Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

Assuredly, grace, by which the will is formally constituted elevated, enlightened, and inspired, has from itself an efficacy both physical — in that it confers supernatural powers — and moral — in that it prepares the will, as is fitting, for the good work: which efficacy is the efficacy of power, and it depends on divine omnipotence and wisdom. The connection of grace with the good act, however, is determined by the exercise of free will, not indeed acting naturally, but elevated: which accordingly consents only through the powers of grace, while it could dissent through the powers of nature. Wherefore the efficacy of the connection of grace with the effect embraces both elements, namely the efficacy of power proper to grace and the determination of free will. Moreover, grace that obtains its effect is called, according to Augustine, congruous; but its congruity in first act need not be affirmed.

I. We must keep before our eyes what we presuppose: for we must argue from the doctrine of faith. This we have already established in the preceding pages. That explanation of the efficacy of grace, therefore, is to be put forward which alone composes all these things together harmoniously: that the grace of God precedes our wills and is the principle of every salutary act, and likewise that free will remains intact under grace and that salutary acts are free, and hence that the grace of God can be resisted; for both are equally of faith, namely the necessity and efficacy of grace and the freedom of the will in the salutary order. With these, likewise, truly sufficient grace is to be composed, which namely, according to the common manner of thinking and speaking, is truly worthy of this appellation 'sufficient': for it is according to this norm that the Church uses its terms. That explanation of Catholic doctrine, therefore, which composes all these things in a friendly covenant is certainly not to be rejected, and if it alone, or before the rest, achieves this, it will have to be received or preferred to the others.

This method of disputing, which proceeds immediately from the articles of faith, just as in other questions bearing on revealed matters, so also in this one, no one will doubt to be safer — although the conclusion to be drawn is not yet a defined matter — than if we wished to argue from the authority of some, even the most approved, doctor, especially if he wrote before the many decisions on this matter were issued by the Church. This is evident first from the fact that the authority of the Church is always to be preferred to all others, and that not only by some, as it were, theoretical profession, but by practical exercise, so that accordingly we should measure not the doctrine of the Church by the opinion, say, of Augustine, but Augustine's opinions by the doctrine of the Church, as far as possible: but if it were manifest with respect to some heading of doctrine that this could not be done, we know indeed to whom the first, nay the only, role must be assigned, if we are not Jansenists. Besides, who assures us that the doctrine of some, even the most approved, doctor is wholly immune from every blemish, that it is not defective in some things, or that something less than right has not at times escaped from him? For neither is this the sense of the Church when it commends the doctrine of some man. Nor should you say that the Roman See through Hormisdas (epist. ad Possessorem) declared Augustine's doctrine on grace to be its own: for 1º Hormisdas appealed only to the books of Augustine written against the Massilians; 2º this testimony of the Roman See is wrongly adduced in our present controversy; for this commendation of the Roman See regards Augustine's doctrine on the necessity and gratuitousness of grace, not the question of its efficacy, or of the manner in which its efficacy is composed with man's freedom, which is our question.

I know, to be sure, that not a few, in order to claim Augustine's authority for themselves, so construct or pervert the history of the Pelagian controversy that Augustine seems to have disputed with the Pelagians about this very efficacy of grace; but, besides that we have already shown this to be false, this likewise again demonstrates how little fittingly it would be demanded that the solution of the question depend on Augustine's authority either alone or chiefly, since not all the learned are yet unanimous in determining about what matter Augustine disputed and about what matter he did not dispute. Let us hold, therefore, first, since they exist, the dogmas sanctioned by the Church, and let us embrace them fully according to the sense which the words themselves convey; then, according to these, let us consult the doctrines of this or that doctor.

II. I note that the discourse now is properly about interior grace. This, however, presupposes exterior graces, by which the subject is disposed and helped, so that grace may exert its force in it. For exterior graces are also required, e. g. the magisterium of faith, and they can contribute much to acting well, especially those which consist in the removal or diminution of impediments. Wherefore the divine help, by which we are aided to work holily, consists of both elements, interior and exterior grace: exterior remotely and by way of occasion or condition, interior proximately and efficiently; for a supernatural salutary act is not produced efficiently except by interior grace, that is, by the elevated will.

III. These things being posited, the first part, after what we have so far said about the nature of grace, does not need demonstration. For since grace is placed in the physical and moral powers by which the will, being equipped, acts, grace itself has from within itself the efficacy by which a supernatural and salutary act is produced; just as any cause whatever has from within itself efficacy for producing the effect to which it is proportioned. And because it confers not only moral but also physical powers, its efficacy is intrinsically also physical. For grace is the physical principle of the act, both because the physical powers, by which the act is produced, are themselves grace, and because the enlightenment and inspiration by which the will is morally moved are also real modes by which the equipped will elicits the act. Wherefore grace is the immediate principle of the salutary act; for it proceeds immediately from the powers by which the augmented will operates. This is called the efficacy of power; for it is the efficacy of grace considered insofar as it is a power, whether the effect follows or not.

COROLLARY. The defenders of this opinion are therefore wrongly objected to, that they assert for the grace of God only a moral efficacy. The state of the question between the two schools is also wrongly established in this way: namely, whether the efficacy of grace is physical or moral. For we both attribute physical efficacy to grace: but the state of the question here is this; whether, grace existing, with which the act can most certainly be done without any other help, the act necessarily exists with the necessity of consequence with respect to that grace, or whether it exists because under that grace and through it the will freely determines itself to the good, being able to resist it.

IV. Moreover, this efficacy depends on divine omnipotence. For in general, to confer powers for something is the work of power, and only the Omnipotent can confer powers for a supernatural work. In particular, if physical powers are considered, they in turn, insofar as they are such, are formally referred to omnipotence as received from it; for just as it is the work of omnipotence to create nature, so it is its work to elevate nature. But if moral powers are regarded, they depend both on omnipotence, in that they are certain powers, and in particular on divine wisdom insofar as they are aptly disposed for bending the will; for it is the work of the wise man to dispose those opportune means by which the will of another is sufficiently aroused and attracted to the work.

V. Moreover, what we say in the Thesis about the connection of grace with the good act remains demonstrated from what has been disputed thus far. For either the good act follows from this alone, that grace is efficacious of itself, and therefore, grace being posited, it is necessary that the act follow; or grace indeed confers the power, but the determination of the act freely depends on the will; since therefore the first is false, the second remains. And so these two things are certain: negatively, that, grace being posited, the consent of the will does not necessarily follow; and that, grace being posited, it is the will that, by the native force of freedom, determines itself, so that if it itself is unwilling, no connection of grace with the good work is had. For this connection is nothing other than the existence of the good act from the powers of grace, and the act proceeds freely from the will: therefore it is the will that freely determines this connection.

But when such a connection is said to depend on the will, the will alone, according to its natural powers, is not to be thought of. For, as we have already explained, the principle of the salutary act is the free will elevated, enlightened, inspired; the will therefore freely exercises itself in the supernatural order, but it is the will elevated, enlightened, inspired; and therefore the existence of the salutary act, that is, its very connection with grace, depends on the free exercise of the will acting according to supernatural powers; just as the existence of a naturally honest act is determined by the will acting according to the powers of nature. Cf. Th. XVII.

This, however, is the difference between natural and supernatural powers, that we can use the former both for good and for evil; but supernatural powers not otherwise than for good. But the will, elevated and equipped with supernatural powers, retains natural powers, just as nature remains, and it can use them, because it can sin. When therefore the will freely consents to grace according to supernatural powers, it can dissent according to natural powers; but dissenting, it casts away grace, which is to resist grace or to receive grace in vain.

Wherefore when the efficacy of the connection of grace with the good work is spoken of, both elements are comprehended; for in order that this connection exist, there is required both the efficacy of the power of grace and the free determination of the will. Just as also in the natural order, in order that an act exist, there is required both the force of the will and free determination, that is, the free act of this force. Wherefore we do not trace the efficacy of the connection back to the free determination of the will alone: because when efficacy is said, there is signified, or can be signified, the force itself by which the act exists, which is the force of grace.

VI. Efficacious or effective grace, namely that which obtains its effect, is wont to be called, on Augustine's authority, congruous grace. That Augustine is the author of this appellation is clear from his testimonies cited under Th. L. n. 5. It is called congruous, namely, because through it a man is so called that he really follows the one calling. Wherefore it is not signified merely that that grace is suitable to the one called; for every sufficient grace is such, and can thus be called congruous; but a special, or greater, congruity is signified, insofar as it is not only apt but moreover attains the effect. By reason, therefore, of the effect which is obtained, that grace is distinguished with such an appellation.

Faure thought (in Enchir. c. 52.) that already in first act grace is congruous, in that, all circumstances being considered, it is already apt certainly to obtain consent. This at least Augustine seems to have thought, who, explaining the efficacy of this grace, warns that not all are affected in one way, that some are attempered, some not attempered to the calling (cf. his words pag. 468.) and therefore, although all are called, not all are chosen. Nevertheless such congruity of grace in first act does not seem to be to be asserted. For a) the will can of itself consent to and resist any grace, and it can consent to a lesser grace and resist a greater one. b) The reason why this congruity is required is this, that it be open to God, if He wills, to predefine good acts, to choose those graces to be supplied which will be infallibly congruous and which therefore He already knows as such. And in order that He know this, that congruity of grace in first act is not necessary; for it suffices that God, through middle knowledge, foreknow with which graces the will would consent, that is, that He foreknows the congruity of graces in second act conditionally. Nor is it true that grace which obtains the effect is more apt than the others, as we have already noted («), but only that it will obtain the effect; and this is true because of the consent of the will. These things, however, we wish to be taken as said generally about the graces which are wont to be conferred ordinarily. For we except extraordinary graces, endowed with such moral force that it is morally impossible a priori for a man not to yield to them willingly and freely.

COROLLARY. Since we admit prevenient graces, by which the will is moved by God to the salutary act — which motion is therefore prior to that same act — we admit the determination of the will, by which it is aroused to act (Th. LII. 1.), which in turn is prior to the act to which it arouses; it is clear that we admit a certain premotion and predetermination: but how far these are from the Thomistic premotion and predetermination! With these, because of their intrinsic efficacy, the act follows with necessity of consequence; under those, the will, enjoying the freedom of indifference, determines itself.