Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali
Domenico Palmieri (1829–1909)
First published 1885
Dominicus Palmieri, S.J.'s Tractatus de gratia divina actuali (Gulpen, 1885) is a systematic Roman-school treatise on actual grace. After defining grace and its divisions, Palmieri examines its effects, necessity for fallen humanity, gratuitous character, efficacy, distribution, and relation to predestination, engaging Augustine, the Fathers, councils, Jansenism, and the scholastic disputes over physical predetermination. The sixty-two-thesis format exemplifies late nineteenth-century neo-scholastic dogmatic method: historical authorities are gathered into tightly argued theological conclusions. Schola presents the Latin work from the 1885 edition.
Prolegomenon I: Prolegomenon. De notione et partitionibus praecipuis gratiae divinae
Thesis I: Gratia, prout dicitur de bono aliquo alteri collato, definitur: beneficium ex benevolentia collatum citra exigentiam eius, cui confertur: ad quam definitionem redit illa communis Scholasticorum: donum gratis datum.
Thesis II: Gratia creata tum in donum naturale tum in donum supernaturale dispesci potest: supernaturale tamen donum potiore iure et magis proprie gratia dicitur; ita ut ea dona in ipsa ratione gratiae specifice differant.
Thesis III: Ratione habita tum status sive integritatis sive lapsus creaturae rationalis, tum principii meritori, quod proprium est alterius status, gratia supernaturalis distinguitur in gratiam Dei et gratiam Christi.
Thesis IV: Gratia supernaturalis alia est externa, alia interna.
Thesis V: Rursus gratia supernaturalis dividi debet in gratiam gratis datam, et gratiam gratum facientem, quae potior est illâ.
Thesis VI: Gratia gratum faciens alia est in habitu sita et permanens, alia actualis et transiens.
Caput I: De Gratiae actualis natura
Articulus I: De iis, quibus gratiae actualis ratio competit
Thesis I: Ad gratias actuales spectant mentis illustrationes tum quae tantum ab extrinseco excitantur in nobis, tum potissimum quas operatur quoque immediate Spiritus in mente nostra.
Thesis II: Ad gratiam actualem spectant quoque inspirationes voluntatis tum mediatae tum immediatae atque inspirationes immediatae inter gratias actuales enumeratas principem obtinent locum.
Thesis III: Gratiae actuales illustrationis et inspirationis continentur certe actibus vitalibus intellectus et voluntatis.
Thesis IV: Actus vitales, quibus continetur gratia actualis illustrationis et inspirationis, quae principium est deliberati actus et operis boni, sunt primo quidem actus indeliberati utriusque facultatis tum vero etiam actus deliberati.
Thesis V: Ex quo corollarii instar consequitur inter auxilia, quibus voluntas adiuvatur, aliqua exsistere, quae sint per se efficacia.
Thesis VI: Ratio gratiae actualis extendi potest etiam ad actus indeliberatos sensus et appetitus sensitivi.
Thesis VII: Ratio gratiae actualis ad universam quoque providentiam externam tum positivam tum negativam, qua ad opera salutaria et ad beatitudinem homines promoventur, extendi debet. 1.
Articulus II: De viribus quas gratia actualis confert
Thesis I: Gratia actualis confert vires morales voluntati ad honeste agendum.
Thesis II: Tenendum est actualem gratiam nedum morales, sed physicas quoque vires addere facultatibus nostris ad actus salutares eliciendos.
Thesis III: Non demonstratur inter gratias actuales recensendas esse qualitates quasdam reales, non vitales et suapte natura fluentes, quae principium intrinsecum sint actus vitalis indeliberati supernaturalis: tenere autem licet quod actualis gratia absolvatur tum actibus vitalibus tum divina operatione elevante facultatem et cum ea producente actus supernaturales.
Articulus III: De generali habitudine gratiae ad voluntatem
Thesis I: Constat ita addi per gratiam formaliter vires tum physicas tum morales voluntati, ut ex voluntate et gratia unum constituatur principium actus deliberati salutaris, quod est nempe voluntas elevata, illustrata, inspirata.
Thesis II: Gratia actualis interior multipliciter dividitur, nempe in excitantem seu vocantem et adiuvantem, in operantem et cooperantem, in praevenientem et subsequentem, in antecedentem et concomitantem.
Caput II: De Gratia actuali necessaria hominibus lapsis
Articulus I: De potestate naturae ad actus ordinis naturalis
Thesis I: In ipsa natura intellectus humani positum est, ut per solas naturae vires sit ei impossibile cognoscere veritates sibi naturales omnes simul collective sumptas.
Thesis II: Liberum quoque arbitrium gaudet naturaliter potestate physica semper honeste agendi servandique legem naturalem; quamvis ad idem praestandum impotentia quadam morali laboret.
Thesis III: Merito proscripta est doctrina, quae statuit omne, quod agit peccator, peccatum esse et omnia opera infidelium esse peccata liberumque arbitrium sine gratiae Dei adiutorio non nisi ad peccandum valere.
Articulus II: Quid natura humana per se sola non possit
Thesis I: Certum est, quoties in monumentis Ecclesiasticis doctrinam revelatam proponentibus legimus credendum esse quod bonum aliquod esse non possit in nobis vel actus aliquis fieri a nobis non possit citra auxilium gratiae, id de bonis et actibus salutaribus intelligendum esse.
Thesis II: Cum testificatione catholica satis constet citra gratiam nihil boni et salutaris in hominibus esse posse, speciatim affirmamus gratiae quoque deberi fidem saluturam eisdemque pium quodvis initium spiritumque precum.
Thesis III: Necessitas gratiae actualis ad agendum sicut oportet asserta a Patribus contra pelagianos, est necessitas non solum moralis, sed physica et absoluta.
Thesis IV: Ex qua doctrina Patrum consequitur actus salutares esse intrinsece h. e. entitate sua supernaturales.
Thesis V: Eamdem doctrinam necessitatis gratiae, quae saeculo V. a Patribus contra pelagianos propugnata est, iam Patres praecedentium saeculorum in Oriente et Occidente continenter tradiderant. 1.
Thesis VI: Gratia porro necessaria ad salutariter agendum iis, qui necdum sunt conversi ad Deum et quovis habitu supernaturali carent, est gratia duplex interior immediata, nempe illustrationis mentis et inspirationis voluntatis.
Thesis VII: Ut tandem de necessitate gratiae actualis pro iustis quoque disseramus, primum advertendum est quod cum gratia praeveniens dicitur necessaria ad omnes actus salutares, non eo ipso dicitur quod ad singulos actus nova gratia praeveniens sit necessaria.
Thesis VIII: Praestituto Tridentinae Synodi Sess.
Appendix I: De sententia Augustini circa necessitatem gratiae actualis in statu integritatis
Parergon I: De quadam sententia Ripalda
Caput III: De Gratiae actualis gratuitate et de praeparatione ad gratiam
Thesis I: Distincto merito operis condigno et congruo, docemus nullum esse posse in natura meritum, quo gratia comparetur atque utrumque pariter meritum naturae condignum et congruum a Patribus fuisse reiectum. 1.
Thesis II: Negandum est quoque naturam viribus suis posse sibi positivam dispositionem ad gratiam comparare.
Thesis III: Neque precibus naturae adseri potest vis impetratoria gratiae, ratione saltem habita huius, in quo versamur, providentiae ordinis.
Thesis IV: Calumnia est plurimos graecos Patres et nominatim Chrysostomum primas partes in ordine salutis tribuisse naturae et idcirco gratiam merito cuidam naturae congruo rependi affirmasse. 1.
Thesis V: Etsi illius theologici effati: *Facienti quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam*; interpretatio, quae statuit facientem quod in se est viribus naturae, se disponere negativa dispositione ad gratiam, permitti possit tanquam non derogans dignitati gratiae; attamen animadvertendum^[15.
Thesis VI: Gratuitas gratiae optime componitur cum impetrutione et meritis ope praecedentis gratiae comparatis.
Thesis VII: Formalis perseverantia, licet sit per gratiam, quae ex divina ordinatione ipsis debetur, in potestate omnium iustorum; est tamen adhuc donum Dei, distinctum a donis tum iustificationis tum illius potestatis divinitus collatae, ideoque donum speciale atque est donum iustis gratuitum; quod tamen iustus potest suppliciter emereri.
Caput IV: De Gratiae actualis efficacia
Articulus I: Synopsis historica controversiae Patres inter et Massilienses
Thesis I: Massilienses negarint ad salutare fidei initium necessariam esse gratiam interiorem immediatam praevenientem.
Thesis II: Gratia, quam Massilienses ad cetera opera necessariam fussi sunt, si in se spectetur prout est auxilium ad operandum, est illa eadem gratia, quam Augustinus contra pelagianos defendit.
Articulus II: Controversia circa gratiae efficaciam
Controversia cum haereticis
Thesis I: Haeretica est sententia, quae statuit ita voluntatem humanam per gratiam Dei antecedenter moveri, ut libertate indifferentiae sub eadem gratia sit destituta.
Thesis II: Sententia Iansenii: gratiam Dei ita esse efficacem, ut inter ipsam et libertatem exsistat habitus line quidem delectationis inde liberatae praevenientis victricis, inde autem voluntatis victae et ad unum insuperabiliter determinatae, qua parte statuit gratiam necessitatem inferentem, haeretica est nec a praecedente differt; quatenus vero gratiam, quae necessitatem infert, in delectatione collocat, falsa est.
Thesis III: Haeretica est haec divinae gratiae notio, quam Quesnellus systema Iansenii emendaturus tradidit, ut sit nempe ipsa omnipotens Dei voluntas vel operatio manus sive voluntatis Dei omnipotentis.
Thesis IV: Inepte vero ad plures Scripturarum locutiones provocant haeretici, ut suam haeresim tueantur.
Thesis V: Perperam ex iis, quae pelagiani ac massilienses contra Augustini doctrinam obiciebant atque ex difficultate, quam ipse Augustinus se experiri fatebatur in conciliando utroque dogmate libertatis et gratiae, colligunt haeretici sententiam, quam ipsi defendunt, esse ipsam Augustini doctrinam.
Thesis VI: Neque proficiunt magis afferentes doctrinam Augustini, qua traditur et explicatur sive gratiam operari ipsum velle, facere ut velimus, dare bonam voluntatem, dare omnia merita, totum esse gratiae, sive gratiam esse, quae nos discernit et opus bonum non esse volentis aut currentis, sed miserentis Dei, sive gratiam esse omnipotentissimam, efficacissimam, insuperabilem, indeclinabilem et a nullo duro corde respui.
Thesis VII: Inscite quoque Jansenius abutitur Augustini doctrina in Expositione Epistolae ad Galatas: quod amplius nos delectat, secundum id operemur necesse est atque appellatione victricis facta gratiae, ut evincat a maiori delectatione voluntatis consensum necessario extorqueri.
Thesis VIII: Falsa est doctrina, quam Iansenius asserit, enarrans distinctionem ab Augustino (*De Correp. et Grat.* cc. 10. 11. 12.) traditam duplicis adiutorii, nempe adiutorii sine quo non et adiutorii quo; falsaque est pariter interpretatio ab eodem Iansenio adlibita in Augustini locis.
Thesis IX: Gratia omnis potestatem tribuens operandi est vere sufficiens ad id propter quod datur, sive operatio consequatur sive non.
Thesis X: Ut gratiae pure sufficientis doctrina catholica impugnetur, frustra obiicitur 1) quod Augustinus aliam gratiam non agnoverit nisi efficacem sive praeter hanc non agnoverit nisi naturalem possibilitatem pelagianam, quod docuerit gratiam Dei nullo duro corde respui negaveritque gratiam Dei omnibus dari; 2) quod idem censuerit frequenter gratiam deesse, qua tentationes superari ac praecepta servari possint.
Controversia inter scholasticos
Thesis I: Sunt qui putant gratiam efficacem, per quam Deus praestat ut velimus, esse motionem Dei in voluntate receptam eamque praeviam prioritate saltem naturae ad actum secundum, quae ex ipsa sua natura sit efficax ita, ut eam necessario necessitate consequentiae sequatur voluntatis consensus atque ita necessario sequatur, ut quamvis voluntas libere vere agat, attamen contradictionem implicet ea gratia praeparari voluntatem eandemque voluntatem ei gratiae non consentire.
Thesis II: Omissa, quia non amplius necessaria, responsione ad argumenta quae ex testimoniis Scripturarum petuntur, ad Augustinum quod spectat, cui praecipue vel unice ex Patribus innituntur Thomistae, docemus Augustinum eam tradere notionem gratiae, quae theoriam gratiae physice praedeterminantis prorsus excludat.
Thesis III: Ex principio philosophico, cui sententia gratiae praedeterminantis innititur, petito ex dignitate causae primae, necessario consequitur Deum praedeterminare ad entitatem actus mali, quod nequit admitti.
Thesis IV: Alterum principium philosophicum, cui doctrina gratiae praedeterminantis innititur: nempe voluntatem, utpote facultatem indifferentem, indigere determinatione accepta ab alio, si eo intelligatur sensu, quo in hac quaestione adhiberi solet, infert libertatis interemptionem et est idcirco prorsus falsum.
I. The determination of a faculty can be taken in two senses. Certainly any finite agent, in order to act actually, stands in need of some determination from without: for it is not an agent by its own essence. This kind of determination aims at this, that the principle which can act be constituted in first act; namely, that all things required for acting be posited, and, when they are posited, it is stirred to act. This determination is necessary for the will also, just as for the other finite causes. For it is necessary that the knowledge of some object precede, and in order that an act of choice be possible, it is necessary that such knowledge precede, by which each act of willing and of not-willing is urged. This determination is extrinsic to the will, and ultimately depends on the objects by which the knowledge of the intellect is determined. When this determination exists, the will is constituted in first act. Thus far the will does not differ from necessary causes; but here the difference begins. For, when all things required for acting are posited, or when it is constituted in first act, a necessary cause necessarily acts, and it does that one thing alone to which it is determined by its own nature and to which it is stirred by its circumstances. But the free will, when all things required for acting are posited, can will, can not-will what is proposed to it, can will this or will that, or can act and not act. Now if the discourse concerns that determination which we have explained, by which the will is constituted in first act, by which the species of the act is determined, we concede it and affirm it to be necessary: nor can there be any question about it. It is this of which St. Thomas speaks in I Ilae. q. IX. a. 4. cf. seg. Thesis.. But the defenders of physical premotion devise another determination from without, by which the second act itself, or the operation of the faculty, is predetermined by God physically acting; so that the will therefore wills rather than not-wills, or conversely, or wills this rather than that, because God antecedently determines the act by His physical action, which cannot be resisted. The reason, however, is, as they say, because even when the other things required for acting are posited, the will remains indifferent: but what is such cannot determine itself to one rather than to another, because since it is indifferent, there is not in it a reason of the one rather than of the other.
Now if this is so, the distinction between a free and a necessary cause is wholly removed. For even a necessary cause can be indifferent of itself to several things, just as a motive force is to impressing on another body either this or that direction of motion: but it is said to act necessarily and not freely, because such an impression is determined from without, not by itself. That is, in order that a cause be free, it is not enough that it have indifference while it is in potency, but it is necessary that in the very exercise of itself it have dominion over its own act and be itself that which determines the act. And the definition of freedom looks to this: a faculty which, when all things required for acting are posited, can act and not act; for either that predetermination is contained among those requisites, or it is not: if it is not contained, it is wrongly numbered among the things which precede the act; if it is contained, then, when it is posited, the will can act and not act; and therefore it is not a predetermination: and if the will cannot act and not act, then it is not free: for this is the definition of freedom, that when all things required for acting are posited it can act and not act. By this argument that distinction is excluded: namely, that it can, in the divided sense, but not in the composite sense with the predetermination: for it is required that it be able with all things required for acting posited, among which this predetermination is placed; and therefore in the composite sense with this predetermination that power must be. Otherwise a necessary cause also, which in the divided sense, i.e., with those things removed which determine a certain act, can not posit it, will have to be called free by the same right. Hence the inability to act otherwise cannot be anything but consequent, arising namely from the very determination of the will, which, when it acts, cannot not act.
Therefore, with that principle established, freedom is destroyed. Hence it is clear that that principle, insofar as it is applied to free causes, is false. And indeed it holds when the indifference is passive. But when the indifference is active: if the acting principle is only in potency, that determination of which we spoke is indeed required, so that it be constituted in first act: but once this is posited, nothing else is demanded from without, but the active faculty itself by its own power brings forth the act, wills or does not will, chooses one thing before another, without any antecedent determination or necessity. Nor is the determination one thing and the act another: but it is one act proceeding freely, i.e., without necessity, from the will. And what must be carefully weighed is that the exercise of freedom consists in this self-determination posited without any necessity: and therefore the so-called necessity of consequence is excluded by the very nature of freedom. For the act, or the determination of the will, is free for this reason, because it does not follow necessarily when all things required for acting are posited, but the will acts, or determines itself to something, without necessity. Yet this act is not without a reason. For the sufficient reason which could be demanded is either the final cause or the efficient cause: the final cause is the apprehended goodness of the thing, the efficient cause is the will itself, which is not only a certain acting cause, but is the mistress of its own act, and therefore acts in such a way that it can not act, wills in such a way that it can not-will. Wherefore they are deceived who seek a sufficient and complete reason, independent of the will, why this act rather than the opposite one is posited: for this is to destroy freedom itself, and this reason is not given. For in order that an act be free, this is required, that rational knowledge be present and the will be mistress of its own act: but whatever act is posited by it will have in itself a sufficient reason for its coming to be; for this is the nature of a free cause, that when all things required for acting are posited, there is a sufficient reason for each act, whether of willing or of not-willing, whether of willing this or of willing that. From the fact that God is the first free being it does not follow that the acts of other free beings must be determined by Him. For, as we said in a similar argument in the preceding Thesis, God is the first free being, just as He is the first living being. But just as it is proper to a living being to elicit vitally an act immanent to itself, so it is proper to a free being to determine its own act; for in this is the essence of freedom. Just as, therefore, from the fact that God is the first living being it does not follow that God vitally elicits the vital acts of creatures, which would amount to pure and unmitigated pantheism, so from the fact that He is the first free being it does not follow that He determines the acts of created freedom; for thus He alone would be a free being: for only that is free which, being indifferent, determines its own act for itself. It is therefore indeed necessary that the act of the will be referred to God as first cause, but not as a free being, just as neither do vital acts depend on God as He is living, but as He is the efficient cause ad extra. Otherwise the act of the will will be free just as the action of an instrument is free, which is used by a free agent. Wherefore in this hypothesis God would be not the first but the only free being; which savors of pantheism. And let these things suffice in this matter: for we can suppose the rest from philosophy. Cf. Suarez De Concursu et efficaci auxilio Dei ad actus liberi arbitrii necessario Lib. Im.Note. We suppose that the third principle of the Thomists in this question, deduced from divine prescience, has been settled in the Tract. de Deo.