Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

Therefore this grace is physically and after the manner of a first act predetermining the will; although in some of those theologians it is said, not very coherently, to pertain to the second act. Moreover, they contend that this grace is necessary in order that a good act of the will may exist, to such a degree that it is impossible for it to be absent and for consent to be had to God calling. Now, however, disputing theologically about this matter, we judge that it must be affirmed that grace of this kind — which precedes the consent of the will and infers it necessarily, so that dissent is repugnant, and which is necessary in order that there be a good act — is opposed to the doctrine which can rightly be gathered from the testimonies of Scripture, their analysis having been instituted, cannot be reconciled with the Tridentine definition: that man moved and excited by God can reject the grace of God, can dissent, if he wills; that it removes freedom and sufficient grace from the midst; finally, that it perverts the concept of grace.

To obtain knowledge of this opinion the Thomists must be brought into consultation. Let us therefore bring them forward into the midst, having followed the best expositor of this matter (Zeitschrift für kath. Theol. Innsbruck. 1877.).

I. The Thomistic opinion, which takes its origin from Dominic Bañez, rests, as regards efficacious grace, first of all on these principles.

Principle 1° is drawn from the dignity of the first cause. Namely, no created agent can act unless it be applied to acting by a divine motion. The principal argument of the Thomists is drawn from the notion of being: that God alone, as the most universal efficient cause of all things, can produce it through a previous, real and physical influx (Graveson, Epistt. theol. polem. T. I. ep. 2a.).Graveson, Epistolae theologicae polemicae, Tomus I, epistola 2a.

In other words: No second cause can operate, unless it be efficaciously determined by the first (Bañez in 1am. p. q. XIV. a. 13.). This motion indeed, if it is truly a motion, must be previous to the act of the creature and prior in nature and causality to the action of the creature, just as every action is prior to its effect; therefore it is rightly called a premotion (Goudin, Phil. p. VI. D. 2. q. 3. a. 2.). Namely, «that preposition prae denotes or can denote nothing other than that God is the prior and first cause, moving, applying, inclining and determining the will prior in nature and causality to the will's determining itself... so that this causal statement is true: therefore the will determines itself in the second act, because it is prior in nature determined by God in the first act» (Lemos in Actis p. 1065.).

The premotion is indeed not prior to the action of the second cause as regards existence, but as regards causality (Reginaldus, De novit. et antiq. nominis praedeter. phys. l. II. c. 36.). «But this previous motion or actual help is really distinguished from the operation of the second cause... for every efficient cause is really distinguished from its effect» (Alvarez, De Auxiliis D. XIX. concl. 5.). Furthermore, «this divine motion received in the creature is called physical by the Thomists... because from its own essence and from within it is efficacious, independently of any created consent» (Gonet, Clypeus Thomist. D. XI. a. 5.).

Now indeed, «since God gives this motion to second causes knowing and willing it, and thus with certain knowledge and intention of a determinate effect — otherwise these would be by chance with respect to God — it follows that that physical premotion is a predetermination» (Reginaldus l. c.). «Physical premotion is called predetermination, because it determines the will to one thing, not only as regards specification but also as regards exercise, although not after the manner of nature» (Nazarius in 1am. p. q. XXII. a. 4.). For God «so predetermines free causes that He makes them operate infallibly — not indeed naturally or from absolute necessity, but freely and contingently according to their own nature» (Alvarez op. c. D. XXIII. n. 13.).

«Physical, therefore, is the predetermination... by which God predetermines man's will in the first act, so that the will itself, with all its freedom, infallibly and freely determines itself in the second act (Lemos l. c. p. 1063.)." But this divine motion takes place for any act of the will. "God causes the action of sin by premoving physically to it, not as it is evil, but precisely as it is an action (Goudin l. c.)." Wherefore "God certainly and infallibly knows all future sins in the decree by which He determined to predetermine the created will to the entity of the act of sin, insofar as it is an action and a being, and to permit the moral malice of sin or sin itself, as it is sin, by not giving efficacious help for avoiding it (Alvarez l. c. D. XI. n. 3.)."

Principle 2^m, drawn from the indifference of the will. "It is proper to the divine will to determine itself independently of any other cause; but the created will, before it determines itself, must be determined by God, namely because it is indifferent and that indifference is resolved in no other way than through a previous motion of God (Graveson op. cit. ep. XI.)." Wherefore "man's free will, because it is created, although it determines an act for itself, nevertheless determines it as predetermined by God (Alvarez l. c. D. XXII.)." Namely, "it is impossible that a determinate act proceed from a potency indeterminate in the first act (Lemos op. cit. p. 1234.)."

Principle 3^m, from the prescience of God. "With the efficacy of physical premotion removed from God, no other sufficient causality remains in God with respect to the determination of free acts, and consequently there can be in God no prescience of such future things; and once that is removed, the very notion of divine providence and predestination with respect to the said acts must necessarily be taken away (Nazarius l. I.)."

With these arguments, indeed, the Thomists wish to prove the physical premotion and predetermination of any act whatever; and if they are worth anything, they ought to be worth equally in the supernatural order no less than in the natural. They warn, however (at which you would not unjustly marvel), that "the Thomists admit general predetermination only as probable according to natural reason and not necessarily connected with the Catholic faith. But grace efficacious of itself they hold as a theological conclusion most certainly handed down by Augustine and Aquinas and, after the articles of faith, above every exception, definable in a proximate and, as it were, ultimate disposition. Whence, even if no physical predetermination to merely natural and moral acts were admitted, we nevertheless contend that it must be admitted in the supernatural order for living rightly and Christianly. We construct general premotion for this reason only, that through it we may pave the way to establishing more richly and more strongly grace efficacious of itself, and that philosophy may also serve to defend it (Contenson Theol. ment. et cord. I. VIII. Diss. 2. specul. 3.).Contenson Theol. ment. et cord. I. VIII. Diss. 2. specul. 3.

II. Wherefore concerning grace efficacious of itself they establish these things. «The principal of the prerequisites, in order that man may produce an act through free will — for example, of conversion to God — is the efficacious decree of God from eternity and the physical motion or efficacious help by which God premoves the will to such an act (Nazarius l. c.).» For this reason «never in fact does the created will produce a supernatural act, unless it be physically premoved and predetermined by efficacious help to producing that same act (Alvarez l. c. D. XCI. n. 8.).» This most celebrated school (says Graveson op. cit. T. II. ep. 3.), firmly adhering to the doctrine of Saints Augustine and Thomas, recognizes no versatile, indifferent grace so subject to man's free will that its efficacy or inefficacy depends on the consent or dissent alone of that same will.» Hence they say: «grace sufficient understood in the Thomistic sense does not comprise in itself everything that is necessary for actually acting, but another grace is required, which is efficacious of itself and from within and which comprises everything that is necessary for actually acting (Serry Schola thomistica vindicata praelect. 2. cf. Gotti Tom. II. Tract. 6. q. 2. Dub. 4. Alvarez l. c. DD. XXIII. et LXXX.).» «Indeed no Thomist ever denied that the created will equipped with grace sufficient in the Thomistic sense has, in that sense, a true, complete, proximate and ready potency, in such a way, however, that besides sufficient grace it needs on God's part another grace for actually acting, namely grace efficacious of itself (Graveson l. c. Tom. I. ep. 1).» But some difference exists in the manner of speaking between the older and the more recent Thomists; for «the Thomists after Alvarez, who call the potency given by merely sufficient graces full, ready, complete and even proximate, certainly agree less with the older ones (Serry D. Augustinus D. Thomae conciliatus praelect. III. c. 26).»

III. But of what sort is the efficacy of this necessary grace efficacious of itself? Namely, «however freely Peter operates while he is being disposed to grace, it nevertheless implies a contradiction that, the same efficacious help standing simultaneously, he should not consent to God calling and preparing (Banez l. c. a. 7.)». Or «it is repugnant to join at the same time with that help of grace the contrary dissent; because to join in this way expressly states the composition of two opposites (Lemos l. c. p. 1052)». Namely, «efficacious help for consenting and actual dissent are mutually repugnant (Alvarez I. c. D. XCII. n. 6)». Wherefore the same Bañez, in 2º. Zae. g. 10. a. I. doc. 3., having admitted the Tridentine definition can. 4. Sess. VI., adds: «with this, nevertheless, it stands in truth that this conjunctive proposition is impossible: God by such help excites and moves man's free will, and man's free will does not consent to God so exciting and calling; for this implies a contradiction.»

IV. Does this efficacious help look to the first act or to the second? «Some (says Xantes Mariales Biblioth. Interp. 7. 4. Relect. 9. sect. 3.) concede that the motion is the complement of the first act; others deny it. Those who deny it deny that it is a complement formally pertaining to the first act and perfecting within the limits of the first act, which is most true. Those who affirm it affirm that it is an extrinsic complement, perfecting not within the limits of the first act, but rather within the line of the second act, at least reductively, insofar as it applies the first act to producing the second exercisedly, which is also most true.» But it is only too evident that what is necessary for acting, and is necessary as a cause, and which therefore is prior to the action by a priority of nature and causality, pertains to the constitution of the first act, although when the action is done it is simultaneous with it. Certainly (as Lemos says l. c. p. 1053) «before the will says: I will, the prevenient help of divine grace precedes by a priority of nature, making it will, and making it in such a way that dissent does not stand simultaneously. Nor is this against the Council of Trent; indeed it is of its express mind.»

V. But how is this efficacy of grace reconciled with human freedom? Not difficult, they say: for what is freedom? «Freedom is nothing other than the very potency of the will connoting the object indifferently proposed (Sebille Interpres thomisticus L. III. c. 1. sect. 5.).» «Positive and active indifference is nothing other than the positing of some act or determination of the will, with potency to the opposite (Graveson op. c. Tom. I. ep. 8).The second act is said to be free... through the indifference which it has to its principle, namely insofar as it could be produced and not produced by it, and produced it can be continued and not continued (Xantes Mariales op. cit. Tom. III, contr. 19. a. 10. c. 4.). Thus Graveson further argues (l. c.): the active indifference of the will arises as from a root from the indifference of the judgment; this root remaining, that also remains. But grace efficacious of itself does not take away that root: therefore.

However, if we listen to Sebille (l. c.), it indeed implies a contradiction that, in the state in which the will actually retains the predetermination to love, the actual positing of non-love should be possible. But we say, he says, that under the predetermination to love the will is truly proximately able not to love, in this sense: because, although the positing of non-love is impossible, the proximate potency to not loving is nevertheless retained (but if, while the act is still impossible, the potency is proximate — when will that act be possible, and of what sort will the potency be?), because for this proximate potency to be had it is not required that that extreme be possible even with the predetermination retained, but it suffices that it be possible absolutely. Wherefore the same writer says: «The Thomistic school most constantly holds that for the free eliciting of an act at some instant it suffices that the will be proximately able at that same instant not to act, although for that same instant the very negation of the act is impossible by reason of some prerequisite then existing, with which the negation of the act has an essential repugnance.» Namely, also, «all the prerequisites for acting standing, free will can, in the composed sense (with grace), not act, by a potency separated and not to be reduced to act; but it cannot not act by a conjoined potency, that is, one to be reduced to act... if it be objected that this potency is in vain, I deny this; indeed, absolutely speaking, it does not imply a contradiction to be reduced to act, but only with the predetermination standing (Xantes Mariales l. c.).»

De Avila, however (in the place to be cited below), says: «We hold with firm faith that man, moved by God by this wonderful, efficacious and efficient and physical help, freely assents and cooperates with God calling — absolutely and simply speaking, and in the divided sense; but if the discourse be carried on in the composed sense, as long as that supposition stands firm that God impels us by this help, we likewise profess according to faith that we operate the acts of free will necessarily and infallibly.» What then do the Thomists intend by this distinction of the composed sense and the divided sense, or what are the terms which must be conceived either as composed together or as divided from one another? «The Thomists teach that man, while he is equipped with grace efficacious of itself, retains a true potency of dissenting from it or of not acting in the divided sense, i.e., retains the potency of dissenting from grace efficacious of itself, but divided and separated from actual dissent — in which potency stands the genuine ground of man's freedom; but that man endowed with grace efficacious of itself does not retain the potency of dissenting from it in the composed sense, i.e., does not retain the potency of dissenting from it conjoined with actual dissent (Graveson l. c.)» «In the present controversy (says Alvarez op. cit. D. CXIV), when it is said that man moved by efficacious help cannot dissent in the composed sense, nothing else is signified than that that efficacious motion and actual dissent are not at the same time in the same man; but the sense is not that efficacious motion and the potency to dissenting are incompossible in the same man,» the potency, however, not to be reduced to act; for (as Bañez says l. c. q. XXIII. a. 3) «the reason is evident: for who resists His (God's) will?»¹ «We confess (says the same Alvarez, ibid.) that the Council of Trent, sect. VI. can. 4, speaks of a physical potency which can be reduced to act absolutely speaking; but nevertheless that potency is never reduced to act, efficacious help standing in man; because the help itself brings it about that that potency is not reduced to an act repugnant to that same help.» If it is repugnant, therefore the act is impossible, that prevenient help being posited. The Thomists therefore concede that, with efficacious help standing, the absolute potency to the opposite, to dissent, remains — a potency, however, never to be reduced to act under that help. Then they deny that their composed and divided sense ever was or is to be explained in this way, namely that the will can in the divided sense of grace, i.e., with grace efficacious of itself removed, and cannot in the composed sense of grace, i.e., with grace efficacious of itself posited; for, as they say, the potency remains absolutely, but nevertheless not to be reduced to act under that help, for the reason that the act is repugnant to it. But is not that the same as saying that the will cannot except divided from grace? I fear lest we play with words. In the 3ª Congregation De Auxiliis before Paul V. (H. Controv. Livini De Meyer L. VI. c. 9.) Bastida had thus proposed the Thomistic distinction of the composed and divided sense: «To be able to dissent in the composed sense they define as being able to join consent with dissent in the will. To be able to dissent in the divided sense, they say, is to retain the free will — even when it is under motion and excitation — the power of lacking the consent to which this grace moves, provided, however, that it lack that grace and be divided from it: so that the sense of the definition is that free will, even while it is moved and excited, retains the power of lacking consent or of having the contrary act — not indeed simultaneously with this motion, but if it be divided from it.» To these things Lemos responded (ibid. c. 10): «The Reverend Father proceeded thus: that being able to dissent in the divided sense says nothing but that free will has the potency to dissenting, if efficacious grace be taken away; but this does not suffice for free will placed under efficacious grace to have freedom. To this it is responded that not only if efficacious grace be taken away, but even with it posited and while it is posited, free will has the potency absolutely and simply to dissenting.» Certainly, but nevertheless a potency never to be reduced to act under that help, for the reason that that help, inferring consent necessarily, by the same necessity excludes dissent. Therefore, although the terms that would be composed (in the composed sense) are consent and dissent, nevertheless, because consent is not except by the force of efficacious grace, and is necessarily had when it exists, nor is it or can it be except when it exists, the matter truly comes back to this: that the terms of the composition are efficacious grace and dissent, and therefore it is denied that dissent can be in the composed sense with grace, as Bastida explained well; and how far that is from the doctrine of Trent, we shall see a little later.

VII. From the things thus far set forth it is sufficiently evident that, given that help efficacious of itself, a certain necessity of acting is present. «As long as that supposition stands firm, that God impels us by this help, we likewise profess according to faith that we operate the acts of free will necessarily and infallibly» (De Avila De Grat. et Lib. arb., cited by Bastida, H. Congr. Livini Meyer L. VI. c. 15. prop. 2). But, they say, the necessity is of the consequence, not of the consequent. Namely, the will is moved by grace efficacious of itself: therefore it cannot not act; the consequence is necessary. The consequent is not, but after the manner of the antecedent, i.e., of grace, which is free not only with the freedom of God moving, but of man, which is involved in grace efficacious of itself; because it would not be efficacious unless it made man will freely (cf. Reginaldum et Nazarium Il. cc.). Certainly, «since God is the first free being and contains in a most eminent way every determination of our will, He cannot by premoving take away, but rather bestows, freedom. Just as a consequent supposition does not take away freedom, a fortiori neither does the antecedent supposition of divine predefinition, because, as the Thomists teach, such a decree arises from the first root and principle of freedom, namely the infinite efficacy of the divine will. But it implies a contradiction that something should precede freedom as a cause of freedom and should destroy freedom (Gonet op. cit. D.IX.).»Gonet op. cit. D.IX.

«For God moves not only to the substance of the act, but also to its mode, which is freedom (Billuart De Deo D. VIII, a. 4.).»Billuart De Deo D. VIII, a. 4.

«Therefore the act will be contingently and freely, because God decreed that it be freely and contingently (Goudin Tract. Theol. I. tract. 2. g. 2. a. 3).»Goudin Tract. Theol. I. tract. 2. g. 2. a. 3.

VIII. Efficacious grace described thus far differs essentially from sufficient grace. «Grace sufficient in the Thomistic sense (says Graveson op. cit. Tom. I. ep. 1ª.) is so essentially distinguished by its nature from grace efficacious in the Thomistic sense, that never and in no case can grace sufficient in the Thomistic sense become grace efficacious in the Thomistic sense, nor is the second act ever posited, unless efficacious grace in the Thomistic sense has supervened.» But that truly sufficient help is given, all Thomists concede. Thus Peter Ledesma (De Auxiliis art. 16.) thinks it must be held, according to faith, that sufficient help distinct from efficacious is given, and that it is sufficient in all rigor and is intrinsically supernatural, and is given on every occasion on which the obligation of a precept urges. Likewise John of St. Thomas, in 1ª. p. q. XIII. a. 3., says it is necessary to posit such help giving sufficiency and ability; because .... a proximate and proportioned faculty for operating is required.

For what reason, then, is such grace called sufficient? Namely, «in sufficient grace everything is contained that is required for the potency of operating well, but not everything that is further required for the act. For it is certain that in every acting cause something more is required for the act than for the potency (Gazzanica Prael. theol. D. V. c. 6. cf. Reginaldum op. cit. tom. I. c. 42. Serry de divina gratia prael. 3.). Therefore, «although sufficient grace is a sufficient power on the part of the first act, nevertheless it is never to be joined with the second act, unless grace efficacious of itself be at hand (Graveson op. cit. tom. I. ep. 1.).» «The prevenient help is sufficient for salvation; nevertheless, by itself alone it cannot attain salvation, unless the light of efficacious help shine upon man, just as sight is sufficient for the beginning of seeing, yet cannot actually see without light (Franciscus Avila apud Suarez De vera intelligentia auxilii efficacis c. 17.).» «For it is one thing to be able to operate, another to operate actually» (Alvarez op. cit. D. XVIII. n. 20.). Moreover, note with Ferdinand Bastida (H. Contr. Livini De Meyer De Auxiliis L. VI. c. 17.) that the first Thomists, with Bañez, affirmed that efficacious predetermining help is necessary for being able, but others afterwards, broken by the difficulty, affirmed that it is required only for operating. But those, indeed, were consistent with themselves; these were not. Thus Didacus Nuñes (in 3m. p. q. 2. De Auxiliis) affirms that to one having sufficient help, «simply speaking, nothing of the requisites for operating is lacking... And to the argument that something necessary is lacking to him, the proposition itself is distinguished: a necessity on the part of the potency, in such a way that the potency is not altogether complete, is in some way bound or impeded, is denied; something necessary is lacking on the part of the act, which is given together with the act itself and passes away.»

But because perhaps this response did not please all Thomists, another was devised. In order, then, that more Thomists may extricate themselves from the difficulty that such help does not seem sufficient, they say that «such is the sufficient grace of the Thomists, that from it not only can the act come forth, but it also in fact comes forth, as often as the created will is not wanting to it; although I confess that it belongs to efficacious grace that the will not be wanting to sufficient grace (Goudin... De Gratia q. V. a. 2.).» Namely, «sufficient help so confers sufficiency for operating, if man wills, that the defect of operation in no way proceeds from any insufficiency of the help itself, but only from the defect of the free will, which resists it and places an obstacle (Lemos Panop. I. IV. p. 2. Tract. 3. c. 2.).» «For God, giving sufficient help, offers the efficacious in it; and because man resists the sufficient, he is deprived of the efficacious which was being offered to him (idem ibid. c. 6.).With whom Alvarez agrees (op. cit. D. CXVIII.), saying: «God, as long as a precept obliges, gives in fact to every man sufficient help, ready to give him efficacious help, unless he place an obstacle to that same help.» And this is (with Goudin l. c. as witness) the opinion of all Thomists, even the more rigid ones, that «man, by resisting sufficient help, placed an obstacle, lest God proceed further with His grace,» as Alvarez says (ibid. D. LXXX.).

This, therefore, is the most certain doctrine concerning the grace of God — indeed, if you believe Bañez, to be believed. «But the assertors (he says in 1. p. q. X. a. 1.) of the contrary opinion say that they cannot understand how man freely believes, hopes and loves, etc., if the help of God is so efficacious, so proceeds from divine predefinition, that these two cannot stand at the same time: this man receives such help and this man is not converted, etc. Therefore, about to respond to this objection, I cannot sufficiently marvel at the ignorance of theologians of this sort, not to say their temerity; for first of all they ought to have believed what they say they cannot understand: for we Catholics believe the mystery of the Trinity, even if we do not understand it.» Which he also repeats, q. XXIII. a. 5., from which it is evident that nothing was said more rashly and less wisely.

IX. Therefore efficacious help or grace is commonly called that by which God brings it about that we actually will, which namely obtains the effect for which it is given, and which is joined with the consent of the will. It is asked whence this actual efficacy of grace arises: these theologians say that it arises from the very character of the help, which is efficacious from its nature, in such a way that the help is not actually efficacious because the will consents, but on the contrary the will consents because the help is efficacious — and indeed with an efficacy from within; so that, with it existing and by its force, the act is posited by the necessity of the consequence, and it is repugnant that it not be posited.

X. From what has been said it is lawful to explain the name of physical predetermination as used by these theologians. Of it three things are to be explained, namely what determination, what that preposition prae, and what physica signify: whence also it will again become clear what follows from such grace.

Determination is attributed to the will, and both the divine and the created will are said to determine themselves and to be determined. Now, first, a twofold determination is to be distinguished, namely from oneself and from another. The former is that which proceeds from the same principle as the thing determined, namely when someone determines himself; the latter is that which proceeds from a principle distinct from the thing determined. This latter is to be understood when efficacious grace is called predetermination; because it proceeds from God. But determination from another is again to be distinguished as twofold, namely determination of the object and determination of the subject. For 1) something is said to be determined inasmuch as it is the term of the determination of the will; thus the existence of the Church was determined from eternity by the divine will. Whence its determination is a determination of the object. 2) Something is said to be determined in that it receives from another into itself some entity or some mode or motion through which it is determined to do or to receive something; thus a sentient being is determined by a sensible species to sensing. What is determined is the subject, and its determination is a determination of the subject. Determination of the object is extrinsic to the object itself, which is denominated determined not by some intrinsic form or intrinsic mode, but solely from its relation to the determining cause. But determination of the subject is intrinsic to the determined thing, which is called determined on account of the intrinsic form or mode by which it is really changed.

Now when the will is said to be predetermined by grace, a determination of the subject is to be understood, not of the object. For it is a determination which exists in the will itself, just as the grace which determines does. That is, the will is not called determined for the reason that its act is the term of the divine will determining or commanding it; but it is called determined for the reason that something is placed in the will itself by God, namely grace, by which it is intrinsically changed and determined to act. Wherefore a determination of this sort is not to be confused with the simple eternal predefinition of good acts, which could be conceived; for this is only in God and places nothing in the will whose acts are predefined.

Now concerning the particle prae. The will, according to these authors, can be determined both in second act and in first act. It is determined in second act by its own act, which it vitally elicits; it is determined in first act by something preceding the act, which accordingly is not something vital, but is placed by God in the will in the manner of a certain quality or motion. Wherefore with respect to this determination the will does not behave except passively. What is placed in the will by God is said by some to be some entity, or form or quality, and by others is said to be only a motion: certainly it is a real modification, whose adequate cause is God and which is not vital. But it is not necessary, they say, that this motion should precede the second act in time; it suffices if it precedes by nature; namely, it precedes in the way in which first act must precede second. In order, therefore, that this word determination may be narrowed to signify the determination prior by nature to the second act, that particle prae is added, and thus it is called predetermination.

Why finally is it called physical? Note that this appellation is given to predetermination. This word physica signifies something proper to predetermination. The word is not added for the sole purpose of signifying that grace is a real cause, an efficient cause — not only moral but also physical — of the salutary act; for that is not proper to the determination which these theologians defend, nor is it denied by their adversaries, who teach that grace is the efficient and physical cause of the good act. But this word physica is added to predetermination so that it may further be signified that the predetermining help has, not from some extrinsic circumstance or congruity, but from its own entity, nature, quality, that by which it predetermines the will.

Moreover this efficacy of predetermining, which belongs to efficacious help from its intrinsic nature, is, according to its authors, so great that by the very fact that that help is placed in the will, it implies a contradiction that the consent of the will should not follow. For what all theologians teach — that it is repugnant that grace be actually efficacious and there be no act — is transferred by these theologians to this grace of theirs, prior to the act and nonetheless requiring from its nature that the act follow.

The necessity of the consequence of the act is called by these same authors necessity of consequence, not necessity of the consequent. Necessity of consequence, because the nexus between the antecedent help and the consequent act is necessary: not necessity of the consequent, because the consequent act follows freely, receiving participated liberty from the divine free will moving the created free will, so strongly and sweetly according to the mode of its nature. Bannez in 1m. p. q. XXIII. a. 5.Bannez, In 1m. p. q. XXIII. a. 5.

Help of this kind physically predetermining is necessary for the act to be; for it is itself that which gives the good act, and just as when it exists the good act necessarily exists, so when the good act does not exist, it must necessarily be said that the help itself was lacking.

This efficacious help differs essentially from sufficient help. But sufficient help indeed gives the ability, as they say, but the act cannot be unless efficacious help is also present. Indeed, just as it is necessary that when efficacious help exists the act exists, so it is impossible that when only sufficient help exists the act exist: for if the act existed through it alone, it would be efficacious; and because sufficient help can be joined with dissent, there would be had an efficacious help which from its nature would not be necessarily connected with consent, which they say is repugnant. Sufficient and efficacious help therefore differ in intrinsic nature: with the former alone it cannot come about that consent is joined, with the latter it cannot come about that dissent is joined — and this from the proper nature of each.

Efficacious help is called both physically predetermining and also a physical predetermination. For it predetermines after the manner of a formal cause; for when it exists in the will, by that very fact the will is predetermined.

It is clear that the exposition of the Thomistic opinion which the Thesis presents is sincere. That too which we add — that those who deny that efficacious help pertains to the first act, or to the constitution of the first act, do not sufficiently cohere with themselves — is manifest. For what is necessary as a principle and cause of the second act and inheres in the faculty itself evidently pertains to the first act: but, with all Thomists admitting that such is efficacious help, therefore.

XI. But entering upon this disputation we protest that we are unwilling in any way to brand with some theological censure the system which we impugn: that is not our office, and the reverence with which we regard catholic doctors restrains us even from thinking it. But in order to set forth what seems to us right, we shall of course have to gather arguments from the Scriptures, from the Councils, from the Fathers, from reason: yet all things are to be taken as if we said: as far as in us lies, this seems to us to follow from those principles, this appears certain to us; for the rest, let the judgment of the matter rest with those to whom it pertains.

For now the question is not whether the grace of God is some entity or dead quality placed in the soul by God. On this matter we have already spoken in Ih. XVI. Nor is the question about the physical efficiency of grace, which we too established there. The question turns only on the mode of causing or of efficacy which these theologians attribute to grace efficacious of itself, and on the sufficiency of the grace which they call sufficient. The question is namely, 1º whether prevenient grace, which the consent of the will follows, is so efficacious from its own nature that the consent of the will follows necessarily by the force of the nature of that same grace, so that it implies a contradiction that this grace be joined in the will with dissent or with lack of consent. It is asked 2º whether under this grace the exercise of liberty remains. It is asked 3º whether, given the necessity of this grace, it can truly be said that those who do not actually work well were furnished with sufficient grace for acting well. This the Theologians who side with Dominic Bannez affirm: we deny. Leaving aside other arguments, we are content with these alone, lest the disputation be drawn out too long.

XII. a) Matth. 11, 21. Woe to you, Chorazin, woe to you, Bethsaida; because if the mighty works which were done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would long ago have repented in sackcloth and ashes. It must be supposed 1º that these words of Christ contain infallible truth, 2º that the reproach of Christ is legitimate and just: both are persuaded from the person of the speaker. It must be supposed 3º that with the mighty works, or miracles, done outwardly, interior graces were conjoined; for without them salutary repentance, which Christ demanded, would have been impossible. These things being posited, we again note that the reproach of Christ is comparative, namely He does not only rebuke the Chorazinites because they did not repent on seeing the signs of Christ, but because they did not repent instructed with that abundance of means which, had the Tyrians had them, they themselves would have repented.

Now with these things presupposed, these things must be certain: 1º that for the Tyrians to do repentance no other help was necessary besides those which were given to the Chorazinites; for if another help had been necessary, then this proposition would be true: if the things which were done in Tyre had been done in Chorazin, the Tyrians would not have repented; moreover this is the contradictory of the proposition of Christ: therefore Christ would be deceitful, if that proposition is true. Since therefore Christ can neither be deceived nor deceive, that proposition must be said to be false, and it must be said that no other help besides those conferred on the Chorazinites was necessary for the Tyrians.

It must be certain, 2°, that the Chorazinites could have done repentance through those same helps by which the Tyrians could have, and that those helps by which the Chorazinites certainly could do repentance were the same as those by which the Tyrians would have repented, and were not lesser. Otherwise that comparative reproach would be unjust. For the Chorazinites could justly have responded: why is the repentance of the Tyrians objected to us, and from it our impenitence is rebuked, because we did not repent instructed with those helps by which they would have repented? Let the same helps be given to us as those which would have been given to the Tyrians, and then, if we do not repent, you may rebuke us, even compared with them.

Therefore 1) the Tyrians would have done repentance with those same helps with which the Chorazinites did not, and for this repentance to be actual there was required, besides those helps, only the positing of the condition, i.e. that those helps actually be conferred.

Therefore 2) that help which remained sufficient in the Chorazinites would have been efficacious in the Tyrians.

Therefore 3) no other help besides the sufficient is necessary for acting.

Therefore 4) efficacious help can by its nature be joined with dissent.

Therefore 5) sufficient and efficacious help do not differ in nature.

Moreover all these conclusions directly oppose the opinion which we impugn: therefore.

Isaias V, 3. seg. What is it that I ought to do further (hebr. what still remained to be done) to my vineyard and did not do to it? Or why (hebr. why) did I wait for it to produce grapes and it produced wild grapes? Namely, why, while I was waiting for it to produce grapes, did it produce wild grapes? We suppose 1) that the fruit which the vineyard, i.e. the people of God (cf. v. 7.), ought to bear is the salutary works by which men please God; for God expects these from men, namely judgment and justice, as the Lord says in v. 7. 2) That the helps which God testifies that He provided to the vineyard were not only external but also… chiefly internal; because these are necessary, and God says that He omitted nothing. 3) That to these men physically predetermining help was not given, since the act was lacking.

Now if for acting there were necessary a predetermining help, or a help without the positing of which it is impossible for the act to follow, then 1° it would be false that God did whatever He ought so that the act would be; for for the act to be, this help would have been necessary, which God denied: He would therefore have had to give it — not insofar as it was owed to men, but insofar as it was necessary that the effect intended by God follow. For if God wills something and it cannot be done unless the means which He alone can give is supplied, God must surely provide it. 2° God would have expected grapes from the vineyard in vain, since He knew that He had denied that means which alone could actually produce grapes; for what do you expect which you know for certain cannot come about? 3° The divine complaint would also be unjust; for why does He complain that the vineyard did not bear fruit, it which was cultivated by Him, when the necessary means for bearing fruit was lacking?

Therefore 1) for the act to be, physically predetermining help is not necessary.

Therefore 2) sufficient grace becomes actually efficacious, or the effect is obtained, not through another help of a different nature superadded, but through the consent of the will.

Therefore 3) sufficient grace and efficacious grace do not differ in intrinsic nature.

Therefore 4) grace which is actually efficacious is not necessarily connected with the good act, but can be conjoined with dissent and then remains purely sufficient.

But these things wholly contradict the doctrine which we attack: therefore.

If these things are maintained, it will easily be clear that the other passages of Scripture, in which men are reproved for contempt of grace, teach the same. Surely e.g. what do they mean, c) the words of Christ. Matth. XXIII, 37. Jerusalem, Jerusalem... how often I willed to gather your children... and you would not! The absence of this effect of gathering together is attributed to the evil will of the Jews because they would not: God willed, they would not; therefore what God willed did not come to be. But if God truly willed it, surely He used those means, He provided all those things which were necessary, which, with the free consent of the will supervening, would have obtained the effect. Otherwise, if the things which God had provided were such that, even with the consent of the human will supervening, they would not have obtained the effect because the efficacious help was lacking; would it be true that God truly willed it? would it truly be said that the effect did not come to be because man would not, and therefore man would be deservedly blamed? If therefore men had willed to use the helps which God conferred on them, willing that salutary effect, those helps would have obtained the effect, i.e. the same helps which remain purely sufficient when the consent of the human will is lacking become efficacious in second act when the will itself consents.

XIII. The Council of Trent Sess. VI. can. 4. defines that free will, moved and excited by God, cooperates by assenting to God exciting and calling, and can dissent, if it wills. Those theologians say that the words of the Council are to be taken in the divided sense, not in the composed sense. But what do they understand by composed and divided sense? Namely, they say, to be able to dissent in the composed sense is to have the power of dissenting in such a way that dissent is composed with consent, which is repugnant; therefore it cannot dissent in the composed sense; but to be able to dissent in the divided sense is to retain under the divine motion the power of dissenting, not however to be reduced to act while there is consent (see above n. VI.). Wherefore it would also be permissible to explain this composed and divided sense in this way: the will under efficacious grace has the power of dissenting — the power, however, conjoinable with the act of dissent, they deny; not conjoinable, they concede. But 1. when it is asked whether the words of the Council are to be taken in the composed sense, there is not understood that composed sense by which consent is conjoined with dissent; but that composed sense is understood by which, namely, dissent is conjoined with grace. Surely a proposition is said to be taken in the composed sense when the predicate belongs to the subject as having itself in the way in which it is expressed in the proposition; whence it is said that this proposition, a blind man sees, is false in the composed sense; because the predicate cannot belong to the subject existing in the way in which it is expressed in the proposition. Now this is the proposition of the Council: free will, moved and excited by God, can dissent, if it wills; it is not said: consenting free will can dissent; which manner of speaking could supply the occasion of devising that composed sense; although even then we would establish the same thing, as will be clear from the analysis made of another similar phrase from chapter 5 of the same Session. But on the part of the subject only the motion and excitation of God is posited. The composed sense of this proposition, therefore, is, that dissent could freely (if it wills) be conjoined at the same time with the motion and excitation of God, or with free will moved and excited by God. It is asked, therefore, whether the words of the Council are to be understood according to this composed sense, or according to the divided sense, namely that free will, moved and excited by God, retains at the same time the power of dissenting, which dissent, however, could not be posited unless that motion and excitation were lacking.

2. The words of the Council are to be weighed: it can dissent — namely, the discussion concerns possible dissent, not in general any other non-salutary act, but dissent: dissent, however, is dissent from something; here, truly, there is speech only of grace, from which man can dissent; the dissent, therefore, of which there is speech here, is dissent from grace, or from God calling and exciting. Now can there be dissent from grace, if grace does not exist? can there be dissent from God calling and exciting, if God does not call and excite? That is utterly impossible. Therefore if dissent is possible, it is possible only under grace, under God moving and exciting, and therefore in the composed sense with grace.

It is not, therefore, the question whether, from the doctrine of Trent, some absolute power of acting otherwise or of acting badly remains to the will under grace, but whether under grace there remains to the will the power of acting otherwise or contrarily, which could be reduced to act under grace itself. This is what we say the Council affirms, and affirms also concerning efficacious grace, and what the adversaries deny, who in their system can only concede that under efficacious grace there indeed remains the power of doing something else and the opposite, but deny that it can be reduced to act under grace.

Surely, as to the first thing which we say is affirmed by the Council, it is clear from what was said just now in n. 2. For it is evident that the Council affirms that under grace there remains the power of resisting grace itself. For that is demonstrated most evidently from that little word dissent; for free will can dissent: but dissent cannot exist unless there is something from which one dissents; dissent, therefore, demands to be at the same time with that from which one dissents; here, however, it is grace, or God moving and exciting, from which free will is said to be able to dissent; therefore grace, and the dissent which can be posited, must be at the same time. Otherwise, if grace be removed, if free will be not moved, from what will it dissent, or be able to dissent? It will be able to do nothing, to do evil, but it will not be able to dissent.

The same is established from the parallel phrase of ch. 5, namely that man receiving the inspiration of God can cast it away. For the act of casting away grace cannot exist except at the same time with grace; for what would you cast away that you do not have? Furthermore, note that in this other phrase there occurs that divided sense of which the adversaries speak. For it is said that man receiving the inspiration can cast it away; it is clear that the casting away and the reception (which is the consent given to the inspiration) cannot be at the same time, but the casting away, just as the reception, must be at the same time with grace; whence in this respect the proposition is to be understood in the composed sense.

Therefore not only does the power of dissenting remain under grace — which power, however, could not come into act unless that grace were taken away — but there remains a power of dissenting which can come into act while grace itself exists: otherwise dissent from grace, from God calling, would be impossible.

But (that we may demonstrate the other thing which we affirmed) this grace, from which free will can dissent, is efficacious grace. It is proved 1 1) because it is that same grace with which man cooperates, can. 4; that same grace which man freely acting receives, ch. 5; it is therefore grace which gives the act: but this is efficacious grace; for with only sufficient grace, according to the adversaries, there is never consent or cooperation. 2 2) because the words of the Council must be taken of any prevenient grace, and not of some one only which from its own nature is indeed sufficient but not efficacious. For the Council speaks without any limitation of that actual grace by which man is disposed to justification; therefore no prevenient grace among those which dispose to justification is such that it cannot be dissented from; for if some one were, and indeed that one which actually disposes man to justification, the proposition of the Council would be simply false; for an indefinite proposition is taken universally, i.e., in order to be true, it must be true universally, according to that universality of which the subject is capable.

But taken universally the proposition of the Council would be false, if man cannot resist efficacious grace, by which he is actually prepared for justification. Now since the actual graces which are conferred before justification and those which are conferred after it are of the same kind, it follows that there is no prevenient grace which cannot actually be resisted. And indeed 3) The Council in that canon, as is clear from the words quoted from chapter 5, wills to assert the freedom of man under grace, because he can dissent from it. Therefore it is proper to freedom to be able to dissent from grace. Furthermore, from this demonstration it follows that if man cannot dissent from some grace, he is not free under it. Whoever, therefore, denies that efficacious graces are also comprehended by the definition of the Council must maintain that under those graces men are not free. But if man is free under every grace, let it be conceded that the Council speaks of every grace.

It is proved 4) The sentence of the Council was issued against Calvin: it was therefore uttered in that sense in which the doctrine of Calvin is excluded and condemned. But Calvin taught that man cannot resist that grace which is efficacious, namely which works the good act in us; therefore the grace which the Tridentine Fathers teach can be resisted is efficacious grace. Therefore from the Council we have that man can dissent from efficacious grace, and that there is no prevenient grace which from its own nature is necessarily connected with the act: but grace physically predetermining is such that it cannot be resisted, that it is from its own nature necessarily connected with the act; therefore grace physically predetermining cannot be composed with the definition of the Council of Trent: q. e. d.

XIV. Bastida shows that freedom is destroyed thus (H. C. L. VI. 17). «I now show that freedom is destroyed from the fact that they say this grace physically predetermines the will. For all cry out with one voice of nature that our freedom is placed in indifference or indetermination (namely, the exercise of freedom does not consist in this, that the will puts forth an act which could not be, which is common to all causes; but in this, that the will existing in first act remains always actively indifferent, and is not in second act determined by nature before it has determined itself, although it does this by powers received from God; for this is to have dominion over its own act: otherwise, however, no distinction is had between necessary and free causes). But nothing can be devised more contrary to indifference and indetermination than physical predetermination to one thing (which by nature runs before the exercise of the faculty), nor can it be conceived in the mind that someone is at the same time indifferent or indeterminate to both and predetermined to one. Nor could God take away from the will the indifference and indetermination to either alternative by an easier way, than by placing in it a form (or motion) by which it is physically predetermined to one thing before it acts (at least by nature). Therefore, since by this efficacious help a predetermination to one thing is placed in the will, by this very fact the indifference or indetermination of the will to either alternative is taken away.» And because it is essential to the created will to act in such a way that it cannot act — at least salutarily — unless predetermined by God, hence neither can any power of active indifference be conceived in the will; for just as the predetermining help takes away this indifference in its exercise, so the essential necessity of the same help takes away its power.

Surely freedom, i.e. the exercise of freedom, consists wholly in this, that the act is posited with no necessity of consequence from all things posited that are required for acting: for this is the definition of freedom, that with all things required for acting posited, it can will, can not-will, can will this, will that: but in the system of the adversaries this very necessity of consequence is constructed: for with efficacious grace required for acting posited, consent follows with necessity of consequence, as they themselves speak; therefore there is no exercise of freedom. Surely let them show how the definition of freedom is verified here. With only sufficient grace posited, the will cannot yet will; because the act is impossible with that alone existing, since efficacious grace is essentially required: with efficacious grace posited, the will cannot not-will: therefore. Or will you say that this definition of freedom regards freedom only in the state of potency, not however when it exercises itself in act? To be sure, when it exercises itself and posits one act, it cannot at the same time posit another: but that definition requires that this act be elicited with no necessity of consequence from the circumstances posited, so that therefore under the same circumstances it could have posited another. Otherwise there is no freedom. For the rest cf. Th. LII.

Nor should you say that God, in predetermining, accommodates Himself to the nature of a free cause: for these are contradictory, namely such predetermination and the accommodation of the motion of God to a free cause: wherefore by the very fact that God accommodates Himself to free causes, He cannot predetermine them. It is indeed the doctrine of St. Thomas in 2m. D. XXV. q. 1. a. 1. cf. the cited Thesis) that God, in moving, accommodates Himself to the natures of the causes which He moves, but on that account He thence inferred that «the determination of the action and of the end is placed in the power of free will.» Wrongly, therefore (as Bastida says, loc. cit.), from the accommodation of God with secondary causes, while He moves them, do these authors infer that God physically predetermines the will with its freedom safe, since from the same entirely antecedent St. Thomas inferred the contrary consequent» and it must be inferred. Cf. In. LI. and LII.

Bastida concludes, «that Bannez commands his predetermination to be believed by us as a mystery of the most holy Trinity is truly ridiculous, as if we ought to assent to his inventions, for this sole reason, because he himself said it, as to decrees of faith... For just as to captivate the intellect in obedience to faith is both a pious and a due duty, so to defer that to some particular author would be impious and execrable.» Let this also be said to other doctors in similar questions.

XIV. If grace physically predetermining is necessary for operating, sufficient grace is removed from the middle: namely, whoever does not operate well lacks not only efficacious help — for if he had it, he would most certainly and necessarily operate — but he lacks also sufficient help. Surely that help is called sufficient which confers the power of operating, the complete power, beyond which nothing else is required for the constitution of the operative principle in first act: but he who lacks the efficacious predetermining help also lacks this power; therefore. And in truth Bannez concedes, 1. p. q. XIV. a 13, that «no secondary cause can operate unless it is efficaciously determined by the first,» he concedes namely that the power of operating is lacking when the efficacious predetermining help is lacking; and thus the first assertors of physical predeterminations spoke, more aptly and logically (cf. the Disputations of Bastida, with Livinus de Meyer, I. VI. c. 15. art. I. § I. fourth proposition). But with the opinion afterwards changed, the defenders of predetermining grace said that it is necessary not for being able but for operating, and therefore can be conferred through sufficient grace. But 1) that is false, and these unjustly departed from the doctrine of Bannez. For if the efficacious predetermining help is not necessary for being able, it no longer pertains to first act, but to the second, and so it is no longer a prevenient help but only a concomitant one, nor is it something which God operates in us without us — which things are wholly repugnant to the nature of this help as it is defended by its assertors. But the defenders of the efficacious predetermining help must teach that it pertains to first act, and that God operates it in us without us.

2. But even if it is necessary only for the act, since nevertheless it is necessary as determining the act and as its cause, it evidently follows that when it is lacking, the act is impossible for man. Namely, contradictions are spoken, when it is said that sufficient help gives the ability, and yet efficacious help, which is different from it and is not in our power, is necessary for the act. For if efficacious help is lacking, it is impossible to posit the act, and indeed impossible because of the lack of the principle necessary for the production of the act; but with this impossibility standing, it is absurd to say that the power of the act is had, that what suffices for positing the act is had.

Nor 3) can it be said that the attainment of the efficacious help necessary for the act is in the power of him who already has sufficient help. For that attainment is in his power either because he can consent to the sufficient help and render it actually efficacious, and thus merit or obtain efficacious help, or because through some natural act he can merit or obtain efficacious help. But this latter would be Pelagian or Semi-Pelagian heresy; the former is impossible in the opinion of the adversaries; for it cannot come about that consent is conjoined with only sufficient help; for then the efficacy of grace would be had depending on the consent of the will, not on the intrinsic nature of grace, and it would be false that any efficacious predetermining grace is necessary for the act.

They say: a good builder is sufficient for building a house in the genus of efficient cause, although in the genus of material cause he needs stones, lime, etc. in order actually to build. Thus sufficient grace is sufficient in its own genus, namely to give the ability, although not in every genus, because another grace is required for the act (cf. Card. Gotti Tomo II. Tract. VI. q. 2. D. 4.).

We answer. If a prince were to shut a good builder of this sort in prison and, having taken away from him the stones, lime, and the other things necessary for building, were to order him to build a house, and, with the house not built, were to condemn him to the death penalty: would there be any man who would not call this judgment of the prince most unjust, and indeed for this simple reason, because the prince was demanding an impossible thing, because that good builder could not build? And yet this is the idea of divine justice which spontaneously comes forth from the system of predetermining grace. For by these examples the character of sufficient grace is explained by them. «Thus a good builder is sufficient in the genus of efficient cause for building a house; although in the genus of material cause he needs stones, lime, etc. in order actually to build. And a painter skilled in his art is sufficient for painting, although in order actually to paint he needs a brush. Thus sufficient grace for faith will be truly sufficient; although in order actually to believe it needs a further grace; because in its own genus and for the effect for which it is proximately given, namely to make man apt and disposed to believe, it suffices of itself: that a further grace is required in order actually to believe, however, is outside the genus of sufficient grace and pertains to the genus of efficacious grace» (Card. Gotti ibid. n. IX.). Therefore whoever sins certainly lacked predetermining grace, which is necessary for acting well and freely avoiding sin, and yet is damned, because he did not do what was impossible for him to do, for the act is impossible without efficacious grace. Indeed, as we shall see presently, he who sins not only lacks the predetermining grace necessary for acting well, but has an efficacious predetermination to the act of sin, which predetermination infers with necessity of consequence the act of sin, just as grace predetermines the good act.

Wherefore it must be denied that that builder has the power for the act of building in those circumstances; he has indeed some elements of that power, but others are lacking, and with some element lacking, the power is not complete: but a power not complete is not a power for that for which it ought to be a power, because it cannot do that. In sum, power to the impossible is not given: but with the principle necessary for the act lacking, the act is impossible; therefore, with efficacious help lacking, the power of the act is lacking, and there is no sufficient grace — truly, I say, sufficient — although we do not deny that it is sufficient thomistically, as they themselves say. And surely, is it not an evident contradiction? Sufficient grace gives the ability; the ability for what? the good act, I think; for on account of it grace is given, and this power is the power of acting well. And nevertheless it is repugnant that with only sufficient grace any good act, even the least, be done: therefore this grace gives the ability and does not give the ability; i.e. it gives the ability for nothing. Can there be any power without an intrinsic order to act? what, then, is this power which is obtained through Thomistic sufficient grace, the power of acting well, to which the good act intrinsically repugns? But what they say, that more is required for the act than for the ability, needs explanation. For if the speech is of the ability in pure potency, of which sort is the power of understanding without any determination to acting, that is true; but then we deny that a sufficient power for understanding is had, because the necessary element is lacking: if, however, the speech is of the proximate ability, or of the power in first act, then we concede that a sufficient power is had, and we concede also that more is required for the act than for the ability, formally however, not efficiently; for this 'more' which is required is nothing but the act itself, not however something on the part of the principle of the act: by that saying, therefore, nothing else is said, except that there is more reality in the power acting than in the power able to act, and yet the reality of the act is from the power itself which is able.

XV. We say that the concept of grace is destroyed in this system: which we briefly prove thus. Grace is a help supplying powers for operating and making us operate, giving the very act in the salutary order: moreover, grace does this in this system by the fact that it predetermines the will to the act, which unless it did, it would not be true that we need the help of God, that God makes us act, that He gives the good act. Now, truly, in a like manner God acts in us with respect to evil acts. For He predetermines the will to the physical act, without which predetermination it would be impossible for it to be posited, and with which existing it is impossible for it not to be posited: and therefore this predetermination is a help supplying powers for acting, making us act, giving the very act. A distinction, indeed, can be feigned in the intention of the giver of the help; but insofar as it is a help giving powers and effecting, one is equal to the other. Therefore if account is taken of that which God physically provides to us in order that we act, we do not need a different help of God for operating salutarily than for operating non-salutarily. But the help of God supplying powers for acting piously and salutarily differs wholly from that divine operation, whatever it may be, by which He physically cooperates with the will acting badly. For such must be the distinction, that it be true what Augustine frequently teaches: «From the time man begins to use the choice of the will, he can both sin and not sin. But one of these he does not do unless aided by Him who said: without me you can do nothing; the other, however, by his own will.» Namely, grace is a help providing power and making the good act: but when one sins, God does not supply power to the will, does not make it act, but the will alone suffices to itself. Therefore the notion of grace, or of the help necessary for acting salutarily, is perverted, when it is constituted in a help predetermining to the act and necessary in order that the will act. Otherwise, however, it stands in the other opinion, as we shall show in its place (Th. LV.).