Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

Therefore it is a singular benefit of God that God mercifully calls a man in such a way as He knows to suit him, so that he does not reject the one calling. But the suitability of grace, inasmuch as it is such and is infallibly known to be such in the future, is properly located in the moral force of the same grace.

I. Infallibility refers to the intellect. It is properly in the intellect and is an endowment of its knowledge; it is attributed, however, also to objects, insofar as they are subject to the knowledge of the intellect, and so, e.g., that is said to be infallibly about to happen which the intellect, incapable of being deceived, certainly knows will happen. This objective infallibility is a certain necessity, inasmuch as, given infallible knowledge of the thing, the thing cannot be otherwise than it is known. Hence, under the name of infallibility, when it is applied to things, a certain necessity is wont to be signified. Now indeed efficacious grace, as such, is not only conjoined with the good work, but this connection of grace with the work is also known by God from eternity as infallibly future.

Note well: if the reason of the connection of grace with the good work were sought, this question has already been answered, namely that it is the free will itself acting with the help of grace; and because, since this connection exists, it exists necessarily, with a consequent necessity indeed, the reason of this necessity too is in turn the free will. Therefore, if by the name of infallibility this necessity of connection is understood, enough has already been done for this question. But something else is sought when it is asked whence the infallibility of the connection of grace with the good work is to be derived. Namely, it is asked whence it is that one conferring that grace is most certain antecedently that the effect will follow: the connection of grace with the act is considered, namely, insofar as it is subject to divine knowledge, and it is asked what is the reason of that infallible knowledge which God has of the same connection before the absolute vision of the effect; or it is asked in what God infallibly sees this connection.

II. He who posits a grace efficacious of itself and from within, with which consent is conjoined necessarily, thinks — and rightly thinks — that in the efficacy of the power of grace, sufficiently and adequately, inasmuch as nothing else is required, its connection with consent is seen infallibly by God; and because this efficacy of the power of grace depends on nothing but divine omnipotence, which so moves the will that it cannot resist its motion, hence they likewise say that God, in His acting omnipotence, or in the operation of His omnipotence, infallibly sees the consent of the will.

III. But once a grace efficacious of itself and predetermining is denied, it is clear that this cannot be asserted. Just as, therefore, as St. Thomas teaches (1ª p. q. XIV. a. 13.), in a cause still indifferent the effect cannot be known with certainty even by God, so too in the mere efficacy of the power of grace, which still leaves the exercise of freedom indifferent, the connection of that grace with consent cannot be known infallibly. It remains, therefore, that just as that connection depends on the free exercise of the will, so too the infallible knowledge of that connection requires the knowledge of that free exercise; once this is infallibly known, the future connection of grace with the good work is infallibly known. Which is nothing other than saying that the infallible knowledge of the connection is determined extrinsically (just as the knowledge of God can be determined objectively) by the connection itself, or by the very determination of the will present to the divine intellect. Now indeed a twofold infallible knowledge of God is to be distinguished with regard to this connection, namely absolute and conditional. For, given the decree of creating the will and of conferring upon it the grace which is to be efficacious, God infallibly sees the future connection with absolute knowledge, because He sees the consent of the will as absolutely future.

But even if the conferral of this grace were not decreed by God, God nevertheless sees, by the knowledge of conditionals, that if that grace were decreed, it would be efficacious! He sees this, moreover, in the consent which would most certainly be given, if that grace were conferred upon the will. This knowledge of God, for this reason — that it is of an object which, in order to be true, does not require any absolute decree of God operating ad extra — is said to be prior to the knowledge of vision.

Thus, just as the connection of grace with the good work, and the consequent necessity of this connection, is formally constituted by the will freely exercising itself — for this free exercise is the connection itself — so too the divine knowledge of this connection is infallible for this reason, because the knowledge of future conditionals sees the very exercise of the will which would take place, if a certain condition were posited. This knowledge is prior to the very decree of conferring such grace. Therefore the infallibility of the connection is to be formally derived from the divine foreknowledge, by which God knows what the will, prevented and aided by such grace, would do.

IV. Nor is the opinion of Augustine different. For Augustine indeed, in the controversy with the Pelagians and Massilians, appeals to divine omnipotence, both to refute the error of those who say that God cannot confer His grace except upon those willing — i.e., those first disposing themselves to it by the sole powers of free will — and therefore to teach that God can, if He wills, convert the hearts of whomsoever by His grace and bring it about that from unwilling they become willing, which is certainly a kind of power, and therefore is to be ascribed to the Omnipotent. But in what manner does Augustine teach that God can bend any will whatsoever? From the solution of this question it is clear what Augustine thought concerning the infallibility of the connection of grace with the good work.

Now indeed it is enough to read what Augustine teaches in Lib. I. ad Simplic. q. II. nn. 13. 14. (see Th. L. n. II. 5.); for from these it is clear that Augustine indeed asserts that it cannot be said that a manner of persuading someone to faith was lacking to the Omnipotent — i.e., of efficaciously calling someone to faith; but he asserts this for this reason, because God can call a man in the way He knows to suit him, so that he does not reject the one calling. This power of calling efficaciously, therefore, comprises the knowledge of the manners by which men are congruently called, and it is exercised by its opportune use. And this knowledge of manners we call middle knowledge; with it shining before Him, God infallibly knows how someone is to be called, so that he freely and infallibly works well. Thus God is not asserted to be omnipotent in bending hearts insofar as, by His physical force, by predetermining, He could bring about in wills the consent which He Himself wishes, but insofar as, on account of His infinite knowledge, He can use those means by which He infallibly attains what He wills; and therefore Augustine does not derive the actual efficacy of grace, or its infallible connection with the good work in the historical or absolute order (for of this he speaks), from divine omnipotence insofar as it is a productive principle ad extra, but derives it from divine foreknowledge, yet in such a way that the use of those means, which are shown beforehand by knowledge to be infallibly efficacious, depends on divine omnipotence insofar as it is a productive principle ad extra.

V. Given the universal salvific will, God owes (to Himself, to be sure) to confer upon all sufficient graces, which accordingly have the efficacy of power. But since the efficacy of the connection depends on the will, each one ought to impute to himself that grace is not actually efficacious. Therefore, even if God confers upon someone graces which He foresaw would not actually be efficacious, He has sufficiently fulfilled the obligation by which He bound Himself, namely of conferring sufficient graces. The conferral, therefore, of a grace which God foresaw would be efficacious, when He could confer another foreseen as not actually efficacious, is an unowed benefit and is a benefit greater in itself; because it is a gift of power and of act, and is a sign of greater love; for every benefit of God proceeds from love, and accordingly a greater benefit proceeds from greater love. It is, therefore, a singular benefit that God calls a man in such a way as He knows to suit him, so that he does not reject the one calling; for in this way it comes about not only that he can, but that he infallibly works well and attains salvation.

VI. Such a gratuitous predestination of grace, which that conditional knowledge would have shone before, Augustine seems to have signified clearly enough. For when, in the cited place ad Simplicianum, he had said that manners of persuading someone to believe are not lacking to God; in the book De Spir. et lit., c. 34, having proposed the question — why is one so persuaded that he is persuaded, while another is not so — he answers nothing other than by appealing to the inscrutable judgments of God. But if Augustine had raised the question why this grace is efficacious, he would easily have answered, namely because the will consents; but if he was asking why that grace, which is to be efficacious, is conferred upon this one rather than another, while upon the other otherwise, then surely recourse must be had to the inscrutable judgments of God: but these presuppose that God knew, apart from the vision of future consent, what the will would do, and freely chose this grace before others. Hence it is clear that it was Augustine's opinion that that middle knowledge shone before the predestination of graces; from which it follows both that a singular benefit is conferred upon him who is so persuaded that he is persuaded, and that the reason of this benefit, given to one and denied to another, is nothing other than the most hidden will of God.

VII. We also judge this to be the doctrine of Augustine: that the suitability of congruent grace, as such, is located in its moral force. Certainly, explaining in the cited place ad Simplicianum, n. 14, how God calls men in that way which is apt for them to follow the one calling, he says: «since one is moved to faith in one way, another in another, and the same thing, often said in one way, moves; said in another way, does not move; and moves one, and does not move another; who would dare to say that a manner of calling was lacking to God?» and then: «who would believe that the manner by which he (Esau) would be persuaded to believe was lacking to the Omnipotent?» And in the preceding n. 13 he says (which he afterwards approves): «Or perhaps those who, called in this way, do not consent, could, called in another way, accommodate the will to faith, so that that saying too would be true: many are called, few are chosen; so that, although many are called in one way, nevertheless, because not all are affected in one way, only those follow the calling who are found suited to take it up? and that saying would be no less true: therefore it is not of the one willing nor of the one running, but of God showing mercy, who called in the way which was apt for those who followed the calling?... If He also willed to have mercy on them, He could so call them in a way which would be apt for them, that they would be both moved and understand and follow.» Wherefore (as he says in q. 68 of the Lib. IXXXIII. qq., which he certainly does not disapprove in the Retract., Book I, c. 26) «neither should those who came attribute it to themselves; because they came called; nor should those who did not wish to come attribute it to another, but only to themselves; since, in order that they might come, they were called in free will.» The grace to which we consent is called a calling, i.e., a grace calling, stirring, and preparing the will — an interior calling, to be sure, a calling apt for him who is called, so that he follows the one calling; he who is called, according as he is disposed, now follows, now does not follow. But a calling imports moral efficacy, nor could a grace physically efficacious of itself and from within be apt for one and not apt for another, and for the same person now apt, now not apt. Since, therefore, according to what has been said (Cap. I. Art. I.), a twofold efficacy of grace is to be attributed — physical, by which the faculty is elevated and becomes powerful for eliciting supernatural acts; moral, by which it is drawn, persuaded, and affected toward the good — the efficacy of grace, insofar as it is congruent and obtains the effect, is to be affirmed as moral. Certainly the moral efficacy of grace can be diverse in diverse graces, greater or lesser; but the physical efficacy does not seem able to be diverse; for it is the elevation of the faculty to the supernatural order, which is the same for all, just as in the order of nature the physical power of the will is the same for all. And we judge this to be the reason why Augustine, who frequently speaks of grace insofar as it is efficacious, i.e., obtains the effect, distinctly presents it to us rather on the part of moral than of physical efficacy; for by that efficacy, congruent to him who is called, it comes about that consent actually follows.

Moreover, since God does not bestow physical supernatural powers except for the good; nor, except for the good, does He attract, persuade, and draw by His illuminations and inspirations, it is altogether clear that God stands in a wholly different manner toward good and salutary acts than toward evil acts. Cf. Th. XLIX. n. XV.

Note. If, when grace is said to be efficacious of itself and from within, the infallibility of efficacy is regarded, which grace borrows from divine omnipotence and wisdom, and this one thing is signified — that God, by means of such graces, can obtain from the will whatever act He Himself wishes, and cannot be impeded by any cause — it must be conceded that such graces are efficacious of themselves and from within, i.e., that the divine operation in the soul, from the omnipotence and foreknowledge of God Himself, obtains infallible efficacy.