Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

Its vigorous defender Laurentius Berti, of the sacred Augustinian order, sets it forth in Book XIV of the Theologicarum Disciplinarum, c. 7. seqq., and in the Augustiniano systemate vindicato, Dissertation 4ª. It comes down, however, to this. 1º «Grace is an act of the intellect and of the will, that is, an illumination of the mind and an inspiration of charity, but it is situated more in delight than in illumination; it is effected, however, by a motion of God, which is the very will of God supplying this delight and charity» (Theol. Discip. L. XIV. c. 7.).

Note: if by the name of act there are understood not only deliberate but chiefly indeliberate acts (cf. Th. XII.), and if by the name of charity there is understood any pious affection, any good will — both of which indeed the same author sometimes means — we have nothing to reproach.

2°. «With the Thomists we are joined most harmoniously in the confession of sufficient and efficacious grace, and we agree that free will accomplishes nothing good unless it is bent and determined to the act by victorious grace. We dissent from them, however, not only in explaining the nature of grace, but also in this, that they are unwilling to admit gradualness in the same grace» (c. 8), about which dissent shortly after.

Now each grace is explained thus (ibid.). «Therefore sufficient grace, in the Thomistic and in our sense, is that which gives the power, not the willing; or if it gives the willing, that willing is so invalid and imperfect that it does not overcome the desires of the flesh contrary to concupiscence, unless a most burning and most powerful charity supervenes. Of this sort are the inspirations and the pious desires of the soul, which move and excite the perverse soul somewhat, but do not draw it to conversion. From which it is clear that sufficient grace always produces some effect, namely a pious motion of the soul and a good will, but one that is invalid and to which free will resists... In order that (man) may will, there is required in this state a holy, victorious delight, which is rejected by no hard heart, and this we call grace efficacious of itself. Therefore grace is that which is always joined with its effect, that is, charity, which gives the power to do and to will, and to will so much that it easily conquers the will of the flesh coveting what is contrary; nor does it only give the power to act well, but it brings about the very action.» And again ibid.: «It must be acknowledged that through sufficient grace there is given to us the power of fulfilling the divine commandments, and a true and proper one, but not one so valid and ready that efficacious grace is not necessary for positing the act.» And cap. 9.: «It is the opinion of the Thomists and of all the Augustinians affirming that efficacious grace is efficacious of itself, that it is not made such either by the cooperation of free will or from congruous circumstances, and that it is most certainly and infallibly joined with its effect inasmuch as it is an individual and peculiar premotion and inspiration conferred upon men not by a suspended and indifferent will of God, but by an absolute and most full one, so that this grace gives the power to do, to will, and to accomplish, and it does not itself cooperate because we will, but we will because it operates...» There is given, therefore, a grace efficacious from within, in the sense now explained.

Note. Since in this matter the Augustinians say the same as the Thomists, what we have brought against the latter holds also against the former. Do not these men seem to you to play games in a serious matter, who speak of an invalid grace, of a grace given to the sinner which does not draw him to conversion, of a grace sufficient for fulfilling the commandments, which is not able to fulfill them unless a grace of another kind is added? Moreover, what was said at the beginning agrees rather with Jansenius: Th. XLVII. XI.

3º. The necessity of grace efficacious from within arises not from the subordination of the second cause to the first, but from the weakness of nature corrupted by concupiscence, to which weakness of the human will aid was given so that it might be moved by divine grace indeclinably and insuperably. Wherefore in the state of the earlier condition, before sin, God conferred upon the rational creature an indifferent illumination and inspiration; but now there is required one that is determinate and effectively premoving (ibid. c. 9. momento 3º. coll. LXII., c. 8. prop. 2.).

Note. Why so great zeal in following the Jansenist doctrines, which, although they have not been condemned, nevertheless cohere with them not a little? The weakness of nature indeed requires that powers be supplied — physical ones, for acting supernaturally, and moral ones, for resisting concupiscence; but once these powers are supplied, the healed will ought to remain the mistress of its own salutary act, just as it was in Adam. For nature is healed through grace; but just as the health of one sick from paralysis of the limbs does not consist in his being able to be dragged by another, but in his moving himself, so the health of free will through grace consists in this, that it acts freely in the salutary order and therefore determines itself. And in very truth, either the freedom of indifference was lost through sin or it remained; if you say it was lost, you have the heresy of Calvin and of Jansenius; if it remained, this alone is required, that man be elevated to the supernatural order, in which through grace he obtains physical powers of acting salutarily; for thus constituted, free will will be able to do that which it could before sin; but against the concupiscence that remains, which inclines to sin only morally, there suffices a certain sweetness of grace, which morally allures to the good, without bringing about of itself necessarily the positing of the act.

4. Delight, that is, charity, has degrees, so that the same degree of grace is efficacious in one man and inefficacious in another, because of the force of the contrary concupiscence, which grace does not overcome (ibid. C. 8.). Note. What if the degrees are equal on both sides? The will will be able to do nothing, contrary to what its nature demands. Cf. what was said in Th. XLV. III. Moreover, this comparison between grace and concupiscence is unworthy and is to be left to Jansenius: «for the least grace can resist any concupiscence»p. q. LXII. a. G. ad 3m.. And surely, since any force of indeliberate concupiscence never necessitates to evil, why does the will never consent to that grace which is called inefficacious and yet is sufficient? If the effect of grace depends also on free consent, it is not efficacious from within; if, on the contrary, it is efficacious from within, it ought to obtain its effect as often as it is possible; but the free consent of the will is possible under whatever concupiscence is pressing, both physically, because freedom remains, and morally, because the delight of grace sufficient for it is present; therefore that distinction of degrees conduces to nothing.

Moreover, the testimonies from the Scriptures and from Augustine for proving this doctrine are the same as those which Jansenius brings forward in defense of his own (cf. Th. XLII. seqg.).

5. On Freedom. «It is one thing to be able to dissent, another to dissent in actual fact; for the potency stands without the act, and we can do many things which we do not do. While we are stirred by efficacious help, we assent infallibly, since God makes us act. We can nevertheless not assent, since such a stirring is not that of the light of glory and of consummated charity, but of illumination and of love, which is consistent with the indifference of judgment» (Ibid. c. 9.). Wherefore «man under efficacious help can dissent by a potency of possibility, that is to say, not of the positing of the act» (Ibid.).

Note. The non-potency of positing the act is an impotence of acting: is this, then, sufficient grace? Freedom remains under grace efficacious of itself, premoving and determining to the act, because the indifference of judgment remains, which is the root of freedom, etc. If this is not to play games in a serious matter, what else will it be? Certainly the indifference of judgment is the root of freedom, because from it follows the indifference of the will, situated in this, that the dominion of its own act lies with the will itself — namely, that it itself determines the act: whence formally freedom consists in this indifference of the will; but this is wholly other than its root, that is, the indifference of judgment. Wherefore it is said always to be present as long as this remains, not because freedom is situated in the indifference of judgment alone, but because from it the latter naturally follows. But if a hypothesis is made which impedes the indifference of the will — of which sort is an antecedent efficacious determination of God to the act, from itself — then we deny that the indifference of the will remains, the active one, I say, which is proper to freedom, and we affirm that contradictions are asserted inasmuch as the natural root of freedom is posited and that is posited which essentially excludes it. Because the root of the tree remains in the ground, will you say that the fruits remain after you have cut down the tree? And enough about these things.

Note. After the Quesnellian propositions had been condemned by Clement XI through the Bull Unigenitus, there were those who, in order to defend them, alleged as a calumny that by the proscription of those propositions the Thomistic doctrine also had been proscribed, the doctrine which the Dominican Fathers uphold. In order to avert this calumny and to console those same Fathers, Benedict XIII, in a Brief given to them on the 6th day of November of the year 1724, says this: «Therefore with great courage despise, beloved sons, the calumnies leveled at your teachings, especially concerning grace efficacious of itself and from within and concerning the gratuitous predestination to glory without any prevision of merits, which you have until now taught laudably and which your School boasts with commendable zeal to have received from the holy Doctors Augustine and Thomas themselves and to be in accord with the Word of God and with the decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs and Councils.» Observe that it is not the Roman Pontiff who testifies that the doctrine of the Dominican Fathers is in accord with the Word of God, etc.; but that this is reported by the Roman Pontiff as having been said by them. Moreover, an opinion which is permitted in the Church, which those who hold it think to be in accord with Scripture, the Fathers, and the Councils, is defended laudably by them, and their zeal in reconciling it with Scripture, the Councils, the Fathers, and the decrees of the Roman See is commendable. But in these things there is contained no definition or approbation of the truth of the opinion considered in itself. Wherefore his successor Clement XII, in a Brief given in the year 1735 on the 2nd day of October, says: «Having ascertained the mind of our same Predecessors, we do not will that anything be detracted — whether by our praises or by their praises conferred upon the Thomistic School, which we approve and confirm by our repeated judgment — from the other Catholic Schools that think differently from it in explaining the efficacy of divine grace, whose merits toward this Holy See are likewise distinguished, so as to hinder them from continuing to defend the opinions on this matter which until now they have taught and defended openly and freely everywhere, even in the light of this Alma City.»