Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

But the reason for this diverse distribution lies hidden in the inscrutable judgments of God, with whom there is no iniquity; and in that diverse distribution is placed the mystery of predestination.

I. The first is established from what has been demonstrated thus far. The second is established by fact; for e. g. the exterior graces, such as the preaching of the Word, were not the same for all, and the interior graces themselves, at least insofar as they are efficacious and helping, likewise are not the same for all. The Thesis aims at this, that it be understood that in the gratuitous distribution of graces is placed the mystery of the supernatural providence of God, or of predestination. We adduce first the doctrine of Augustine, from which a mystery of this sort is established: then, a simple observation having been applied, it will be clear that in the distribution of graces alone is placed the mystery of predestination.

II. Thus the Pelagians, as is well known, denied the gratuitousness of grace and objected against it that, if grace is given freely, it must be asserted that the lots of men are ruled by a certain fate, or that God is an accepter of persons (cf. Cont. Iulian. L. II. c. 18. n. 46. et Epist. ad Sixtum CXCIV. n. 4.).

On the contrary, Augustine defended grace as altogether gratuitous, denying that either of those two things which the Pelagians inferred follows from it. A question therefore arose, and a double one at that, and Augustine accurately distinguishes each (De Dono persev. c. 8. nn. 16, 18. Epist. cit. c. 2. nn. 4, 5. Cont. Iulian. L. IV. c. 8. n. 46): namely, 1) why the grace of God is not given to all, but is given to some and not to others. 2) If of all men, none of whom merits it, it is given only to certain ones, why it is given to this one rather than to that one. Augustine does not answer both questions in the same way.

III. Before we report the answers of Augustine, it must be noted 1) that the grace about which the question is raised is not just any grace, but a certain determinate grace, namely a more abundant grace, or a grace efficacious in act. For sufficient grace, in the judgment of Augustine himself (as we suppose has been demonstrated), is denied to no one; therefore the question cannot be about it, why it is not given to all. Augustine, however, as we have already noted elsewhere, spoke specifically about that grace which is joined with its effect, about the grace of the elect, of the children of the promise. The question therefore came back to this, why faith itself, justification, perseverance are not given to all; or why that grace is not conferred on all which, nevertheless, is given to others, by which it comes about that they actually believe, are justified, and persevere.

It must be noted 2) that efficacious grace under this formal aspect, insofar as it is foreseen as going to be efficacious in the future if it is given, is owed to no one; for what man can exact is the grace by which he is able, that is, sufficient grace or efficacious grace in first act; that grace, however, be efficacious in second act, that is placed in the power of man himself aided by sufficient grace; there is therefore no reason why God should be bound to give anything more.

Hence 3) the sufficient reason for calming all complaints is this double one: first, the more abundant or efficacious grace, as such, is an unowed gift, is unowed mercy; second, that the sufficient grace which is given to man is not efficacious in him, that is due to the fault of man; and therefore it is from man himself that he has not had efficacious grace.

But 4) it cannot be denied that the omnipotent God does not lack a way by which He calls all in such a manner that they infallibly follow the one calling, and if God willed to have mercy even on those very ones (who do not follow), He could call them in the way that would be suited to them, so that they would both be moved and understand and follow (Ad Simplic. L. I. q. 2. nn. 13. 14.). it cannot be denied that the omnipotent God does not lack a way by which He calls all in such a manner that they infallibly follow the one calling, and if God willed to have mercy even on those very ones (who do not follow), He could call them in the way that would be suited to them, so that they would both be moved and understand and follow (Ad Simplic. L. I. q. 2. nn. 13. 14.). Why, therefore, is such grace not given to all, or why are not all called in this way?

IV. The answer of Augustine to this first question comes down to this. He who seeks the reason for this diverse distribution of graces can raise the question in this sense, so as to wish to accuse God of injustice, as if he said: Is not God unjust, because in an equal case He has mercy on some and not on others? Or, conceding that there is no injustice on the part of God, he can still ask why God, who could have had mercy on all, did not in fact will to have mercy on all in this way.

To the question understood in the former way Augustine answers by demonstrating that there is no injustice on the part of God, both because, if grace is not efficacious, that is from the fault of man; and because efficacious grace is an unowed benefit. Enchir. c. 99. «He has mercy with great goodness, He hardens with no iniquity: so that neither may the freed man glory in his own merits, nor the condemned man complain of his own merits.» Moreover, these are merits, because, having sufficient graces, he willed not to consent to them; the hardening, therefore, which consists in the denial of helping grace, is to be traced back not to the iniquity or injustice of God, but to the fault of man, who, not consenting to the sufficient graces, was the cause of his not being helped by God. And De Praed. SS. c. 8: «Why, then, does He not teach all to come to Christ, unless because all whom He teaches He teaches in mercy; and those whom He does not teach He does not teach in judgment?» If in mercy, therefore it is an unowed benefit. Moreover, when you hear judgment, you understand at once that Augustine teaches that the evil will of man is the cause, which merited it, and therefore spurned the graces by which it could be good. For speaking of God blinding and hardening (Tract. in Ioan. LIII. n. 6.) he says: «I answer that even this their will has merited. For thus God blinds, thus He hardens, by deserting, not by helping, which He can do by a hidden judgment, but cannot do by an unjust one.» Behold what it is that the judgment of God is not unjust: because, namely, the will of men merited it. It is therefore supposed that sufficient graces were not lacking, by which he could do good.

V. It must be noted that Augustine, in order to set more openly in view this reason of the unowed, which belongs to grace, frequently appeals to original sin. Not that original sin alone is a sufficient reason why, once the restoration of the whole human nature through Christ is established, sufficient grace is denied, but that the same sin is a reason showing that grace, and especially efficacious grace, is gratuitous and unowed to nature, which gratuitousness of grace Augustine alone undertakes to demonstrate. But lest the opinion of Augustine be wrongly understood, it must be noted that Augustine speaks of that discrimination which is made through the first grace, which finds all bound by original sin, and that therefore to demonstrate unowed grace from original sin still existing and not yet remitted, and that it is false that Augustine derives the reason for the denial of efficacious grace and of perseverance to the just even from original sin, however fully remitted. This could be demonstrated by an analysis instituted of all those testimonies of Augustine which are adduced by those who impose this opinion on Augustine, namely that God deprives some of so great a good on account of a sin which He most fully pardoned to them. But because all those testimonies are most similar to one another, it will be enough to recite one; the rest can be compared. In Contr. duas epistt. Pelagg. L. II. c. 7., acceptance of persons having been defined and the parable of the denarii Matth. XX, 1. seqg. having been brought forward, he continues: «for here is all justice: this I will. To you, he says, I have repaid, to this one I have given: neither, that I might give to this one, did I take anything from you, or diminish or deny what I owed. As, therefore, here there is no acceptance of persons, because one is thus honored in such a way that another is not defrauded of what is owed; so also, when according to the purpose of God one is called and another is not called, to the one called a gratuitous good is given, of which good the calling itself is the beginning; to the one not called a bad is repaid, because all are guilty before Him in that through one man sin entered into the world... The good indeed is given without merit and freely; because he is from the same mass as him to whom it is not given: the bad, however, is repaid with merit and as owed, because in the mass of perdition bad is not badly repaid to bad.» The sense is obvious, that here Augustine speaks of those who are still guilty of original sin. For it is a question of vocation, which there is no reason why you should not receive as the first grace, since the speech is about guilty ones bound by original sin. He teaches the same in Epist. CLXXX. ad Paulinum, nn. 16. 17. and Epist. CXC, ad Optatum nn. 9. 10. Epist. CXCIV ad Sixtum n. 4. and elsewhere. Cf. Faure in Enchirid. ad caput 55. To this belongs what he says in De Dono persev. c. 8. «Why, he says, is the grace of God not given according to the merits of men? I answer, because God is merciful. Why then, he says, not to all? and here I answer, because God is judge.» Namely, original sin existing, there exists a reason why God can condemn man and therefore also deny grace, so that if He confers it, that is wholly from divine liberality and mercy, which Augustine wishes to prove.

Hence, when he expressly raises the question about those in whom original sin has already been remitted, he does not seek from it the reason for the grace of perseverance denied. Thus in De Dono persev. c. 8. n. 19., this question having been proposed, why He did not give perseverance even to the end to certain ones who worshipped Him in good faith, he answers «why do you think, except because he does not lie who says: they went out from us, but they were not of us, etc.» He indicates, namely, that the reason is to be sought from those very ones who fell away by their own sin. Therefore ibid. n. 21. he constitutes two classes of those to whom benefits of this sort are denied by God, namely of little children, who are still bound by original sin, and of those of mature age, both the impious and the pious, signifying that one is not to speak of all in the same way. And indeed, returning to the question why of two pious men perseverance is given to one and not to the other, he recurs again to the words of John, then adds: «they were not in Christ chosen before the constitution of the world, they were not in Him obtaining a lot, they were not predestined according to the purpose of Him who works all things, etc.» by which words only the gratuitousness of the predestination of perseverance is declared.

VI. Nevertheless, two things are still to be distinguished. For it is one thing to teach: perseverance is denied to the just man on account of this motive, which is original sin, which nevertheless was remitted; another thing: the gratuitousness of perseverance being supposed, which is the reason why it can be denied without injury, to take up original sin in order to show that fallen man complains more without merit about perseverance denied than if he had remained whole. For this latter discourse comes down to this. By what right does anyone complain that perseverance is not given to him, to whom the first grace could meritedly have been denied, which being denied, perseverance also would have been denied? By this argument it is not said that original sin remitted is a motive for God to deny the grace of perseverance, but only it is shown how without merit man complains for a denied good otherwise unowed, to whom everything, namely the first grace and perseverance, could have been denied. Thus Augustine seems to argue in Op. imp. L. II. c. 142. cf. Faure at the cited place.

VII. But when, setting aside the question of the justice of God, one asks simply why God does not confer grace on all, since He can if He wills, Augustine answers that the judgments of God are inscrutable. De Dono persev. n. 21. «Of two little children equally bound by original sin, why this one is taken up, that one is left behind, and of two impious men already of mature age, why this one is so called that he follows the one calling; that one, however, either is not called (by the preaching of faith) or is not so called; the judgments of God are inscrutable.» Cf. also L. I. ad Simplic. q. 2. n. 17. and this Augustine frequently hands down either in these words or in similar ones, exclaiming namely with the Apostle: O the depth of the riches! and is there iniquity with God?

Nevertheless, in order that Augustine may in some way defend these inscrutable judgments, he warns that from this diverse distribution of graces this effect follows, or this good is obtained, that the gratuitousness of grace becomes more manifest; for if it were given to all, it would seem as it were connected with nature and owed, and thus those who receive it would be borne toward God with greater humility and gratitude. Enchir. c. 99: «He sees, if he grasps (the words of the Apostle Rom. IX. 20. 21.), the whole human race condemned by so just a judgment in the apostate root, that even if none were freed from it, no one could rightly reproach the justice of God, and that those who are freed ought to have been freed in such a way that, from the many not freed and left in the most just damnation, it might be shown what the whole lump had merited and whither the owed judgment of God would also lead those very ones, unless unowed mercy came to their aid; so that every mouth of those willing to glory in their own merits may be stopped and he who glories may glory in the Lord.» Cf. also the letter to Paulinus of Nola n. 22. 24. 25.

Moreover, as we have already warned, these things are not to be taken of the denial of grace or of the providence necessary for the salvation of each man; for this conflicts with the certain doctrine of Augustine on the universal salvific will. Cf. n. 111.

But Augustine indeed teaches that this manner of liberation ought to have been used, so that by not liberating many it might be shown what the whole human race had merited. It is clear 1) that this non-liberation of the many is not a necessary means to showing that, which could have been manifested in other ways. It is clear 2) both from the very phrase and from the nature of the thing that non-liberation and damnation are not the object of the will of God intending it, but only permitting it. Wherefore 3) the showing of the merit of the human race is not an end intended through the damnation of the many; for then this would be a means and intended by God: but it is a reason of the fittingness of the permission, that the many are damned. Whence 4) that 'ought to have been' does not signify the necessity of employing this manner for showing that, but only the fittingness. And indeed, if this permission had been necessary, the judgments of God would no longer be said to be inscrutable in a permission of this sort: for an evident reason would appear. He asserts, therefore,5) that it was fitting for God (yet in such a way that the opposite also would have been fitting for God, if He had willed it) to permit the perdition of the many, just as in general the Theologians teach that the permission of moral evils is fitting for God; because besides the fact that He is not bound to impede moral evil, there is present a reason or sufficient condition for exercising this right of permitting which He has, namely some good which can be elicited from the evil for His glory. For God can permit moral evil, because He is not bound to impede it; it is necessary, however, that some good be able to be elicited from the permitted evil: this good, moreover, is indeed not an end intended by God when He wills to permit the evil, but is as it were a condition so that He can exercise His right of permitting evils. Thus Augustine teaches that it was fitting to permit many to be damned, because from this permitted evil that good could be gathered, that the gratuitousness of grace might be known more evidently. Hence the vessels of mercy understand (contr. duas epistt. Pelagg. L. IV. c. 6.) how gratuitous a mercy is shown to them, because to the vessels of wrath, with whom the cause of perdition and the common mass is theirs, owed and just wrath is repaid.

VIII. To the second question, namely, if grace is not given to all, why nevertheless it is given to this one rather than to that one, e. g. why rather to Peter than to Judas, the answer of Augustine is shorter and more expeditious: namely, that no reason for this thing can be thought out, that it pertains to the inscrutable judgments of God. De Dono persev. c. 8. »If already, he says, it was fitting, that, by not damning all, He might show what was owed to all and thus commend His grace more gratefully to the vessels of mercy: why in the same cause would He punish me rather than him, or liberate him rather than me?" Augustine answers: »This I do not say; if you ask why, because I confess that I do not find what to say." Contr. duas epistt. Pelagg. I. IV. c. 6. n. 16. »But why does He make these men sheep and does not make those, with whom there is no acceptance of persons? This itself is the question, to which the blessed Apostle says to those proposing more curiously than capably: O man, who are you who answer God? Does the clay say to him who formed it: why did you make me thus? This itself is the question, which pertains to that height, which, wishing to see through, the same Apostle in a certain way was afraid and cried out: O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God: how inscrutable are His judgments and unsearchable His ways!" Cf. also epist. 194, ad Sixtum. n. 23.

Note that in the same place Augustine adds: »Let His gratuitous mercy, therefore, be pleasing to us, even if this deep question remains unresolved. Which nevertheless (question) is so far resolved, inasmuch as the Apostle resolves it saying: but if God, willing to show His wrath and make known His power, brought (endured) with much patience the vessels of wrath, which are perfected (fitted) for perdition, and (the little word 'and' is missing in the Vulgate) that He might make known the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He prepared for glory. For wrath is not repaid unless owed, lest there be iniquity with God: mercy, however, even when it is shown unowed, is not iniquity with God." But saying these things Augustine seems to pass from the special question why this one rather than that one is saved, to the general one, why not all are saved. For of this the proper answer is that of Paul. Cf. Card. Toletum Comment. in Epist. ad Rom. in h. 1.

But now from these things which we have adduced thus far from Augustine, it is established that the diverse distribution of graces is placed in mystery. And indeed, let a reason be given why those graces are not given to all, by which those men would infallibly be made safe if they were conferred; why rather to this one than to that one that series of efficacious graces is conferred: although something can be brought forward for the former question, nevertheless nothing for the second, nor can what is brought forward for the former satisfy the mind, unless recourse be had to the hidden will of God.

But that mystery is the mystery of the divine counsel and good pleasure and is called a mystery; because the creature cannot scrutinize and know the counsels of God. Moreover, the thing which underlies this mystery is either the absolute predestination to glory before foreseen merits, which predestination would be necessary for someone to be saved and yet would not pertain to all; or it is the conferral of graces efficacious from within, which would be necessary for salutary acts to be, and yet again are not given to all; or it is a distribution of graces differing according to the will of God, so that indeed sufficient ones are given to all, but not to all with the same abundance, nor to all those which are foreseen to attain their effect, especially perseverance. But not the first; because although in itself that predestination is not repugnant and perhaps is given for many, it is repugnant that it be necessary and yet be denied to many. Not the second; both because it supposes the first, and because such grace is not given, and because Augustine and the other Fathers, who, disputing with the Pelagians, preached the mystery of the predestination of grace, had no controversy about the special mode by which the intrinsic force of grace operates in the will: therefore what they teach about the mystery of predestination does not pertain to the nature of such grace. The third, therefore, remains. And indeed all the sayings of Augustine, in which he confesses the mystery, point to this. For he says it is inscrutable why this one is called, that one is not called, to this one it is so persuaded that he is persuaded, to that one not so, why this one is called in a way suited to him that he follows the one calling, not so that one, why this one is made a sheep, not that one, etc. But these things exhibit a differing distribution of graces. Therefore.

THE END.