural operation and tending to a supernatural end. E.g., God created the angels, at once founding nature in them and lavishing grace. But nevertheless those things which were in the angel, the term of creation, are in no way called aids. Such was the existence by which formally the angelic nature was educed from nothing; such also consequently was the angelic intellect and will and free choice and the remaining properties which are due to the angelic nature from its proper quiddity and are naturally represented in the divine idea. For all these cannot properly be called aids, but as pertaining to the existence of the thing as naturally following from the essence, against Pelagius, who thinks the whole grace of God to be free choice. Since however, as St. Thomas teaches in 1. 2, q. 109, a. 1, «however perfect any corporeal or spiritual nature is posited to be, it cannot proceed to its act unless it is moved by God», therefore every creature needs for its operation or motion the aid of God the first mover. The reason of which St. Thomas insinuates in the same place, since «from God is every formal perfection as from the first act». As if he said, just as the thing depends in to-be on the first act, which is to-be itself, so also it depends in every operation of its own, since everything that operates, operates insofar as it is in act.

3. — Concerning which it is especially to be observed and to beware of the bad philosophy of certain men asserting that the influx of the first cause into the second, that the second may actually act, is nothing other than the conservation of the second cause and of every power of it by which it is constituted in first act sufficiently for acting. This sentence I evidently gather to be that of Molina and of Suarez. Of Molina indeed in his Concordia, disp. 27 and 28, which are had from p. 179, where he says that God by general aid and concurrence does not influence second causes by premoving them, but only influences immediately the very operations and effects of second causes, without any premotion of the causes themselves. And he thinks the contrary sentence takes away the freedom of choice, and holds that God by His concurrence, whether general or gratuitous, is disposed as a partial cause with respect to the effect. For he says on p. 169: «Whence it comes about that the general concurrence of God is not an influx of God into the second cause, as if, moved beforehand, it acted and produced its effect, but is an influx immediately into its action and effect». And on the following page he says: «since it cannot be denied that any effect whatever of a second cause needs the immediate influx of God into it that it may be conserved, even after the influx of the second cause has ceased, much more that it be newly produced. Certainly either it would have to be granted that the general concurrence of God with second causes for their actions and effects is not an influx into the causes, but with the causes immediately into the actions and effects, which we intend to prove; or it would have to be affirmed that God influences the production of each effect by a double general concurrence: one immediately into the cause and through the cause mediately into the effect, and the other into the effect». So much for Molina. Behold how he denies that the concurrence of God influences anything in the second cause, but only conserves it in its to-be and power, concerning which conservation there is no controversy.

Likewise Suarez in his Metaphysica, disp. 22, sec. 1 and 2 philosophizes at length concerning the first cause and cooperation or concurrence with second causes. And when in the first section he had treated of the immediate concurrence of God in every thing, operation, and motion, afterwards in the second section, while inquiring what that concurrence of the first cause is, whether it is something by way of principle or of action, and having related various sentences, he at length concludes in n. 20 that «the concurrence of the first cause, besides what it is by way of action or becoming, does not include from intrinsic necessity anything newly imparted to the second cause itself which would be a principle of its action or a condition necessary for it». He says «newly imparted, because it is certain that the concurrence of the second cause supposes in it a power of acting given and conserved by the first cause, which we suppose here, and we inquire what beyond it must necessarily be added on the part of the first cause». So far Suarez. Which sentence he strives to prove from testimonies of St. Thomas, from which all Thomists prove the opposite. Concerning which matter, if it were to be treated according to the dignity of the subject, a rather prolix treatise would have to be composed.

4. — Now I say first against Molina, that it is unworthy of the divine omnipotence to assert that God is a partial cause with His creature, just as two men dragging a boat are called partial causes, because neither influences the other nor is the whole effect attributed to each singly, but to both at once. But when God concurs with a second cause, the whole effect and whatever is in it is immediately from God by immediacy of power and of supposit, as Suarez also confesses above. Where note that that particle immediately is not taken exclusively so as to exclude the supposit and power of the second cause, but only imports the intimate and perfect power of God operating in all things, in which He intimately exists by essence, by power, and by presence. Nevertheless He assumes certain creatures to cooperate with Him in the same effect, by power imparted to them by God by way of principle, to which the effect is proportioned. And in this part Suarez agrees with us where cited above [sect. 1], nn. 22 and 23, where he cites St. Thomas, bk. 3 Contra gentes, c. 70, saying that «it does not come from insufficiency of power, but from the immensity of His goodness that He has communicated to creatures the power of acting; and therefore not by Himself alone, but with them does He will to produce such effects». Likewise Suarez denies, as less probable, that God and the creature are partial causes composing one total cause, but says that each is whole in its own order, insofar as one is subordinated to the other. But surely, if subordination consists in nothing other than the conservation of the second cause, he denies that such causes meet fortuitously for acting, since «the second cause depends on the first a priori and essentially, because it is insufficient of itself to do anything without its aid. But the first cause properly depends neither on the second, neither a priori nor a posteriori … And since the first cause always acts from certain knowledge and its own will and according to the order instituted by itself, it cannot be said to meet fortuitously with the second cause for acting, but with the highest providence concerning things». Which doctrine we shall afterwards adduce against him.

I say secondly against the same Molina, that there is no need for a double general concurrence, one into the cause, another into the effect, when the effect is an immanent action; but rather God by a single influx moves the cause and with it has produced the action, whether we speak of the general concurrence of the first cause by which He governs all things, or of the special gratuitous concurrence. It is proved. Since if the second cause depends a priori and essentially on the first, as Suarez well said, there is no need for one influx into the second cause as actually causing, and another into its action; but the second cause itself from the passive motion of the first cause receives actual power of acting and producing. I said however «into the cause as actually causing», since if the cause is considered as it is in itself with habitual power of acting, by another divine influx it is conserved in that to-be and by another it is actually moved to effecting actually. This influx nevertheless immediately reaches the cause and the effect, since as it is from God it does not depend on the second cause, although the effect itself depends on each. And for this reason God is said to produce the effect through the mediation of the second cause, because He Himself makes the effect depend on it in becoming, and sometimes in being conserved, as happens in vital actions.

Now we say thirdly against Francisco Suarez: whenever a second cause passes from not operating to operating, it is necessary that the cause itself be moved by the first, which motion is received passively in the cause itself. And from that motion, as it is from God, the actual causality of the second cause is so far from being impeded that rather it is thereby actually perfected so that it operates. This doctrine is expressly that of St. Thomas in 1 p., q. 105, a. 4 and 1. 2, q. 6, a. 1 ad 3 and q. 10, a. 4 and most of all q. 109, a. 1, where we commended his words, namely: «however perfect any corporeal or spiritual creature is posited to be, it cannot proceed to its act unless it is moved by God; which motion indeed is according to the account of His providence, not according to the necessity of nature». And he concludes that «the action of any created being whatever depends on God as to two things: in one way insofar as it has from Him the perfection or form by which it acts; in another way insofar as it is moved by Him to acting». Note that he does not say «insofar as it depends on Him for acting», but says it is moved, lest anyone say that it depends insofar as it is conserved. In which article St. Thomas speaks universally, and not only of agents acting naturally, as Suarez says, but also of agents acting supernaturally.

5. — In whose doctrine of St. Thomas note first that he says, «however perfect a corporeal or spiritual creature is posited to be», namely through its form, power, and habit, «it cannot proceed to act unless it is moved by God».

Note secondly that he says this motion is from God not according to the necessity of its nature, as the heaven moves these lower things, but according to the account of His providence. From which it follows that, since government is the execution of the account of providence, it is impossible for any creature to be moved or to operate unless it is moved by God, whose motion is prior in nature to every other motion or operation of any creature whatever, whether it moves itself, or another, or is moved by another. And the reason is that, just as the to-be of God is the cause perpetually influencing to-be in creatures, so it is necessary that when a creature passes from not operating to operating, or in any other way moves or is moved, the influx of the divine motion be prior in the order of causality. And it is confirmed from the doctrine of St. Thomas, q. 109, a. 6: «For it is necessary, since every agent acts for an end, that every cause convert its effects to its end; and therefore since according to the order of agents or movers there is the order of ends, it is necessary that man be converted to the last end through the motion of the first mover». From which doctrine I argue thus: the last end influences by nature earlier, according to its proper mode of causing or finalizing, those things which are ordered to the end than do other particular ends: therefore the first agent also influences by nature earlier every operation and motion than does every creature acting or moving. And this reason proceeds much more concerning the operation of a lower agent which is ordered to a supernatural end. Since although God converts all things to Himself; but He converts just men to Himself as to the special end which they intend, as Dionysius says, De divinis nominibus, ch. 4.

6. — It is to be observed however that those doctors Molina and Suarez, to pave the way for their opinions concerning the determination of free choice to acting, destroy even in natural things many metaphysical principles, as will be patent to one reading disputation 22, where Suarez innovates much concerning the subordination of the second cause to the first, as is patent in n. 47, where he expressly holds that that maxim, a second cause does not act unless moved by the first, ought not to be understood so «that a second cause, besides its to-be and every connatural power of acting which it has, needs a new true and real motion received in itself that it may act».

But this doctrine seems to us most false. First indeed because it is against the common sense of philosophers heretofore received, and against the natural reason which St. Thomas uses in 1. 2, q. 9, a. 4: «everything that is sometimes an agent in act, and sometimes in potency, needs to be moved by some mover». And thence he gathers that, since the will begins to will what it previously did not will, it is necessary that it be moved to willing by some extrinsic principle.

Then, because the divine government, which is the effect of the account of providence, posits something real anew in the things governed besides the conservation of those things in their to-be and natural powers. For no one has hitherto said that the creation and conservation of things is government, but rather a certain passive motion which proceeds from the account of divine providence and is received in the things governed.

Moreover through that doctrine the discourse of natural reason is enervated, by which it is shown that there is one first mover and one efficient cause. For surely, if the actual causality of the second cause does not depend on the actual influence of the first upon the second cause itself, the discourse of Aristotle in bk. 8 of the Physics is vain. For from that principle, everything that is moved is moved by another, we could answer that we stop at once at some particular mover which is not moved by another. E.g., when wood is heated, it is moved by fire which is causing in act, without its being actually moved by another; and so fire will be the first mover with respect to that effect, and it will not be necessary to arrive at the first mover who is God. The more so since Aristotle thought the world to be from eternity, and not to depend on the free will of God in its conservation; and nevertheless by that discourse he intended to show that there is one first actually moving the rest which move or are moved.

And finally, to put an example in morals, and to destroy the chief reason on which Suarez relies to prove that the free will is not determined by God, I argue thus: free choice is perfected really and intrinsically and formally through immanent action, just as any other vital potency; e.g., sight by seeing, intellect by understanding. Therefore, just as any other vital potency depends on the motion of the first cause as on an efficient cause that it may operate in act, so also the faculty of free choice. The consequence is proved. Since this faculty passes from privative potency to act no less than do the other vital potencies when they exercise their proper actions. It is confirmed. Since the intellect through cognition of the indifference of means to the end is perfected anew when from not cognizing that indifference it becomes cognizing. Therefore it is moved by another to that cognition.

But you will say: the intellect from cognition of the end can move itself to cognition of the means, just as from cognition of first principles it moves itself to scientific cognition. It is answered that this very thing we assert, but we intend thereby to prove that the motion of the first cause is necessary, since even for the cognition of the end and the cognition of first principles there is required in us the motion of the first cause. Since for such cognition we are sometimes in potency, sometimes in act, the motion of the first cause, which is always in act, is required, as St. Thomas teaches in 1. 2, q. 9, a. 4. From this therefore we confirm that the will which does not elect and afterwards elects is moved not only by itself insofar as it wills the end, but also by the first cause which moves it to actually willing the end. For whatever is the cause of the cause is the cause of the caused, if the predication is formal, insofar as something is the cause of the cause as causing.

Moreover that maxim, everything that is in potency must be reduced to act by something that is in act, is most received among philosophers and metaphysicians; for also on that account did Aristotle posit the agent intellect, because our intellect is in potency to receiving likenesses. And that maxim is founded on that principle known by natural light, no one gives what he does not have, at least eminently. Therefore if our free choice is to be perfected by a perfection for which it is in potency with privation of it, it is necessary that it be reduced to that actual perfection by another which is in act. This reason, although it has place in the natural actions of free choice, nevertheless proceeds much more in supernatural elections; as when man consents to believe, to hope, and to love as is fitting for justification and salvation. Even although someone could answer to the reason given by saying that the will as it is in act for willing the end naturally, is able to move itself to willing the means and to electing something fitting for the end; nevertheless this solution, whatever sort it be, has no place in the aforesaid supernatural elections. And the reason is manifest, since the will, while it passes from not consenting to the assent of believing those things which are of faith, and of hoping in God the aider for eternal life, and of loving Him above all things as the supernatural end, cannot beforehand be in sufficient and virtuous act concerning its proper object, which is good in common, whence it might determine itself to electing the aforesaid means to that supernatural end. Therefore this change is of the right hand of the Most High, and consequently it needs to be determined by it that it may determine itself. Which determinations, namely the passive determination as it is from God moving, and the active determination as it is from the will consenting, although they are conjoined in the same moment, nevertheless the active determination of the will is dependent on the passive motion, which is from the free choice of God, intimately operating and moving and reducing free choice to act according to the mode of its nature, by illuminating the intellect that it may better cognize the means, and by inspiring into the will that it may efficaciously elect what is well-pleasing to God. And this is what the Apostle says in the proposed theme, may He fit you in every good, that you may do His will, doing in you what is pleasing before God. Behold our will is passively fitted by God that we may do. But how this comes about efficaciously, he explains in what he says, doing in you what is well-pleasing before Him.

With which doctrine agrees the exposition of St. Augustine concerning that, who are moved by the Spirit of God, ad Rom., 8 (v. 14), De verbis Apostoli, serm. 13. «Someone says to me: therefore we are moved, we do not act. I answer, nay both you act and you are moved; and then you act well if you are moved by the good. For the Spirit of God who moves you is an aider to those acting; the very name of aider prescribes to you».

7. — But those who hold the contrary clamor that we destroy free choice through that passive determination by God, as by a really efficient cause moving free choice. We on the contrary object that they precipitate free choice, attributing to it the principate in the real and physical determination of itself, in which consists the consummation of consent; while God Himself is only a moral cause furnishing certain supernatural aids, sufficient indeed, if free choice wills to use them. But this good use is not a real effect from the causality of the grace of God, but only a moral effect, insofar as God gave it at the time at which He foreknew that free choice would consent. Concerning which matter we shall treat more deeply in the third part. We therefore build up free choice while humbling it under the mighty hand of God, according to the doctrine of the Apostle ad Phil., 2 (vv. 12-13): With fear and trembling work out your salvation. For God is He who works in you both to will and to accomplish, lest we be proud thinking that we do anything of ourselves which the grace of God does not do in us. But those who say that our will applies itself to the work, and at once God also influences; «but if our free choice continues its influx, the actual concurrence of God also will cease», seem to assert that God awaits our will that we may will to be cleansed. So seems Suarez to say in bk. 3 De auxiliis, ch. 6, n. 7. But concerning this difficulty it will be established from what is to be said what is to be held.