Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

Domenico Palmieri

Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

Domenico Palmieri (1829–1909)

First published 1885

Dominicus Palmieri, S.J.'s Tractatus de gratia divina actuali (Gulpen, 1885) is a systematic Roman-school treatise on actual grace. After defining grace and its divisions, Palmieri examines its effects, necessity for fallen humanity, gratuitous character, efficacy, distribution, and relation to predestination, engaging Augustine, the Fathers, councils, Jansenism, and the scholastic disputes over physical predetermination. The sixty-two-thesis format exemplifies late nineteenth-century neo-scholastic dogmatic method: historical authorities are gathered into tightly argued theological conclusions. Schola presents the Latin work from the 1885 edition.


Prolegomenon I: Prolegomenon. De notione et partitionibus praecipuis gratiae divinae

Thesis I: Gratia, prout dicitur de bono aliquo alteri collato, definitur: beneficium ex benevolentia collatum citra exigentiam eius, cui confertur: ad quam definitionem redit illa communis Scholasticorum: donum gratis datum.

Thesis II: Gratia creata tum in donum naturale tum in donum supernaturale dispesci potest: supernaturale tamen donum potiore iure et magis proprie gratia dicitur; ita ut ea dona in ipsa ratione gratiae specifice differant.

Thesis III: Ratione habita tum status sive integritatis sive lapsus creaturae rationalis, tum principii meritori, quod proprium est alterius status, gratia supernaturalis distinguitur in gratiam Dei et gratiam Christi.

Thesis IV: Gratia supernaturalis alia est externa, alia interna.

Thesis V: Rursus gratia supernaturalis dividi debet in gratiam gratis datam, et gratiam gratum facientem, quae potior est illâ.

Thesis VI: Gratia gratum faciens alia est in habitu sita et permanens, alia actualis et transiens.

Caput I: De Gratiae actualis natura

Articulus I: De iis, quibus gratiae actualis ratio competit

Thesis I: Ad gratias actuales spectant mentis illustrationes tum quae tantum ab extrinseco excitantur in nobis, tum potissimum quas operatur quoque immediate Spiritus in mente nostra.

Thesis II: Ad gratiam actualem spectant quoque inspirationes voluntatis tum mediatae tum immediatae atque inspirationes immediatae inter gratias actuales enumeratas principem obtinent locum.

Thesis III: Gratiae actuales illustrationis et inspirationis continentur certe actibus vitalibus intellectus et voluntatis.

Thesis IV: Actus vitales, quibus continetur gratia actualis illustrationis et inspirationis, quae principium est deliberati actus et operis boni, sunt primo quidem actus indeliberati utriusque facultatis tum vero etiam actus deliberati.

Thesis V: Ex quo corollarii instar consequitur inter auxilia, quibus voluntas adiuvatur, aliqua exsistere, quae sint per se efficacia.

Thesis VI: Ratio gratiae actualis extendi potest etiam ad actus indeliberatos sensus et appetitus sensitivi.

Thesis VII: Ratio gratiae actualis ad universam quoque providentiam externam tum positivam tum negativam, qua ad opera salutaria et ad beatitudinem homines promoventur, extendi debet. 1.

Articulus II: De viribus quas gratia actualis confert

Thesis I: Gratia actualis confert vires morales voluntati ad honeste agendum.

Thesis II: Tenendum est actualem gratiam nedum morales, sed physicas quoque vires addere facultatibus nostris ad actus salutares eliciendos.

Thesis III: Non demonstratur inter gratias actuales recensendas esse qualitates quasdam reales, non vitales et suapte natura fluentes, quae principium intrinsecum sint actus vitalis indeliberati supernaturalis: tenere autem licet quod actualis gratia absolvatur tum actibus vitalibus tum divina operatione elevante facultatem et cum ea producente actus supernaturales.

Articulus III: De generali habitudine gratiae ad voluntatem

Thesis I: Constat ita addi per gratiam formaliter vires tum physicas tum morales voluntati, ut ex voluntate et gratia unum constituatur principium actus deliberati salutaris, quod est nempe voluntas elevata, illustrata, inspirata.

Thesis II: Gratia actualis interior multipliciter dividitur, nempe in excitantem seu vocantem et adiuvantem, in operantem et cooperantem, in praevenientem et subsequentem, in antecedentem et concomitantem.

Caput II: De Gratia actuali necessaria hominibus lapsis

Articulus I: De potestate naturae ad actus ordinis naturalis

Thesis I: In ipsa natura intellectus humani positum est, ut per solas naturae vires sit ei impossibile cognoscere veritates sibi naturales omnes simul collective sumptas.

Thesis II: Liberum quoque arbitrium gaudet naturaliter potestate physica semper honeste agendi servandique legem naturalem; quamvis ad idem praestandum impotentia quadam morali laboret.

Thesis III: Merito proscripta est doctrina, quae statuit omne, quod agit peccator, peccatum esse et omnia opera infidelium esse peccata liberumque arbitrium sine gratiae Dei adiutorio non nisi ad peccandum valere.

Articulus II: Quid natura humana per se sola non possit

Thesis I: Certum est, quoties in monumentis Ecclesiasticis doctrinam revelatam proponentibus legimus credendum esse quod bonum aliquod esse non possit in nobis vel actus aliquis fieri a nobis non possit citra auxilium gratiae, id de bonis et actibus salutaribus intelligendum esse.

Thesis II: Cum testificatione catholica satis constet citra gratiam nihil boni et salutaris in hominibus esse posse, speciatim affirmamus gratiae quoque deberi fidem saluturam eisdemque pium quodvis initium spiritumque precum.

Thesis III: Necessitas gratiae actualis ad agendum sicut oportet asserta a Patribus contra pelagianos, est necessitas non solum moralis, sed physica et absoluta.

Thesis IV: Ex qua doctrina Patrum consequitur actus salutares esse intrinsece h. e. entitate sua supernaturales.

Thesis V: Eamdem doctrinam necessitatis gratiae, quae saeculo V. a Patribus contra pelagianos propugnata est, iam Patres praecedentium saeculorum in Oriente et Occidente continenter tradiderant. 1.

Thesis VI: Gratia porro necessaria ad salutariter agendum iis, qui necdum sunt conversi ad Deum et quovis habitu supernaturali carent, est gratia duplex interior immediata, nempe illustrationis mentis et inspirationis voluntatis.

Thesis VII: Ut tandem de necessitate gratiae actualis pro iustis quoque disseramus, primum advertendum est quod cum gratia praeveniens dicitur necessaria ad omnes actus salutares, non eo ipso dicitur quod ad singulos actus nova gratia praeveniens sit necessaria.

Thesis VIII: Praestituto Tridentinae Synodi Sess.

Appendix I: De sententia Augustini circa necessitatem gratiae actualis in statu integritatis

Parergon I: De quadam sententia Ripalda

Caput III: De Gratiae actualis gratuitate et de praeparatione ad gratiam

Thesis I: Distincto merito operis condigno et congruo, docemus nullum esse posse in natura meritum, quo gratia comparetur atque utrumque pariter meritum naturae condignum et congruum a Patribus fuisse reiectum. 1.

Thesis II: Negandum est quoque naturam viribus suis posse sibi positivam dispositionem ad gratiam comparare.

Thesis III: Neque precibus naturae adseri potest vis impetratoria gratiae, ratione saltem habita huius, in quo versamur, providentiae ordinis.

Thesis IV: Calumnia est plurimos graecos Patres et nominatim Chrysostomum primas partes in ordine salutis tribuisse naturae et idcirco gratiam merito cuidam naturae congruo rependi affirmasse. 1.

Thesis V: Etsi illius theologici effati: *Facienti quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam*; interpretatio, quae statuit facientem quod in se est viribus naturae, se disponere negativa dispositione ad gratiam, permitti possit tanquam non derogans dignitati gratiae; attamen animadvertendum^[15.

Thesis VI: Gratuitas gratiae optime componitur cum impetrutione et meritis ope praecedentis gratiae comparatis.

Thesis VII: Formalis perseverantia, licet sit per gratiam, quae ex divina ordinatione ipsis debetur, in potestate omnium iustorum; est tamen adhuc donum Dei, distinctum a donis tum iustificationis tum illius potestatis divinitus collatae, ideoque donum speciale atque est donum iustis gratuitum; quod tamen iustus potest suppliciter emereri.

Caput IV: De Gratiae actualis efficacia

Articulus I: Synopsis historica controversiae Patres inter et Massilienses

Thesis I: Massilienses negarint ad salutare fidei initium necessariam esse gratiam interiorem immediatam praevenientem.

Thesis II: Gratia, quam Massilienses ad cetera opera necessariam fussi sunt, si in se spectetur prout est auxilium ad operandum, est illa eadem gratia, quam Augustinus contra pelagianos defendit.

Articulus II: Controversia circa gratiae efficaciam

Controversia cum haereticis

Thesis I: Haeretica est sententia, quae statuit ita voluntatem humanam per gratiam Dei antecedenter moveri, ut libertate indifferentiae sub eadem gratia sit destituta.

Thesis II: Sententia Iansenii: gratiam Dei ita esse efficacem, ut inter ipsam et libertatem exsistat habitus line quidem delectationis inde liberatae praevenientis victricis, inde autem voluntatis victae et ad unum insuperabiliter determinatae, qua parte statuit gratiam necessitatem inferentem, haeretica est nec a praecedente differt; quatenus vero gratiam, quae necessitatem infert, in delectatione collocat, falsa est.

Thesis III: Haeretica est haec divinae gratiae notio, quam Quesnellus systema Iansenii emendaturus tradidit, ut sit nempe ipsa omnipotens Dei voluntas vel operatio manus sive voluntatis Dei omnipotentis.

Thesis IV: Inepte vero ad plures Scripturarum locutiones provocant haeretici, ut suam haeresim tueantur.

I. The Scriptural expressions which the Calvinist, Jansenist, and Quesnellian heretics gather together are those by which we are taught either what man is able to do by himself in the order of salvation, or how and what grace works in us. To the first class belong those by which men are called dead in sins Ephes. II, 1., blind Luc. IV, 19., darkness Matth. VI, 23., an evil tree Matth. VII, 18., servants of sin Rom. VI, 17., being in the flesh, which cannot subject itself to the law of God Rom. VIII, 7., animal men 1. Cor. II, 14., able to do nothing from themselves, as from themselves 2. Cor. III, 5.. To the second class belong those expressions by which God is said to create a clean heart Psalm. L, 12., to make in us a new heart Ezech. XXXVI, 26., to raise from the dead and to give life Ephes. II, 5., to open and circumcise the heart Deuter. XXX, 6., to take away the heart of stone and give a heart of flesh and make us walk in his precepts Ezech. XXXVI, 26., to compel to enter Luc. XIV, 23., to draw Ioan. VI, 44.. To the third class are referred those expressions by which it is asserted that all must be ascribed to God, since he is the one who works all things in us Isaiae XXVI, 12. Ephes. I, 11. 1. Cor. XII, 6., who begins and who perfects Philip. I, 6..

II. But now, as to the first testimonies, we note 1) that most of these expressions are metaphorical; and if you take them more strictly and wish that whatever can be signified by those expressions be excluded from the thing signified, you must take away from the will not only the act of free determination, but also the spontaneous act, which is a vital act and cannot proceed from one who is dead. This, moreover, also goes against those who hurl these testimonies at us. And so 2) some norm must be laid down, to which the interpretation of metaphors of this kind is to be measured. But this norm, according to the heretics themselves, can be none other than the doctrine on the same matter set forth by Scripture in proper or clearer words. But it is established from the preceding Thesis that the clearest testimonies of Scripture assert freedom for man acting through grace; therefore the sense of those metaphorical expressions cannot be that which excludes the power of the will freely determining itself under grace. Wherefore 3) the obvious sense of those expressions is quite clear here: namely, men are regarded according to that which they made themselves to be by sinning, and indeed freely, whether by the sin of the first man or by their own actual sins; for on account of these they are dead, blind, in darkness, animal, servants of sin. Men are accordingly regarded according to that which they have from themselves, destitute of the grace of God. Moreover, of these it must truly be affirmed that they do not live the supernatural life, nor can they live it; that they cannot put forth any act of this life; that they can have no salutary knowledge. But what does this contribute to the question: whether man freely determines himself under grace? Furthermore, the sinful man is called an evil tree, but the evil tree is not the nature or a faculty of the will; rather, properly speaking, the act itself or the volition is so called, or the evil tree is the man willing evil, or evil things; and just as he is freely an evil tree, because the free volition is the beginning and origin of many sins, so man, by changing his will, can freely become a good tree, which indeed he cannot do without the grace of God; but excited and helped by grace, man makes himself a good tree, as Christ himself teaches Matth. XII, 33. (Cf. Enchirid. August. c. 15. with the notes of Faure). The wisdom of the flesh, to be sure, cannot subject itself to the law of God: but that is just the same as saying that he who wills to sin cannot be obedient to God; for the wisdom of the flesh consists in those practical and free judgments by which men rule themselves according to the desires of the flesh, and while these exist man is an enemy of God and cannot be a friend. Moreover, these are the ones who are said by the Apostle to be in the flesh, namely those who freely live according to the desires of the flesh, not those who merely bear habitual concupiscence and are stirred by its indeliberate movements. For the Apostle denies that the faithful are in the flesh, although they certainly were still subject to concupiscence and bore a corruptible body. Finally, what is said, that we can do nothing from ourselves, teaches the necessity of grace for salutary acts, not its efficacy determining to one; and it says in proper terms what the earlier formulae signified metaphorically.

III. To the second class of testimonies there must first be applied the same response which was given under numbers 1º and 2º to the first testimonies. Indeed, our justification is so attributed to God in the Scriptures that it is also asserted of us in almost the same formulae. For the inclination of the heart is attributed both to God 1. Reg. VIII, 58. and to man Psal. CAVIII, 112.; the change of heart is asserted of God 1. Sam. X, 9. and of man Eccle. II, 3.; the circumcision of the heart is also attributed to man Deuter. X, 16.; likewise the opening of the heart Apoc. III, 20. to God, the conversion of the heart Psal. LXXXIV, 5. but is also claimed for man Ioel. II, 12. Act. IIl, 19. God is said to make in us a new heart, but men too are said to do the same Ezech. XVIII, 31. God writes the law in hearts, but men too are said to write it in their own hearts Prov. III, 3. VII, 3. God washes our souls, but men too wash themselves Ierem. IV, 14. God is he who establishes and confirms man, but man too is he who stands and confirms himself 1. Cor. XVI. 13. Iacobi V, 8. God sanctifies man, and man too is said to sanctify himself 1. Ioan. III, 3. Moreover, nothing is more evident than these for showing that God does not so act that he alone acts, that he alone determines.

'Then, moreover, we answer that justification is therefore likened to creation, vivification, and resurrection because in this business man of himself alone can do nothing; God is the one who confers new life from no preceding merit, indeed from a pre-existing positive demerit, and he confers it inasmuch as he gives the power that men may be made sons of God, preparing the wills and helping them once prepared, and he bestows the adoptive filiation itself by the infusion of sanctifying grace. He therefore vivifies and regenerates and raises up efficiently through prevenient grace, working in us without us, but in such a way that we work the good meritorious acts together with him, freely assenting to the grace to which we could, if we wished, resist. God, however, takes away the heart of stone, that is, the undisciplined heart, and gives a heart of flesh, that is, a docile heart, and makes us act, not by compelling or determining the will, or by immediately inspiring the deliberate act itself, nor by himself alone effecting the whole, but by preparing the will and helping it once prepared, so that God is the author, and indeed the principal author, not only of the power but also of our act. Moreover, by this expression and similar ones there is signified the certainty or infallibility of the effect: but the infallibility of the effect must be distinguished from its necessity.

As for the testimony of Luke, compel to enter αὐτέγκατον ἀναγκάζειν, it is evident that the discourse is not about physical necessity, by which the indifference of the will is destroyed; for the one who compels, or who must compel, is not God, but a servant, h. e. an apostolic man, who can indeed persuade and allure men to faith and to God, but cannot determine their will to one. The discourse is about a certain moral force placed in persuasions and even in threats and punishments, when they can be justly employed.

Therefore what the Church begs of God in a certain prayer (Sabb. ante Dominic. Passionis) is not similar to this: compel our wills, rebellious toward you. But by these words there is signified that strength and sweetness of divine providence and grace by which the effect is most certainly obtained, not that force which would impose necessity.

Augustine thus explains the words of John in Ioan. Tract. XXVI. n. 7. «See how the Father draws: by teaching he delights, not by imposing necessity.» Therefore, by the adduced and similar expressions there is not signified the efficacy of grace determining to one, but there is expressed the efficacy of grace conferring the power of acting salutarily and working with us.

IV. As to the third, we have already seen in what way in the work of salvation all must be ascribed to God (Ioh. XVII, VII.). For all is not to be given to God as if he were the sole cause of the act, or the sole free cause of the act, but because he is also the sole cause elevating the will efficiently and conferring supernatural powers upon it, and because on that account in the exercise of the faculty he is the principal cause of the salutary act; and thus of any good act, even of its beginning, God is the author through his grace. The will, however, is at the same time a cause of the same salutary act, and indeed a principal cause, not merely an instrumental one; because it is that which determines the act, which nevertheless it elicits by the help of the power it has received.

Thesis V: Perperam ex iis, quae pelagiani ac massilienses contra Augustini doctrinam obiciebant atque ex difficultate, quam ipse Augustinus se experiri fatebatur in conciliando utroque dogmate libertatis et gratiae, colligunt haeretici sententiam, quam ipsi defendunt, esse ipsam Augustini doctrinam.

Thesis VI: Neque proficiunt magis afferentes doctrinam Augustini, qua traditur et explicatur sive gratiam operari ipsum velle, facere ut velimus, dare bonam voluntatem, dare omnia merita, totum esse gratiae, sive gratiam esse, quae nos discernit et opus bonum non esse volentis aut currentis, sed miserentis Dei, sive gratiam esse omnipotentissimam, efficacissimam, insuperabilem, indeclinabilem et a nullo duro corde respui.

Thesis VII: Inscite quoque Jansenius abutitur Augustini doctrina in Expositione Epistolae ad Galatas: quod amplius nos delectat, secundum id operemur necesse est atque appellatione victricis facta gratiae, ut evincat a maiori delectatione voluntatis consensum necessario extorqueri.

Thesis VIII: Falsa est doctrina, quam Iansenius asserit, enarrans distinctionem ab Augustino (*De Correp. et Grat.* cc. 10. 11. 12.) traditam duplicis adiutorii, nempe adiutorii sine quo non et adiutorii quo; falsaque est pariter interpretatio ab eodem Iansenio adlibita in Augustini locis.

Thesis IX: Gratia omnis potestatem tribuens operandi est vere sufficiens ad id propter quod datur, sive operatio consequatur sive non.

Thesis X: Ut gratiae pure sufficientis doctrina catholica impugnetur, frustra obiicitur 1) quod Augustinus aliam gratiam non agnoverit nisi efficacem sive praeter hanc non agnoverit nisi naturalem possibilitatem pelagianam, quod docuerit gratiam Dei nullo duro corde respui negaveritque gratiam Dei omnibus dari; 2) quod idem censuerit frequenter gratiam deesse, qua tentationes superari ac praecepta servari possint.

Controversia inter scholasticos

Thesis I: Sunt qui putant gratiam efficacem, per quam Deus praestat ut velimus, esse motionem Dei in voluntate receptam eamque praeviam prioritate saltem naturae ad actum secundum, quae ex ipsa sua natura sit efficax ita, ut eam necessario necessitate consequentiae sequatur voluntatis consensus atque ita necessario sequatur, ut quamvis voluntas libere vere agat, attamen contradictionem implicet ea gratia praeparari voluntatem eandemque voluntatem ei gratiae non consentire.

Thesis II: Omissa, quia non amplius necessaria, responsione ad argumenta quae ex testimoniis Scripturarum petuntur, ad Augustinum quod spectat, cui praecipue vel unice ex Patribus innituntur Thomistae, docemus Augustinum eam tradere notionem gratiae, quae theoriam gratiae physice praedeterminantis prorsus excludat.

Thesis III: Ex principio philosophico, cui sententia gratiae praedeterminantis innititur, petito ex dignitate causae primae, necessario consequitur Deum praedeterminare ad entitatem actus mali, quod nequit admitti.

Thesis IV: Alterum principium philosophicum, cui doctrina gratiae praedeterminantis innititur: nempe voluntatem, utpote facultatem indifferentem, indigere determinatione accepta ab alio, si eo intelligatur sensu, quo in hac quaestione adhiberi solet, infert libertatis interemptionem et est idcirco prorsus falsum.

Thesis V: Immerito tandem Thomistae obiiciunt nobis doctrinam s.

Thesis VI: lisdem pene omnibus argumentis hactenus allatis reiiciendum censemus quoque systema illud circa gratiam, quod Augustinianum audit. 1.

Thesis VII: Suppositis principiis fidei in hac materia: gratiam nempe interiorem praevenire et adiuvare nostram voluntatem, omnium actuum salutarium principium esse gratiam Dei, gratiam Dei vere sufficientem dari, liberum arbitrium integrum manere sub gratia gratiamque Dei abiicere posse seu Dei gratiae resistere: ita doctrinam catholicam hanc explicandam censemus.

Thesis VIII: Infallibilis proinde connexio futura gratiae, si haec datur, cum bono opere non est adaequate petenda ex efficacia virtutis gratiae et ex divina omnipotentia, sed ea supposita, formaliter petenda est ex divina praescientia, quae noscit quid sub qualibet gratia actura sit voluntas creata, si ea gratia ipsi donetur.

Thesis IX: Quum non modo bene agendi facultas, sed ipse bonus actus et consensus voluntatis a gratia pendeant, si fiat, quippe qui est a voluntate non per se sed per gratiam praeparata ut fiat; pronum est colligere, eum, qui bene operatur, nihil habere quod non acceperit Deumque esse qui illum discernit.

Thesis X: Talis autem explicatio doctrinae catholicae idoneis fundamentis innititur.

Caput V: De distributione gratiarum

Thesis I: Nulla Dei praecepta hominibus iustis volentibus et conantibus secundum praesentes, quas habent, vires, sunt impossibilia: praesto quoque illis est semper gratia necessaria, qua possibilia fiant.

Thesis II: Nemo est in hac vita adeo obstinatus in malo, ut quavis gratia sufficiente ad resipiscendum et salutem consequendam sit destitutus.

Thesis III: Nullis hominibus adultis vel infidelibus media opportuna aut gratiae sufficientes negantur, quibus ad agnitionem valeant venire veritatis salutemque tandem obtinere.

Thesis IV: Quemadmodum Deus nemini neget auxilia sufficientia ad salutem assequendam, non eadem tamen est quoad singulos distributio gratiarum.

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