Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali
Domenico Palmieri (1829–1909)
First published 1885
Dominicus Palmieri, S.J.'s Tractatus de gratia divina actuali (Gulpen, 1885) is a systematic Roman-school treatise on actual grace. After defining grace and its divisions, Palmieri examines its effects, necessity for fallen humanity, gratuitous character, efficacy, distribution, and relation to predestination, engaging Augustine, the Fathers, councils, Jansenism, and the scholastic disputes over physical predetermination. The sixty-two-thesis format exemplifies late nineteenth-century neo-scholastic dogmatic method: historical authorities are gathered into tightly argued theological conclusions. Schola presents the Latin work from the 1885 edition.
Prolegomenon I: Prolegomenon. De notione et partitionibus praecipuis gratiae divinae
Thesis I: Gratia, prout dicitur de bono aliquo alteri collato, definitur: beneficium ex benevolentia collatum citra exigentiam eius, cui confertur: ad quam definitionem redit illa communis Scholasticorum: donum gratis datum.
Thesis II: Gratia creata tum in donum naturale tum in donum supernaturale dispesci potest: supernaturale tamen donum potiore iure et magis proprie gratia dicitur; ita ut ea dona in ipsa ratione gratiae specifice differant.
Thesis III: Ratione habita tum status sive integritatis sive lapsus creaturae rationalis, tum principii meritori, quod proprium est alterius status, gratia supernaturalis distinguitur in gratiam Dei et gratiam Christi.
Thesis IV: Gratia supernaturalis alia est externa, alia interna.
Thesis V: Rursus gratia supernaturalis dividi debet in gratiam gratis datam, et gratiam gratum facientem, quae potior est illâ.
Thesis VI: Gratia gratum faciens alia est in habitu sita et permanens, alia actualis et transiens.
Caput I: De Gratiae actualis natura
Articulus I: De iis, quibus gratiae actualis ratio competit
Thesis I: Ad gratias actuales spectant mentis illustrationes tum quae tantum ab extrinseco excitantur in nobis, tum potissimum quas operatur quoque immediate Spiritus in mente nostra.
Thesis II: Ad gratiam actualem spectant quoque inspirationes voluntatis tum mediatae tum immediatae atque inspirationes immediatae inter gratias actuales enumeratas principem obtinent locum.
Thesis III: Gratiae actuales illustrationis et inspirationis continentur certe actibus vitalibus intellectus et voluntatis.
Thesis IV: Actus vitales, quibus continetur gratia actualis illustrationis et inspirationis, quae principium est deliberati actus et operis boni, sunt primo quidem actus indeliberati utriusque facultatis tum vero etiam actus deliberati.
Thesis V: Ex quo corollarii instar consequitur inter auxilia, quibus voluntas adiuvatur, aliqua exsistere, quae sint per se efficacia.
Thesis VI: Ratio gratiae actualis extendi potest etiam ad actus indeliberatos sensus et appetitus sensitivi.
Thesis VII: Ratio gratiae actualis ad universam quoque providentiam externam tum positivam tum negativam, qua ad opera salutaria et ad beatitudinem homines promoventur, extendi debet. 1.
Articulus II: De viribus quas gratia actualis confert
Thesis I: Gratia actualis confert vires morales voluntati ad honeste agendum.
Thesis II: Tenendum est actualem gratiam nedum morales, sed physicas quoque vires addere facultatibus nostris ad actus salutares eliciendos.
Thesis III: Non demonstratur inter gratias actuales recensendas esse qualitates quasdam reales, non vitales et suapte natura fluentes, quae principium intrinsecum sint actus vitalis indeliberati supernaturalis: tenere autem licet quod actualis gratia absolvatur tum actibus vitalibus tum divina operatione elevante facultatem et cum ea producente actus supernaturales.
Articulus III: De generali habitudine gratiae ad voluntatem
Thesis I: Constat ita addi per gratiam formaliter vires tum physicas tum morales voluntati, ut ex voluntate et gratia unum constituatur principium actus deliberati salutaris, quod est nempe voluntas elevata, illustrata, inspirata.
Thesis II: Gratia actualis interior multipliciter dividitur, nempe in excitantem seu vocantem et adiuvantem, in operantem et cooperantem, in praevenientem et subsequentem, in antecedentem et concomitantem.
Caput II: De Gratia actuali necessaria hominibus lapsis
Articulus I: De potestate naturae ad actus ordinis naturalis
Thesis I: In ipsa natura intellectus humani positum est, ut per solas naturae vires sit ei impossibile cognoscere veritates sibi naturales omnes simul collective sumptas.
Thesis II: Liberum quoque arbitrium gaudet naturaliter potestate physica semper honeste agendi servandique legem naturalem; quamvis ad idem praestandum impotentia quadam morali laboret.
Thesis III: Merito proscripta est doctrina, quae statuit omne, quod agit peccator, peccatum esse et omnia opera infidelium esse peccata liberumque arbitrium sine gratiae Dei adiutorio non nisi ad peccandum valere.
Articulus II: Quid natura humana per se sola non possit
Thesis I: Certum est, quoties in monumentis Ecclesiasticis doctrinam revelatam proponentibus legimus credendum esse quod bonum aliquod esse non possit in nobis vel actus aliquis fieri a nobis non possit citra auxilium gratiae, id de bonis et actibus salutaribus intelligendum esse.
Thesis II: Cum testificatione catholica satis constet citra gratiam nihil boni et salutaris in hominibus esse posse, speciatim affirmamus gratiae quoque deberi fidem saluturam eisdemque pium quodvis initium spiritumque precum.
Thesis III: Necessitas gratiae actualis ad agendum sicut oportet asserta a Patribus contra pelagianos, est necessitas non solum moralis, sed physica et absoluta.
Thesis IV: Ex qua doctrina Patrum consequitur actus salutares esse intrinsece h. e. entitate sua supernaturales.
Thesis V: Eamdem doctrinam necessitatis gratiae, quae saeculo V. a Patribus contra pelagianos propugnata est, iam Patres praecedentium saeculorum in Oriente et Occidente continenter tradiderant. 1.
Thesis VI: Gratia porro necessaria ad salutariter agendum iis, qui necdum sunt conversi ad Deum et quovis habitu supernaturali carent, est gratia duplex interior immediata, nempe illustrationis mentis et inspirationis voluntatis.
Thesis VII: Ut tandem de necessitate gratiae actualis pro iustis quoque disseramus, primum advertendum est quod cum gratia praeveniens dicitur necessaria ad omnes actus salutares, non eo ipso dicitur quod ad singulos actus nova gratia praeveniens sit necessaria.
Thesis VIII: Praestituto Tridentinae Synodi Sess.
Appendix I: De sententia Augustini circa necessitatem gratiae actualis in statu integritatis
Parergon I: De quadam sententia Ripalda
Caput III: De Gratiae actualis gratuitate et de praeparatione ad gratiam
Thesis I: Distincto merito operis condigno et congruo, docemus nullum esse posse in natura meritum, quo gratia comparetur atque utrumque pariter meritum naturae condignum et congruum a Patribus fuisse reiectum. 1.
Thesis II: Negandum est quoque naturam viribus suis posse sibi positivam dispositionem ad gratiam comparare.
Thesis III: Neque precibus naturae adseri potest vis impetratoria gratiae, ratione saltem habita huius, in quo versamur, providentiae ordinis.
Thesis IV: Calumnia est plurimos graecos Patres et nominatim Chrysostomum primas partes in ordine salutis tribuisse naturae et idcirco gratiam merito cuidam naturae congruo rependi affirmasse. 1.
Thesis V: Etsi illius theologici effati: *Facienti quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam*; interpretatio, quae statuit facientem quod in se est viribus naturae, se disponere negativa dispositione ad gratiam, permitti possit tanquam non derogans dignitati gratiae; attamen animadvertendum^[15.
Thesis VI: Gratuitas gratiae optime componitur cum impetrutione et meritis ope praecedentis gratiae comparatis.
Thesis VII: Formalis perseverantia, licet sit per gratiam, quae ex divina ordinatione ipsis debetur, in potestate omnium iustorum; est tamen adhuc donum Dei, distinctum a donis tum iustificationis tum illius potestatis divinitus collatae, ideoque donum speciale atque est donum iustis gratuitum; quod tamen iustus potest suppliciter emereri.
Caput IV: De Gratiae actualis efficacia
Articulus I: Synopsis historica controversiae Patres inter et Massilienses
Thesis I: Massilienses negarint ad salutare fidei initium necessariam esse gratiam interiorem immediatam praevenientem.
Thesis II: Gratia, quam Massilienses ad cetera opera necessariam fussi sunt, si in se spectetur prout est auxilium ad operandum, est illa eadem gratia, quam Augustinus contra pelagianos defendit.
I. We say that if it is considered in itself—for that grace labored under this very vice in the opinion of the Massilians, that it was repaid to the merits of nature—but once abstraction is made from this relation of grace, in which the error lies, of which we have already spoken, the grace admitted by the Massilians on account of works was, as regards its own nature and efficacy, that very same grace which Augustine vindicated as necessary for absolutely all good acts, even for the beginning of faith; it was, namely, the same help.
II. The demonstration is easy, with the most explicit testimonies adduced. Augustine, De Praed. SS. ch. 1, says: «Those brethren have advanced so far as to confess that the wills of men are preceded by the grace of God, and to agree that no one is sufficient for himself either to begin or to complete any good work. Holding, therefore, to these points to which they have advanced, they are distinguished very much from the error of the Pelagians.» And in de Dono Persev. ch. 17, he says: «Those who place only the beginning of faith and perseverance even to the end so in our power as not to think them to be gifts of God;... but they concede that God gives the rest, when they are obtained from him by the faith of the believer.» And ibid., ch. 24: «I think that I have taught sufficiently, or rather more than sufficiently, that both to begin to believe in the Lord and to remain in the Lord even to the end are gifts of God. But the other goods pertaining to a pious life, by which God is rightly worshipped, even those very ones on account of whom we do these things concede that they are gifts of God.» Hilary testifies the same, epist. ad Aug. ch. 2: «Moreover, they agree that no one is sufficient for himself even to begin, let alone to complete, any work; for they do not think that a sick man's willing to be healed with a terrified and suppliant will is to be counted among any of the works of their cure.»
II. But in order that our works may be gifts of God, they must, on Augustine's authority, be from the interior grace of the will—namely, from that grace which he himself defended against the Pelagians. Therefore, those whom Augustine testifies to have believed that good works are gifts of God are to be said to have admitted that grace which Augustine championed. Certainly Augustine did not hold as catholic anyone who did not confess wholly that grace of the will which he himself championed; but the same Augustine testifies that the Massilians, as regards the grace necessary for works, were separated from the Pelagians and therefore thought with the Catholics (as he openly teaches in the testimony shortly to be adduced); therefore. And in very truth, if the grace admitted by the Massilians for works had been other than that which Augustine approved, he would have had to institute with them a twofold disputation—one on the necessity of grace for faith, the other on the quality of the grace necessary for works; but this question is not raised, and it is not raised because the Massilians are said to consent that all good works are gifts of God and are given by God; therefore.
IV. The same thing is shown by the argumentation with which Augustine and, after him, Boniface II pressed the Massilians and their followers. For Augustine thus attacks them in De Dono Persev. ch. 17, who deny that there is any longer place for reproofs and exhortations, if the beginning of faith and perseverance are from the grace of God. Why, then, do they preach with us (therefore there was no difference on this point) that wisdom and continence are gifts of God? But if these are preached as being gifts of God, the exhortation by which we exhort men to be wise and continent is not impeded; what, then, is at last the reason that they think the exhortation to be impeded by which we exhort men to come to faith and to remain in it even to the end, if these too are said to be gifts of God? «But this argumentation would avail nothing ad hominem, if the Massilians had said that the other works are gifts of God in an entirely different sense from that which Augustine understood. Therefore.»
V. Wherefore the Massilians, who conceded that faith was foreknown by God but denied that it was predestined—that is, denied that it was the effect of grace prepared by God from eternity—protested that they conceded the other works to be predestined. «But we, they say, say that God did not foreknow anything of ours except the faith by which we begin to believe, and therefore chose us before the constitution of the world and predestined us, so that we might also be holy and immaculate by his grace and work» (De Praed. SS. ch. 19). But Augustine, that they might think catholicly about grace, demands nothing else from the Massilians except that they concede predestination also for faith and perseverance (ibid., coll. ch. 1 and ch. 10, n. 19); therefore the profession of predestination is the profession of that necessary grace which Augustine asserted; but the Massilians conceded that the other works besides faith are predestined; therefore.
VI. Therefore the Massilians professed that help is supplied by God for works, that this help is necessary, and they professed that same help which was admitted by the other Catholics; for by the profession of this help they were distinguished very much from the Pelagians, and nothing else was demanded of them, that they might think entirely catholicly, than that they preach that grace is necessary also for the beginning of faith and for persevering; therefore.
Therefore the Massilians, as regards works, confessed the necessity of interior immediate grace—not only of illumination, but also of inspiration; for Augustine always championed this grace.
VII. Note that the ontological nature of the divine help and its efficacy is not denied by anyone by the very fact that he says it is repaid to the merit of some nature. For it can be conceived that the grace is the same in itself, inasmuch as it is necessary help, even if it is said to be repaid to the merit of nature. For it can remain—or at least it can be conceived to remain (albeit through error)—still an entitatively supernatural gift, even if, in order to confer it, God requires some congruous merit of nature. The ratio of the gratuitous, that is, of the benefit, is indeed changed; but the thing, as it is in itself, can remain the same, or at least it can be conceived (albeit through error) that it remains the same.
COROLLARY. Although the Massilians and Augustine differed among themselves on the question of the term which grace attains and of its gratuitousness, they nevertheless agreed plainly in that which pertains to the character of grace, insofar as it is help for acting. But, as Jansenius himself teaches, the Massilians did not confess that grace which would determine the will to one thing, but rather that grace whose use was in the power of free will; therefore neither did Augustine ever teach a grace determining the will to one thing, but on the contrary he is to be said to have asserted that grace whose use is in the power of free will, to which the will can consent and likewise dissent.