Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

To the faithful who are also sinners, grace is given for warding off sins, and the grace necessary as the occasion requires, that they may be able to return to the state of justice.

I. The first part is contradictory to the first proposition of Jansenius. The first proposition of Jansenius is this: Some precepts of God are impossible for just men willing and striving according to the present powers which they have: grace is also lacking to them, by which they might become possible. Jansenius indeed does not deny to the just that possibility of keeping the law which may be said to be placed either in the capacity of free will, which, considered in itself, can be bent to good as also to evil, or in the capacity of receiving the help by which the law may be able to be observed: this possibility he readily concedes to the just

Jansenius. Nor does he deny that possibility which arises from habitual grace: inasmuch as through it a power for acting well is also given, which however alone does not suffice; this power, while habitual grace remains, remains. (L. III. De Gratia Christi c. 15.). The question, therefore, is not about this possibility. Nor is the question whether the observance of the precepts is possible for the just through some grace which, the circumstances in which man is engaged being set aside, could produce the work in other circumstances; for Jansenius also does not deny this power, who concedes that the just can have a heavenly delight, but a small one, not prevailing over the earthly delight, i.e., not victorious, of the sort which is required that a good act may be able to be done: which small heavenly delight, however, could be victorious and obtain the effect, if a lesser earthly delight were opposed. Jansenius indeed asserts that the just sin, because the powers are lacking for the reason that they have not prayed; for if they had prayed, they could have obtained grace: therefore when they sin, they have the remote power of not sinning. But here there is nothing but a certain play on words. For the power of praying, which is supposed, is only conditional, namely if grace be given, which however is not given while concupiscence prevails; because while it prevails, nothing good can be done. Nor finally is the question whether sufficient grace for acting is conferred upon the just at each moment, but when there is need that they act well.

II. The question, therefore, is 1) whether, when the precept urges, the just can always, according to the present powers which they have, keep the precept; but because the observance of the precept must be salutary, the question is 2) whether they have the powers through grace, or whether grace is given to them by which the observance of the precept may also become possible in a salutary manner. Jansenius denies both, who, affirming that grace is at times lacking, speaks of that grace which is efficacious and which according to him is the sole principle of the good salutary work; for without this grace he judges that no good work is done, and he rejects purely natural good works. Thus Jansenius denies that the precepts of God are at times possible for the just, so that at the same time he affirms that they sin with formal sin and merit punishment when they do not keep the law; for the infirmity of nature, since it is from the fault of the first man, does not excuse them from sin.

Although, however, he says that some precepts of God are impossible, in truth he asserts this impossibility to be present as often as the just man sins. For the reason why Jansenius affirmed (Lib. III. de Gratia Christi c. 13.) «that some precepts of God are impossible for the just willing and striving according to the present powers which they have, and that grace is also lacking to them by which they might become possible,» depends on his heresy concerning efficacious grace. For if the grace necessary for acting is only efficacious grace, which is efficacious in such a way that it necessarily produces the act for which it is given, so that when it is present it cannot happen that the act be lacking, while when it fails the act can in no way come to be: it follows that those who sin lack efficacious grace, and therefore lack the grace necessary for acting well, and that for them the observance of the precept is impossible. As often, therefore, as the just sin, they lack the grace by which they could not sin, and for them it is impossible not to sin. Wherefore you see that it is not said only that some precepts are impossible for the just, but also for those willing and striving according to the present powers which they have; for however much they will and strive, if the efficacious grace of victorious delight is lacking, the effort is in vain; because they are necessarily drawn by the earthly delight so that they sin freely (with Jansenian freedom). From which it is clear that in the system of Jansenius the second part of the condemned proposition is joined with the first as its reason: for the only means by which the precepts can become possible for men and, when it exists, by which the precepts are necessarily fulfilled, is grace, and that efficacious: wherefore it is called by Jansenius the grace by which the precepts become possible. We do not indeed contend that under this precise aspect the proposition of Jansenius was condemned; so that it is denied for this reason alone that there are some precepts impossible for the just, because supernatural grace is always available to them: for the first proposition is not joined with the other under a causal form, by which the second member is bound with the first: moreover, the first member of the proposition could be false, even if supernatural grace were not given for any observance of the law. Furthermore, since in the second member it is established by us that the grace by which the precepts become possible is not lacking, supernatural grace is not explicitly spoken of. However, since those things which prove that supernatural grace is never lacking to the just as the occasion requires prove also that whatever other means necessary for acting well are not lacking to them; hence we judge it to be enough if, being about to prove that grace is not lacking to the just, we speak only of grace properly so called, required for acting salutarily. It is manifest, moreover, that the falsity of the whole Jansenian proposition will be demonstrated if the falsity of either member is shown. For in the Catholic sense the possibility of the just acting rightly is a salutary possibility, by which namely they can merit the kingdom of heaven: this, however, is had through supernatural grace; hence if the possibility of keeping the law is present to them, supernatural grace is also present, by which the possibility is given, and if this grace is present, the possibility also of keeping the law is present. Namely, the matter at length comes back to this, that the same thing is denied by Jansenius in both members under a different form, and therefore both members are shown false by the same arguments.

III. The doctrine of the Church, therefore, opposed to the Jansenian doctrine is that there are no precepts of God impossible for the just according to the present powers which they have, nor is grace lacking to them by which they might become possible. You will ask about which precepts the discourse is. I answer that the proposition is universal. Nevertheless, if account is taken of the Jansenian sense, which is proscribed, and of the sense of the Church, which is established, it is clear that the discourse is chiefly about those precepts by the violation of which the just man ceases to be just. For in these Jansenius places his examples, explaining his doctrine in the cited place. The sense of the Church, however, can be drawn out from the Trid. Council, which in Sess. VI. c. 11. first, deliberately, proscribes that rash saying that the precepts of God are impossible for the justified man to observe, then notes that it is not adverse to its own teaching that the just slip into daily sins, because namely through these they do not cease to be just. Moreover, also with regard to venial sins, each one can be avoided, and if the just man wills and strives according to the powers which he has, certainly then he can, which however Jansenius denies.

Furthermore, the power which is denied by Jansenius is that which is called relative, namely with respect to the circumstances in which the just man is found and the powers which he has; according to the present powers, he says, which he has. For the other power, as we have seen, he concedes, which is called absolute, or it is the power of the thing considered absolutely, the circumstances in which the just man is engaged being set aside, and it is the possibility of the action in itself or the possibility of receiving the grace by which the law can be observed.

IV. Thus this is the most manifest Catholic doctrine asserted both in the Second Synod of Orange and in the Tridentine Synod. For the former in c. 25. says «this also we believe according to the Catholic faith, that, grace received through baptism, all the baptized, with Christ helping and cooperating, can and ought, if they are willing to labor faithfully, to fulfill those things which pertain to salvation.» In which words the help and cooperation of Christ signify actual grace. The Jansenians say that the sentence of the Synod is true, even if the baptized are at times unwilling to labor on account of a defect of grace: because the proposition of the Synod is conditional; if they are willing, which conditional proposition remains true, although men do not actually will for whatever cause, e.g., on account of a defect of grace. But such an exception is ridiculous. For in conditional propositions of this sort, which regard the order of facts, the condition is attached to that part which is uncertain and can be lacking, not to that which is certain. But in the Jansenian opinion the part that is uncertain and can be lacking would be the efficacious help of Christ; for while this exists, the will to labor cannot be lacking: the Synod, therefore, should have said: if Christ was willing to help and cooperate. But there is no doubt about the help of Christ: only the will of man to labor is uncertain. Therefore the help is always present, and hence the power of willing to labor is always had; because grace is had, not only because grace can be had.

The Trident. Syn. says, Sess. VI. c. 11. «No one ought to use that rash voice, prohibited by the Fathers under anathema, that the precepts of God are impossible for the justified man to observe; for God does not command impossibilities, but by commanding admonishes both to do what you can and to ask what you cannot, and helps that you may be able.» Hence can. 18. «If anyone shall have said that the precepts of God are impossible for man, even justified and constituted under grace, to observe. A. S.»

In the same chapter the Tridentine Synod established this principle: «God does not forsake those once justified by His grace, unless He is first forsaken by them.» The Jansenians answer that there the discourse is about habitual grace, according to which God does not forsake man unless he first sinned. But that principle is used by the Fathers to prove that the just can keep the words of God with divine help, or that God does not command impossibilities, because He helps that you may be able; therefore the discourse is not only about the forsaking of God which takes place through the withdrawal of divine friendship, which withdrawal supposes that man by an act of sin has forsaken God. But about the forsaking of God through the withdrawal of the help for acting, so that the divine friendship may be preserved. And certainly, if before man forsakes God, God Himself withdraws the necessary help; although the loss of habitual grace follows the act of sin, because however this could not be avoided, in that God deni De Gratia Christi. Lib. II. cc. 14. 17. et L. IV. De statu naturae lapsae cc. 24. 25. ed the help, God would truly have forsaken man before being forsaken. Moreover, this is the sense of the words of Trent: for those things which are inserted concerning the fall into daily sins aim at this, that a certain objection be solved: because namely the just sin daily; for the Synod teaches that through these light sins men do not cease to be just. Which done, it returns to what is above, establishing that the justified, living soberly and piously, can make progress through Jesus Christ; for God by His grace, etc. The same doctrine was confirmed by the proscription of propos. 54. of Baius. «This definitive opinion, that God has commanded nothing impossible to man, is falsely attributed to Augustine, since it is Pelagius's.»

But now this principle expressed by the Tridentine Fathers, on which their doctrine ontologically rests and which is also revealed, that God does not command impossibilities, shines with the same evidence to human reason with which the truth that God is just, that God is most perfect, shines, and of it all the Fathers are witnesses, who deny the necessity of sinning. What, furthermore, Jansenius? He indeed devised many things, that he might wipe away the mark of absurdity from this his opinion, of which the chief is that one received from the Calvinists (cf. Dechamps De haeresi ianseniana L. I. c. V.): that God does not unjustly command impossibilities to fallen men, and that they become guilty when they do not observe the law which they cannot observe; because that impotence takes its origin from the sin of the first parent, of which sin whatever is afterwards necessarily done from concupiscence can be regarded as a continuation. For an act to be free, it is enough that it be free in its cause: the act of Adam, however, was free. Rightly, therefore, does God continue to exact from men the observance of the law which nature received in Adam, although through its own fault this nature cannot observe it. But by this doctrine 1) the essential distinction is removed between original sin and personal sins, which are imputed to those by whom they are committed: by this doctrine it is denied to the just that original sin has been remitted; if for if it has been remitted, the sin of Adam cannot be imputed to them, and if it is not imputed, that which necessarily follows from a certain effect of that sin which remained, such as is concupiscence, cannot by reason of that sin be regarded as guilt. For although, sin being remitted, the punishment can remain; yet the liability of guilt, or guilt, cannot remain: but since that which afterwards necessarily follows is imputed as guilt only on account of the preceding liability, from which is all the malice of the subsequent act, it follows that if that liability is lacking, and thus with respect to this man it is as if it had never been, every reason also fails why that subsequent act should be imputed to guilt. Thus one who has remitted to a servant, who has cut off his own feet, this offense, can no longer punish him because he does not proceed where his duty would require. Or, on the contrary, in this opinion any sins whatsoever of a baptized man are entirely without guilt; for they have the character of guilt only from the liability of the free sin of Adam imputed to us: this liability, therefore, being remitted through baptism, every character of guilt ceases for the subsequent necessary, non-free acts. For the free liability, on account of which alone they could be imputed, is already remitted. 3) By this doctrine it is established that God can justly command a man blind from birth to look and see, and if he does not obey, to punish him with eternal death; for it is the same impossibility both of acting well without grace and of seeing without eyes, and both that blindness, from which is the impossibility of seeing, and the infirmity of nature, from which is the impossibility of acting well, are effects of the sin of Adam, and certainly blindness, deafness, and whatever is of this sort, are, no less than the necessity of sinning, according to Jansenius (De statu naturae purae L. III. c. 11.), punishments of the sin of Adam.

VI. If we consult the doctrine of the Scriptures, the falsity, first, of this opinion, that some precepts of God are impossible for the just, is proved by those arguments which we brought in Th. XXXVI, p. 11. Then we are taught the same thing by the words of 12° Ioannis V, 3. 4. This is the love of God, that we keep His commandments, and His commandments are not heavy (cf. Matth. XI, 29.). And the reason is subjoined why they are not heavy; because everything that is born of God overcomes the world, and this is the victory which overcomes the world, our faith. Namely, every just man has the power of overcoming the world (the concupiscence of the flesh, the concupiscence of the eyes, the pride of life, as he says ibid. II. 16.); he overcomes, however, through faith, which is the victor of the world. (cf. Hebr. XI, 33; 1. Petr. V, 9). The Apostle teaches the same thing saying 1. Cor. X, 13: God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able, but will make with the temptation issue, that you may be able to bear it. It is certain, therefore, that God will not permit us to be tempted above that which we can (powers not only physical, but moral are to be considered), and this certainty rests on the faithfulness of God. Nay, God with the temptation will make τὴν ἔκβασιν τοῦ ὑπενεγκεῖν, will effect namely the happy outcome of the struggle, so that therefore to bear it may be light; or, as Chrysostom explains in h. 1., God will make that «we pass through the temptations, and before we pass through them, we bear them. For He Himself gives patience and brings prompt liberation, so that in this way the temptation can be borne. For He indicated this in saying: He will make the issue that you may be able to bear it.» But from these things the Jansenian doctrine is wholly abhorrent.

VII. The doctrine of Augustine, however, is that «it is foolish to give precepts to him for whom it is not free to do what is commanded, and iniquitous to condemn him who had not the power to fulfill what was commanded» (De Fide cont. manichaeos c. 9.), «that God does not command impossibilities, but by commanding admonishes us to do what we can and to ask what we cannot» (De Natura et Grat. c. 43): namely, in the very giving of the law is contained the divine admonition that we ask what we cannot, i.e., that we pray for the powers which we feel are lacking to us. The grace of praying, therefore, is always ready, that grace namely which Augustine calls small, by which the way is prepared to the great grace (Th. XLVIII. n. IX.). For the principle of Augustine is certain: that grace is joined with the law, by which the law can be fulfilled. For thus he concludes c. 4. n. 9. De Gratia et lib. arb. «Man, therefore, is helped by grace, lest his will be commanded without cause.» Hence (Lib. de Grat. et lib. arb. c. 10) he says: «The Pelagians think that they know something great, when they say: God would not command what He knew could not be done by man. Who does not know this? but He commands some things for this reason, which we cannot (by the powers of nature, as the Pelagians wanted), that we may know what we ought to ask from Him.» For it is done by the powers of grace, which is denied to no one asking rightly: the power, however, of asking rightly is available to all the just; otherwise God would command what He knew could not be done. That the help necessary for the just, when they sin, has not been lacking, Augustine hands on in all those chapters of doctrine in which the profession of suff... cient grace is contained, which we gave in Th. XLVII. n. X.

VIII. And indeed, that an action be imputed to a man for guilt and punishment, it is not enough that he have free will (which however is lacking in the Jansenian opinion), but the power of doing what is commanded is required; for neither, if you command me to fly, is it enough that I be free, that you punish me unless I have flown; but you must also give me the power of flying. Nor is it enough that some other one had this power, but he must have it who is commanded, if the action is to be imputed to him as the acting person. Nor is it enough, therefore, that man had that power in the head of his nature, when namely he did not yet exist in act, a power which he lost through that first sin: but here and now he must still have it, since here and now this man is urged by the precept, and his personal, singular will is addressed, not that of the whole nature; otherwise it will not be lawful to impute to man anything but that one first sin. The power, moreover, which is required is not a conditional power, but an absolute one, i.e., it is not a power which would be had if some condition had been posited, but a power which is had; because what does not exist does nothing, nor is it a power which consists wholly in the capacity of having powers, if another should wish to give them, but it is a power placed in certain powers actually had, by which also others, if there is need, can be obtained; for the former is not a power of acting, but only a passivity of receiving power from another, if he should wish to give. Wherefore, the precept urging, the violation of which is to be imputed to man for guilt, the present power of doing that which now impends is required, and at least the power of praying for the obtaining of further help, by which the enemy may be utterly vanquished, if the struggle or the exercise of virtue must be carried out. This is the power by which the just precepts are possible according to the present powers which he has, and it is therefore called relative power. But Jansenius denies this power to the just when they do not keep the law, and yet wishes them to be guilty of fault and punishment: absurd and impious, therefore, is this doctrine.

IX. The principal argument on which this doctrine of Jansenius rests, and of which it is nothing but the necessary corollary, namely that there is no purely sufficient grace, has already been overthrown in Th. XLVII. and XLVIII.

X. They argue from Augustine, as they are wont. And so they point out, 1°, that Augustine, in the book De Perfect. iustitiae, to Celestius contending that the precepts of God ought to be possible, replies n. 6: «it is most wisely commanded to man that he walk with straight steps, so that when he has perceived that he cannot, he may seek the mediator.» And already above, n. 5, he had said «this man ought to be without limping, and if he ought, he can. Nor yet, when he wills, can he at once, but when, the cure having been applied, he has been healed and the medicine has aided the will.»

But in that book the treatment concerns the perfection of justice, which consists not only in avoiding sins, even venial ones, but in the removal of every imperfection and the extinction of concupiscence (See the Synopsis on Pelagian Impeccability). «For health itself is true freedom, which would not have perished if the will (of the first man) had remained good. But because the will sinned, a hard necessity of having sin followed the sinner (physical necessity of sin improperly so called, i.e. of the movements of concupiscence; of moral sin properly so called, and indeed grave without grace, light however without privilege), until the whole infirmity is healed and entire freedom is received.» ibid. n. 9. Cf. Tract. de Deo Creant. Th. LX. nn. IV et V. When it is said here that he who wills cannot at once, it is not signified that he cannot do what he here and now ought, but what he here and now wills, i.e. to gain the full and absolute victory over concupiscence. «He therefore who wills to do the commandments of God and cannot, already indeed has a good will, but as yet small and weak; he will be able, however, when he has had a great and robust one.» De Gratia et lib. arb. c. 17. But that he already then has the powers of praying and of obtaining stronger grace, so that he can always keep himself immune from sin, Augustine teaches, as we saw Th. XLVIII. «Whoever says (says Prosper, the best interpreter of Augustine, in his Responsiones to the 12th objection of the Gauls) that obedience (i.e. the grace of obedience) is withdrawn from some who are called and live piously and justly, so that they cease to obey, thinks ill of the goodness and justice of God.»

They note 2) that Augustine affirms that God does not give perseverance to some of those to whom, that they might live as Christians, He had given dilection. De Corrept. et grat. c. 8. I answer that this is most true and that all confess it; for the treatment concerns formal perseverance itself, or the grace effecting it. But we now treat of the power, about which Augustine teaches (De Corrept. et gratia c. 7) that the just man would persevere in what he had heard and held, if he willed that »men desert God and are deserted.« Cf. Th. XLVI. The Massilians bring forward 3) what is found in c. 22 of De Dono perseverantiae.; from Augustine's doctrine, they said, it followed that the words were to be spoken to the people thus, when the mystery of predestination is preached: «if you who obey, if you are predestined to be rejected, the powers of obedience will be withdrawn, so that you cease to obey.» Further, Augustine in this sentence reproves that the speech is delivered to the people in the second person, and warns that it should rather be said in the third person: if any who obey, etc. Therefore he approved the sentence itself, that powers are withdrawn from the just, and indeed to this end, that they cease to obey.

I answer. Augustine does not only reprove what has been recalled; for in proposing that emendation he signifies that he also has something else which he reproves; for he says n. 61: «why is it not rather said at least thus, as was said by me a little before: first, that this be not said of those who hear in the people, but of others to them.» If this is the first; therefore a second emendation is to be expected. And which? namely that it be said thus: «If any, however, obey, but are not predestined to His kingdom and glory, they are temporary and will not remain in the same obedience until the end,» which agree with those things which he had said a little before, n. 58, and which indeed can and ought to be said also by all those who admit predestination to glory after foreseen merits. Augustine warns that, if in this second way the words are spoken to the people, nothing is lost of the sentence proposed in the first way: from which the Jansenians gather that Augustine does not reprove the sentence contained in the former formula. Which we will not begrudge granting, if they themselves concede that the sentence is the same in both formulas, and therefore that Augustine approved nothing more in the former than what is contained in the latter. Certainly Augustine accepted the former formula in such a way that through it was signified the simple fact of the denial of further and more powerful grace, which God is not bound to give, and the fact of the cessation of obedience before the end, indeed from the fault of man, so that those words: that you cease to obey, do not express the final reason, but only the consequent effect, or one permitted by God, who nevertheless could have impeded it, had He willed. For he notes «that in that way, in which they think it ought to be said, the same sentence can be pronounced in almost the same words also concerning the prescience of God, which certainly they cannot deny, so that it be said: «and if you who obey, if you are foreknown to be rejected, you will cease to obey.» Therefore Augustine here treats not of the subtraction of necessary help, but only of denied efficacious grace.

Finally they say, on Augustine's authority, that Peter, when he fell denying Christ, lacked the grace by which he could stand. Serm. 296. n. 1: «he had dared more than his capacity sustained, he had promised more than he could» and de Gratia et lib. arb. c. 17: «Peter did not yet have charity when through fear he thrice denied the Lord, and yet, although small and imperfect, it was not lacking when he said: Lord, I will lay down my soul for you; for he thought himself able to do what he felt himself willing.» The same also Chrysostom says, homil. in Matth. LXXXII, n. 3 seq.: «with the divine help withdrawn, (Peter) could not stand.»

I answer: in the judgment of these doctors, Peter lacked sufficient grace; nor did he lack efficacious grace, namely that by which Peter rendered himself unworthy, presuming and not praying as he ought — I concede; that God denied it to one willing and striving according to the powers which he had — I deny.

Namely, in Peter's fall the Fathers consider an evident example of human weakness, what man can do acting from his own powers. Peter willed, and ardently willed, to die for Christ, but with a will not humble, not ordered; placed in the occasion, he yielded most basely. That Peter might acknowledge his own weakness, God permitted him to act according to his natural powers, in which he trusted: from which it has been shown to us what nature alone can do. Now indeed, that God might permit this, there was no need to deny Peter sufficient graces, at least of praying, but it was enough to deny the efficacious graces, of which he had shown himself unworthy; and this is that subtraction of help of which the Fathers speak.

But what Christ said to Peter before the passion: «you cannot follow me now» Ioan. XIII, 30, if it is referred to the simple confession of Christ, which Peter ought to have made, does not signify an antecedent impossibility arising from the lack of necessary grace, but a consequent one arising from Peter's own will, which, willing to deny Christ, could not follow Him, a denial which Christ already foresaw. If however it is referred to following Him in martyrdom, as it seems, it signifies an impossibility arising from the fact that God had destined at another time to place Peter in those circumstances in which he was to obtain the glory of martyrdom.

XI. As to the second part of the Thesis, which treats of faithful sinners, we defend two things: first, that grace is given to them by which they can avoid sins, and that this is given whenever the precept urges; second, that grace is given to them that they may repent: as to this latter, however, we do not defend that grace is always given to them, but as opportunity offers, e.g. when they are called externally, God calls them with His interior grace, and when they consent to the first graces, certainly God does not deny the further graces by which they can arrive at justification.

Jansenius in the cited place affirms not only of the just, but also of the faithful in general, that to those willing and striving some precepts of God are impossible, and the grace by which they might become possible is lacking. And this coheres with his opinion on efficacious grace.

XII. The first head of the asserted doctrine is demonstrated by almost the same arguments by which the preceding part was demonstrated. For it holds also for sinners that God cannot command impossible things, and for them holds the doctrine of Paul, 1. Cor. X. 13 and 1. Ioan. V. 3, and the authority of Augustine and of all the Fathers who deny the necessity of sinning; and then the reason adduced in n. VIII.

You will say: some sin, according to the doctrine of the theologians, can be the punishment of sin; therefore when someone has sinned, he can be deprived by God of the grace by which he could not sin, in punishment of the preceding sin, and thus sin necessarily. Thus s. Thomas I, II. q. LXXXVII, a. 7: «Accidentally a sin can be the punishment of a sin in three ways. First indeed on the part of the cause, which is the removal of the prohibitor. For the causes inclining to sin are the passions, the temptation of the devil, and other things of this kind: which causes are indeed impeded through the help of grace, which is withdrawn through sin. Whence, since the withdrawal itself of grace is a certain punishment and is from God, as was said above (q. LXXIX, a. 3.), it follows that accidentally also the sin which follows from this is called a punishment.» Further, the withdrawal of grace in the cited place is represented as that «from which it follows that the mind is not divinely illumined to see rightly, and the heart of man is not softened to live rightly,» which is the twofold actual grace necessary for operation. God can therefore withdraw grace from the sinner, and with it withdrawn it comes about that he sins.

I answer. Either the sin which is the punishment of sin is sin properly so called, i.e. formal fault, or it is not: if it is not, we wander outside the question; for we treat of the power of avoiding sins properly so called: if however it is sin properly so called, we turn the argument back. For that some sin be the punishment of sin, it must be a new sin, distinct from the preceding one; but if it is from a necessity induced by the preceding sin, which merited the withdrawal of necessary help, it has no guilt except in the cause, i.e. it is not formally a new fault, but previously only a formal fault was admitted: therefore.

Namely, the withdrawal of grace which is the punishment of sin is not the withdrawal of any grace or sufficient help whatsoever, but the withdrawal of efficacious grace or in like manner of proximately sufficient grace; and it is of this that the theologians speak, and s. Thomas, who in the cited place, from q. LXXIX, disputes about the blinded and the hardened, to whom, as we shall see in the following Th., he does not deny sufficient graces.

The second head of the doctrine of this part is proved again from the fact that sinners are held by the obligation of converting themselves to God; they can, therefore: but it is repugnant that they can both begin and perfect conversion without grace, and that supernatural grace properly so called; therefore they are not destitute of it. To this chiefly contribute the divine protestations confirmed by oath in Ezechiel XXXIII, 11. seq. As I live, says the Lord God: I do not will the death of the impious, but that the impious be converted from his way and live. Be converted, be converted from your most evil ways. Ridiculous would be this exhortation to conversion and the affirmation of the will of God, that the sinner be converted, if God, who alone can give, denies the grace by which alone sinners can be converted. And the words of Peter, 2. Epist. II, 9: The Lord does not delay His promise, as some think, but acts patiently for your sake, not willing that some perish, but that all return to repentance. Certainly to this end the Sacrament of Penance was instituted by Christ, that whatever sins might be remitted to whatever faithful sinner. It is therefore the will of Christ that all faithful sinners, if they do what is in them, obtain reconciliation through that sacrament. But unless this will of Christ is true, it must be said that faithful sinners can do what God requires in order that they obtain the fruit of the Sacrament; they cannot, however, without grace; therefore both in reality they can, and they have the grace by which they can.