Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

I. St. Thomas, De Verit. q. XXIV. a. 11. thus describes obstinacy: «Obstinacy imports a certain firmness in sin, by which a person cannot turn back from sin. That a person cannot turn back from sin, however, can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that his own powers do not suffice for him to be wholly freed from sin, and thus anyone falling into mortal sin is said to be unable to return to justice. But from that firmness in sin a person is not properly called obstinate. In another way a person has firmness in sin such that he cannot even cooperate toward rising from sin. But this is twofold. In one way, so that he can in no way cooperate, and this is perfect obstinacy, with which the demons are obstinate; for their mind is so fixed in evil that every motion of their free will is disordered and is sin, and therefore they can in no way prepare themselves to have the grace by which sin is forgiven. In another way, so that he cannot easily cooperate toward leaving sin, and this is imperfect obstinacy, with which a person can be obstinate in the state of the way, namely while a person has his will so fixed in sin that no motions toward the good arise except weak ones. Yet because some do arise, from them the way is given for him to be prepared for grace.»

Therefore 1) obstinacy is a certain firmness in sin: 2) in this life only imperfect obstinacy is possible: 3) it does not consist in this, that a person wholly lacks the powers of rising from sin, nor 4) does it consist in this, that no good motion of free will can exist in him, by which a person prepares himself for grace (namely, justifying grace). But 5) it consists in this, that a person so adheres to evil through the will that it is difficult for him to cooperate (namely, with grace) in order to leave the state of sin.

II. That this may be understood more clearly, obstinacy in cause and obstinacy in effect must be distinguished. The obstinacy in cause, or the cause of obstinacy, is assigned by St. Thomas (ibid., art. preceding), namely, on the part of reason, the perversion of judgment on account of the impulse of passion; on the part of the will, the inclination of an evil habit, which is like a certain nature of the one having it (cf. this article and the preceding one). When, therefore, the perversion of judgment and the inclination of the evil habit are so great that a person can cooperate with grace only with difficulty, he himself is said to be obstinate in evil. Wherefore the generation of the perversion of the judgment of reason and of the evil inclination — a generation which takes place through preceding acts and gradually — is the cause of obstinacy, or obstinacy in cause; but that state which follows upon it, in which a person cooperates with the grace of God only with difficulty in order to leave sin, is obstinacy in effect, which comprises an actual perversion of the judgment of reason (blindness) and an actual inclination of the habit toward evil (hardness of heart).

Wherefore this firmness of the will in evil, introduced from the preceding causes, is habitual and permanent, and this habitual disposition is the reason why the subsequent acts of the will generally come to be ordered toward evil, and no motions toward the good arise except weak ones.

Therefore obstinacy in evil is nothing but a certain species of habit, or of the habitual disposition left behind from sin. For a habitual disposition can be more or less stable; it can be had toward fewer or more sins: but when it is so great that the will adheres so firmly to evil that it can recall itself to the good only with difficulty, then the firmness of the will in evil, or obstinacy, is so called. Whence what is said of habit in general must also be affirmed of obstinacy in evil.

II. Hence it follows that firmness of the will in evil of this kind, and the continual perseverance in it through the exercise of evil acts, is free to the will — both because that habitual disposition was freely introduced, and because the operation which takes place according to that habitual disposition is not necessary; for a habit does not induce necessity, although it can produce the greatest facility of act. Through the perversion of judgment, however, the light of reason is not so darkened that a man does not perceive that he acts badly; for that which he judges to be good for himself on account of passion and evil inclination cannot be evident to him, and therefore some apprehension and estimation of evil always remains, which, unless it were freely lulled to sleep, could bring forth its fruits.

«That a man in the state of the way cannot be so obstinate in evil but that he can cooperate toward his own liberation, the reason is clear, because passion is both loosened and repressed, and habit does not wholly corrupt the soul, nor does it adhere to the false so stubbornly but that it can be led away by a contrary reason,» says St. Thomas l. c. a. 11..

The difficulty, therefore, of cooperating with grace, when the will exists fixed in evil, since it follows upon that free firmness in evil, is itself also free.

Therefore the obstinacy of the will in evil is not any necessity properly so called of sinning, but is a certain free habitual disposition by which cooperation with grace is rendered difficult, so that one may leave the state of sin; which disposition, however, like any habit, can at least gradually be diminished and put off. This is the doctrine of St. Thomas.

IV. Nor does St. Augustine think otherwise. For he deliberately treats of this matter in Tractatu IIII. in Ioannem, on those words of Isaiah cited by John: «Therefore they could not believe; because Isaiah said again: He has blinded their eyes and hardened their heart, that they may not see with their eyes and understand with their heart and be converted, and I heal them.» «For it is said to us (he says, n. 5): if they could not believe, what sin is it of a man not doing what he cannot do»It is clear that the question is about the obstinate, who are also called blinded, and whose most frequent example Augustine places in those Jews of whom Isaiah speaks..

But now what notion of obstinacy Augustine would form in his mind is clear from what follows. He says, n. 6: «They could not believe; because the prophet Isaiah foretold this: but the prophet foretold this because God foreknew that this would be. Why, then, they could not, if it be asked of me, I answer quickly: because they were unwilling.» Therefore the obstinacy of the Jews was free.

Hence he indeed permits others (n. 8) to explain this question more clearly and better: yet he warns two things, namely: «that no one dare so to defend free will as to try to take away from us the prayer in which we say, lead us not into temptation; again, that no one deny the free choice of the will and dare to excuse sin».

Wherefore, explaining why they could not believe, he traces this inability back to the free disposition of the evil will (n. 9): «It is not, therefore, a wonder that they could not believe, whose will was so proud that, not knowing the justice of God, they wished to establish their own... But it was said thus, they could not, where it must be understood that they were unwilling, just as it was said of our Lord God: he cannot deny himself... As, therefore, that the Lord cannot deny himself is the praise of the divine will, so that they could not is the fault of the human will." Whence Augustine affirms an inability of this kind not as antecedent, but only as consequent (n. 10): «Those who are so proudly wise as to think that so much must be attributed to the powers of their own will that they deny that divine help is necessary for them in order to live well, cannot believe in Christ... Hence also those could not believe, not because men cannot be changed for the better, but as long as they are so minded, they cannot believe.»

To the difficulty, however, thus proposed (n. 6): «But the Prophet, you say, gives another cause, not their will (namely, why they were unwilling to believe): what cause does the Prophet give? because God gave them a spirit of compunction, eyes that they might not see and ears that they might not hear, and he blinded their eyes and hardened their heart.» Augustine answers: «I answer that even this their will merited. For in this way God blinds, in this way he hardens, by deserting and not helping, which he can do by a hidden judgment, but cannot do by an unjust one.» Namely, God hardens by not helping, that is, by not conferring helping grace, namely grace actually efficacious. But 1) that grace is not efficacious depends on the will: why, therefore, efficacious grace is not actually conferred, or why the grace which is conferred is not actually efficacious, the cause is the will. Moreover, God could indeed have conferred some grace which he foresaw would be efficacious, but he justly denied it, because their evil will merited that. And so God hardens by deserting, that is, by not helping, or by not conferring grace actually efficacious, which can therefore be understood in two ways, namely, either on account of preceding demerits he denies the grace which he foreknew would be efficacious, or he simply deserts, inasmuch as, the will withholding its cooperation from sufficient grace, God does not help it. Because, therefore, as Augustine teaches elsewhere, God does not desert unless he is deserted; not God, but the will is the sole cause of the evil act.

V. But now, with the concept of obstinacy which can take place in this life thus defined, it is readily clear that the obstinate are not deprived of necessary graces. This is evident 1) by the authority of St. Thomas, who does not will obstinacy in this life to be anything but imperfect, from which accordingly a man can withdraw and be converted to the good; moreover this cannot happen without grace: he who places obstinacy in this, that a person cooperates with difficulty in order to leave sin; but in order that a person cooperate, the grace of God is required, with which he cooperates: he therefore supposes grace to be at hand, with which he could absolutely, but with which he can cooperate only with difficulty. And indeed the holy Doctor supposes that motions toward the good arise in the obstinate, albeit weak; moreover these are motions of grace. 2) by the authority of Augustine. For the cause why the obstinate cannot act well is that they are unwilling; moreover this reason would be false in the view of Augustine, if grace were lacking, which confers the power. Again, Augustine concedes only that helping grace, that is, actually efficacious grace, is lacking to them, but he teaches that this is from their fault: he does not, therefore, deny, nay he implicitly asserts, that sufficient graces preparing the will, whether proximately or remotely, are present to the obstinate. Note that in those words deserting and not helping, the particle and is explanatory: for if the following words said something other than the preceding, they would say less and therefore would be useless.

Note again that here Augustine says that God hardens by not helping, elsewhere he says that God hardens by not having mercy, I. J. ad Simplie. q. 2. nn. 15. 16. For the mercy of God is the bestowal of helping grace, that is, actually efficacious grace: «for of whom he has mercy, he calls him in such a way as he knows is congruent for him, that he does not reject the one calling,» as he says ibid., n. 13.

And indeed what we have heard from Thomas — that obstinacy in this life is nothing but imperfect — Augustine had already taught. For he says, in Psal. VI. n. 8, on the words of Paul (Rom. I, 28.) God gave them over to a reprobate mind: That is the blindness of the mind: whoever has been given over to it is shut off from the interior light of God, but not yet entirely, while he is in this life. For there are exterior darknesses, which are understood to pertain more to the day of judgment, so that he is entirely outside God, whoever, while there is time, has refused to be corrected; for what is it to be entirely outside God, except to be in the deepest blindness?... The beginning of this wrath is that which every sinner suffers in this life... and therefore he does not say (Psalmus VI. 8. My eye is troubled by wrath) it is extinguished, namely, my eye is troubled by wrath.»

Hence in Psalm. XVIII. Enarrat. 1a, n. 7, he teaches that «the Word made flesh, taking up our mortality, did not allow any mortal to excuse himself from the shadow of death, and the heat of the Word indeed penetrated that very shadow.»Augustinus, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalmus XVIII, n. 7. However great, therefore, the shadow of death may be in this life, it is not total, but is sprinkled with the light and heat of the divine sun — namely, grace — by which the blinded man can, if he will, return to the way of justice.

VI. And in very truth 3) Cf. Augustinus, Tractatus in Ioannem, XLIV, n. 6. — that we may argue also from the analogy of faith — this was persuasively held by Augustine, which every Catholic feels and reason itself demonstrates: that the time of the present life is a time of probation and a course granted to us by God, that by working we may attain eternal life, and that the power of working for the attainment of the end ceases when life ceases; that now, to be sure, is the time of mercy, in the other life is the time of judgment. Thus Tract. XLIV. n. 6. in Ioann., on those words: «the night comes when no one can work.» What shall we say of that night? when will it be when no one can work? That night will be the night of the impious, that night of those to whom it will be said at the end: «go into the eternal fire.» Let a man, therefore, work while he lives, lest he be overtaken by that night, where no one can work. It is one thing to be the time of working, another of receiving. While you live, do. And Tract. LIV. n. 5: «Now is the time of mercy, afterwards there will be judgment.» Therefore even the obstinate, who live here, can work their own salvation; the mercy of God is also at hand for them; they have, therefore, graces by which they can be saved.

VII. Although, therefore, it would not be opposed in itself to the salvific will of God to abandon some sinners altogether, with no further grace supplied — for just as he could punish them, existing in sin, with death, or deprive them of their mind, so too, while the natural good of a longer life is still granted, he can deprive them of all graces and hold them as already to be condemned — nevertheless, having regard to the economy of divine providence, by which the time of the present life is established as a time of probation and of the way, it must be said that as long as God permits sinners to live, he also grants them the space of repenting, and therefore they still pertain to the salvific will of God, which confers on all the means necessary for salvation. Whence August. Retract. I. I. c. XIX. n. 7: «Concerning anyone however wicked, placed in this life, one must certainly not despair, nor is one imprudently praying for him of whom one does not despair.»Augustinus, Retractationes, I, XIX, n. 7.

This is confirmed also by the catholic dogma established against Novatian, namely that there is no sin which cannot be expiated by penance and remitted by the Church; therefore even the obstinate can do penance, that is, come to their senses from their lethargy and return to God.

VIII. Note that Augustine, in Exposit. quarumd. proposit. Epist. ad Rom. c. 12, says of the hardened Pharaoh: «This is not, therefore, imputed to him, that he did not then obey, since with a hardened heart he could not obey; but because he showed himself worthy of having his heart hardened, by his prior unbelief.» But these sayings of Augustine are connected with a certain singular doctrine of his. Namely, laboring under that error that the beginning of faith is not a gift of God, but that through it we obtain the other gifts, he teaches here that although the good works which we do through the grace of God are imputed to us, or are ours, because we act willingly; yet in a special manner faith is ours and is imputed to us, because it is from us alone and is the principle and reason why the other good works exist. But now he illustrates this false doctrine, which he afterwards condemned, by this example, namely that to the hardened Pharaoh the first sin, by which he merited to be hardened, is imputed, but those things which follow the hardening are not imputed. These things, to be sure, must be understood of the special imputation by which the first sin is imputed, just as Augustine thought that faith is imputed. For the first sin is from the malice of man alone; but those things which follow the hardening come also from the punishment of God, as Augustine speaks there, who hardens in punishment of preceding sins, or deserts the sinner. Moreover, with this false doctrine of the beginning of faith rejected, Augustine must be judged afterwards to have thought about hardening what we have recited from him from Tract. LIII. in Ioann.

It is brought forward from the Lib. De Nat. et Grat. c. 22.* «the light of truth worthily deserts the transgressor of the law, deserted by which he certainly becomes blind, and it is more necessary that he stumble and, falling, be afflicted, and, afflicted, not rise, so that he therefore only hears the voice of the law, by which he is admonished to implore the grace of the Savior.» But 1) if he is admonished to implore the grace of the Savior, therefore he can do this; therefore he has at least the grace of praying. 2) This desertion is not from the denial of all grace, but of grace actually helping. The punishment indeed is in this, that God does not confer more abundant or efficacious graces, Palm. De Grat. not indeed that he denies all grace; for Augustine testifies that all things which happen in this state are sins and are imputed to man; nor does he teach that they are imputed only on account of the first sin, but each one by itself; for he says that with these sins increased, the punishment is also increased. Moreover, if grace were lacking, the power of avoiding sins would, according to Augustine, be lacking; whence they would be unjustly imputed. Therefore.

You will say that some sins are unforgivable, as is clear from Matth. XII. 31. 32. the spirit of blasphemy will not be forgiven: whoever has spoken a word against the Son of man, it will be forgiven him: but whoever has spoken against the Holy Spirit, it will not be forgiven him, neither in this age, nor in the future. Could not obstinacy in evil be a sin of this kind against the Holy Spirit? I answer, referring the reader to those things which I have disputed on this matter in the Tract. De Poenit. Th. IX.