Tractatus de vera et legitima concordia liberi arbitrii creati cum auxiliis gratiae Dei

1. — The question, therefore, is: whether indifference is of the intrinsic account of free choice.

It is argued first for the negative part. In God there is the most perfect free choice; and yet in Him there can be no indifference: therefore indifference does not pertain of itself and intrinsically to the formal account of free choice. The consequence is clear because, just as in God there is whatever pertains to the formal account of wisdom, because wisdom is a perfection simply simple, so also there ought to be whatever pertains to the formal account of free choice.

2. — It is argued secondly. Christ the Lord obeyed freely unto death; and yet, with the precept supposed, He could not not obey: therefore His free choice did not have indifference to obeying or not obeying. The consequence is clear, because He did not have indifference to sinning or meriting.

3. — It is argued thirdly. The evil angel now in fact sins: therefore he operates freely. And yet he does not have indifference in his free choice, which is obstinate in evil, since the angel from its nature elects immutably. Therefore at least to a free act it is not necessary that there remain some indifference in the will for either alternative.

4. — It is argued lastly, and the first argument is confirmed. For if indifference is required to the formal account of free choice, it would follow that God would not be altogether immutable, but could or could have had Himself otherwise in Himself than He now has Himself. The consequent is against that of James 1 (v. 17): With whom there is no change nor shadow of alteration. To the proof of the consequence it is to be noted that man is not called viciously changeable or inconstant when he changes counsel from new and reasonable circumstances coming upon him. But nevertheless his will is really changed if, after it willed something, it again wills that it not be done. The angel, however, is less changeable on account of the perfection of its nature. For after it elects something, it elects immutably, nor can it elect the opposite. Nevertheless in the angel a real changeability is considered in its free choice insofar as the election which it had, it could not have had, and consequently it could have had itself otherwise really in itself than it now has itself. But in God neither change nor shadow of alteration can be found. For the divine will could not from eternity have had another real action than it now has because, since it is the purest act, no real difference can be found in His will which is not necessary and eternal in God Himself.

5. — For the decision of this difficulty it is to be noted that indifference can be taken in two ways. In one way negatively; and thus a thing is said not differing nor determined. In another way it can be taken privatively, so that that is said to be indifferent which is apt to be determined whether by itself, or by another, or at the same time by itself and by another; e.g., just as a man who has not settled to take a wife, nor indeed has settled not to take one, is apt to determine himself to either part of the contradiction, is indifferent privatively.

Note secondly that still indifference, whether taken negatively or privatively, can be taken in three ways. In one way purely actively, insofar as that thing to which it belongs can by its faculty operate something, and can not operate that same; just as the craftsman has an active faculty of art for making some artifact, or for not making it, or for making another. Another is indifference purely passively, just as prime matter is indifferent to every form. Thirdly there is found indifference in both ways in some faculty, just as living things have power for various motions, active and passive, for from themselves they both move and are moved; just as progressive motion is at the same time action and passion.

6. — With these supposed let there be a first conclusion: If we speak of free choice in common according to its whole analogy, as it includes the divine free choice, there is not understood to pertain to its formal account except negative and active indifference, which is found in every free choice, although not always active alone.

It is proved. Because privative indifference is repugnant to God, namely that there be in Him a passive aptitude for either alternative, and there not be determination to the other. And note that we do not speak here in respect of the actions ad intra, in which no indifference can be found, but all things are from natural necessity and purest act; but we speak of the indifference which is in the divine power by comparison to all creatures, whether existing or possible. And in this way we affirm that the divine will is not determined from its nature to producing some creature, nor is determined from its nature to not producing some; but we say the divine omnipotence to have itself negatively indifferently in power for producing some creature, or for not producing. And the reason is because no creature has a necessary connection with the primary object of the divine will, nor could it bring any advantage so that the divine will better attain or enjoy this its beatitude. We have said, moreover, that this negative indifference is found actively in God, that we might condescend to the manner of speaking of certain moderns. But indeed we would more properly say that that indifference negatively befits the active power of God considered according to itself.

A second conclusion explicative of the preceding: When God has settled from eternity to make the world and all the other things which He makes in time, He does not have Himself otherwise in Himself than if He had not settled to create the world, or had settled not to create. This truth is one of the admirables of the divine majesty, namely how, with the total cause existing necessarily in the same way, the same effect does not follow necessarily.

Nevertheless this conclusion is proved from the immutability of God, who since He is purest act, it is impossible that He be in potency to having Himself otherwise in Himself than He now has Himself. But all His power is purest act, so that the deliberation of creating and the deliberation of not creating have no real difference in God Himself; just as neither does it make a real difference to be finalizing and to finalize, but there is only a difference of reasoned reason, just as is posited among the divine attributes.

From this conclusion it follows that the whole account of potentiality which is insinuated in the definition of free choice given in common, if we speak most formally, must be refunded into the object of free choice, which is always a means having passive indifference so that it can be ordered or not be ordered to the end. When, therefore, we say, free choice is the faculty of intellect and will for either alternative, we assign to each power an object having passive indifference. To the intellect indeed it befits to be intellective and to understand that indifference of the object; and such cognition is the root and proximate foundation of freedom, which is formally in the will just as also the very use of freedom. Likewise to the will we assign an indifferent object, that is, not having a necessary connection to the end which is the object of the will. For since the whole account of willing the means is the will of the end, to which the will is determined, if there be known some means which, although it can have some fittingness to that end, nevertheless does not have a necessary fittingness, thence it is that the goodness of that means is passively indifferent, so that it can be ordered or not be ordered, and be elected or not be elected to the end. And this is the chief reason on account of which we understand there to be in God the most perfect free choice and the most formal, including no imperfection, because from the most perfect cognition of the end, there is in God the most perfect cognition of the indifference of all other things, in which there is no necessary connection with the highest good, which is the object of the divine will. And yet God knows in them that they are orderable to the manifestation of the highest good finalizing all possible creatures. He finalizes, moreover, only those which by His free will He has made, indeed so that to be finalizing and to finalize posit no real difference in the divine will, but only a differing relation of reason.

And thus far the definition has been explicated concerning the purest formality of free choice, which is found in God alone; just as also the plenary account of wisdom and of the other perfections which are called by theologians perfections simply simple, is found in God alone in fullness, on which depend and to which are subordinated such perfections as they are formally participated by creatures.

A third conclusion: In every created free choice there is found not only the passive indifference of the object known as indifferently eligible, but there is also found some passive indifference with a certain potentiality of the subject.

This conclusion is proved by a common reason. First because every creature, however intellectual, has something of potentiality, since God alone is pure act; but every creature has received and limited to-be and dependent on the first to-be in becoming and in being conserved, and consequently in its every operation: therefore also created free choice in its own way must have potentiality and passive indifference to its operation and use of freedom.

It is proved secondly, because in no intellectual creature can it be found that now it does not elect and afterwards it elects without change of itself: therefore in every intellectual creature there is found some passive indifference in its free choice. The antecedent is proved. Because the election which is in the creature neither is its to-be, since it is an operation, nor is determined by the author of nature, just as the will of the end which is the object of the will. Therefore while the will elects what does not have a necessary connection with its object, it is really changed from potency to act.

Thirdly it is proved. Because every intellectual creature is peccable and defectible: therefore changeable through free choice. The antecedent is a common document demonstrated by theologians; by Saint Thomas in 1 p., q. 63, a. 1, and 1. 2, q. 89, and book 3 Against the Gentiles, ch. 108. The consequence is clear, because to be changed from good to evil presupposes the potentiality and passive indifference of the rational creature.

Finally it is proved inductively. For the angels created in grace were really changed through free choice from good to evil, and likewise man created in grace was really changed. Afterwards indeed in the state of fallen nature we experience this changeability from good to evil through free choice, and from evil to good through the grace of God we believe the change to be made.

A fourth conclusion: Nevertheless the faculty of free choice and the use of that faculty, however much the free choice be created, does not consist formally in the passion or potentiality of that faculty, but indeed the faculty is active and the use of it is action.

This conclusion is most certain according to faith, as is clear from the Council of Trent sess. 6, can. 4, 5 and 6. And indeed from the very definition of free choice it stands that that faculty is active for acting this or another, or for electing to act or not to act. And finally all human actions in which only is found the account of moral good or evil are true actions elicited by active powers, although on the part of the subject they have conjoined something of passibility, while the power passes from not operating to operating by virtue of the motion of a superior agent.

From which it follows that Suarez labors in vain in book 1 On aids, ch. 2, showing that this indifference of created free choice and the use of freedom does not consist in passion, judging that he defines something against us. But indeed he himself fashioned an enemy whom he might strike.

7. — From what has been said there follows one corollary very to be noted: that a created free choice will be the more perfect free, namely, the more through grace it shall have been assimilated to the divine free choice both in the foundation and root and in the formality of the will having itself to either alternative. This corollary seems to be openly demonstrated. For if man has this greatest perfection, that he was made to the image and likeness of God, on account of free choice and the dominion which he has for acting either alternative, as has been explicated, it is very well gathered that, if through grace this faculty is elevated, it will be the more perfect the more it shall have been assimilated in the mode of operating to the divine free choice.

There follows secondly that free choice and the exercise of it is more perfect in the blessed than in mere wayfarers. This is proved, because the first foundation, although not the proximate, of freedom is the determinate cognition of the end and the immutable adherence of the will to the ultimate end. And the blessed seeing God from the nature of the thing love Him immutably, just as God Himself sees and loves Himself. Therefore already in this foundation the blessed are maximally assimilated to God. Again from the perfect cognition and love of the highest good the indifference of the means to that end, which is the proximate root of the use of freedom, is more perfectly known.

From which it follows at last that the very use of freedom which is formally in the will is in a more perfect mode free, however infallibly the will of them always elects the good. We do not, however, posit merit in the blessed, not from defect of freedom, but because they are now constituted in the term of beatitude. Otherwise, moreover, it is repugnant that someone see God and merit in the election of the means to the end, just as Christ saw God as He now sees, and nevertheless most perfectly merited for us grace and glory in electing to obey unto death.