Tractatus de vera et legitima concordia liberi arbitrii creati cum auxiliis gratiae Dei

1. — If one were not contending with Catholics, the first question truly would have been whether there is free choice. But this ought to be supposed as something certain, both demonstrated by natural reason and confirmed in the sacred writings. On this matter see what we said on the Prima Pars, q. 83, a. 1, and above all read St. Thomas in De Veritate, q. 24, a. 1. Indeed the very experience within ourselves teaches us that there is a power of electing one of two proposals and refuting the other, or even of electing neither but of suspending the will. It follows, then, that one should no more dispute with someone who denies free will than with a brute.

The whole difficulty, therefore, lies in the very quiddity of free choice. On this matter Luis Molina in his new Concordia, p. 11 says as follows: «First of all it must be established what is understood by the name of free choice. For freedom can be taken in two ways. In one way as it is said from the verb to liberate [libero] and is opposed to slavery. In this sense it is said: Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom (2 Cor. 3:17)». Of freedom taken thus, he says, we have no discourse in this place. In the other way it is taken as it is said from the verb to please [libet]. And in this manner, it is taken in two ways. In one way as it is opposed to coercion—and in this way we grant that in the Godhead [in divinis] the Father generates the Son freely, that is, not under coercion but spontaneously. «But in another way it can be taken as it is opposed to necessity—and thus that agent is called free which, with all requisites for acting posited, can act and not act, or can so do one thing such that it can also do the contrary. And from this freedom, the faculty by which such an agent can so operate is called free. Since, however, it does not operate except with the preceding decision and judgment of reason, it is from this that … it is called free choice».

Here he notes two things. «The first is that boys and the insane not only operate spontaneously, but also effect many things freely, so that it is in their power to effect them or not to effect them … But on that account neither fault nor merit is imputed to them, because they do not discern by reason between moral good and evil … The second is that the will cannot but elicit all its acts». And he gives the example of the will of one seeing God, which cannot but love God. Likewise while we are on the way, acts often creep up which the will could not prevent. Whence the will is free as to its exercise only by comparison with those acts which it cannot elicit. «But if at the same time it can elicit either this act or its contrary indifferently, freedom is understood as to the species of the act, which has the aspect of full and perfect freedom». Thus far, that is Molina.

2. — In Molina's discourse many things are worthy of note. In the first place, I do not know why he derived choice from the verb to please [libet] rather than from the verb to liberate [libero], unless it just pleased him to do so. For surely if he had consulted the authors of the Latin language, he would speak otherwise. For he who pursues things prior to the mind's right deliberation does what pleases himself. But he who deliberates by right reason what is to be done is not said to have done what pleased himself. We say, therefore, that the freedom of choice extends itself more widely than desire, or rather, that it is entirely independent of it. For it happens that, in the absence of deliberating, some things please us, e.g., to fornicate or to steal, and yet we deliberate that one must not steal nor fornicate. If, however, the incontinent man shall have deliberated that one must fornicate, then indeed I declare that he deliberated what had pleased him beforehand. Whence indeed the derivation of free choice is foreign to the verb to please [libet], since we deliberate neither all the things that please us, nor do all the things we deliberate please us, although we sometimes deliberate some things that please us.

3. — Much more properly, therefore, do I judge free choice to be derived from the verb libero. For although in the primitive signification he is called free who does not serve slavery, as Cicero says in book 2 De natura deorum, he who is of a free mother is free; hence nevertheless several significations are drawn through a certain likeness, as Calepinus teaches in the verb liber. Of which one is that free be taken for immune, whether for one not subject or bound to anything. Whence Cicero in book 1 De finibus said time to be free, when the option of electing is released to us and when nothing impedes. And Livy in book 7 De bello Macedonico says free choice to be the free will and judgment of mind. Where he mentions both powers. Although, therefore, freedom, according to its primeval signification, be contrary to slavery, nevertheless because, just as he who is a slave is bound to the command of one master, so hence the freedom of which we speak is derived to the faculty of the will which is not bound to the pursuit of one object, but indifferently has the power of willing this or not willing, or at some time of desiring the contrary. But because that faculty and power arises from reason, which can also indifferently judge of such an object that it is fitting or not fitting to the will, hence the freedom of choice is so called, or free choice. For choice properly pertains to the judgment of mind; whence more properly perhaps it would be called a free adjudication, or adjudicated freedom. For freedom is formally in the will, but radically in the adjudication of the intellect. And thus free choice signifies the freedom of the will which depends on the adjudication of reason.

Note secondly that that author adduced the testimony II Cor., 3, Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom, judging that there freedom cannot be taken for the freedom of which we now speak. Which indeed is false; for Rom., 8 (v. 14): Who are driven by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. And yet the works to the performance of which they are driven not only snatch them from the slavery of sin, but also through them they merit eternal life with the heavenly Father, and consequently where the Spirit of the Lord is there is the freedom of which we speak.

Note thirdly that that author says in the same place that the Father in divinis generates the Son freely, that is, not under coercion but spontaneously. This manner of speaking ought not to please theologians. For although concerning the Holy Spirit some Scotists say that He is breathed from the Father and the Son freely, that is, by spontaneous will, nevertheless concerning the Son I have neither read nor heard a like locution. For although it pleases God the Father concerning the begotten Son, nevertheless theologians will in no way dare to say that spontaneous will is understood as the principle of generation; but rather before every intellection of the divine will, we confess the perfect principle of generating through the mode of nature to be in the divine intellect. That manner of speaking, therefore, is not to be admitted, namely that the Father generates the Son freely, that is, spontaneously, because in such a locution it is insinuated that spontaneous will is in some way the principle of the generation of the Son; just as we say that a stone descends spontaneously, and that a brute proceeds of its own accord to pasture, where a certain natural appetite is given to be understood as the principle of those motions. In which way we shall rightly say that the Father and the Son breathe the Holy Spirit of their own accord, not only because not under coercion, but because they breathe by will.

Moreover what he says seemed worthy of note, that boys not only operate spontaneously, but also effect many things freely, which nevertheless are imputed to them neither to fault nor to merit, because they do not discern by reason between moral good and evil. Which assertion seems to imply a contradiction. For if the definition of free choice which he had premised fits boys and the insane, namely that, with all requisites for acting posited, it is in their power to effect such things or not to effect them, or to will the contrary, it follows that they can sin, for that indifference arises from the adjudication of reason judging that so to be fitting or not fitting. And he gives the example in boys in the seventh year of their age completed; and yet indeed at that age they confess their sins and are absolved.

Lastly observe what is most worthy of note, namely what he said in the last place, that freedom as to the specification of the act holds the account of full and perfect freedom. That is, if the will can not only elicit or not elicit this act, but also the contrary of this, e.g., if the will of someone can will the act of virtue or of the contrary vice, it follows from this doctrine that there is in God and in Christ no full and perfect account of freedom; since God and Christ cannot so will the good that they can will the contrary. And the same would follow concerning those confirmed in grace, who cannot sin, and consequently would not enjoy the account of full and perfect freedom.

4. — With these assertions refuted, let us proceed to establishing the true and legitimate definition of free choice.

Of the many definitions of free choice that are circulated, the authors of the new concord have elected for themselves the worst. For the most illustrious Bellarmine, cardinal assumed from the Society concerning religion, in the third tome of the Controversies, ch. 21, which is On grace and free choice, book 3, ch. 3, distinguishes five definitions of free choice, and none of them is that which Molina and Suarez wished to use, namely: free choice is that which, with all requisites for acting posited, can act this or not act, or will the contrary. This form of the definition of free choice is found neither in Aristotle, nor in the Master, nor in the divine Thomas, nor in any grave doctor, except in Almain and other nominalists.

And indeed if they rightly understood and explained that definition, it would have been a tolerable foundation. We, therefore, intending to destroy their understanding, ask what they understand by those words, «with all requisites for acting posited». For if discourse be of the requisites before the free action is exercised, it is very well understood that the will still remains indifferent to acting or not acting. Nevertheless among those requisites is not numbered the efficacy of the divine motion, whether in the order of nature or in the order of grace; for that efficacy is simultaneous with the consent of our will. If, however, they understand their definition of the requisites in the moment in which the free action is exercised, it is proved false that, with all those posited, it is compossible for man not to elect that good which God precepts or counsels, because one of the requisites is the actual divine motion by which the will is moved from not willing to willing. Where it is to be observed that we do not assert simply and absolutely that it is not possible for the will not to elect, but we have said that it is not compossible with the position of all that are requisite in the moment of the good consent that the will not exercise that act. Otherwise the divine intention by which God wills man to elect would be frustrated.

5. — Nevertheless those authors tend elsewhere. For they judge that no other requisites are necessary on the part of God in the moment of the human operation than those that preceded, besides the general concurrence by which God conserves all things and concurs with all operating things; and thus man remains free and so indifferent that it is compossible not to act, even in the composite sense, with all those requisites on the part of God posited. And in this they judge the freedom of man to consist. And to such a point does Molina hold this that in his Concordia, p. 232, he says that the division of sufficient aid into efficacious and inefficacious is taken from the effect, which at the same time depends on the freedom of choice, and that that sufficient aid, whether greater or less in itself, is called efficacious with which choice is converted according to its freedom, when nevertheless, with nothing in that aid preventing it, it could have not been converted. And on p. 425 he judges it an error that there be given an efficacious aid which has its efficacy from the mode of the divine motion and from God Himself.

Likewise Suarez in book 3 On aids, ch. 6, n. 7 agrees in the matter with Molina, for he says that that concurrence of God «depends on our choice for it to be posited in second act». Which Bellarmine in tome 3, book 1 On grace and free choice, ch. 12 says to be an error against the sacred writings.

6. — But against that doctrine several things are to be said in what follows. Now, however, for understanding the legitimate definition of free choice, we suppose necessary that division of composite sense and divided sense which some ridicule when discourse is of free operation. Not because they deny it to be impossible for free choice at the same time to consent and not to consent, for this would be to deny the first principle, that a thing is and is not, but because they judge freedom to consist in this, that with all requisites for acting posited coming from without, even from God Himself inflowing and concurring, free choice stands at the same time not willing to operate. And to such a point does Francis Suarez judge this to be necessary that he judges the use of freedom to be totally destroyed if we posit on the part of God an aid so efficacious that simultaneously with it it is not compossible for the will not to operate. Let there be seen book 1 of the Opuscula, ch. 1, from n. 5 to 7, and ch. 2 from n. 2; in which whole chapter he seems to insinuate that according to our opinion, the indifference of freedom as to use is in us only passively, although we are far from this opinion. But what we assert is that our free will, when from not deliberating it passes to deliberating and determines itself freely to use, is nevertheless prior in nature determined by the divine will. He indeed and his associates will the free will so to determine itself that it is in no way determined by another from without; otherwise the whole freedom, if any intervenes in that election, will be in the agent or the one determining, and not in the will itself which is determined. We, however, confess so great a freedom in God alone; in the rational creature there is freedom subordinated to the motion of the divine will and freedom. And so far is it that our freedom is thereby destroyed that rather it takes strength therefrom for deliberating and for freely acting what God wills man to deliberate. But of this we shall speak more broadly in the third part of this treatise. Now, however, let us approach the establishing of the true definition of free choice.

7. — But first let us consider the other fifth definition which the most illustrious Bellarmine elects in the place cited above, under this form: «Free choice is the free power, of those things that conduce to some end, of electing one before another, or of accepting one and the same, or of rejecting it according to choice, attributed to the intelligent nature to the great glory of God». This definition he explains more broadly in his own way; but in our judgment it is not a skillful definition, but partly superfluous and confused, and partly diminished.

In the first place, since in God there is formally free choice, it would be fitting to define according to the universal account, although analogous, fitting God and creatures, which are created to the image of God. But that definition fits creatures only. Therefore it is limited nor does it adequately explicate the formality of free choice. But be it that he so intended to define created free choice, nevertheless he ought not to have posited in the definition both parts of the thing defined. For he says, it is a free power, etc., and according to choice of rejecting, etc., which is the greatest defect in assigning definitions. Finally what he says, «attributed to the intellectual creature to the great glory of God», has an obscure sense, for he seems to hold it to be a gift of grace, or something conferred on the intellectual nature from the liberality of God, which is false. For although to draw creatures from nothing was from the free will of God, as also to conserve them, nevertheless that man be having free choice is owed, just as that he be risible, indeed it is naturally contained in the idea of man which is in God. Concerning which read Augustine in book 1 On the grace of Christ, ch. 3, 4, 5 and 6.

8. — We, therefore, supposing according to the Catholic faith that in God there is formally free choice, just as there is knowledge and wisdom and intellect and will and the remaining perfections which are called by theologians simply simple, intend to assign such a definition in which we do not exclude the divine free choice; since to the likeness of it man was made free and master of his actions. The definition, moreover, is this: Free choice is the faculty of intellect and will for acting or not acting, or for acting the one or the other. This definition is assigned by the Master of the Sentences in book 2, d. 24, § 5. We, however, have said «of intellect and will» where the Master said «of reason and will», because he intended to treat specially of the free choice of man. And moreover he added, «by which the good is elected with grace assisting, or evil with the same deserting». Nevertheless the exact definition of free choice according to its whole universal account is that it be a faculty of intellect and will for either alternative. Those things, moreover, which follow, namely for acting or not acting, or for pursuing the one or the other, explicate what we understand by either alternative.

It is to be noted, moreover, that we have not said, or for acting the contrary, since to act the contrary does not pertain to the formality of free choice, but rather to imperfection and infirmity. Whence the perfect and full account of freedom is found without that indifference of contrariety, in the sole freedom of contradiction or of diversity, which is exercised in that free choice can elect one means or another means fitting to the end. The divine Thomas uses that definition in 2 Sent., dist. 25, a. 1 ad 1. That to be able to sin is not the formal account of the free will, the divine Thomas demonstrates in 1 p., q. 62, a. 8 ad 3, and in 2. 2, q. 88, a. 4 ad 1, in 1 Sent., d. 42, q. 2, a. 1 ad 3 and On truth, q. 24, a. 3 and very often elsewhere. And thus holds the divine Anselm in the dialogue On free choice, ch. 1. Not, however, on that account do we deny that it is very well gathered that free choice is in him who can sin, nor on that account does he have free choice because he can sin; but because while he sins, he uses the faculty of free choice against the law of God.

9. — But that we may consider more deeply the formality and origin of free choice, it is to be noted from the doctrine of the divine Thomas in 1 p., q. 19, a. 1, that will is demonstrated to belong to someone from that he has intellect; just as each thing has such an inclination as it has the form of its to-be. And such a disposition in things lacking cognition is called natural appetite, as gravity in a stone; and in those having sense, it is animal appetite; in those having intellect, moreover, it is intellectual appetite or will. And thence it is gathered that in God there is will, since in Him there is intellect.

Note secondly that formally speaking the faculty for either alternative is not the will itself insofar as it tends to the universal good known by the intellect or to its proper object; for thus it is borne naturally and from necessity to such an object. Whence in God Himself in respect of His proper object there is no faculty for either alternative, but the greatest necessity of the divine nature conjoined with the highest and infinite perfection, namely with the possession and enjoyment of the highest good, which is to see Himself and to enjoy His goodness. The created will of man, moreover, although naturally and necessarily determined to its proper object, which is good in common; nevertheless has this imperfection, that it is not determined as to perpetual exercise, but only as to specification, namely that it cannot will evil under the account of evil. The will, finally, of the angel is naturally determined actually as to exercise to its proper object, which is its proper good, which it loves also in sinning.

Note thirdly that the aforesaid natural and necessary disposition of the will to its proper object is the first foundation of its freedom through order to the means; to such a point that, the more perfect that prior disposition shall have been and the more necessary in act, the more perfect the mode in which it will be free in respect of the means. This doctrine is of Saint Thomas in On Truth, q. 24, a. 1 ad 20 and 1. 2, q. 10, a. 1 and 2. Just as in speculative matters the natural cognition of the first principles is the root of all discourse, so the more perfect the cognition of the end shall have been, the better is known the indifference of certain means to it, which is the proper account of freedom.

Which is clear first in God, whose will is most free in respect of all things that are outside God, because neither in common nor in particular did it need any means to its proper end, but from His goodness God proceeded to the production of creatures, ordering them to manifesting Himself.

Then the angel elects the more freely the more with greater natural cognition, and with a more necessary disposition to its proper good, it proceeds to the means fitting to that natural end, in respect of which end it could not sin in electing a means. But because in respect of the supernatural end it was not determined through its nature, thence it was made that it could have sinned, in badly electing to remain in its beatitude, in not ordering it to the supernatural end, of which ordering it had a supernatural precept.

Man, finally, who holds the lowest place in the order of intellectual beings, especially if considered in pure naturals or in fallen nature, enjoys the less perfect freedom the less determined he is to the proper end and object of the will. And although free choice has not been lost through sin, as faith teaches, nevertheless unless it be healed through grace, it remains infirm and wounded, so that even in the good according to natural reason it cannot persevere long.

From what has been said there follows one corollary: that although indifference is necessary to the account of free choice, nevertheless it will not on that account be the more perfect free choice because in itself it is indifferent in more ways. It is proved. Since otherwise it would follow that the free choice of the sinner would be more perfect, since it has indifference to good and evil, than of the just man confirmed in grace, whose free choice is now not indifferent to sinning. Indeed also Christ the Lord would enjoy lesser freedom since from the grace of union He is impeccable. Likewise it would follow that free choice is more perfect when it does not determine itself to election than when it elects, since before it elects it is less determined.

Note fourthly that, although the first foundation of freedom be the natural determination of the will to the known end, nevertheless the proximate radical foundation of the use of free choice consists in the cognition of the indifference of the means to that end. Which cognition indeed in the supreme free choice is not distinct from the natural cognition of the end, which is the account of knowing all possible means orderable to that end. But of human freedom, of which we intend next to philosophize, the proximate radical principle is not the cognition of the ultimate end and of good in common as it is the object of the will. But since man is of rational nature, from that cognition of the end he discourses to inquiring into the means useful to that end; and of them he deliberates and takes counsel, and at length from such a judgment he determines here and now that this means is to be elected, and thus exercises his freedom, not remaining indifferent in act, but determined through himself to one by actually operating; remaining nevertheless with the power which he had in deliberating. But because the greatest difficulty is in understanding the indifference which is required to the account of free choice, a special question concerning this matter is to be disputed in the following chapter.

1. — The question, therefore, is: whether indifference is of the intrinsic account of free choice.

It is argued first for the negative part. In God there is the most perfect free choice; and yet in Him there can be no indifference: therefore indifference does not pertain of itself and intrinsically to the formal account of free choice. The consequence is clear because, just as in God there is whatever pertains to the formal account of wisdom, because wisdom is a perfection simply simple, so also there ought to be whatever pertains to the formal account of free choice.

2. — It is argued secondly. Christ the Lord obeyed freely unto death; and yet, with the precept supposed, He could not not obey: therefore His free choice did not have indifference to obeying or not obeying. The consequence is clear, because He did not have indifference to sinning or meriting.

3. — It is argued thirdly. The evil angel now in fact sins: therefore he operates freely. And yet he does not have indifference in his free choice, which is obstinate in evil, since the angel from its nature elects immutably. Therefore at least to a free act it is not necessary that there remain some indifference in the will for either alternative.

4. — It is argued lastly, and the first argument is confirmed. For if indifference is required to the formal account of free choice, it would follow that God would not be altogether immutable, but could or could have had Himself otherwise in Himself than He now has Himself. The consequent is against that of James 1 (v. 17): With whom there is no change nor shadow of alteration. To the proof of the consequence it is to be noted that man is not called viciously changeable or inconstant when he changes counsel from new and reasonable circumstances coming upon him. But nevertheless his will is really changed if, after it willed something, it again wills that it not be done. The angel, however, is less changeable on account of the perfection of its nature. For after it elects something, it elects immutably, nor can it elect the opposite. Nevertheless in the angel a real changeability is considered in its free choice insofar as the election which it had, it could not have had, and consequently it could have had itself otherwise really in itself than it now has itself. But in God neither change nor shadow of alteration can be found. For the divine will could not from eternity have had another real action than it now has because, since it is the purest act, no real difference can be found in His will which is not necessary and eternal in God Himself.

5. — For the decision of this difficulty it is to be noted that indifference can be taken in two ways. In one way negatively; and thus a thing is said not differing nor determined. In another way it can be taken privatively, so that that is said to be indifferent which is apt to be determined whether by itself, or by another, or at the same time by itself and by another; e.g., just as a man who has not settled to take a wife, nor indeed has settled not to take one, is apt to determine himself to either part of the contradiction, is indifferent privatively.

Note secondly that still indifference, whether taken negatively or privatively, can be taken in three ways. In one way purely actively, insofar as that thing to which it belongs can by its faculty operate something, and can not operate that same; just as the craftsman has an active faculty of art for making some artifact, or for not making it, or for making another. Another is indifference purely passively, just as prime matter is indifferent to every form. Thirdly there is found indifference in both ways in some faculty, just as living things have power for various motions, active and passive, for from themselves they both move and are moved; just as progressive motion is at the same time action and passion.

6. — With these supposed let there be a first conclusion: If we speak of free choice in common according to its whole analogy, as it includes the divine free choice, there is not understood to pertain to its formal account except negative and active indifference, which is found in every free choice, although not always active alone.

It is proved. Because privative indifference is repugnant to God, namely that there be in Him a passive aptitude for either alternative, and there not be determination to the other. And note that we do not speak here in respect of the actions ad intra, in which no indifference can be found, but all things are from natural necessity and purest act; but we speak of the indifference which is in the divine power by comparison to all creatures, whether existing or possible. And in this way we affirm that the divine will is not determined from its nature to producing some creature, nor is determined from its nature to not producing some; but we say the divine omnipotence to have itself negatively indifferently in power for producing some creature, or for not producing. And the reason is because no creature has a necessary connection with the primary object of the divine will, nor could it bring any advantage so that the divine will better attain or enjoy this its beatitude. We have said, moreover, that this negative indifference is found actively in God, that we might condescend to the manner of speaking of certain moderns. But indeed we would more properly say that that indifference negatively befits the active power of God considered according to itself.

A second conclusion explicative of the preceding: When God has settled from eternity to make the world and all the other things which He makes in time, He does not have Himself otherwise in Himself than if He had not settled to create the world, or had settled not to create. This truth is one of the admirables of the divine majesty, namely how, with the total cause existing necessarily in the same way, the same effect does not follow necessarily.

Nevertheless this conclusion is proved from the immutability of God, who since He is purest act, it is impossible that He be in potency to having Himself otherwise in Himself than He now has Himself. But all His power is purest act, so that the deliberation of creating and the deliberation of not creating have no real difference in God Himself; just as neither does it make a real difference to be finalizing and to finalize, but there is only a difference of reasoned reason, just as is posited among the divine attributes.

From this conclusion it follows that the whole account of potentiality which is insinuated in the definition of free choice given in common, if we speak most formally, must be refunded into the object of free choice, which is always a means having passive indifference so that it can be ordered or not be ordered to the end. When, therefore, we say, free choice is the faculty of intellect and will for either alternative, we assign to each power an object having passive indifference. To the intellect indeed it befits to be intellective and to understand that indifference of the object; and such cognition is the root and proximate foundation of freedom, which is formally in the will just as also the very use of freedom. Likewise to the will we assign an indifferent object, that is, not having a necessary connection to the end which is the object of the will. For since the whole account of willing the means is the will of the end, to which the will is determined, if there be known some means which, although it can have some fittingness to that end, nevertheless does not have a necessary fittingness, thence it is that the goodness of that means is passively indifferent, so that it can be ordered or not be ordered, and be elected or not be elected to the end. And this is the chief reason on account of which we understand there to be in God the most perfect free choice and the most formal, including no imperfection, because from the most perfect cognition of the end, there is in God the most perfect cognition of the indifference of all other things, in which there is no necessary connection with the highest good, which is the object of the divine will. And yet God knows in them that they are orderable to the manifestation of the highest good finalizing all possible creatures. He finalizes, moreover, only those which by His free will He has made, indeed so that to be finalizing and to finalize posit no real difference in the divine will, but only a differing relation of reason.

And thus far the definition has been explicated concerning the purest formality of free choice, which is found in God alone; just as also the plenary account of wisdom and of the other perfections which are called by theologians perfections simply simple, is found in God alone in fullness, on which depend and to which are subordinated such perfections as they are formally participated by creatures.

A third conclusion: In every created free choice there is found not only the passive indifference of the object known as indifferently eligible, but there is also found some passive indifference with a certain potentiality of the subject.

This conclusion is proved by a common reason. First because every creature, however intellectual, has something of potentiality, since God alone is pure act; but every creature has received and limited to-be and dependent on the first to-be in becoming and in being conserved, and consequently in its every operation: therefore also created free choice in its own way must have potentiality and passive indifference to its operation and use of freedom.

It is proved secondly, because in no intellectual creature can it be found that now it does not elect and afterwards it elects without change of itself: therefore in every intellectual creature there is found some passive indifference in its free choice. The antecedent is proved. Because the election which is in the creature neither is its to-be, since it is an operation, nor is determined by the author of nature, just as the will of the end which is the object of the will. Therefore while the will elects what does not have a necessary connection with its object, it is really changed from potency to act.

Thirdly it is proved. Because every intellectual creature is peccable and defectible: therefore changeable through free choice. The antecedent is a common document demonstrated by theologians; by Saint Thomas in 1 p., q. 63, a. 1, and 1. 2, q. 89, and book 3 Against the Gentiles, ch. 108. The consequence is clear, because to be changed from good to evil presupposes the potentiality and passive indifference of the rational creature.

Finally it is proved inductively. For the angels created in grace were really changed through free choice from good to evil, and likewise man created in grace was really changed. Afterwards indeed in the state of fallen nature we experience this changeability from good to evil through free choice, and from evil to good through the grace of God we believe the change to be made.

A fourth conclusion: Nevertheless the faculty of free choice and the use of that faculty, however much the free choice be created, does not consist formally in the passion or potentiality of that faculty, but indeed the faculty is active and the use of it is action.

This conclusion is most certain according to faith, as is clear from the Council of Trent sess. 6, can. 4, 5 and 6. And indeed from the very definition of free choice it stands that that faculty is active for acting this or another, or for electing to act or not to act. And finally all human actions in which only is found the account of moral good or evil are true actions elicited by active powers, although on the part of the subject they have conjoined something of passibility, while the power passes from not operating to operating by virtue of the motion of a superior agent.

From which it follows that Suarez labors in vain in book 1 On aids, ch. 2, showing that this indifference of created free choice and the use of freedom does not consist in passion, judging that he defines something against us. But indeed he himself fashioned an enemy whom he might strike.

7. — From what has been said there follows one corollary very to be noted: that a created free choice will be the more perfect free, namely, the more through grace it shall have been assimilated to the divine free choice both in the foundation and root and in the formality of the will having itself to either alternative. This corollary seems to be openly demonstrated. For if man has this greatest perfection, that he was made to the image and likeness of God, on account of free choice and the dominion which he has for acting either alternative, as has been explicated, it is very well gathered that, if through grace this faculty is elevated, it will be the more perfect the more it shall have been assimilated in the mode of operating to the divine free choice.

There follows secondly that free choice and the exercise of it is more perfect in the blessed than in mere wayfarers. This is proved, because the first foundation, although not the proximate, of freedom is the determinate cognition of the end and the immutable adherence of the will to the ultimate end. And the blessed seeing God from the nature of the thing love Him immutably, just as God Himself sees and loves Himself. Therefore already in this foundation the blessed are maximally assimilated to God. Again from the perfect cognition and love of the highest good the indifference of the means to that end, which is the proximate root of the use of freedom, is more perfectly known.

From which it follows at last that the very use of freedom which is formally in the will is in a more perfect mode free, however infallibly the will of them always elects the good. We do not, however, posit merit in the blessed, not from defect of freedom, but because they are now constituted in the term of beatitude. Otherwise, moreover, it is repugnant that someone see God and merit in the election of the means to the end, just as Christ saw God as He now sees, and nevertheless most perfectly merited for us grace and glory in electing to obey unto death.

1. — To the first argument it is easily answered from the aforesaid conclusions: I grant the major, and I distinguish the minor. For if it be understood of privative or passive indifference which subjectively is or is understood to be in God, I grant the minor. And I deny the consequence, because such indifference does not pertain to the formality of free choice. If, however, it be understood of negative indifference which befits the active faculty of God, I deny the minor; indeed the divine faculty is not determined of itself to creating, nor is determined to not creating, but is only the power of creating.

2. — To the second argument it is answered that the supervening precept does not destroy the formality of freedom nor its root, because with the cognition of the indifference of some means according to itself to the end existing, the will also which serves under that cognition freely elects that means in obeying the extrinsic precept, which does not destroy the formality of freedom.

If, however, anyone sophistically urge that, with the precept standing, in the composite sense Christ could not not operate, since otherwise He could have sinned: it is answered that the formality and perfection of freedom does not consist in that He can not operate by sinning, but in that absolutely speaking He could not operate or operate. For free choice is not defined through indifference to opposites in the composite sense, but in the divided sense, in that it is said to be a faculty for either alternative. Therefore even if these two could not stand together: Christ has the precept of obeying unto death, and Christ does not will to die, nevertheless through this it does not follow that absolutely speaking He could not not will to die.

But if again the sophist urge that at least in respect of this act which is to obey, Christ did not have the faculty for obeying or not obeying: therefore He did not obey freely: it is answered, whatever be of the consequence, that what is inferred implies a contradiction, therefore He did not obey freely, if He obeyed, since the act of obedience is an act of moral virtue, in whose account it is included that it be a human and free act. Therefore to obey and not to obey implies a contradiction. But it is answered more to the form, I distinguish the antecedent. For if that act of obeying presuppose the precept, so that not to obey is disobedience, I grant the antecedent. And I deny the consequence, since to obey freely it is not necessary that the one obeying can sin. If, however, not to obey be taken purely negatively, I deny the antecedent. Indeed Christ was able not to obey, because it was possible not to have the precept; just as this negative is true: Christ did not obey unto the death of stoning or of beheading, because this negative posits nothing in to-be nor presupposes a precept.

We have, therefore, that to the freedom of obeying, even with the precept standing, it suffices that the will electing to obey serve under the cognition of the indifference of that means in order to the ultimate end, notwithstanding that it cannot sin. Just as God absolutely speaking most freely conserves the universe, and nevertheless with the promise of eternal life standing, it is incompossible for the world to be annihilated, just as it is impossible for God to lie. It is to be observed, therefore, always for dissolving importunate sophisms that, whatever coming upon from without does not destroy the formality of freedom nor the formal use of it, which consists in the subordination of the will to the cognition of the indifference of the means to the end, cannot destroy free choice nor the exercise of it.

3. — To the third argument are to be seen the things we said more broadly on the First Part, q. 64, a. 2, dub. 1 ad 2 arg. Now, however, it is answered that, although the evil angel is obstinate through fully deliberated operation, nevertheless this does not destroy the indifference which is required to free action. And the reason is because a free action is not said because it itself is not determined to the object which falls under election, but it is said free from the faculty and from the mode of the faculty from which it proceeds, namely from the faculty of intellect and will, which of itself has itself indifferently to either alternative, whether with negative or privative and passive indifference. Since, therefore, the election of the angel had such a beginning and such a root, it is necessary that as long as it endures, it be a free election, although it itself be determined to a particular object, which is verified also in human election. But in the angel election has another condition, on account of the inflexible nature of the angel, so that what it once elects, it cannot not elect, nor can it reject it. But nevertheless this inflexibility is so far from derogating from the faculty of freedom that rather it attests the greatest perfection of the angelic free faculty, insofar as the angel, as the divine Thomas teaches in that article cited, elects with the highest cognition of the indifference of the means to the end and of all the circumstances, and consequently cannot depart from the election once elicited, at least by refuting what it once elects. Men, however, even after they have elected, can refute what they once elected. Which changeability indeed does not arise from much perfection of free choice, but from the excessive potentiality of the faculty of intellect and will; because while man elects, he does not have perfect cognition of all the circumstances, and therefore with a new circumstance coming upon, he elects other than he had elected.

And this doctrine is proved abundantly enough. For if to the perfection of the use of free choice it pertained to be able to cease from the election of that which is once elected, there would not be in God the perfect faculty of free choice. For it stands that after God has decreed something to be done or to do, it implies a contradiction that God elect the opposite of what He elected, according to that: My counsel shall stand and all my will shall be done (Is., 46,10), and that I Reg., 15 (v. 29): The Triumpher in Israel will not spare nor be bent by repentance; for He is not a man that He should do penance. From which it follows that the more perfect free choice shall have been, the more constant it will be and the less changeable from what it once elects.

We have, therefore, that the demons now obstinate in evil sin no less than they sinned in the beginning of perfect deliberation. For knowing that they are of inflexible nature, they deliberated to remain in themselves, in not referring themselves to the supernatural end, as they were bound from the supernatural precept which they knew by faith, as the divine Augustine teaches in the Enchiridion, ch. 105: «Much more freely will free choice be free, which will be altogether unable to serve sin».

There follows also from the preceding doctrine that those confirmed in grace not less freely keep the mandates, indeed more perfectly freely than those not confirmed in grace; since their free choice through the grace of confirmation is stabilized and determined to the good, to the likeness of God.

From this doctrine, finally, we shall afterwards gather how the efficacious aid of God perfects freedom and the use of free choice.

4. — To the fourth argument it is already clear from the first and second conclusion. For we do not deny to God the negative indifference of the divine free choice. The argument, however, proves that, if there were given in God some privative or passive indifference, He would not be altogether immutable, since He could have Himself in Himself otherwise than He now has Himself. The whole most formal account of free choice, therefore, consists in the active faculty not determined to one, but having negative indifference to either alternative of acting or not acting. This power and faculty, moreover, is in the intellect and will. In the intellect indeed radically, insofar as in it there is the cognition of the indifference of the means to the end; in the will, however, formally there is the faculty of electing either alternative which is proposed by the intellect with indifference. The use itself, finally, of this faculty does not consist in some negative or passive indifference of the election itself; for every election is specifically determined and in the individual to one object with its circumstances. But the denomination of the use of free choice befits the election on the part of the principle from which it sets out, namely from the cognition of the indifference of the means to the end, and from the will, which serving under that cognition and subordinated to it, determines one to be elected. And thus the intellect is moved by the will to the act of command, which is explicated through the word of the imperative do.

Whence it stands how far we are from that opinion which Suarez judges us to hold, that the account of freedom and the use of it consists formally in the cognition and judgment of the indifference of the object. For we assert that the use of freedom consists in this radically, by means of which root God Himself in most perfectly illuminating the intellect and intimately inspiring in the will effects that the will determine itself as freely as if it were not acted from without. And nevertheless it is moved strongly on the part of God the first mover. Whose motion and aid does not bind the free faculty, but in perfecting it effects that it operate infallibly, as we intend to explicate more fully in what follows. Thus far concerning the first part of this treatise.