Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali
Domenico Palmieri (1829–1909)
First published 1885
Dominicus Palmieri, S.J.'s Tractatus de gratia divina actuali (Gulpen, 1885) is a systematic Roman-school treatise on actual grace. After defining grace and its divisions, Palmieri examines its effects, necessity for fallen humanity, gratuitous character, efficacy, distribution, and relation to predestination, engaging Augustine, the Fathers, councils, Jansenism, and the scholastic disputes over physical predetermination. The sixty-two-thesis format exemplifies late nineteenth-century neo-scholastic dogmatic method: historical authorities are gathered into tightly argued theological conclusions. Schola presents the Latin work from the 1885 edition.
Prolegomenon I: Prolegomenon. De notione et partitionibus praecipuis gratiae divinae
Thesis I: Gratia, prout dicitur de bono aliquo alteri collato, definitur: beneficium ex benevolentia collatum citra exigentiam eius, cui confertur: ad quam definitionem redit illa communis Scholasticorum: donum gratis datum.
Thesis II: Gratia creata tum in donum naturale tum in donum supernaturale dispesci potest: supernaturale tamen donum potiore iure et magis proprie gratia dicitur; ita ut ea dona in ipsa ratione gratiae specifice differant.
Thesis III: Ratione habita tum status sive integritatis sive lapsus creaturae rationalis, tum principii meritori, quod proprium est alterius status, gratia supernaturalis distinguitur in gratiam Dei et gratiam Christi.
Thesis IV: Gratia supernaturalis alia est externa, alia interna.
Thesis V: Rursus gratia supernaturalis dividi debet in gratiam gratis datam, et gratiam gratum facientem, quae potior est illâ.
Thesis VI: Gratia gratum faciens alia est in habitu sita et permanens, alia actualis et transiens.
Caput I: De Gratiae actualis natura
Articulus I: De iis, quibus gratiae actualis ratio competit
Thesis I: Ad gratias actuales spectant mentis illustrationes tum quae tantum ab extrinseco excitantur in nobis, tum potissimum quas operatur quoque immediate Spiritus in mente nostra.
Thesis II: Ad gratiam actualem spectant quoque inspirationes voluntatis tum mediatae tum immediatae atque inspirationes immediatae inter gratias actuales enumeratas principem obtinent locum.
Thesis III: Gratiae actuales illustrationis et inspirationis continentur certe actibus vitalibus intellectus et voluntatis.
Thesis IV: Actus vitales, quibus continetur gratia actualis illustrationis et inspirationis, quae principium est deliberati actus et operis boni, sunt primo quidem actus indeliberati utriusque facultatis tum vero etiam actus deliberati.
Thesis V: Ex quo corollarii instar consequitur inter auxilia, quibus voluntas adiuvatur, aliqua exsistere, quae sint per se efficacia.
Thesis VI: Ratio gratiae actualis extendi potest etiam ad actus indeliberatos sensus et appetitus sensitivi.
Thesis VII: Ratio gratiae actualis ad universam quoque providentiam externam tum positivam tum negativam, qua ad opera salutaria et ad beatitudinem homines promoventur, extendi debet. 1.
Articulus II: De viribus quas gratia actualis confert
Thesis I: Gratia actualis confert vires morales voluntati ad honeste agendum.
Thesis II: Tenendum est actualem gratiam nedum morales, sed physicas quoque vires addere facultatibus nostris ad actus salutares eliciendos.
Thesis III: Non demonstratur inter gratias actuales recensendas esse qualitates quasdam reales, non vitales et suapte natura fluentes, quae principium intrinsecum sint actus vitalis indeliberati supernaturalis: tenere autem licet quod actualis gratia absolvatur tum actibus vitalibus tum divina operatione elevante facultatem et cum ea producente actus supernaturales.
Articulus III: De generali habitudine gratiae ad voluntatem
Thesis I: Constat ita addi per gratiam formaliter vires tum physicas tum morales voluntati, ut ex voluntate et gratia unum constituatur principium actus deliberati salutaris, quod est nempe voluntas elevata, illustrata, inspirata.
Thesis II: Gratia actualis interior multipliciter dividitur, nempe in excitantem seu vocantem et adiuvantem, in operantem et cooperantem, in praevenientem et subsequentem, in antecedentem et concomitantem.
Caput II: De Gratia actuali necessaria hominibus lapsis
Articulus I: De potestate naturae ad actus ordinis naturalis
Thesis I: In ipsa natura intellectus humani positum est, ut per solas naturae vires sit ei impossibile cognoscere veritates sibi naturales omnes simul collective sumptas.
Thesis II: Liberum quoque arbitrium gaudet naturaliter potestate physica semper honeste agendi servandique legem naturalem; quamvis ad idem praestandum impotentia quadam morali laboret.
Thesis III: Merito proscripta est doctrina, quae statuit omne, quod agit peccator, peccatum esse et omnia opera infidelium esse peccata liberumque arbitrium sine gratiae Dei adiutorio non nisi ad peccandum valere.
Articulus II: Quid natura humana per se sola non possit
Thesis I: Certum est, quoties in monumentis Ecclesiasticis doctrinam revelatam proponentibus legimus credendum esse quod bonum aliquod esse non possit in nobis vel actus aliquis fieri a nobis non possit citra auxilium gratiae, id de bonis et actibus salutaribus intelligendum esse.
Thesis II: Cum testificatione catholica satis constet citra gratiam nihil boni et salutaris in hominibus esse posse, speciatim affirmamus gratiae quoque deberi fidem saluturam eisdemque pium quodvis initium spiritumque precum.
Thesis III: Necessitas gratiae actualis ad agendum sicut oportet asserta a Patribus contra pelagianos, est necessitas non solum moralis, sed physica et absoluta.
Thesis IV: Ex qua doctrina Patrum consequitur actus salutares esse intrinsece h. e. entitate sua supernaturales.
Thesis V: Eamdem doctrinam necessitatis gratiae, quae saeculo V. a Patribus contra pelagianos propugnata est, iam Patres praecedentium saeculorum in Oriente et Occidente continenter tradiderant. 1.
Thesis VI: Gratia porro necessaria ad salutariter agendum iis, qui necdum sunt conversi ad Deum et quovis habitu supernaturali carent, est gratia duplex interior immediata, nempe illustrationis mentis et inspirationis voluntatis.
Thesis VII: Ut tandem de necessitate gratiae actualis pro iustis quoque disseramus, primum advertendum est quod cum gratia praeveniens dicitur necessaria ad omnes actus salutares, non eo ipso dicitur quod ad singulos actus nova gratia praeveniens sit necessaria.
Thesis VIII: Praestituto Tridentinae Synodi Sess.
Appendix I: De sententia Augustini circa necessitatem gratiae actualis in statu integritatis
Parergon I: De quadam sententia Ripalda
Caput III: De Gratiae actualis gratuitate et de praeparatione ad gratiam
Thesis I: Distincto merito operis condigno et congruo, docemus nullum esse posse in natura meritum, quo gratia comparetur atque utrumque pariter meritum naturae condignum et congruum a Patribus fuisse reiectum. 1.
Thesis II: Negandum est quoque naturam viribus suis posse sibi positivam dispositionem ad gratiam comparare.
Thesis III: Neque precibus naturae adseri potest vis impetratoria gratiae, ratione saltem habita huius, in quo versamur, providentiae ordinis.
Thesis IV: Calumnia est plurimos graecos Patres et nominatim Chrysostomum primas partes in ordine salutis tribuisse naturae et idcirco gratiam merito cuidam naturae congruo rependi affirmasse. 1.
Thesis V: Etsi illius theologici effati: *Facienti quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam*; interpretatio, quae statuit facientem quod in se est viribus naturae, se disponere negativa dispositione ad gratiam, permitti possit tanquam non derogans dignitati gratiae; attamen animadvertendum^[15.
Thesis VI: Gratuitas gratiae optime componitur cum impetrutione et meritis ope praecedentis gratiae comparatis.
Thesis VII: Formalis perseverantia, licet sit per gratiam, quae ex divina ordinatione ipsis debetur, in potestate omnium iustorum; est tamen adhuc donum Dei, distinctum a donis tum iustificationis tum illius potestatis divinitus collatae, ideoque donum speciale atque est donum iustis gratuitum; quod tamen iustus potest suppliciter emereri.
Caput IV: De Gratiae actualis efficacia
Articulus I: Synopsis historica controversiae Patres inter et Massilienses
Thesis I: Massilienses negarint ad salutare fidei initium necessariam esse gratiam interiorem immediatam praevenientem.
Thesis II: Gratia, quam Massilienses ad cetera opera necessariam fussi sunt, si in se spectetur prout est auxilium ad operandum, est illa eadem gratia, quam Augustinus contra pelagianos defendit.
Articulus II: Controversia circa gratiae efficaciam
Controversia cum haereticis
Thesis I: Haeretica est sententia, quae statuit ita voluntatem humanam per gratiam Dei antecedenter moveri, ut libertate indifferentiae sub eadem gratia sit destituta.
Thesis II: Sententia Iansenii: gratiam Dei ita esse efficacem, ut inter ipsam et libertatem exsistat habitus line quidem delectationis inde liberatae praevenientis victricis, inde autem voluntatis victae et ad unum insuperabiliter determinatae, qua parte statuit gratiam necessitatem inferentem, haeretica est nec a praecedente differt; quatenus vero gratiam, quae necessitatem infert, in delectatione collocat, falsa est.
Thesis III: Haeretica est haec divinae gratiae notio, quam Quesnellus systema Iansenii emendaturus tradidit, ut sit nempe ipsa omnipotens Dei voluntas vel operatio manus sive voluntatis Dei omnipotentis.
I. The opinion concerning the grace of Christ placed in the victorious delectation, and the whole system of the twofold victorious and vanquished delectation, already during the lifetime of Arnauld, who had taken up in the sect the office of master after Jansenius, began to displease the Jansenians, and was rejected by Quesnel, who succeeded Arnauld, a wholly different system being substituted in its place. Quesnel did not defend that system, nor does it appear in his condemned propositions. What, then, did Quesnel devise? A thing at once most frivolous and absurd: for grace, which is a created thing, he substituted the author of grace himself, who would immediately and irresistibly excite salutary acts in us. Namely, he taught that grace is placed in the divine omnipotence, or in the action or operation of omnipotent God, whose immediate and necessary term is the salutary act, and that this divine operation cannot be resisted: for what resists the omnipotent? This notion of divine grace is set forth in the condemned propositions 10a, 11a, 19a, 23a, 24a, coll. 12a, 13a, 16a, 20a, 22a. Hence Quesnel teaches that the grace of God is nothing other than His omnipotent will, or the operation of the hand of omnipotent God, which nothing can impede or retard, and therefore that an indubitable effect, namely the salutary act, follows at whatever time and in whatever place God wills to save the soul, and that no human will resists interior grace; because nothing resists the omnipotent, namely that God commands and by this very fact all things are done, and that the operation of grace is signified by that operation by which God produces creatures out of nothing and recalls the dead to life.
II. Now, in the first place, every grace is indeed an operation of God, if operation is taken effectively, that is, it is a certain created term of God working in us; and it is an operation of omnipotent God, that is, of God who is omnipotent, and in a certain sense it is also an operation of God insofar as He is omnipotent; because the omnipotence of God is required to elevate nature and to confer supernatural powers. But it is not an operation of omnipotent God in this sense, that with regard to obtaining the effect, which is the salutary act, the efficacy of omnipotence is exercised, to which, on account of the infinite power with which the might of God abounds, nothing is able to resist; for the grace of God is resisted. It is in this sense, however, that grace is called by Quesnel an operation of the omnipotent will.
2º. Furthermore, the idea of this Quesnellian grace is such that the grace of God can exist without any created effect of God preceding the salutary act and preparing the will: «the grace of God is nothing other (he says in prop. 112) than the will of omnipotent God commanding and doing what He commands.» But this will is a simple immanent volition of God, virtually passing outward, on account of which the salutary act that is commanded exists, namely the same efficacious volition by which created things exist, and to which therefore the grace of God is compared by Quesnel. But this volition immediately attains the effect, that is, it produces it, without any other thing intervening between the willed effect and the efficacious volition of God, which would prepare the will for the effect from God and be the principle or cause of that ultimate intended effect, that is, of the salutary act. But divine grace is not this will of God or operation of the will of God, but is His real effect, namely something created in the soul, by which the soul is prepared to act salutarially. This is evident from the whole tradition, which was set forth in all of Chapter 1. Hence what is more inept than that illuminations and inspirations, which are our vital acts, and the elevation of the faculty, which is a certain mode of ours, should be the will of God, that is, God?
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The grace of God is not the will of God commanding good acts to exist; for this command itself is the law, which is indeed distinguished from grace: but grace is the benign and merciful will of God supplying powers and helping to do that which God commands: what is clearer than this in the doctrine of Augustine?
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Moreover, the efficacy of grace, by which God obtains salutary acts, when He wills them infallibly, depends not on the power of divine omnipotence alone, but also on infallible knowledge, as we are about to declare presently with Augustine.
III. The Quesnellians ineptly appeal to those testimonies of Scripture in which it is affirmed either that God does all things whatsoever He wills, Psal. CXIII, 3 and CXXXIV, 6, or that no one can resist the will of God, if He Himself has decreed to save Israel Esther. XIII, 9. For one must distinguish, first, between those things which God alone does and those which God wills to be done by us freely cooperating: the former are effects of the power of God alone, the latter depend also on our will, and depend in such a way that they are done freely. Then, a twofold resistance to the divine legislative will must be distinguished: one, by which He commanding is not obeyed; the other, by which he who does not obey is nevertheless able to elude His vengeance as well. Finally, a twofold reason must be distinguished why it is impossible that that which God decreed should not be done: one arising from the efficacy alone of the divine omnipotent will, the other arising from the infallible knowledge by which the decree of God is governed. Now the cited places of Scripture, commending the efficacy of the divine omnipotent will, either speak of effects which depend on the will of God alone, or, if they speak of those effects for which the concurrence of the free human will is also required, when they teach that it is impossible that it be done otherwise than God decreed and that man resist the will of God, they do not exclude the knowledge of God, by which the divine will is governed and by which it comes about that the divine will infallibly obtains what it has decreed.
Nor is the doctrine of Augustine other. For therefore, according to Augustine a) the will of God is omnipotent and always happens; because God wills either that His law be kept or that transgressors be punished: but either of the two always happens, nor can His transgressors flee the avenging power. In De Spir. et lit. c. 33 he has this: «God wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth; not, however, in such a way that He takes away from them free will, by which, using it well or badly, they are most justly judged. When this happens, the infidels indeed act against the will of God, when they do not believe His Gospel: nor, however, do they on that account overcome it, but they defraud themselves of a great and supreme good and entangle themselves in penal evils, about to experience in punishments the power of Him whose mercy in gifts they despised. Thus the will of God is always invincible: but it would be conquered, if it did not find what to do with the despisers, or if they could in any way escape what He has constituted concerning such ones. For whoever says, for example: I will that all these my servants work in the vineyard and, resting after their labor, feast, in such a way that whoever of them is unwilling to do this always grinds in the mill; whoever has despised it indeed seems to act against the will of his master; but then he will conquer it, if, despising the mill as well, he should flee, which can in no way happen under the power of God.
Or b) according to the same Augustine, that which the Omnipotent wills always happens for this reason, because either what He Himself wills happens or what He permits to happen happens; but He permits willingly, not unwillingly. Thus in Enchir. c. 95, preaching the omnipotence of God, he says: «therefore nothing happens unless the Omnipotent wills it to happen, either by permitting it to happen or by doing it Himself:» and in c. 100: «As far as they themselves (the wicked) are concerned, they did what God did not will; but as far as the omnipotence of God is concerned, they were in no way able to bring it about. For by this very fact that they acted against His will, His will was done concerning them. For on this account the great works of the Lord are sought out unto all His wills, so that in a marvelous and ineffable way nothing happens apart from His will, not even what happens against His will. Because it would not happen if He did not permit it, nor does He permit it unwillingly, but willingly; nor would the good one permit evils to be made, unless the Omnipotent were able to make good even out of evil.» Cf. Faure's notes on both chapters.
c) Augustine indeed asserts (De Correp. et Grat. c. 14.) that it is not to be doubted that human wills cannot resist the will of God, who in heaven and on earth has done all things whatsoever He willed, so as to prevent Him Himself from doing what He wills" and that God does not do this very thing «except through the wills of the men themselves,» since He has «without doubt the most omnipotent power of inclining hearts whither He pleases.» But this most omnipotent power consists in this, he says, that the effect of the mercy of God cannot be in the power of man in such a way that it happens that God indeed wills to show mercy efficaciously, but wills it in vain because man is unwilling (Ad Simplicianum L. I. q. 2ª, n. 13.).
Now this indeed comes about from the fact «that if God willed to show mercy to them, He could so call them as would be fitting for them, so that they would be both moved and understand and follow. For those are the elect, who are congruously called... God shows mercy to no one in vain; but on whomsoever He shows mercy, Him He calls in such a way as He knows to be congruous to him, so that he does not reject the one calling.» Ibidem. But this is what we were saying, that the certainty of the effect depends not on power alone, but also on knowledge.