Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

Furthermore, it is false that the dignity of the first cause requires that it itself predetermine secondary causes, and it is false even more so, if the secondary causes are free causes.

I. The first philosophical principle, i.e., known by the very light of reason, by which the necessity of physically predetermining grace is proved by its authors, is this, that a secondary cause, from its very condition of being a secondary cause, cannot act unless the first cause concurs by premoving and predetermining the act: whence this principle, since it holds for any secondary cause and in any order, it follows that also in the supernatural order, for salutary acts, a predetermination of God is necessary, which will be physically predetermining grace. The doctrine of physically predetermining grace, therefore, is nothing but a special application of that universal principle, that every secondary cause is to be premoved and predetermined by God.

Hence these same authors not only concede but contend that God predetermines to the entity of sin as well: for it is necessary that God concur to the entity of sin; but God does not concur to the acts of creatures except by predetermining with a previous concurrence to the act (Th. XLIX. I.). This predetermination to the entity of sin is efficacious, just as the grace predetermining to the good act is efficacious, namely, just as dissent cannot be joined with the latter, so neither with the former. The reason is that both alike are predetermination, i.e., the operation of the omnipotent first cause, which no secondary cause can resist. Moreover, it is necessary that these authors defend this predetermination to the entity of the act of sin; for if this be denied, that philosophical principle is false, and if that is false, the doctrine of physically predetermining grace lacks its foundation. «This necessity, says Bannez p. q. XIV. a. 13., follows from the most efficacious power of the first cause, which so determines all secondary causes to produce their effects, that no secondary cause can» depart from its determination." Wherefore the same author (ibid. q. XXIII. a. 13), having related the opinion of those who teach that God confers on all the predestined and reprobate sufficient help by which they can operate well in every event, if they will, yet does not determine or apply their will to a good or evil use, but the actual operation depends solely on the freedom of the will willing to determine itself to a good or evil action; he affirms that it is false and little consonant with Catholic truth; against which he argues thus. «For from it manifestly follows that God has no providence over the actual use of free will, which is opposed to the doctrine of Thomas and Augustine, indeed even to manifest truth: therefore. Proof of the consequence: since the whole providence of God terminates in this, to confer on free will sufficient help by which it could operate well, if it will. But that it operates well or ill would pertain wholly to free will itself, because God would not determine it to operate well or ill.» Cf. the words of Alvarez cited above.

But we say that by this very consequence the falsity of the doctrine of physically predetermining grace, as it rests on that principle, is demonstrated. This is demonstrated most evidently from the absurdities which are contained in this opinion, which teaches that God predetermines to the entity of the act of sin.

Absurdity I. God is properly and per se the cause of the evil work. For he who freely impels another and premoves him with a premotion which cannot be resisted is himself properly and per se the cause of the act which necessarily follows his motion. Surely, is not God properly and per se the cause of the good act, because by His grace He predetermines the act? Do they not say, to defend God as the adequate cause of the salutary act, that it is necessary that we say that God predetermines to salutary acts? Since therefore God likewise predetermines to the evil work, He will be its adequate cause and therefore its proper and per se cause. Nor does the distinction between the entity of the act and its malice matter. For 1) malice, which is a certain privation, cannot be caused except by the entity of the act being caused; therefore it can in no other way be caused properly and per se, unless the entity of sin is caused properly and per se, unless by causing the entity of the act to which the malice belongs; nor is it necessary that the agent intend that malice, but it is enough that he intend that which he knows to be forbidden. Surely 2) the entity of the act being necessarily posited on account of the determination, if its malice is from us, it will be from us insofar as we intend it: but who, when he sins, intends malice? Or is it necessary to intend the malice of the act in order that there be sin? Then, that he intend it, since this intention is an act, is not another predetermination required? But if we do not intend the malice, how is it true that the malice of the act, to which we are predetermined by God, is from us?

Furthermore, the entity of the act, e.g., of hatred of one's neighbor, being necessarily posited on account of God's predetermination, is it in man's power to add malice to it or not to add it? Is the malice separable from that act, when the act is done by one who knows (as is here supposed), being simultaneously predetermined by God? By what act is the will the author of the malice, since it cannot act unless predetermined by God? Or does it suffice that the will be a finite and deficient cause? But this is the condition on account of which sin can exist, not the reason why it exists, unless there be some free act or free omission of an act, which itself also is some elicited act.

Besides, 1°) what is prohibited by the law is not the malice of the act alone, but the very physical act itself, which is evil; but he who willingly does what the law forbids is in reality the cause of the evil work, and he who premoves another to positing that act in such a way that he cannot be resisted is the proper and per se cause of that thing which the law forbids, i.e., of the evil work. For a cause is called proper which truly is a cause whether by moral influence or especially by physical influence: a cause is called per se, with respect to some effect, whose operation is naturally ordered to producing that effect, and if it is a free cause, whose operation is ordered by the intention of the agent to that effect. But that it be the per se cause of evil, nothing else is required than that it be, in the said manner, the cause of that thing or action which is known to be evil. Moreover, the predetermination of the evil work is naturally ordered to effecting it; because necessarily from its nature it brings it about, and since that predetermination is freely given by God, God certainly intends that which He knows cannot but follow from it.

Yet this both abhors common sense and right reason and is opposed to Canon 6 of Session VI of Trent: If anyone shall say that it is not in man's power to make his ways evil, but that God works evil works just as He works good ones, not permissively only, but also properly and per se, so that the betrayal of Judas is no less His own work than the calling of Paul, A. S.

Absurdity II. It follows from this opinion that the betrayal of Judas is no less the proper work of God than the calling of Paul; for the calling of Paul is the work of God, because God predetermined, so that in the opinion of the adversaries it would not be the work of God, nor would it be to be attributed to God but rather to Paul that he came when called, unless God had predetermined the will of Paul; but likewise God predetermined the will of Judas to the act of betrayal: therefore the betrayal of Judas is no less the work of God than the calling of Paul. But this is repugnant to the cited canon.

Absurdity III. It follows that it is not in man's power to make his ways evil. For when he lacks the predetermination to the entity of the act of sin, he cannot sin, and this is metaphysically impossible for him; for who could posit malice without the entity of some act? But when he has that predetermination, he cannot but elicit that act, and again it is metaphysically impossible for him to abstain from that act, and therefore from sin; therefore. Surely let them say how he sins freely. Is it in man's power to produce or not to produce the malice alone without predetermination? But malice alone is not producible, and if it were producible, a predetermination would be required. Is it in man's power to add malice or goodness to the entity of the act to which he is predetermined? But it is absurd that goodness could be added to an act of blasphemy, and that malice could be added to an act of the love of God; but if this could be done, it would have to be done through some action, which would again demand a predetermination: therefore. Moreover, this doctrine also is opposed to the cited canon.

Absurdity IV. It follows that man, when he sins, does not sin. For he cannot resist the cause leading him into sin. But Augustine's opinion from Lib. III. de lib. arb. is certain: «Whatever that cause of the will is (i.e., the act of willing), if it cannot be resisted, one yields to it without sin: but if it can be resisted, let one not yield to it, and one will not sin.»

Absurdity V. It follows that God tempts men with a more vehement temptation than the Demon. For the Demon acts on the will only mediately and morally; but God immediately and physically. Therefore it is false and absurd that God predetermines to the entity of the act of sin: false therefore and absurd that God, the first cause, predetermines the will to the act; consequently false that God by His efficacious grace predetermines the will to salutary acts.

II. That the dignity of the first cause does not claim for itself that it predetermine secondary causes, and free ones likewise, is left sufficiently demonstrated from the preceding part; for the predetermination of the entity of sin follows from it, which teems with many absurdities, as we have seen.

And indeed the concurrence of God to the acts or operations of creatures is demanded for this reason, because whatever is and whatever comes to be must proceed from the first cause of all being. But in order that the act be from God, it suffices that it be the term of the divine action ad extra; since however God effects ad extra by willing (de Deo Creant. Th. V.), in order that God be the cause of the act, it suffices that He Himself, man willing, will that act. And this is the concurrence which is called simultaneous, the concurrence by which God concurs as universal cause, says St. Thomas, and cooperates with all agents on account of the necessity equally common to all, and therefore cooperates with all in the same manner. Indeed, for salutary acts something previous to the salutary act is required, which is from God. But this is situated in the elevation of the faculty, the illumination, the inspiration, which pertain to the constitution of the first act made ready for the deliberate supernatural act. But when the faculty is thus constituted in the supernatural first act, it requires no other concurrence besides the simultaneous one, just as in the natural order (ct. Th. XVII.). Nor is divine predetermination required for any cause.

And indeed if the cause which acts is a necessary cause, it is already by its nature determined to the act specifically: as regards exercise, however, it is determined by the circumstances, or by all those things given which it is necessary that it act, and therefore then it acts with God concurring at the same time. But what would the superadded predetermination of God accomplish, since it is already, its nature being presupposed, a cause determined by the circumstances to the act in such a way that it cannot not act? therefore God's predetermination to the act is useless.

But if it is a free cause, it itself, insofar as it is a cause, requires no other concurrence than that which is required by other causes: for the need of concurrence is common and equal for all; because its reason is the same for all. Insofar, however, as it is a free cause, it requires to be indifferent when it acts, and therefore rejects a previous concurrence predetermining it.

Moreover, that consequence is to be denied, that if God is the first cause, He must also be the first determiner: for the determination of the act is proper to freedom, of which it cannot be deprived without ceasing to be freedom; for the determination of the act is the very free exercise of the faculty, which is proper to it. Just as, since the act of the will is a vital act, although God is the first cause of the act, it does not follow that God is the first living principle of the same; indeed He is in no way its living principle. In the same way, although God is the first cause of the act, it does not follow that He is the first determiner: for just as the vitality of the act, so the determination of the same depends on the will, God concurring as the universal cause of being, not as determining the act. Whence the first, indeed the only determiner of the act is the free will; for the determination of the act is not something other than the act itself, but is the act freely elicited, i.e., without any necessity of consequence from all the things posited that are necessary for acting.