Tractatus de vera et legitima concordia liberi arbitrii creati cum auxiliis gratiae Dei

1. — If one were not contending with Catholics, the first question truly would have been whether there is free choice. But this ought to be supposed as something certain, both demonstrated by natural reason and confirmed in the sacred writings. On this matter see what we said on the Prima Pars, q. 83, a. 1, and above all read St. Thomas in De Veritate, q. 24, a. 1. Indeed the very experience within ourselves teaches us that there is a power of electing one of two proposals and refuting the other, or even of electing neither but of suspending the will. It follows, then, that one should no more dispute with someone who denies free will than with a brute.

The whole difficulty, therefore, lies in the very quiddity of free choice. On this matter Luis Molina in his new Concordia, p. 11 says as follows: «First of all it must be established what is understood by the name of free choice. For freedom can be taken in two ways. In one way as it is said from the verb to liberate [libero] and is opposed to slavery. In this sense it is said: Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom (2 Cor. 3:17)». Of freedom taken thus, he says, we have no discourse in this place. In the other way it is taken as it is said from the verb to please [libet]. And in this manner, it is taken in two ways. In one way as it is opposed to coercion—and in this way we grant that in the Godhead [in divinis] the Father generates the Son freely, that is, not under coercion but spontaneously. «But in another way it can be taken as it is opposed to necessity—and thus that agent is called free which, with all requisites for acting posited, can act and not act, or can so do one thing such that it can also do the contrary. And from this freedom, the faculty by which such an agent can so operate is called free. Since, however, it does not operate except with the preceding decision and judgment of reason, it is from this that … it is called free choice».

Here he notes two things. «The first is that boys and the insane not only operate spontaneously, but also effect many things freely, so that it is in their power to effect them or not to effect them … But on that account neither fault nor merit is imputed to them, because they do not discern by reason between moral good and evil … The second is that the will cannot but elicit all its acts». And he gives the example of the will of one seeing God, which cannot but love God. Likewise while we are on the way, acts often creep up which the will could not prevent. Whence the will is free as to its exercise only by comparison with those acts which it cannot elicit. «But if at the same time it can elicit either this act or its contrary indifferently, freedom is understood as to the species of the act, which has the aspect of full and perfect freedom». Thus far, that is Molina.

2. — In Molina's discourse many things are worthy of note. In the first place, I do not know why he derived choice from the verb to please [libet] rather than from the verb to liberate [libero], unless it just pleased him to do so. For surely if he had consulted the authors of the Latin language, he would speak otherwise. For he who pursues things prior to the mind's right deliberation does what pleases himself. But he who deliberates by right reason what is to be done is not said to have done what pleased himself. We say, therefore, that the freedom of choice extends itself more widely than desire, or rather, that it is entirely independent of it. For it happens that, in the absence of deliberating, some things please us, e.g., to fornicate or to steal, and yet we deliberate that one must not steal nor fornicate. If, however, the incontinent man shall have deliberated that one must fornicate, then indeed I declare that he deliberated what had pleased him beforehand. Whence indeed the derivation of free choice is foreign to the verb to please [libet], since we deliberate neither all the things that please us, nor do all the things we deliberate please us, although we sometimes deliberate some things that please us.

3. — Much more properly, therefore, do I judge free choice to be derived from the verb libero. For although in the primitive signification he is called free who does not serve slavery, as Cicero says in book 2 De natura deorum, he who is of a free mother is free; hence nevertheless several significations are drawn through a certain likeness, as Calepinus teaches in the verb liber. Of which one is that free be taken for immune, whether for one not subject or bound to anything. Whence Cicero in book 1 De finibus said time to be free, when the option of electing is released to us and when nothing impedes. And Livy in book 7 De bello Macedonico says free choice to be the free will and judgment of mind. Where he mentions both powers. Although, therefore, freedom, according to its primeval signification, be contrary to slavery, nevertheless because, just as he who is a slave is bound to the command of one master, so hence the freedom of which we speak is derived to the faculty of the will which is not bound to the pursuit of one object, but indifferently has the power of willing this or not willing, or at some time of desiring the contrary. But because that faculty and power arises from reason, which can also indifferently judge of such an object that it is fitting or not fitting to the will, hence the freedom of choice is so called, or free choice. For choice properly pertains to the judgment of mind; whence more properly perhaps it would be called a free adjudication, or adjudicated freedom. For freedom is formally in the will, but radically in the adjudication of the intellect. And thus free choice signifies the freedom of the will which depends on the adjudication of reason.

Note secondly that that author adduced the testimony II Cor., 3, Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom, judging that there freedom cannot be taken for the freedom of which we now speak. Which indeed is false; for Rom., 8 (v. 14): Who are driven by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. And yet the works to the performance of which they are driven not only snatch them from the slavery of sin, but also through them they merit eternal life with the heavenly Father, and consequently where the Spirit of the Lord is there is the freedom of which we speak.

Note thirdly that that author says in the same place that the Father in divinis generates the Son freely, that is, not under coercion but spontaneously. This manner of speaking ought not to please theologians. For although concerning the Holy Spirit some Scotists say that He is breathed from the Father and the Son freely, that is, by spontaneous will, nevertheless concerning the Son I have neither read nor heard a like locution. For although it pleases God the Father concerning the begotten Son, nevertheless theologians will in no way dare to say that spontaneous will is understood as the principle of generation; but rather before every intellection of the divine will, we confess the perfect principle of generating through the mode of nature to be in the divine intellect. That manner of speaking, therefore, is not to be admitted, namely that the Father generates the Son freely, that is, spontaneously, because in such a locution it is insinuated that spontaneous will is in some way the principle of the generation of the Son; just as we say that a stone descends spontaneously, and that a brute proceeds of its own accord to pasture, where a certain natural appetite is given to be understood as the principle of those motions. In which way we shall rightly say that the Father and the Son breathe the Holy Spirit of their own accord, not only because not under coercion, but because they breathe by will.

Moreover what he says seemed worthy of note, that boys not only operate spontaneously, but also effect many things freely, which nevertheless are imputed to them neither to fault nor to merit, because they do not discern by reason between moral good and evil. Which assertion seems to imply a contradiction. For if the definition of free choice which he had premised fits boys and the insane, namely that, with all requisites for acting posited, it is in their power to effect such things or not to effect them, or to will the contrary, it follows that they can sin, for that indifference arises from the adjudication of reason judging that so to be fitting or not fitting. And he gives the example in boys in the seventh year of their age completed; and yet indeed at that age they confess their sins and are absolved.

Lastly observe what is most worthy of note, namely what he said in the last place, that freedom as to the specification of the act holds the account of full and perfect freedom. That is, if the will can not only elicit or not elicit this act, but also the contrary of this, e.g., if the will of someone can will the act of virtue or of the contrary vice, it follows from this doctrine that there is in God and in Christ no full and perfect account of freedom; since God and Christ cannot so will the good that they can will the contrary. And the same would follow concerning those confirmed in grace, who cannot sin, and consequently would not enjoy the account of full and perfect freedom.

4. — With these assertions refuted, let us proceed to establishing the true and legitimate definition of free choice.

Of the many definitions of free choice that are circulated, the authors of the new concord have elected for themselves the worst. For the most illustrious Bellarmine, cardinal assumed from the Society concerning religion, in the third tome of the Controversies, ch. 21, which is On grace and free choice, book 3, ch. 3, distinguishes five definitions of free choice, and none of them is that which Molina and Suarez wished to use, namely: free choice is that which, with all requisites for acting posited, can act this or not act, or will the contrary. This form of the definition of free choice is found neither in Aristotle, nor in the Master, nor in the divine Thomas, nor in any grave doctor, except in Almain and other nominalists.

And indeed if they rightly understood and explained that definition, it would have been a tolerable foundation. We, therefore, intending to destroy their understanding, ask what they understand by those words, «with all requisites for acting posited». For if discourse be of the requisites before the free action is exercised, it is very well understood that the will still remains indifferent to acting or not acting. Nevertheless among those requisites is not numbered the efficacy of the divine motion, whether in the order of nature or in the order of grace; for that efficacy is simultaneous with the consent of our will. If, however, they understand their definition of the requisites in the moment in which the free action is exercised, it is proved false that, with all those posited, it is compossible for man not to elect that good which God precepts or counsels, because one of the requisites is the actual divine motion by which the will is moved from not willing to willing. Where it is to be observed that we do not assert simply and absolutely that it is not possible for the will not to elect, but we have said that it is not compossible with the position of all that are requisite in the moment of the good consent that the will not exercise that act. Otherwise the divine intention by which God wills man to elect would be frustrated.

5. — Nevertheless those authors tend elsewhere. For they judge that no other requisites are necessary on the part of God in the moment of the human operation than those that preceded, besides the general concurrence by which God conserves all things and concurs with all operating things; and thus man remains free and so indifferent that it is compossible not to act, even in the composite sense, with all those requisites on the part of God posited. And in this they judge the freedom of man to consist. And to such a point does Molina hold this that in his Concordia, p. 232, he says that the division of sufficient aid into efficacious and inefficacious is taken from the effect, which at the same time depends on the freedom of choice, and that that sufficient aid, whether greater or less in itself, is called efficacious with which choice is converted according to its freedom, when nevertheless, with nothing in that aid preventing it, it could have not been converted. And on p. 425 he judges it an error that there be given an efficacious aid which has its efficacy from the mode of the divine motion and from God Himself.

Likewise Suarez in book 3 On aids, ch. 6, n. 7 agrees in the matter with Molina, for he says that that concurrence of God «depends on our choice for it to be posited in second act». Which Bellarmine in tome 3, book 1 On grace and free choice, ch. 12 says to be an error against the sacred writings.

6. — But against that doctrine several things are to be said in what follows. Now, however, for understanding the legitimate definition of free choice, we suppose necessary that division of composite sense and divided sense which some ridicule when discourse is of free operation. Not because they deny it to be impossible for free choice at the same time to consent and not to consent, for this would be to deny the first principle, that a thing is and is not, but because they judge freedom to consist in this, that with all requisites for acting posited coming from without, even from God Himself inflowing and concurring, free choice stands at the same time not willing to operate. And to such a point does Francis Suarez judge this to be necessary that he judges the use of freedom to be totally destroyed if we posit on the part of God an aid so efficacious that simultaneously with it it is not compossible for the will not to operate. Let there be seen book 1 of the Opuscula, ch. 1, from n. 5 to 7, and ch. 2 from n. 2; in which whole chapter he seems to insinuate that according to our opinion, the indifference of freedom as to use is in us only passively, although we are far from this opinion. But what we assert is that our free will, when from not deliberating it passes to deliberating and determines itself freely to use, is nevertheless prior in nature determined by the divine will. He indeed and his associates will the free will so to determine itself that it is in no way determined by another from without; otherwise the whole freedom, if any intervenes in that election, will be in the agent or the one determining, and not in the will itself which is determined. We, however, confess so great a freedom in God alone; in the rational creature there is freedom subordinated to the motion of the divine will and freedom. And so far is it that our freedom is thereby destroyed that rather it takes strength therefrom for deliberating and for freely acting what God wills man to deliberate. But of this we shall speak more broadly in the third part of this treatise. Now, however, let us approach the establishing of the true definition of free choice.

7. — But first let us consider the other fifth definition which the most illustrious Bellarmine elects in the place cited above, under this form: «Free choice is the free power, of those things that conduce to some end, of electing one before another, or of accepting one and the same, or of rejecting it according to choice, attributed to the intelligent nature to the great glory of God». This definition he explains more broadly in his own way; but in our judgment it is not a skillful definition, but partly superfluous and confused, and partly diminished.

In the first place, since in God there is formally free choice, it would be fitting to define according to the universal account, although analogous, fitting God and creatures, which are created to the image of God. But that definition fits creatures only. Therefore it is limited nor does it adequately explicate the formality of free choice. But be it that he so intended to define created free choice, nevertheless he ought not to have posited in the definition both parts of the thing defined. For he says, it is a free power, etc., and according to choice of rejecting, etc., which is the greatest defect in assigning definitions. Finally what he says, «attributed to the intellectual creature to the great glory of God», has an obscure sense, for he seems to hold it to be a gift of grace, or something conferred on the intellectual nature from the liberality of God, which is false. For although to draw creatures from nothing was from the free will of God, as also to conserve them, nevertheless that man be having free choice is owed, just as that he be risible, indeed it is naturally contained in the idea of man which is in God. Concerning which read Augustine in book 1 On the grace of Christ, ch. 3, 4, 5 and 6.

8. — We, therefore, supposing according to the Catholic faith that in God there is formally free choice, just as there is knowledge and wisdom and intellect and will and the remaining perfections which are called by theologians simply simple, intend to assign such a definition in which we do not exclude the divine free choice; since to the likeness of it man was made free and master of his actions. The definition, moreover, is this: Free choice is the faculty of intellect and will for acting or not acting, or for acting the one or the other. This definition is assigned by the Master of the Sentences in book 2, d. 24, § 5. We, however, have said «of intellect and will» where the Master said «of reason and will», because he intended to treat specially of the free choice of man. And moreover he added, «by which the good is elected with grace assisting, or evil with the same deserting». Nevertheless the exact definition of free choice according to its whole universal account is that it be a faculty of intellect and will for either alternative. Those things, moreover, which follow, namely for acting or not acting, or for pursuing the one or the other, explicate what we understand by either alternative.

It is to be noted, moreover, that we have not said, or for acting the contrary, since to act the contrary does not pertain to the formality of free choice, but rather to imperfection and infirmity. Whence the perfect and full account of freedom is found without that indifference of contrariety, in the sole freedom of contradiction or of diversity, which is exercised in that free choice can elect one means or another means fitting to the end. The divine Thomas uses that definition in 2 Sent., dist. 25, a. 1 ad 1. That to be able to sin is not the formal account of the free will, the divine Thomas demonstrates in 1 p., q. 62, a. 8 ad 3, and in 2. 2, q. 88, a. 4 ad 1, in 1 Sent., d. 42, q. 2, a. 1 ad 3 and On truth, q. 24, a. 3 and very often elsewhere. And thus holds the divine Anselm in the dialogue On free choice, ch. 1. Not, however, on that account do we deny that it is very well gathered that free choice is in him who can sin, nor on that account does he have free choice because he can sin; but because while he sins, he uses the faculty of free choice against the law of God.

9. — But that we may consider more deeply the formality and origin of free choice, it is to be noted from the doctrine of the divine Thomas in 1 p., q. 19, a. 1, that will is demonstrated to belong to someone from that he has intellect; just as each thing has such an inclination as it has the form of its to-be. And such a disposition in things lacking cognition is called natural appetite, as gravity in a stone; and in those having sense, it is animal appetite; in those having intellect, moreover, it is intellectual appetite or will. And thence it is gathered that in God there is will, since in Him there is intellect.

Note secondly that formally speaking the faculty for either alternative is not the will itself insofar as it tends to the universal good known by the intellect or to its proper object; for thus it is borne naturally and from necessity to such an object. Whence in God Himself in respect of His proper object there is no faculty for either alternative, but the greatest necessity of the divine nature conjoined with the highest and infinite perfection, namely with the possession and enjoyment of the highest good, which is to see Himself and to enjoy His goodness. The created will of man, moreover, although naturally and necessarily determined to its proper object, which is good in common; nevertheless has this imperfection, that it is not determined as to perpetual exercise, but only as to specification, namely that it cannot will evil under the account of evil. The will, finally, of the angel is naturally determined actually as to exercise to its proper object, which is its proper good, which it loves also in sinning.

Note thirdly that the aforesaid natural and necessary disposition of the will to its proper object is the first foundation of its freedom through order to the means; to such a point that, the more perfect that prior disposition shall have been and the more necessary in act, the more perfect the mode in which it will be free in respect of the means. This doctrine is of Saint Thomas in On Truth, q. 24, a. 1 ad 20 and 1. 2, q. 10, a. 1 and 2. Just as in speculative matters the natural cognition of the first principles is the root of all discourse, so the more perfect the cognition of the end shall have been, the better is known the indifference of certain means to it, which is the proper account of freedom.

Which is clear first in God, whose will is most free in respect of all things that are outside God, because neither in common nor in particular did it need any means to its proper end, but from His goodness God proceeded to the production of creatures, ordering them to manifesting Himself.

Then the angel elects the more freely the more with greater natural cognition, and with a more necessary disposition to its proper good, it proceeds to the means fitting to that natural end, in respect of which end it could not sin in electing a means. But because in respect of the supernatural end it was not determined through its nature, thence it was made that it could have sinned, in badly electing to remain in its beatitude, in not ordering it to the supernatural end, of which ordering it had a supernatural precept.

Man, finally, who holds the lowest place in the order of intellectual beings, especially if considered in pure naturals or in fallen nature, enjoys the less perfect freedom the less determined he is to the proper end and object of the will. And although free choice has not been lost through sin, as faith teaches, nevertheless unless it be healed through grace, it remains infirm and wounded, so that even in the good according to natural reason it cannot persevere long.

From what has been said there follows one corollary: that although indifference is necessary to the account of free choice, nevertheless it will not on that account be the more perfect free choice because in itself it is indifferent in more ways. It is proved. Since otherwise it would follow that the free choice of the sinner would be more perfect, since it has indifference to good and evil, than of the just man confirmed in grace, whose free choice is now not indifferent to sinning. Indeed also Christ the Lord would enjoy lesser freedom since from the grace of union He is impeccable. Likewise it would follow that free choice is more perfect when it does not determine itself to election than when it elects, since before it elects it is less determined.

Note fourthly that, although the first foundation of freedom be the natural determination of the will to the known end, nevertheless the proximate radical foundation of the use of free choice consists in the cognition of the indifference of the means to that end. Which cognition indeed in the supreme free choice is not distinct from the natural cognition of the end, which is the account of knowing all possible means orderable to that end. But of human freedom, of which we intend next to philosophize, the proximate radical principle is not the cognition of the ultimate end and of good in common as it is the object of the will. But since man is of rational nature, from that cognition of the end he discourses to inquiring into the means useful to that end; and of them he deliberates and takes counsel, and at length from such a judgment he determines here and now that this means is to be elected, and thus exercises his freedom, not remaining indifferent in act, but determined through himself to one by actually operating; remaining nevertheless with the power which he had in deliberating. But because the greatest difficulty is in understanding the indifference which is required to the account of free choice, a special question concerning this matter is to be disputed in the following chapter.