Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

To the faithful who are also sinners, grace is given for warding off sins, and the grace necessary as the occasion requires, that they may be able to return to the state of justice.

I. The first part is contradictory to the first proposition of Jansenius. The first proposition of Jansenius is this: Some precepts of God are impossible for just men willing and striving according to the present powers which they have: grace is also lacking to them, by which they might become possible. Jansenius indeed does not deny to the just that possibility of keeping the law which may be said to be placed either in the capacity of free will, which, considered in itself, can be bent to good as also to evil, or in the capacity of receiving the help by which the law may be able to be observed: this possibility he readily concedes to the just

Jansenius. Nor does he deny that possibility which arises from habitual grace: inasmuch as through it a power for acting well is also given, which however alone does not suffice; this power, while habitual grace remains, remains. (L. III. De Gratia Christi c. 15.). The question, therefore, is not about this possibility. Nor is the question whether the observance of the precepts is possible for the just through some grace which, the circumstances in which man is engaged being set aside, could produce the work in other circumstances; for Jansenius also does not deny this power, who concedes that the just can have a heavenly delight, but a small one, not prevailing over the earthly delight, i.e., not victorious, of the sort which is required that a good act may be able to be done: which small heavenly delight, however, could be victorious and obtain the effect, if a lesser earthly delight were opposed. Jansenius indeed asserts that the just sin, because the powers are lacking for the reason that they have not prayed; for if they had prayed, they could have obtained grace: therefore when they sin, they have the remote power of not sinning. But here there is nothing but a certain play on words. For the power of praying, which is supposed, is only conditional, namely if grace be given, which however is not given while concupiscence prevails; because while it prevails, nothing good can be done. Nor finally is the question whether sufficient grace for acting is conferred upon the just at each moment, but when there is need that they act well.

II. The question, therefore, is 1) whether, when the precept urges, the just can always, according to the present powers which they have, keep the precept; but because the observance of the precept must be salutary, the question is 2) whether they have the powers through grace, or whether grace is given to them by which the observance of the precept may also become possible in a salutary manner. Jansenius denies both, who, affirming that grace is at times lacking, speaks of that grace which is efficacious and which according to him is the sole principle of the good salutary work; for without this grace he judges that no good work is done, and he rejects purely natural good works. Thus Jansenius denies that the precepts of God are at times possible for the just, so that at the same time he affirms that they sin with formal sin and merit punishment when they do not keep the law; for the infirmity of nature, since it is from the fault of the first man, does not excuse them from sin.

Although, however, he says that some precepts of God are impossible, in truth he asserts this impossibility to be present as often as the just man sins. For the reason why Jansenius affirmed (Lib. III. de Gratia Christi c. 13.) «that some precepts of God are impossible for the just willing and striving according to the present powers which they have, and that grace is also lacking to them by which they might become possible,» depends on his heresy concerning efficacious grace. For if the grace necessary for acting is only efficacious grace, which is efficacious in such a way that it necessarily produces the act for which it is given, so that when it is present it cannot happen that the act be lacking, while when it fails the act can in no way come to be: it follows that those who sin lack efficacious grace, and therefore lack the grace necessary for acting well, and that for them the observance of the precept is impossible. As often, therefore, as the just sin, they lack the grace by which they could not sin, and for them it is impossible not to sin. Wherefore you see that it is not said only that some precepts are impossible for the just, but also for those willing and striving according to the present powers which they have; for however much they will and strive, if the efficacious grace of victorious delight is lacking, the effort is in vain; because they are necessarily drawn by the earthly delight so that they sin freely (with Jansenian freedom). From which it is clear that in the system of Jansenius the second part of the condemned proposition is joined with the first as its reason: for the only means by which the precepts can become possible for men and, when it exists, by which the precepts are necessarily fulfilled, is grace, and that efficacious: wherefore it is called by Jansenius the grace by which the precepts become possible. We do not indeed contend that under this precise aspect the proposition of Jansenius was condemned; so that it is denied for this reason alone that there are some precepts impossible for the just, because supernatural grace is always available to them: for the first proposition is not joined with the other under a causal form, by which the second member is bound with the first: moreover, the first member of the proposition could be false, even if supernatural grace were not given for any observance of the law. Furthermore, since in the second member it is established by us that the grace by which the precepts become possible is not lacking, supernatural grace is not explicitly spoken of. However, since those things which prove that supernatural grace is never lacking to the just as the occasion requires prove also that whatever other means necessary for acting well are not lacking to them; hence we judge it to be enough if, being about to prove that grace is not lacking to the just, we speak only of grace properly so called, required for acting salutarily. It is manifest, moreover, that the falsity of the whole Jansenian proposition will be demonstrated if the falsity of either member is shown. For in the Catholic sense the possibility of the just acting rightly is a salutary possibility, by which namely they can merit the kingdom of heaven: this, however, is had through supernatural grace; hence if the possibility of keeping the law is present to them, supernatural grace is also present, by which the possibility is given, and if this grace is present, the possibility also of keeping the law is present. Namely, the matter at length comes back to this, that the same thing is denied by Jansenius in both members under a different form, and therefore both members are shown false by the same arguments.

III. The doctrine of the Church, therefore, opposed to the Jansenian doctrine is that there are no precepts of God impossible for the just according to the present powers which they have, nor is grace lacking to them by which they might become possible. You will ask about which precepts the discourse is. I answer that the proposition is universal. Nevertheless, if account is taken of the Jansenian sense, which is proscribed, and of the sense of the Church, which is established, it is clear that the discourse is chiefly about those precepts by the violation of which the just man ceases to be just. For in these Jansenius places his examples, explaining his doctrine in the cited place. The sense of the Church, however, can be drawn out from the Trid. Council, which in Sess. VI. c. 11. first, deliberately, proscribes that rash saying that the precepts of God are impossible for the justified man to observe, then notes that it is not adverse to its own teaching that the just slip into daily sins, because namely through these they do not cease to be just. Moreover, also with regard to venial sins, each one can be avoided, and if the just man wills and strives according to the powers which he has, certainly then he can, which however Jansenius denies.

Furthermore, the power which is denied by Jansenius is that which is called relative, namely with respect to the circumstances in which the just man is found and the powers which he has; according to the present powers, he says, which he has. For the other power, as we have seen, he concedes, which is called absolute, or it is the power of the thing considered absolutely, the circumstances in which the just man is engaged being set aside, and it is the possibility of the action in itself or the possibility of receiving the grace by which the law can be observed.

IV. Thus this is the most manifest Catholic doctrine asserted both in the Second Synod of Orange and in the Tridentine Synod. For the former in c. 25. says «this also we believe according to the Catholic faith, that, grace received through baptism, all the baptized, with Christ helping and cooperating, can and ought, if they are willing to labor faithfully, to fulfill those things which pertain to salvation.» In which words the help and cooperation of Christ signify actual grace. The Jansenians say that the sentence of the Synod is true, even if the baptized are at times unwilling to labor on account of a defect of grace: because the proposition of the Synod is conditional; if they are willing, which conditional proposition remains true, although men do not actually will for whatever cause, e.g., on account of a defect of grace. But such an exception is ridiculous. For in conditional propositions of this sort, which regard the order of facts, the condition is attached to that part which is uncertain and can be lacking, not to that which is certain. But in the Jansenian opinion the part that is uncertain and can be lacking would be the efficacious help of Christ; for while this exists, the will to labor cannot be lacking: the Synod, therefore, should have said: if Christ was willing to help and cooperate. But there is no doubt about the help of Christ: only the will of man to labor is uncertain. Therefore the help is always present, and hence the power of willing to labor is always had; because grace is had, not only because grace can be had.

The Trident. Syn. says, Sess. VI. c. 11. «No one ought to use that rash voice, prohibited by the Fathers under anathema, that the precepts of God are impossible for the justified man to observe; for God does not command impossibilities, but by commanding admonishes both to do what you can and to ask what you cannot, and helps that you may be able.» Hence can. 18. «If anyone shall have said that the precepts of God are impossible for man, even justified and constituted under grace, to observe. A. S.»

In the same chapter the Tridentine Synod established this principle: «God does not forsake those once justified by His grace, unless He is first forsaken by them.» The Jansenians answer that there the discourse is about habitual grace, according to which God does not forsake man unless he first sinned. But that principle is used by the Fathers to prove that the just can keep the words of God with divine help, or that God does not command impossibilities, because He helps that you may be able; therefore the discourse is not only about the forsaking of God which takes place through the withdrawal of divine friendship, which withdrawal supposes that man by an act of sin has forsaken God. But about the forsaking of God through the withdrawal of the help for acting, so that the divine friendship may be preserved. And certainly, if before man forsakes God, God Himself withdraws the necessary help; although the loss of habitual grace follows the act of sin, because however this could not be avoided, in that God deni De Gratia Christi. Lib. II. cc. 14. 17. et L. IV. De statu naturae lapsae cc. 24. 25. ed the help, God would truly have forsaken man before being forsaken. Moreover, this is the sense of the words of Trent: for those things which are inserted concerning the fall into daily sins aim at this, that a certain objection be solved: because namely the just sin daily; for the Synod teaches that through these light sins men do not cease to be just. Which done, it returns to what is above, establishing that the justified, living soberly and piously, can make progress through Jesus Christ; for God by His grace, etc. The same doctrine was confirmed by the proscription of propos. 54. of Baius. «This definitive opinion, that God has commanded nothing impossible to man, is falsely attributed to Augustine, since it is Pelagius's.»

But now this principle expressed by the Tridentine Fathers, on which their doctrine ontologically rests and which is also revealed, that God does not command impossibilities, shines with the same evidence to human reason with which the truth that God is just, that God is most perfect, shines, and of it all the Fathers are witnesses, who deny the necessity of sinning. What, furthermore, Jansenius? He indeed devised many things, that he might wipe away the mark of absurdity from this his opinion, of which the chief is that one received from the Calvinists (cf. Dechamps De haeresi ianseniana L. I. c. V.): that God does not unjustly command impossibilities to fallen men, and that they become guilty when they do not observe the law which they cannot observe; because that impotence takes its origin from the sin of the first parent, of which sin whatever is afterwards necessarily done from concupiscence can be regarded as a continuation. For an act to be free, it is enough that it be free in its cause: the act of Adam, however, was free. Rightly, therefore, does God continue to exact from men the observance of the law which nature received in Adam, although through its own fault this nature cannot observe it. But by this doctrine 1) the essential distinction is removed between original sin and personal sins, which are imputed to those by whom they are committed: by this doctrine it is denied to the just that original sin has been remitted; if for if it has been remitted, the sin of Adam cannot be imputed to them, and if it is not imputed, that which necessarily follows from a certain effect of that sin which remained, such as is concupiscence, cannot by reason of that sin be regarded as guilt. For although, sin being remitted, the punishment can remain; yet the liability of guilt, or guilt, cannot remain: but since that which afterwards necessarily follows is imputed as guilt only on account of the preceding liability, from which is all the malice of the subsequent act, it follows that if that liability is lacking, and thus with respect to this man it is as if it had never been, every reason also fails why that subsequent act should be imputed to guilt. Thus one who has remitted to a servant, who has cut off his own feet, this offense, can no longer punish him because he does not proceed where his duty would require. Or, on the contrary, in this opinion any sins whatsoever of a baptized man are entirely without guilt; for they have the character of guilt only from the liability of the free sin of Adam imputed to us: this liability, therefore, being remitted through baptism, every character of guilt ceases for the subsequent necessary, non-free acts. For the free liability, on account of which alone they could be imputed, is already remitted. 3) By this doctrine it is established that God can justly command a man blind from birth to look and see, and if he does not obey, to punish him with eternal death; for it is the same impossibility both of acting well without grace and of seeing without eyes, and both that blindness, from which is the impossibility of seeing, and the infirmity of nature, from which is the impossibility of acting well, are effects of the sin of Adam, and certainly blindness, deafness, and whatever is of this sort, are, no less than the necessity of sinning, according to Jansenius (De statu naturae purae L. III. c. 11.), punishments of the sin of Adam.

VI. If we consult the doctrine of the Scriptures, the falsity, first, of this opinion, that some precepts of God are impossible for the just, is proved by those arguments which we brought in Th. XXXVI, p. 11. Then we are taught the same thing by the words of 12° Ioannis V, 3. 4. This is the love of God, that we keep His commandments, and His commandments are not heavy (cf. Matth. XI, 29.). And the reason is subjoined why they are not heavy; because everything that is born of God overcomes the world, and this is the victory which overcomes the world, our faith. Namely, every just man has the power of overcoming the world (the concupiscence of the flesh, the concupiscence of the eyes, the pride of life, as he says ibid. II. 16.); he overcomes, however, through faith, which is the victor of the world. (cf. Hebr. XI, 33; 1. Petr. V, 9). The Apostle teaches the same thing saying 1. Cor. X, 13: God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able, but will make with the temptation issue, that you may be able to bear it. It is certain, therefore, that God will not permit us to be tempted above that which we can (powers not only physical, but moral are to be considered), and this certainty rests on the faithfulness of God. Nay, God with the temptation will make τὴν ἔκβασιν τοῦ ὑπενεγκεῖν, will effect namely the happy outcome of the struggle, so that therefore to bear it may be light; or, as Chrysostom explains in h. 1., God will make that «we pass through the temptations, and before we pass through them, we bear them. For He Himself gives patience and brings prompt liberation, so that in this way the temptation can be borne. For He indicated this in saying: He will make the issue that you may be able to bear it.» But from these things the Jansenian doctrine is wholly abhorrent.

VII. The doctrine of Augustine, however, is that «it is foolish to give precepts to him for whom it is not free to do what is commanded, and iniquitous to condemn him who had not the power to fulfill what was commanded» (De Fide cont. manichaeos c. 9.), «that God does not command impossibilities, but by commanding admonishes us to do what we can and to ask what we cannot» (De Natura et Grat. c. 43): namely, in the very giving of the law is contained the divine admonition that we ask what we cannot, i.e., that we pray for the powers which we feel are lacking to us. The grace of praying, therefore, is always ready, that grace namely which Augustine calls small, by which the way is prepared to the great grace (Th. XLVIII. n. IX.). For the principle of Augustine is certain: that grace is joined with the law, by which the law can be fulfilled. For thus he concludes c. 4. n. 9. De Gratia et lib. arb. «Man, therefore, is helped by grace, lest his will be commanded without cause.» Hence (Lib. de Grat. et lib. arb. c. 10) he says: «The Pelagians think that they know something great, when they say: God would not command what He knew could not be done by man. Who does not know this? but He commands some things for this reason, which we cannot (by the powers of nature, as the Pelagians wanted), that we may know what we ought to ask from Him.» For it is done by the powers of grace, which is denied to no one asking rightly: the power, however, of asking rightly is available to all the just; otherwise God would command what He knew could not be done. That the help necessary for the just, when they sin, has not been lacking, Augustine hands on in all those chapters of doctrine in which the profession of suff... cient grace is contained, which we gave in Th. XLVII. n. X.

VIII. And indeed, that an action be imputed to a man for guilt and punishment, it is not enough that he have free will (which however is lacking in the Jansenian opinion), but the power of doing what is commanded is required; for neither, if you command me to fly, is it enough that I be free, that you punish me unless I have flown; but you must also give me the power of flying. Nor is it enough that some other one had this power, but he must have it who is commanded, if the action is to be imputed to him as the acting person. Nor is it enough, therefore, that man had that power in the head of his nature, when namely he did not yet exist in act, a power which he lost through that first sin: but here and now he must still have it, since here and now this man is urged by the precept, and his personal, singular will is addressed, not that of the whole nature; otherwise it will not be lawful to impute to man anything but that one first sin. The power, moreover, which is required is not a conditional power, but an absolute one, i.e., it is not a power which would be had if some condition had been posited, but a power which is had; because what does not exist does nothing, nor is it a power which consists wholly in the capacity of having powers, if another should wish to give them, but it is a power placed in certain powers actually had, by which also others, if there is need, can be obtained; for the former is not a power of acting, but only a passivity of receiving power from another, if he should wish to give. Wherefore, the precept urging, the violation of which is to be imputed to man for guilt, the present power of doing that which now impends is required, and at least the power of praying for the obtaining of further help, by which the enemy may be utterly vanquished, if the struggle or the exercise of virtue must be carried out. This is the power by which the just precepts are possible according to the present powers which he has, and it is therefore called relative power. But Jansenius denies this power to the just when they do not keep the law, and yet wishes them to be guilty of fault and punishment: absurd and impious, therefore, is this doctrine.

IX. The principal argument on which this doctrine of Jansenius rests, and of which it is nothing but the necessary corollary, namely that there is no purely sufficient grace, has already been overthrown in Th. XLVII. and XLVIII.

X. They argue from Augustine, as they are wont. And so they point out, 1°, that Augustine, in the book De Perfect. iustitiae, to Celestius contending that the precepts of God ought to be possible, replies n. 6: «it is most wisely commanded to man that he walk with straight steps, so that when he has perceived that he cannot, he may seek the mediator.» And already above, n. 5, he had said «this man ought to be without limping, and if he ought, he can. Nor yet, when he wills, can he at once, but when, the cure having been applied, he has been healed and the medicine has aided the will.»

But in that book the treatment concerns the perfection of justice, which consists not only in avoiding sins, even venial ones, but in the removal of every imperfection and the extinction of concupiscence (See the Synopsis on Pelagian Impeccability). «For health itself is true freedom, which would not have perished if the will (of the first man) had remained good. But because the will sinned, a hard necessity of having sin followed the sinner (physical necessity of sin improperly so called, i.e. of the movements of concupiscence; of moral sin properly so called, and indeed grave without grace, light however without privilege), until the whole infirmity is healed and entire freedom is received.» ibid. n. 9. Cf. Tract. de Deo Creant. Th. LX. nn. IV et V. When it is said here that he who wills cannot at once, it is not signified that he cannot do what he here and now ought, but what he here and now wills, i.e. to gain the full and absolute victory over concupiscence. «He therefore who wills to do the commandments of God and cannot, already indeed has a good will, but as yet small and weak; he will be able, however, when he has had a great and robust one.» De Gratia et lib. arb. c. 17. But that he already then has the powers of praying and of obtaining stronger grace, so that he can always keep himself immune from sin, Augustine teaches, as we saw Th. XLVIII. «Whoever says (says Prosper, the best interpreter of Augustine, in his Responsiones to the 12th objection of the Gauls) that obedience (i.e. the grace of obedience) is withdrawn from some who are called and live piously and justly, so that they cease to obey, thinks ill of the goodness and justice of God.»

They note 2) that Augustine affirms that God does not give perseverance to some of those to whom, that they might live as Christians, He had given dilection. De Corrept. et grat. c. 8. I answer that this is most true and that all confess it; for the treatment concerns formal perseverance itself, or the grace effecting it. But we now treat of the power, about which Augustine teaches (De Corrept. et gratia c. 7) that the just man would persevere in what he had heard and held, if he willed that »men desert God and are deserted.« Cf. Th. XLVI. The Massilians bring forward 3) what is found in c. 22 of De Dono perseverantiae.; from Augustine's doctrine, they said, it followed that the words were to be spoken to the people thus, when the mystery of predestination is preached: «if you who obey, if you are predestined to be rejected, the powers of obedience will be withdrawn, so that you cease to obey.» Further, Augustine in this sentence reproves that the speech is delivered to the people in the second person, and warns that it should rather be said in the third person: if any who obey, etc. Therefore he approved the sentence itself, that powers are withdrawn from the just, and indeed to this end, that they cease to obey.

I answer. Augustine does not only reprove what has been recalled; for in proposing that emendation he signifies that he also has something else which he reproves; for he says n. 61: «why is it not rather said at least thus, as was said by me a little before: first, that this be not said of those who hear in the people, but of others to them.» If this is the first; therefore a second emendation is to be expected. And which? namely that it be said thus: «If any, however, obey, but are not predestined to His kingdom and glory, they are temporary and will not remain in the same obedience until the end,» which agree with those things which he had said a little before, n. 58, and which indeed can and ought to be said also by all those who admit predestination to glory after foreseen merits. Augustine warns that, if in this second way the words are spoken to the people, nothing is lost of the sentence proposed in the first way: from which the Jansenians gather that Augustine does not reprove the sentence contained in the former formula. Which we will not begrudge granting, if they themselves concede that the sentence is the same in both formulas, and therefore that Augustine approved nothing more in the former than what is contained in the latter. Certainly Augustine accepted the former formula in such a way that through it was signified the simple fact of the denial of further and more powerful grace, which God is not bound to give, and the fact of the cessation of obedience before the end, indeed from the fault of man, so that those words: that you cease to obey, do not express the final reason, but only the consequent effect, or one permitted by God, who nevertheless could have impeded it, had He willed. For he notes «that in that way, in which they think it ought to be said, the same sentence can be pronounced in almost the same words also concerning the prescience of God, which certainly they cannot deny, so that it be said: «and if you who obey, if you are foreknown to be rejected, you will cease to obey.» Therefore Augustine here treats not of the subtraction of necessary help, but only of denied efficacious grace.

Finally they say, on Augustine's authority, that Peter, when he fell denying Christ, lacked the grace by which he could stand. Serm. 296. n. 1: «he had dared more than his capacity sustained, he had promised more than he could» and de Gratia et lib. arb. c. 17: «Peter did not yet have charity when through fear he thrice denied the Lord, and yet, although small and imperfect, it was not lacking when he said: Lord, I will lay down my soul for you; for he thought himself able to do what he felt himself willing.» The same also Chrysostom says, homil. in Matth. LXXXII, n. 3 seq.: «with the divine help withdrawn, (Peter) could not stand.»

I answer: in the judgment of these doctors, Peter lacked sufficient grace; nor did he lack efficacious grace, namely that by which Peter rendered himself unworthy, presuming and not praying as he ought — I concede; that God denied it to one willing and striving according to the powers which he had — I deny.

Namely, in Peter's fall the Fathers consider an evident example of human weakness, what man can do acting from his own powers. Peter willed, and ardently willed, to die for Christ, but with a will not humble, not ordered; placed in the occasion, he yielded most basely. That Peter might acknowledge his own weakness, God permitted him to act according to his natural powers, in which he trusted: from which it has been shown to us what nature alone can do. Now indeed, that God might permit this, there was no need to deny Peter sufficient graces, at least of praying, but it was enough to deny the efficacious graces, of which he had shown himself unworthy; and this is that subtraction of help of which the Fathers speak.

But what Christ said to Peter before the passion: «you cannot follow me now» Ioan. XIII, 30, if it is referred to the simple confession of Christ, which Peter ought to have made, does not signify an antecedent impossibility arising from the lack of necessary grace, but a consequent one arising from Peter's own will, which, willing to deny Christ, could not follow Him, a denial which Christ already foresaw. If however it is referred to following Him in martyrdom, as it seems, it signifies an impossibility arising from the fact that God had destined at another time to place Peter in those circumstances in which he was to obtain the glory of martyrdom.

XI. As to the second part of the Thesis, which treats of faithful sinners, we defend two things: first, that grace is given to them by which they can avoid sins, and that this is given whenever the precept urges; second, that grace is given to them that they may repent: as to this latter, however, we do not defend that grace is always given to them, but as opportunity offers, e.g. when they are called externally, God calls them with His interior grace, and when they consent to the first graces, certainly God does not deny the further graces by which they can arrive at justification.

Jansenius in the cited place affirms not only of the just, but also of the faithful in general, that to those willing and striving some precepts of God are impossible, and the grace by which they might become possible is lacking. And this coheres with his opinion on efficacious grace.

XII. The first head of the asserted doctrine is demonstrated by almost the same arguments by which the preceding part was demonstrated. For it holds also for sinners that God cannot command impossible things, and for them holds the doctrine of Paul, 1. Cor. X. 13 and 1. Ioan. V. 3, and the authority of Augustine and of all the Fathers who deny the necessity of sinning; and then the reason adduced in n. VIII.

You will say: some sin, according to the doctrine of the theologians, can be the punishment of sin; therefore when someone has sinned, he can be deprived by God of the grace by which he could not sin, in punishment of the preceding sin, and thus sin necessarily. Thus s. Thomas I, II. q. LXXXVII, a. 7: «Accidentally a sin can be the punishment of a sin in three ways. First indeed on the part of the cause, which is the removal of the prohibitor. For the causes inclining to sin are the passions, the temptation of the devil, and other things of this kind: which causes are indeed impeded through the help of grace, which is withdrawn through sin. Whence, since the withdrawal itself of grace is a certain punishment and is from God, as was said above (q. LXXIX, a. 3.), it follows that accidentally also the sin which follows from this is called a punishment.» Further, the withdrawal of grace in the cited place is represented as that «from which it follows that the mind is not divinely illumined to see rightly, and the heart of man is not softened to live rightly,» which is the twofold actual grace necessary for operation. God can therefore withdraw grace from the sinner, and with it withdrawn it comes about that he sins.

I answer. Either the sin which is the punishment of sin is sin properly so called, i.e. formal fault, or it is not: if it is not, we wander outside the question; for we treat of the power of avoiding sins properly so called: if however it is sin properly so called, we turn the argument back. For that some sin be the punishment of sin, it must be a new sin, distinct from the preceding one; but if it is from a necessity induced by the preceding sin, which merited the withdrawal of necessary help, it has no guilt except in the cause, i.e. it is not formally a new fault, but previously only a formal fault was admitted: therefore.

Namely, the withdrawal of grace which is the punishment of sin is not the withdrawal of any grace or sufficient help whatsoever, but the withdrawal of efficacious grace or in like manner of proximately sufficient grace; and it is of this that the theologians speak, and s. Thomas, who in the cited place, from q. LXXIX, disputes about the blinded and the hardened, to whom, as we shall see in the following Th., he does not deny sufficient graces.

The second head of the doctrine of this part is proved again from the fact that sinners are held by the obligation of converting themselves to God; they can, therefore: but it is repugnant that they can both begin and perfect conversion without grace, and that supernatural grace properly so called; therefore they are not destitute of it. To this chiefly contribute the divine protestations confirmed by oath in Ezechiel XXXIII, 11. seq. As I live, says the Lord God: I do not will the death of the impious, but that the impious be converted from his way and live. Be converted, be converted from your most evil ways. Ridiculous would be this exhortation to conversion and the affirmation of the will of God, that the sinner be converted, if God, who alone can give, denies the grace by which alone sinners can be converted. And the words of Peter, 2. Epist. II, 9: The Lord does not delay His promise, as some think, but acts patiently for your sake, not willing that some perish, but that all return to repentance. Certainly to this end the Sacrament of Penance was instituted by Christ, that whatever sins might be remitted to whatever faithful sinner. It is therefore the will of Christ that all faithful sinners, if they do what is in them, obtain reconciliation through that sacrament. But unless this will of Christ is true, it must be said that faithful sinners can do what God requires in order that they obtain the fruit of the Sacrament; they cannot, however, without grace; therefore both in reality they can, and they have the grace by which they can.

I. St. Thomas, De Verit. q. XXIV. a. 11. thus describes obstinacy: «Obstinacy imports a certain firmness in sin, by which a person cannot turn back from sin. That a person cannot turn back from sin, however, can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that his own powers do not suffice for him to be wholly freed from sin, and thus anyone falling into mortal sin is said to be unable to return to justice. But from that firmness in sin a person is not properly called obstinate. In another way a person has firmness in sin such that he cannot even cooperate toward rising from sin. But this is twofold. In one way, so that he can in no way cooperate, and this is perfect obstinacy, with which the demons are obstinate; for their mind is so fixed in evil that every motion of their free will is disordered and is sin, and therefore they can in no way prepare themselves to have the grace by which sin is forgiven. In another way, so that he cannot easily cooperate toward leaving sin, and this is imperfect obstinacy, with which a person can be obstinate in the state of the way, namely while a person has his will so fixed in sin that no motions toward the good arise except weak ones. Yet because some do arise, from them the way is given for him to be prepared for grace.»

Therefore 1) obstinacy is a certain firmness in sin: 2) in this life only imperfect obstinacy is possible: 3) it does not consist in this, that a person wholly lacks the powers of rising from sin, nor 4) does it consist in this, that no good motion of free will can exist in him, by which a person prepares himself for grace (namely, justifying grace). But 5) it consists in this, that a person so adheres to evil through the will that it is difficult for him to cooperate (namely, with grace) in order to leave the state of sin.

II. That this may be understood more clearly, obstinacy in cause and obstinacy in effect must be distinguished. The obstinacy in cause, or the cause of obstinacy, is assigned by St. Thomas (ibid., art. preceding), namely, on the part of reason, the perversion of judgment on account of the impulse of passion; on the part of the will, the inclination of an evil habit, which is like a certain nature of the one having it (cf. this article and the preceding one). When, therefore, the perversion of judgment and the inclination of the evil habit are so great that a person can cooperate with grace only with difficulty, he himself is said to be obstinate in evil. Wherefore the generation of the perversion of the judgment of reason and of the evil inclination — a generation which takes place through preceding acts and gradually — is the cause of obstinacy, or obstinacy in cause; but that state which follows upon it, in which a person cooperates with the grace of God only with difficulty in order to leave sin, is obstinacy in effect, which comprises an actual perversion of the judgment of reason (blindness) and an actual inclination of the habit toward evil (hardness of heart).

Wherefore this firmness of the will in evil, introduced from the preceding causes, is habitual and permanent, and this habitual disposition is the reason why the subsequent acts of the will generally come to be ordered toward evil, and no motions toward the good arise except weak ones.

Therefore obstinacy in evil is nothing but a certain species of habit, or of the habitual disposition left behind from sin. For a habitual disposition can be more or less stable; it can be had toward fewer or more sins: but when it is so great that the will adheres so firmly to evil that it can recall itself to the good only with difficulty, then the firmness of the will in evil, or obstinacy, is so called. Whence what is said of habit in general must also be affirmed of obstinacy in evil.

II. Hence it follows that firmness of the will in evil of this kind, and the continual perseverance in it through the exercise of evil acts, is free to the will — both because that habitual disposition was freely introduced, and because the operation which takes place according to that habitual disposition is not necessary; for a habit does not induce necessity, although it can produce the greatest facility of act. Through the perversion of judgment, however, the light of reason is not so darkened that a man does not perceive that he acts badly; for that which he judges to be good for himself on account of passion and evil inclination cannot be evident to him, and therefore some apprehension and estimation of evil always remains, which, unless it were freely lulled to sleep, could bring forth its fruits.

«That a man in the state of the way cannot be so obstinate in evil but that he can cooperate toward his own liberation, the reason is clear, because passion is both loosened and repressed, and habit does not wholly corrupt the soul, nor does it adhere to the false so stubbornly but that it can be led away by a contrary reason,» says St. Thomas l. c. a. 11..

The difficulty, therefore, of cooperating with grace, when the will exists fixed in evil, since it follows upon that free firmness in evil, is itself also free.

Therefore the obstinacy of the will in evil is not any necessity properly so called of sinning, but is a certain free habitual disposition by which cooperation with grace is rendered difficult, so that one may leave the state of sin; which disposition, however, like any habit, can at least gradually be diminished and put off. This is the doctrine of St. Thomas.

IV. Nor does St. Augustine think otherwise. For he deliberately treats of this matter in Tractatu IIII. in Ioannem, on those words of Isaiah cited by John: «Therefore they could not believe; because Isaiah said again: He has blinded their eyes and hardened their heart, that they may not see with their eyes and understand with their heart and be converted, and I heal them.» «For it is said to us (he says, n. 5): if they could not believe, what sin is it of a man not doing what he cannot do»It is clear that the question is about the obstinate, who are also called blinded, and whose most frequent example Augustine places in those Jews of whom Isaiah speaks..

But now what notion of obstinacy Augustine would form in his mind is clear from what follows. He says, n. 6: «They could not believe; because the prophet Isaiah foretold this: but the prophet foretold this because God foreknew that this would be. Why, then, they could not, if it be asked of me, I answer quickly: because they were unwilling.» Therefore the obstinacy of the Jews was free.

Hence he indeed permits others (n. 8) to explain this question more clearly and better: yet he warns two things, namely: «that no one dare so to defend free will as to try to take away from us the prayer in which we say, lead us not into temptation; again, that no one deny the free choice of the will and dare to excuse sin».

Wherefore, explaining why they could not believe, he traces this inability back to the free disposition of the evil will (n. 9): «It is not, therefore, a wonder that they could not believe, whose will was so proud that, not knowing the justice of God, they wished to establish their own... But it was said thus, they could not, where it must be understood that they were unwilling, just as it was said of our Lord God: he cannot deny himself... As, therefore, that the Lord cannot deny himself is the praise of the divine will, so that they could not is the fault of the human will." Whence Augustine affirms an inability of this kind not as antecedent, but only as consequent (n. 10): «Those who are so proudly wise as to think that so much must be attributed to the powers of their own will that they deny that divine help is necessary for them in order to live well, cannot believe in Christ... Hence also those could not believe, not because men cannot be changed for the better, but as long as they are so minded, they cannot believe.»

To the difficulty, however, thus proposed (n. 6): «But the Prophet, you say, gives another cause, not their will (namely, why they were unwilling to believe): what cause does the Prophet give? because God gave them a spirit of compunction, eyes that they might not see and ears that they might not hear, and he blinded their eyes and hardened their heart.» Augustine answers: «I answer that even this their will merited. For in this way God blinds, in this way he hardens, by deserting and not helping, which he can do by a hidden judgment, but cannot do by an unjust one.» Namely, God hardens by not helping, that is, by not conferring helping grace, namely grace actually efficacious. But 1) that grace is not efficacious depends on the will: why, therefore, efficacious grace is not actually conferred, or why the grace which is conferred is not actually efficacious, the cause is the will. Moreover, God could indeed have conferred some grace which he foresaw would be efficacious, but he justly denied it, because their evil will merited that. And so God hardens by deserting, that is, by not helping, or by not conferring grace actually efficacious, which can therefore be understood in two ways, namely, either on account of preceding demerits he denies the grace which he foreknew would be efficacious, or he simply deserts, inasmuch as, the will withholding its cooperation from sufficient grace, God does not help it. Because, therefore, as Augustine teaches elsewhere, God does not desert unless he is deserted; not God, but the will is the sole cause of the evil act.

V. But now, with the concept of obstinacy which can take place in this life thus defined, it is readily clear that the obstinate are not deprived of necessary graces. This is evident 1) by the authority of St. Thomas, who does not will obstinacy in this life to be anything but imperfect, from which accordingly a man can withdraw and be converted to the good; moreover this cannot happen without grace: he who places obstinacy in this, that a person cooperates with difficulty in order to leave sin; but in order that a person cooperate, the grace of God is required, with which he cooperates: he therefore supposes grace to be at hand, with which he could absolutely, but with which he can cooperate only with difficulty. And indeed the holy Doctor supposes that motions toward the good arise in the obstinate, albeit weak; moreover these are motions of grace. 2) by the authority of Augustine. For the cause why the obstinate cannot act well is that they are unwilling; moreover this reason would be false in the view of Augustine, if grace were lacking, which confers the power. Again, Augustine concedes only that helping grace, that is, actually efficacious grace, is lacking to them, but he teaches that this is from their fault: he does not, therefore, deny, nay he implicitly asserts, that sufficient graces preparing the will, whether proximately or remotely, are present to the obstinate. Note that in those words deserting and not helping, the particle and is explanatory: for if the following words said something other than the preceding, they would say less and therefore would be useless.

Note again that here Augustine says that God hardens by not helping, elsewhere he says that God hardens by not having mercy, I. J. ad Simplie. q. 2. nn. 15. 16. For the mercy of God is the bestowal of helping grace, that is, actually efficacious grace: «for of whom he has mercy, he calls him in such a way as he knows is congruent for him, that he does not reject the one calling,» as he says ibid., n. 13.

And indeed what we have heard from Thomas — that obstinacy in this life is nothing but imperfect — Augustine had already taught. For he says, in Psal. VI. n. 8, on the words of Paul (Rom. I, 28.) God gave them over to a reprobate mind: That is the blindness of the mind: whoever has been given over to it is shut off from the interior light of God, but not yet entirely, while he is in this life. For there are exterior darknesses, which are understood to pertain more to the day of judgment, so that he is entirely outside God, whoever, while there is time, has refused to be corrected; for what is it to be entirely outside God, except to be in the deepest blindness?... The beginning of this wrath is that which every sinner suffers in this life... and therefore he does not say (Psalmus VI. 8. My eye is troubled by wrath) it is extinguished, namely, my eye is troubled by wrath.»

Hence in Psalm. XVIII. Enarrat. 1a, n. 7, he teaches that «the Word made flesh, taking up our mortality, did not allow any mortal to excuse himself from the shadow of death, and the heat of the Word indeed penetrated that very shadow.»Augustinus, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalmus XVIII, n. 7. However great, therefore, the shadow of death may be in this life, it is not total, but is sprinkled with the light and heat of the divine sun — namely, grace — by which the blinded man can, if he will, return to the way of justice.

VI. And in very truth 3) Cf. Augustinus, Tractatus in Ioannem, XLIV, n. 6. — that we may argue also from the analogy of faith — this was persuasively held by Augustine, which every Catholic feels and reason itself demonstrates: that the time of the present life is a time of probation and a course granted to us by God, that by working we may attain eternal life, and that the power of working for the attainment of the end ceases when life ceases; that now, to be sure, is the time of mercy, in the other life is the time of judgment. Thus Tract. XLIV. n. 6. in Ioann., on those words: «the night comes when no one can work.» What shall we say of that night? when will it be when no one can work? That night will be the night of the impious, that night of those to whom it will be said at the end: «go into the eternal fire.» Let a man, therefore, work while he lives, lest he be overtaken by that night, where no one can work. It is one thing to be the time of working, another of receiving. While you live, do. And Tract. LIV. n. 5: «Now is the time of mercy, afterwards there will be judgment.» Therefore even the obstinate, who live here, can work their own salvation; the mercy of God is also at hand for them; they have, therefore, graces by which they can be saved.

VII. Although, therefore, it would not be opposed in itself to the salvific will of God to abandon some sinners altogether, with no further grace supplied — for just as he could punish them, existing in sin, with death, or deprive them of their mind, so too, while the natural good of a longer life is still granted, he can deprive them of all graces and hold them as already to be condemned — nevertheless, having regard to the economy of divine providence, by which the time of the present life is established as a time of probation and of the way, it must be said that as long as God permits sinners to live, he also grants them the space of repenting, and therefore they still pertain to the salvific will of God, which confers on all the means necessary for salvation. Whence August. Retract. I. I. c. XIX. n. 7: «Concerning anyone however wicked, placed in this life, one must certainly not despair, nor is one imprudently praying for him of whom one does not despair.»Augustinus, Retractationes, I, XIX, n. 7.

This is confirmed also by the catholic dogma established against Novatian, namely that there is no sin which cannot be expiated by penance and remitted by the Church; therefore even the obstinate can do penance, that is, come to their senses from their lethargy and return to God.

VIII. Note that Augustine, in Exposit. quarumd. proposit. Epist. ad Rom. c. 12, says of the hardened Pharaoh: «This is not, therefore, imputed to him, that he did not then obey, since with a hardened heart he could not obey; but because he showed himself worthy of having his heart hardened, by his prior unbelief.» But these sayings of Augustine are connected with a certain singular doctrine of his. Namely, laboring under that error that the beginning of faith is not a gift of God, but that through it we obtain the other gifts, he teaches here that although the good works which we do through the grace of God are imputed to us, or are ours, because we act willingly; yet in a special manner faith is ours and is imputed to us, because it is from us alone and is the principle and reason why the other good works exist. But now he illustrates this false doctrine, which he afterwards condemned, by this example, namely that to the hardened Pharaoh the first sin, by which he merited to be hardened, is imputed, but those things which follow the hardening are not imputed. These things, to be sure, must be understood of the special imputation by which the first sin is imputed, just as Augustine thought that faith is imputed. For the first sin is from the malice of man alone; but those things which follow the hardening come also from the punishment of God, as Augustine speaks there, who hardens in punishment of preceding sins, or deserts the sinner. Moreover, with this false doctrine of the beginning of faith rejected, Augustine must be judged afterwards to have thought about hardening what we have recited from him from Tract. LIII. in Ioann.

It is brought forward from the Lib. De Nat. et Grat. c. 22.* «the light of truth worthily deserts the transgressor of the law, deserted by which he certainly becomes blind, and it is more necessary that he stumble and, falling, be afflicted, and, afflicted, not rise, so that he therefore only hears the voice of the law, by which he is admonished to implore the grace of the Savior.» But 1) if he is admonished to implore the grace of the Savior, therefore he can do this; therefore he has at least the grace of praying. 2) This desertion is not from the denial of all grace, but of grace actually helping. The punishment indeed is in this, that God does not confer more abundant or efficacious graces, Palm. De Grat. not indeed that he denies all grace; for Augustine testifies that all things which happen in this state are sins and are imputed to man; nor does he teach that they are imputed only on account of the first sin, but each one by itself; for he says that with these sins increased, the punishment is also increased. Moreover, if grace were lacking, the power of avoiding sins would, according to Augustine, be lacking; whence they would be unjustly imputed. Therefore.

You will say that some sins are unforgivable, as is clear from Matth. XII. 31. 32. the spirit of blasphemy will not be forgiven: whoever has spoken a word against the Son of man, it will be forgiven him: but whoever has spoken against the Holy Spirit, it will not be forgiven him, neither in this age, nor in the future. Could not obstinacy in evil be a sin of this kind against the Holy Spirit? I answer, referring the reader to those things which I have disputed on this matter in the Tract. De Poenit. Th. IX.

I. Since by good natural acts a man can negatively dispose himself for grace; hence, in order that an adult man may attain faith, a supernatural grace is indeed required, which immediately prepares him for faith, which grace can be manifold, one more or less mediate than another; yet a negative disposition for grace can be obtained through natural means or helps. Moreover, if faith is an end that must necessarily be attained, at least those means must be at hand by which a man doing what is in him may attain faith. But if you judge that no good act is done that is not supernatural, then the discussion can only be about grace properly so called. The demonstration of the thesis depends on the doctrine established elsewhere concerning the serious universal salvific will, which we presuppose.

II. But there is no need to declare in particular how God provides for the salvation of any infidel who labors under invincible ignorance. For it is certain that ways are not lacking to the Divine omnipotence by which it attains what it intends, nor must we be anxious about this matter. For if God wills to save men only through faith properly so called (for the proposition has been condemned which teaches: faith improperly so called from the testimony of creatures suffices for justification), since men, whether consenting to supernatural graces or first doing what is in them according to the strength of nature, God will certainly so provide for them that they can have faith. Moreover, the Church holds that graces are also conferred on infidels. Among those condemned by Alexander VIII on 7 December 1690 this is the 5th proposition: «Pagans, Jews, heretics, and others of this kind receive from Jesus Christ absolutely no influence: and hence you will rightly infer that in them there is a naked and unarmed will without any sufficient grace.» Cf. also the 29th proposition of Quesnell: «Outside the Church no grace is given.»

III. But the most holy Pius IX is to be heard, who in the Encyclical Letter to the Cardinals, Archbishops, and Bishops of Italy, given on 10 August 1863, has these words: «It is known to Us and to you that those who labor under invincible ignorance with regard to our most holy religion and who, zealously keeping the natural law and its precepts inscribed by God in the hearts of all and being ready to obey God, lead an honest and upright life, can, by the operating power of divine light and grace, attain eternal life: since God, who fully beholds, scrutinizes, and knows the minds, souls, thoughts, and habits of all, by His supreme goodness and clemency does not at all suffer anyone to be punished with eternal torments who does not have the guilt of voluntary fault.»

One may compare what we have given in the Parergon to Chapter II, p. 254, under nn. I. III. IV., which contribute very much to confirming and illustrating the present thesis.

IV. But the reason of the thesis is most simple. It depends, namely, on this, that the will of God that men be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth is universal I. Tim. II. 1. seqq.; but infidels cannot actually come to faith unless they are prepared by grace; therefore God has also destined His graces for them and confers them as opportunity offers.

V. Yet the thesis is not to be dismissed without our freeing Augustine from the calumny inflicted on him by Jansenius with regard to the fourfold state of men which Augustine distinguished: before the law, under the law, under grace, in peace. For Jansenius, in De statu naturae lapsae L. III. c. 2. seqq., teaches that «the opinion of Augustine, which the Pelagians detested so greatly, is none other than this: that the free choice of the will, after the fall of the first man, before it is visited by grace, h. e. before it embraces the Christian faith, where grace begins, is so held captive under earthly lusts that that freedom of the will, bound as it were with iron chains, can in no way rise up to will or do the good, but is turned about in evil only with a captive motion.» Jansenius proves this also by this fourth argument «from the four states of the people of God before the law, under the law, under grace, and in peace. For in Augustine there is this difference among those states, that in the first two the free choice lies captive and enslaved under the concupiscence of sin, so that it cannot fulfill the law of justice set before it or the very good work which the law commands. For although in the second state man, already instructed by the law and terrified by the fear of punishment, is from time to time struck by certain desires of living well; yet because the free choice is not yet freed from sin, that is, from the concupiscence dominating his will or consent, it cannot resist its motions... In the other two states the free choice, freed by liberating grace, is free, and either fights or rests in the peace of beatitude. These states are distinguished by certain degrees in the whole human race, so that the first had its place in most men from the fall of Adam up to Moses, who gave the law, during which whole time the human race lived in the deepest ignorance. The second from Moses up to Christ, who gave the liberating grace; for that time was of a law removing ignorance indeed, but granting no grace for doing well, and much less granting freedom to the free choice from the tyranny of dominating lust. In the third state the grace of Christ frees the human race... In the fourth, most perfectly free, we triumph.» He adds further: «These states also have their place in individual men by a certain proportion. The first and the second, as long as man lies in the deep ignorance of the justice of the law to be done or, even if he already knows the precepts, yet destitute of true faith or of the liberating spirit of charity, lies under his own binding and conquering lusts... In the third state the free choice is drawn out and freed from the law of sin and death... In the fourth, by the blessed resurrection, it is freed from all evil.» Jansenius appeals to Enchir. c. 118, to Lib. qq. LXXXIII. q. 66, to Comm. in Epist. ad Galatas c. 5, to the Exposition of whichVI. Jansenius, in l. I. De Gratia Christi c. 2, discloses the mystery of this matter in these words: «According to the doctrine of Augustine, most firmly founded in Scripture... the most salutary counsel of God in reforming the Jewish people was in giving the law, not that through sufficient grace, which would be present to them, they might live rightly by observing it, which He foreknew they could not yet do; but that by the multitude of sins and the magnitude of the transgressions, which were known to be about to follow through the law which they could not fulfill, their pride might be broken... so that, the pride of the proud being convicted and humility conceived, at length they would acknowledge that they were sick and could not fulfill the law that had been given... which scope of God is so far from supposing that sufficient grace for observing the law was present to the Jews, that rather, on the contrary, it convinces that it was in no way present to them, but that God chose this way of crushing pride, so that by the knowledge and confession of their own weakness He might lead them to invoke and obtain the grace sufficient for observing the law.»

Likewise Jansenius, in De Gratia Christi l. III. c. 9, distinguishing the sons and heirs of the Old Testament, who, gaping after the earthly goods promised to them, seemed indeed to themselves to live well, but were sinners, from the Dispensers and Administrators of the Old Testament, who did not spurn its figurative precepts and promises, but understood, loved, and awaited the New in them as in certain prophetic signs; with this distinction, I say, established, he decides that whatever he had so far said about the Jews constituted under the old law is to be understood of the true and genuine heirs and sons of that Testament which was given on Mount Sinai and which begot unto servitude.

VII. But this opinion is wholly foreign to Augustine's mind, and so foreign that it is evidently refuted by his very authority.

Indeed 1) This very opinion, which Jansenius imputes to Augustine, the Pelagians used to object to him, as Augustine testifies in Cont. duas epistt. Pelagg. l. III. c. 2: «We, they say, do not say that the law of the Old Testament was given for this, that it might justify the obedient, but that it might become the cause of graver sin.» But what does Augustine say to these things? Does he concede that this is said by him? hear...

»They do not at all understand what we say about the law, because we say that which the Apostle says, whom they do not understand.« It is certain, therefore, that what the Pelagians, and with the Pelagians Jansenius, impute to him is not taught by Augustine. What then was Augustine saying? He compared the two earlier states, before the law and under the law, with the state under grace, viewed according to what they are in themselves, having regard to their own economy and sufficiency for salvation. For if the law, whether natural or written, is viewed in itself, it certainly does not suffice for salvation; for through it there is knowledge of what is to be done, but there is not the help necessary for the work; indeed, since through the law there is knowledge of sin, if this alone is present, it makes men not just, but rather transgressors. That this is Augustine's meaning is clear from what follows. For in the same place he says »But we say that by the law it comes about that God is heard as to what He wills to be done; but by grace, that the law is obeyed.« Where you have the distinction between law and grace drawn from the proper effect of each. And c. 4: »What Catholic would say what they boast that we say: that the Holy Spirit, the helper of virtue, was not in the Old Testament, unless we understand the old Testament in the way the Apostle said: from Mount Sinai begetting unto truth?« That is, insofar as it was the testament of servants, bearing a law that terrifies and punishes, it did not help; only under this aspect can it be said to have lacked grace; moreover, this is to consider the law only according to what is proper to it. Again c. 7. n. 20: »More plainly and briefly it can be said thus: the justice of the law is not fulfilled when the law commands and man does it as it were by his own powers; but when the Spirit helps and the free will of man, freed by the grace of God, does it.« That is, the will under the law is a will instructed indeed with the knowledge of what God commands; but left to its own natural powers it does not suffice for the observance of the law, but a helping Spirit is required. And in truth 2) that Augustine's doctrine is to be so understood is shown most evidently by this, that Augustine most certainly and most frequently taught that the grace of God was at hand for the men of the Old Testament, not only the greater ones but also the people indiscriminately, and that there were just men among them. Indeed, in Psalm. LXVII n. 2: »There were also in that people those who understood, having the faith which was afterwards revealed, pertaining not to the letter of the law, but to the grace of the Spirit. For not without this faith were those who could foresee and foretell its future revelation in Christ, since even those old Sacraments were significant of future things. Did only the prophets have this faith? did not the people also?

But even those who faithfully heard the prophets were helped by the same grace, so that they understood what they heard. But certainly the Sacrament of the kingdom of heaven was veiled in the Old Testament, which was to be revealed in the New in the fullness of time.» Cf. also his letter to Hilarius of Sicily 157. n. 14. 15.

VIII. Wherefore Augustine 3) In the Letter which he wrote with four other Bishops to Innocent, he says n. 14: «Through the law is knowledge of sin. But now without the law the justice of God is manifest, attested by the law and the prophets. When the Apostle says: it is manifested, he shows that it existed even then (the justice of God, which according to Augustine is that by which God makes us just; read among other things chapter 7. n. 20. of Book III against the two Letters of the Pelagians and Serm. LXXXII. c. 9.), but like that rain which Gideon obtained, then hidden as it were in the fleece, now manifest as it were on the threshing floor.... Just as many flee from the face of reigning sin to grace, as now lying open on the threshing floor, so few (just Jews, few compared with the just of the Church, which embraces the whole world) fled to it as then lying hidden in the fleece.» places between the Old and the New Testament not this distinction, that grace was then lacking and now is; but that it was then hidden, now manifest.

Namely, the economy of the Jewish people was in itself an economy of the law, which was manifest; grace, however, was conferred on the same people, but not by the force of the law or by the force of that economy, but by the force of the economy of the Gospel, which indeed was then veiled and hidden, but now, after Christ, is revealed and manifest. Whence in the Old Testament the law is said to have been manifest, grace hidden.

IX. Moreover, in order that Augustine's doctrine may be understood more intimately, one must note the distinction placed by him between these two phrases: to be under the law and to be in the law or with the law. In Ioann. Tract. III., n. 2: «Whence had men been made to be under the law? by not fulfilling the law. For he who fulfills the law is not under the law, but with the law.» Ibid. Tract. LI. n. 27: «All who are guilty are under the law; those living well are with the law.» In Psalm. I. n. 2: «It is one thing to be in the law, another to be under the law. He who is in the law acts according to the law; he who is under the law is acted upon according to the law. The former, therefore, is free; the latter is a slave.» Therefore to be under the law is not merely to have the law, but not to keep the law one has and thereby to be made guilty and condemned: a slave, therefore, is he who is under the law; for he does not work from love of justice, on account of which he would be free under grace and in the law and with the law, and on that account he is subject to the threats, terrors, and vengeance of the law. Wherefore Augustine affirms of any man, whether Jew or Christian, that he is under the law if he does not fulfill it; for the law is not placed for the just, but for the unjust, and he affirms that he is in the law if he fulfills it. But if a comparison is made of the people of the Old Testament and the people of the New Testament, and the economy of each is viewed according to what is proper to it, it is clear that «in the old law fear prevailed, in the new love,» as he says in Psalm. LXXVII. n. 7, and that the men of the Old Testament, having regard to the economy of the law alone, could not observe the law, but the men of the New Testament can; for grace is proper to this state, as such. Moreover, if the «law is more commonly so called when it threatens, terrifies, avenges» (Ad Simplic. L. I. q. I. n. 17) and if he is under the law who does not fulfill it, he also will be under the law who cannot fulfill it and therefore must fear its vengeance; wherefore the men of the Old Testament, since, having regard to the law alone, which alone pertained to them, they could not fulfill the law, were under the law. But just as the Christian, who by reason of the economy in which he lives is under grace, if nevertheless he does not keep the law and sins, he himself is under the law and therefore, as Augustine says, looks to the Old Testament begetting unto servitude; so also the Jew, who by reason of the economy in which he lived was under the law, if nevertheless he had kept the law through the grace which was not lacking to him through the merits of Christ, who was working even then, he himself would have been in the law and under grace and would have looked to the New Testament. Contr. duas epistt. Pelagg. I. III. c. 4. n. 9: «To the Old Testament, which is from Mount Sinai begetting unto servitude, which is Agar, those belong who, when they have received the holy and just and good law, think that the letter can suffice for them for life, and therefore, that they may become doers of the law, do not seek divine mercy.» This doctrine of Augustine concerning men under the law is the same as that concerning men who were before the law. For, viewed according to the reason of their state, they lacked also the positive law given from without; yet they did not lack, on account of the merits of Christ to be revealed in the state of grace, the knowledge and grace necessary for acting. Are we to think that Augustine judged that all the Patriarchs, Seth, Noe, Abraham, Isaac, etc., were destitute of the grace of God and did nothing but sins? What is more manifest against Scripture? Certainly he affirms in Enchir. c. 118 that grace was conferred on them no less than on those who were under the old law: «So also the people of God has been ordered through the intervals of times, as it pleased God. For it was first before the law, secondly under the law... then under grace... Which grace indeed was not lacking before to those to whom it behooved to be imparted, although according to the dispensation of the time, veiled and hidden.»

When, therefore, the singular state of a man who first lived in the deepest darkness of ignorance, then comes to know sin through the law, and at length, helped by the grace of God, works rightly, is compared with these states of the human race only according to what these states had proper to themselves, it does not follow that the human race existing in the earlier states lacked the helps necessary for acting salutarily, nor that there were no just men. Faure in 1. c. Enchirid.

But the reason for this diverse distribution lies hidden in the inscrutable judgments of God, with whom there is no iniquity; and in that diverse distribution is placed the mystery of predestination.

I. The first is established from what has been demonstrated thus far. The second is established by fact; for e. g. the exterior graces, such as the preaching of the Word, were not the same for all, and the interior graces themselves, at least insofar as they are efficacious and helping, likewise are not the same for all. The Thesis aims at this, that it be understood that in the gratuitous distribution of graces is placed the mystery of the supernatural providence of God, or of predestination. We adduce first the doctrine of Augustine, from which a mystery of this sort is established: then, a simple observation having been applied, it will be clear that in the distribution of graces alone is placed the mystery of predestination.

II. Thus the Pelagians, as is well known, denied the gratuitousness of grace and objected against it that, if grace is given freely, it must be asserted that the lots of men are ruled by a certain fate, or that God is an accepter of persons (cf. Cont. Iulian. L. II. c. 18. n. 46. et Epist. ad Sixtum CXCIV. n. 4.).

On the contrary, Augustine defended grace as altogether gratuitous, denying that either of those two things which the Pelagians inferred follows from it. A question therefore arose, and a double one at that, and Augustine accurately distinguishes each (De Dono persev. c. 8. nn. 16, 18. Epist. cit. c. 2. nn. 4, 5. Cont. Iulian. L. IV. c. 8. n. 46): namely, 1) why the grace of God is not given to all, but is given to some and not to others. 2) If of all men, none of whom merits it, it is given only to certain ones, why it is given to this one rather than to that one. Augustine does not answer both questions in the same way.

III. Before we report the answers of Augustine, it must be noted 1) that the grace about which the question is raised is not just any grace, but a certain determinate grace, namely a more abundant grace, or a grace efficacious in act. For sufficient grace, in the judgment of Augustine himself (as we suppose has been demonstrated), is denied to no one; therefore the question cannot be about it, why it is not given to all. Augustine, however, as we have already noted elsewhere, spoke specifically about that grace which is joined with its effect, about the grace of the elect, of the children of the promise. The question therefore came back to this, why faith itself, justification, perseverance are not given to all; or why that grace is not conferred on all which, nevertheless, is given to others, by which it comes about that they actually believe, are justified, and persevere.

It must be noted 2) that efficacious grace under this formal aspect, insofar as it is foreseen as going to be efficacious in the future if it is given, is owed to no one; for what man can exact is the grace by which he is able, that is, sufficient grace or efficacious grace in first act; that grace, however, be efficacious in second act, that is placed in the power of man himself aided by sufficient grace; there is therefore no reason why God should be bound to give anything more.

Hence 3) the sufficient reason for calming all complaints is this double one: first, the more abundant or efficacious grace, as such, is an unowed gift, is unowed mercy; second, that the sufficient grace which is given to man is not efficacious in him, that is due to the fault of man; and therefore it is from man himself that he has not had efficacious grace.

But 4) it cannot be denied that the omnipotent God does not lack a way by which He calls all in such a manner that they infallibly follow the one calling, and if God willed to have mercy even on those very ones (who do not follow), He could call them in the way that would be suited to them, so that they would both be moved and understand and follow (Ad Simplic. L. I. q. 2. nn. 13. 14.). it cannot be denied that the omnipotent God does not lack a way by which He calls all in such a manner that they infallibly follow the one calling, and if God willed to have mercy even on those very ones (who do not follow), He could call them in the way that would be suited to them, so that they would both be moved and understand and follow (Ad Simplic. L. I. q. 2. nn. 13. 14.). Why, therefore, is such grace not given to all, or why are not all called in this way?

IV. The answer of Augustine to this first question comes down to this. He who seeks the reason for this diverse distribution of graces can raise the question in this sense, so as to wish to accuse God of injustice, as if he said: Is not God unjust, because in an equal case He has mercy on some and not on others? Or, conceding that there is no injustice on the part of God, he can still ask why God, who could have had mercy on all, did not in fact will to have mercy on all in this way.

To the question understood in the former way Augustine answers by demonstrating that there is no injustice on the part of God, both because, if grace is not efficacious, that is from the fault of man; and because efficacious grace is an unowed benefit. Enchir. c. 99. «He has mercy with great goodness, He hardens with no iniquity: so that neither may the freed man glory in his own merits, nor the condemned man complain of his own merits.» Moreover, these are merits, because, having sufficient graces, he willed not to consent to them; the hardening, therefore, which consists in the denial of helping grace, is to be traced back not to the iniquity or injustice of God, but to the fault of man, who, not consenting to the sufficient graces, was the cause of his not being helped by God. And De Praed. SS. c. 8: «Why, then, does He not teach all to come to Christ, unless because all whom He teaches He teaches in mercy; and those whom He does not teach He does not teach in judgment?» If in mercy, therefore it is an unowed benefit. Moreover, when you hear judgment, you understand at once that Augustine teaches that the evil will of man is the cause, which merited it, and therefore spurned the graces by which it could be good. For speaking of God blinding and hardening (Tract. in Ioan. LIII. n. 6.) he says: «I answer that even this their will has merited. For thus God blinds, thus He hardens, by deserting, not by helping, which He can do by a hidden judgment, but cannot do by an unjust one.» Behold what it is that the judgment of God is not unjust: because, namely, the will of men merited it. It is therefore supposed that sufficient graces were not lacking, by which he could do good.

V. It must be noted that Augustine, in order to set more openly in view this reason of the unowed, which belongs to grace, frequently appeals to original sin. Not that original sin alone is a sufficient reason why, once the restoration of the whole human nature through Christ is established, sufficient grace is denied, but that the same sin is a reason showing that grace, and especially efficacious grace, is gratuitous and unowed to nature, which gratuitousness of grace Augustine alone undertakes to demonstrate. But lest the opinion of Augustine be wrongly understood, it must be noted that Augustine speaks of that discrimination which is made through the first grace, which finds all bound by original sin, and that therefore to demonstrate unowed grace from original sin still existing and not yet remitted, and that it is false that Augustine derives the reason for the denial of efficacious grace and of perseverance to the just even from original sin, however fully remitted. This could be demonstrated by an analysis instituted of all those testimonies of Augustine which are adduced by those who impose this opinion on Augustine, namely that God deprives some of so great a good on account of a sin which He most fully pardoned to them. But because all those testimonies are most similar to one another, it will be enough to recite one; the rest can be compared. In Contr. duas epistt. Pelagg. L. II. c. 7., acceptance of persons having been defined and the parable of the denarii Matth. XX, 1. seqg. having been brought forward, he continues: «for here is all justice: this I will. To you, he says, I have repaid, to this one I have given: neither, that I might give to this one, did I take anything from you, or diminish or deny what I owed. As, therefore, here there is no acceptance of persons, because one is thus honored in such a way that another is not defrauded of what is owed; so also, when according to the purpose of God one is called and another is not called, to the one called a gratuitous good is given, of which good the calling itself is the beginning; to the one not called a bad is repaid, because all are guilty before Him in that through one man sin entered into the world... The good indeed is given without merit and freely; because he is from the same mass as him to whom it is not given: the bad, however, is repaid with merit and as owed, because in the mass of perdition bad is not badly repaid to bad.» The sense is obvious, that here Augustine speaks of those who are still guilty of original sin. For it is a question of vocation, which there is no reason why you should not receive as the first grace, since the speech is about guilty ones bound by original sin. He teaches the same in Epist. CLXXX. ad Paulinum, nn. 16. 17. and Epist. CXC, ad Optatum nn. 9. 10. Epist. CXCIV ad Sixtum n. 4. and elsewhere. Cf. Faure in Enchirid. ad caput 55. To this belongs what he says in De Dono persev. c. 8. «Why, he says, is the grace of God not given according to the merits of men? I answer, because God is merciful. Why then, he says, not to all? and here I answer, because God is judge.» Namely, original sin existing, there exists a reason why God can condemn man and therefore also deny grace, so that if He confers it, that is wholly from divine liberality and mercy, which Augustine wishes to prove.

Hence, when he expressly raises the question about those in whom original sin has already been remitted, he does not seek from it the reason for the grace of perseverance denied. Thus in De Dono persev. c. 8. n. 19., this question having been proposed, why He did not give perseverance even to the end to certain ones who worshipped Him in good faith, he answers «why do you think, except because he does not lie who says: they went out from us, but they were not of us, etc.» He indicates, namely, that the reason is to be sought from those very ones who fell away by their own sin. Therefore ibid. n. 21. he constitutes two classes of those to whom benefits of this sort are denied by God, namely of little children, who are still bound by original sin, and of those of mature age, both the impious and the pious, signifying that one is not to speak of all in the same way. And indeed, returning to the question why of two pious men perseverance is given to one and not to the other, he recurs again to the words of John, then adds: «they were not in Christ chosen before the constitution of the world, they were not in Him obtaining a lot, they were not predestined according to the purpose of Him who works all things, etc.» by which words only the gratuitousness of the predestination of perseverance is declared.

VI. Nevertheless, two things are still to be distinguished. For it is one thing to teach: perseverance is denied to the just man on account of this motive, which is original sin, which nevertheless was remitted; another thing: the gratuitousness of perseverance being supposed, which is the reason why it can be denied without injury, to take up original sin in order to show that fallen man complains more without merit about perseverance denied than if he had remained whole. For this latter discourse comes down to this. By what right does anyone complain that perseverance is not given to him, to whom the first grace could meritedly have been denied, which being denied, perseverance also would have been denied? By this argument it is not said that original sin remitted is a motive for God to deny the grace of perseverance, but only it is shown how without merit man complains for a denied good otherwise unowed, to whom everything, namely the first grace and perseverance, could have been denied. Thus Augustine seems to argue in Op. imp. L. II. c. 142. cf. Faure at the cited place.

VII. But when, setting aside the question of the justice of God, one asks simply why God does not confer grace on all, since He can if He wills, Augustine answers that the judgments of God are inscrutable. De Dono persev. n. 21. «Of two little children equally bound by original sin, why this one is taken up, that one is left behind, and of two impious men already of mature age, why this one is so called that he follows the one calling; that one, however, either is not called (by the preaching of faith) or is not so called; the judgments of God are inscrutable.» Cf. also L. I. ad Simplic. q. 2. n. 17. and this Augustine frequently hands down either in these words or in similar ones, exclaiming namely with the Apostle: O the depth of the riches! and is there iniquity with God?

Nevertheless, in order that Augustine may in some way defend these inscrutable judgments, he warns that from this diverse distribution of graces this effect follows, or this good is obtained, that the gratuitousness of grace becomes more manifest; for if it were given to all, it would seem as it were connected with nature and owed, and thus those who receive it would be borne toward God with greater humility and gratitude. Enchir. c. 99: «He sees, if he grasps (the words of the Apostle Rom. IX. 20. 21.), the whole human race condemned by so just a judgment in the apostate root, that even if none were freed from it, no one could rightly reproach the justice of God, and that those who are freed ought to have been freed in such a way that, from the many not freed and left in the most just damnation, it might be shown what the whole lump had merited and whither the owed judgment of God would also lead those very ones, unless unowed mercy came to their aid; so that every mouth of those willing to glory in their own merits may be stopped and he who glories may glory in the Lord.» Cf. also the letter to Paulinus of Nola n. 22. 24. 25.

Moreover, as we have already warned, these things are not to be taken of the denial of grace or of the providence necessary for the salvation of each man; for this conflicts with the certain doctrine of Augustine on the universal salvific will. Cf. n. 111.

But Augustine indeed teaches that this manner of liberation ought to have been used, so that by not liberating many it might be shown what the whole human race had merited. It is clear 1) that this non-liberation of the many is not a necessary means to showing that, which could have been manifested in other ways. It is clear 2) both from the very phrase and from the nature of the thing that non-liberation and damnation are not the object of the will of God intending it, but only permitting it. Wherefore 3) the showing of the merit of the human race is not an end intended through the damnation of the many; for then this would be a means and intended by God: but it is a reason of the fittingness of the permission, that the many are damned. Whence 4) that 'ought to have been' does not signify the necessity of employing this manner for showing that, but only the fittingness. And indeed, if this permission had been necessary, the judgments of God would no longer be said to be inscrutable in a permission of this sort: for an evident reason would appear. He asserts, therefore,5) that it was fitting for God (yet in such a way that the opposite also would have been fitting for God, if He had willed it) to permit the perdition of the many, just as in general the Theologians teach that the permission of moral evils is fitting for God; because besides the fact that He is not bound to impede moral evil, there is present a reason or sufficient condition for exercising this right of permitting which He has, namely some good which can be elicited from the evil for His glory. For God can permit moral evil, because He is not bound to impede it; it is necessary, however, that some good be able to be elicited from the permitted evil: this good, moreover, is indeed not an end intended by God when He wills to permit the evil, but is as it were a condition so that He can exercise His right of permitting evils. Thus Augustine teaches that it was fitting to permit many to be damned, because from this permitted evil that good could be gathered, that the gratuitousness of grace might be known more evidently. Hence the vessels of mercy understand (contr. duas epistt. Pelagg. L. IV. c. 6.) how gratuitous a mercy is shown to them, because to the vessels of wrath, with whom the cause of perdition and the common mass is theirs, owed and just wrath is repaid.

VIII. To the second question, namely, if grace is not given to all, why nevertheless it is given to this one rather than to that one, e. g. why rather to Peter than to Judas, the answer of Augustine is shorter and more expeditious: namely, that no reason for this thing can be thought out, that it pertains to the inscrutable judgments of God. De Dono persev. c. 8. »If already, he says, it was fitting, that, by not damning all, He might show what was owed to all and thus commend His grace more gratefully to the vessels of mercy: why in the same cause would He punish me rather than him, or liberate him rather than me?" Augustine answers: »This I do not say; if you ask why, because I confess that I do not find what to say." Contr. duas epistt. Pelagg. I. IV. c. 6. n. 16. »But why does He make these men sheep and does not make those, with whom there is no acceptance of persons? This itself is the question, to which the blessed Apostle says to those proposing more curiously than capably: O man, who are you who answer God? Does the clay say to him who formed it: why did you make me thus? This itself is the question, which pertains to that height, which, wishing to see through, the same Apostle in a certain way was afraid and cried out: O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God: how inscrutable are His judgments and unsearchable His ways!" Cf. also epist. 194, ad Sixtum. n. 23.

Note that in the same place Augustine adds: »Let His gratuitous mercy, therefore, be pleasing to us, even if this deep question remains unresolved. Which nevertheless (question) is so far resolved, inasmuch as the Apostle resolves it saying: but if God, willing to show His wrath and make known His power, brought (endured) with much patience the vessels of wrath, which are perfected (fitted) for perdition, and (the little word 'and' is missing in the Vulgate) that He might make known the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He prepared for glory. For wrath is not repaid unless owed, lest there be iniquity with God: mercy, however, even when it is shown unowed, is not iniquity with God." But saying these things Augustine seems to pass from the special question why this one rather than that one is saved, to the general one, why not all are saved. For of this the proper answer is that of Paul. Cf. Card. Toletum Comment. in Epist. ad Rom. in h. 1.

But now from these things which we have adduced thus far from Augustine, it is established that the diverse distribution of graces is placed in mystery. And indeed, let a reason be given why those graces are not given to all, by which those men would infallibly be made safe if they were conferred; why rather to this one than to that one that series of efficacious graces is conferred: although something can be brought forward for the former question, nevertheless nothing for the second, nor can what is brought forward for the former satisfy the mind, unless recourse be had to the hidden will of God.

But that mystery is the mystery of the divine counsel and good pleasure and is called a mystery; because the creature cannot scrutinize and know the counsels of God. Moreover, the thing which underlies this mystery is either the absolute predestination to glory before foreseen merits, which predestination would be necessary for someone to be saved and yet would not pertain to all; or it is the conferral of graces efficacious from within, which would be necessary for salutary acts to be, and yet again are not given to all; or it is a distribution of graces differing according to the will of God, so that indeed sufficient ones are given to all, but not to all with the same abundance, nor to all those which are foreseen to attain their effect, especially perseverance. But not the first; because although in itself that predestination is not repugnant and perhaps is given for many, it is repugnant that it be necessary and yet be denied to many. Not the second; both because it supposes the first, and because such grace is not given, and because Augustine and the other Fathers, who, disputing with the Pelagians, preached the mystery of the predestination of grace, had no controversy about the special mode by which the intrinsic force of grace operates in the will: therefore what they teach about the mystery of predestination does not pertain to the nature of such grace. The third, therefore, remains. And indeed all the sayings of Augustine, in which he confesses the mystery, point to this. For he says it is inscrutable why this one is called, that one is not called, to this one it is so persuaded that he is persuaded, to that one not so, why this one is called in a way suited to him that he follows the one calling, not so that one, why this one is made a sheep, not that one, etc. But these things exhibit a differing distribution of graces. Therefore.

THE END.