Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

Domenico Palmieri

Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

Domenico Palmieri (1829–1909)

First published 1885

Dominicus Palmieri, S.J.'s Tractatus de gratia divina actuali (Gulpen, 1885) is a systematic Roman-school treatise on actual grace. After defining grace and its divisions, Palmieri examines its effects, necessity for fallen humanity, gratuitous character, efficacy, distribution, and relation to predestination, engaging Augustine, the Fathers, councils, Jansenism, and the scholastic disputes over physical predetermination. The sixty-two-thesis format exemplifies late nineteenth-century neo-scholastic dogmatic method: historical authorities are gathered into tightly argued theological conclusions. Schola presents the Latin work from the 1885 edition.


Prolegomenon I: Prolegomenon. De notione et partitionibus praecipuis gratiae divinae

Thesis I: Gratia, prout dicitur de bono aliquo alteri collato, definitur: beneficium ex benevolentia collatum citra exigentiam eius, cui confertur: ad quam definitionem redit illa communis Scholasticorum: donum gratis datum.

Thesis II: Gratia creata tum in donum naturale tum in donum supernaturale dispesci potest: supernaturale tamen donum potiore iure et magis proprie gratia dicitur; ita ut ea dona in ipsa ratione gratiae specifice differant.

Thesis III: Ratione habita tum status sive integritatis sive lapsus creaturae rationalis, tum principii meritori, quod proprium est alterius status, gratia supernaturalis distinguitur in gratiam Dei et gratiam Christi.

Thesis IV: Gratia supernaturalis alia est externa, alia interna.

Thesis V: Rursus gratia supernaturalis dividi debet in gratiam gratis datam, et gratiam gratum facientem, quae potior est illâ.

Thesis VI: Gratia gratum faciens alia est in habitu sita et permanens, alia actualis et transiens.

Caput I: De Gratiae actualis natura

Articulus I: De iis, quibus gratiae actualis ratio competit

Thesis I: Ad gratias actuales spectant mentis illustrationes tum quae tantum ab extrinseco excitantur in nobis, tum potissimum quas operatur quoque immediate Spiritus in mente nostra.

Thesis II: Ad gratiam actualem spectant quoque inspirationes voluntatis tum mediatae tum immediatae atque inspirationes immediatae inter gratias actuales enumeratas principem obtinent locum.

Thesis III: Gratiae actuales illustrationis et inspirationis continentur certe actibus vitalibus intellectus et voluntatis.

Thesis IV: Actus vitales, quibus continetur gratia actualis illustrationis et inspirationis, quae principium est deliberati actus et operis boni, sunt primo quidem actus indeliberati utriusque facultatis tum vero etiam actus deliberati.

Thesis V: Ex quo corollarii instar consequitur inter auxilia, quibus voluntas adiuvatur, aliqua exsistere, quae sint per se efficacia.

Thesis VI: Ratio gratiae actualis extendi potest etiam ad actus indeliberatos sensus et appetitus sensitivi.

Thesis VII: Ratio gratiae actualis ad universam quoque providentiam externam tum positivam tum negativam, qua ad opera salutaria et ad beatitudinem homines promoventur, extendi debet. 1.

Articulus II: De viribus quas gratia actualis confert

Thesis I: Gratia actualis confert vires morales voluntati ad honeste agendum.

Thesis II: Tenendum est actualem gratiam nedum morales, sed physicas quoque vires addere facultatibus nostris ad actus salutares eliciendos.

Thesis III: Non demonstratur inter gratias actuales recensendas esse qualitates quasdam reales, non vitales et suapte natura fluentes, quae principium intrinsecum sint actus vitalis indeliberati supernaturalis: tenere autem licet quod actualis gratia absolvatur tum actibus vitalibus tum divina operatione elevante facultatem et cum ea producente actus supernaturales.

Articulus III: De generali habitudine gratiae ad voluntatem

Thesis I: Constat ita addi per gratiam formaliter vires tum physicas tum morales voluntati, ut ex voluntate et gratia unum constituatur principium actus deliberati salutaris, quod est nempe voluntas elevata, illustrata, inspirata.

Thesis II: Gratia actualis interior multipliciter dividitur, nempe in excitantem seu vocantem et adiuvantem, in operantem et cooperantem, in praevenientem et subsequentem, in antecedentem et concomitantem.

Caput II: De Gratia actuali necessaria hominibus lapsis

Articulus I: De potestate naturae ad actus ordinis naturalis

Thesis I: In ipsa natura intellectus humani positum est, ut per solas naturae vires sit ei impossibile cognoscere veritates sibi naturales omnes simul collective sumptas.

Thesis II: Liberum quoque arbitrium gaudet naturaliter potestate physica semper honeste agendi servandique legem naturalem; quamvis ad idem praestandum impotentia quadam morali laboret.

Thesis III: Merito proscripta est doctrina, quae statuit omne, quod agit peccator, peccatum esse et omnia opera infidelium esse peccata liberumque arbitrium sine gratiae Dei adiutorio non nisi ad peccandum valere.

Articulus II: Quid natura humana per se sola non possit

Thesis I: Certum est, quoties in monumentis Ecclesiasticis doctrinam revelatam proponentibus legimus credendum esse quod bonum aliquod esse non possit in nobis vel actus aliquis fieri a nobis non possit citra auxilium gratiae, id de bonis et actibus salutaribus intelligendum esse.

Thesis II: Cum testificatione catholica satis constet citra gratiam nihil boni et salutaris in hominibus esse posse, speciatim affirmamus gratiae quoque deberi fidem saluturam eisdemque pium quodvis initium spiritumque precum.

Thesis III: Necessitas gratiae actualis ad agendum sicut oportet asserta a Patribus contra pelagianos, est necessitas non solum moralis, sed physica et absoluta.

Thesis IV: Ex qua doctrina Patrum consequitur actus salutares esse intrinsece h. e. entitate sua supernaturales.

Thesis V: Eamdem doctrinam necessitatis gratiae, quae saeculo V. a Patribus contra pelagianos propugnata est, iam Patres praecedentium saeculorum in Oriente et Occidente continenter tradiderant. 1.

Thesis VI: Gratia porro necessaria ad salutariter agendum iis, qui necdum sunt conversi ad Deum et quovis habitu supernaturali carent, est gratia duplex interior immediata, nempe illustrationis mentis et inspirationis voluntatis.

Thesis VII: Ut tandem de necessitate gratiae actualis pro iustis quoque disseramus, primum advertendum est quod cum gratia praeveniens dicitur necessaria ad omnes actus salutares, non eo ipso dicitur quod ad singulos actus nova gratia praeveniens sit necessaria.

Thesis VIII: Praestituto Tridentinae Synodi Sess.

Appendix I: De sententia Augustini circa necessitatem gratiae actualis in statu integritatis

Parergon I: De quadam sententia Ripalda

Caput III: De Gratiae actualis gratuitate et de praeparatione ad gratiam

Thesis I: Distincto merito operis condigno et congruo, docemus nullum esse posse in natura meritum, quo gratia comparetur atque utrumque pariter meritum naturae condignum et congruum a Patribus fuisse reiectum. 1.

Thesis II: Negandum est quoque naturam viribus suis posse sibi positivam dispositionem ad gratiam comparare.

Thesis III: Neque precibus naturae adseri potest vis impetratoria gratiae, ratione saltem habita huius, in quo versamur, providentiae ordinis.

Thesis IV: Calumnia est plurimos graecos Patres et nominatim Chrysostomum primas partes in ordine salutis tribuisse naturae et idcirco gratiam merito cuidam naturae congruo rependi affirmasse. 1.

Thesis V: Etsi illius theologici effati: *Facienti quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam*; interpretatio, quae statuit facientem quod in se est viribus naturae, se disponere negativa dispositione ad gratiam, permitti possit tanquam non derogans dignitati gratiae; attamen animadvertendum^[15.

Thesis VI: Gratuitas gratiae optime componitur cum impetrutione et meritis ope praecedentis gratiae comparatis.

Thesis VII: Formalis perseverantia, licet sit per gratiam, quae ex divina ordinatione ipsis debetur, in potestate omnium iustorum; est tamen adhuc donum Dei, distinctum a donis tum iustificationis tum illius potestatis divinitus collatae, ideoque donum speciale atque est donum iustis gratuitum; quod tamen iustus potest suppliciter emereri.

Caput IV: De Gratiae actualis efficacia

Articulus I: Synopsis historica controversiae Patres inter et Massilienses

Thesis I: Massilienses negarint ad salutare fidei initium necessariam esse gratiam interiorem immediatam praevenientem.

I. Before we prove this, we must briefly declare what is agreed upon by all, namely that the Massilians admitted certain exterior graces, and these necessary for the beginning of faith. Indeed, Prosper testifies, epist. ad August., c. 3, that this was the opinion of the Massilians: «every man is admonished by divine institutions to believe and to hope»; and Hilary likewise reports, epist. ad August., c. 2: «they assert what is agreeable to truth or fitting to preaching (namely, that the faithful are publicly taught), so that when the occasion of obtaining salvation is announced to those who are prostrate and will never rise by their own strength, by that very merit by which they willed and believed that they could be healed of their disease, they may obtain both the increase of faith itself and the effect of their entire healing.»

And in very truth we have heard that the Massilians, in order to extricate themselves from the difficulty taken from the fact that the preaching of the Gospel was denied to many peoples, had recourse to a certain knowledge of God of future things which would never be future; but this response indicates that they judged that some exterior calling of God is necessary for adults; for if this had not been certain to them, they would surely have answered that those peoples could and can come to faith by other means, and therefore that the lack of preaching is not an argument proving that God does not will all men to believe; as Prosper, together with others, argued against them.

Furthermore, the Massilians, in order to defend their doctrine, appealed to certain works of St. Augustine, especially to the Exposition of Certain Propositions in the Epistle to the Romans, and confessed that they accepted and approved everything which he had taught there, as Hilary testifies, epist. ad August., c. 3. Augustine himself, however, in De Praed. SS., c. 3, is a witness that when he wrote those little works he was in the same error in which the Massilians then found themselves. Now in that Exposition Augustine taught the necessity of exterior grace. For he says in that c. 3 of De Praed. SS.: «In like manner I erred, thinking that the faith by which we believe in God is not a gift of God, but that it is from us and in us, and that through it we obtain the gifts of God by which we live temperately, justly, and piously in this world. For I did not think that faith was prevented by the grace of God, so that through it there would be given to us what we might usefully ask, unless because we could not believe if the proclamation of truth did not precede; but that we should consent to the Gospel preached to us, I judged to be ours and to be from ourselves.» Therefore.

Wherefore those who, as Prosper testifies, ibid., c. 4, said that man is called to the grace of God whether through the natural law, or through the written law, or through evangelical preaching, thus distinguishing between the natural law and the written or extrinsically handed-down one, must be said to have signified by the name of natural law that state which is called that of the law of nature, which indeed did not exclude many exterior graces, whether extrinsic or also intrinsic and supernatural.

And indeed, since that first act was called by the Massilians faith, faith in Christ, credulity, desire of health, the entreaty of the physician and savior, some positive revelation was required, through which the disease and the physician might be recognized, which can be known only by revelation, and to which revelation faith would respond, which rests on the authority of God speaking.

Il. These things being settled, let us come to the demonstration of the Thesis. Theologians prove it by several arguments. And first, by the testimony of those who in the fifth and sixth centuries made mention of the errors of the Gauls concerning grace and refuted them. For it is established from these testimonies that the Massilians claimed the beginning of faith for nature alone, wished nature to take the lead and grace to follow, and grace to be conferred at length by the merit of credulity obtained by the powers of nature. But this is an open denial of the necessary interior and immediate grace for the beginning of faith; for what is asserted, that the beginning of faith is owed to nature alone, that nature takes the lead, that grace follows, etc., contradicts the necessity of interior immediate grace.

We have already given the testimony of Prosper in the preceding historical synopsis, n. VI. Hilary likewise reports to August., c. 2: «These are the things which are debated at Marseilles, or also in other places in Gaul. It is new and useless to preaching, that certain men are said to be chosen according to the purpose of election, so that they can neither receive it nor hold it, unless the will to believe is given. They think that all the vigor of preaching is excluded, if it is said that nothing which may be aroused in men through it has remained (after the sin of Adam). They agree that every man perished in Adam, and that no one is freed from there by his own free choice. But this they assert as agreeable», and the rest which we gave a little before.

Augustine, De Praedest. SS., c. 1: «These our brothers have arrived at confessing that the wills of men are prevented by the grace of God, and at agreeing that no one can suffice for himself for any good work, whether to be begun or to be completed. Therefore, retaining these things to which they have arrived, they are distinguished greatly from the error of the Pelagians.» Then, after a few intervening words, he continues, c. 2: «First, therefore, we must show that the faith by which we are Christians is a gift of God: if only we can do this more diligently than we have already done in so many and such great volumes. But now I see that I must answer those who say that the divine testimonies which we have adduced on this matter avail to this, that we should know that we have faith itself indeed from ourselves, but its increase from God, as if faith is not given to us by him but is only increased in us by him, by that merit by which it took its beginning from us.» Compare also the clear testimony on this matter recited a little before, in which he describes his old error similar to this one. And at the end of the book he concludes, saying that a new question had compelled him to dispute. He explains, indeed, of what sort the new question is, namely: «since in our earlier little works we had shown by sufficiently suitable testimonies that faith too is a gift of God, it was found that it was objected that those testimonies avail to this, that they show the increase of faith to be a gift of God; but that the beginning of faith, by which one first believes in Christ, is from man himself and is not a gift of God, but that God builds this up, so that when it has gone before, the rest, which are gifts of God, follow as by this merit.» Boniface II, in the letter to Caesarius by which he confirmed the Canons of the Second Synod of Orange, says, c. 1: «You indicate that some bishops of the Gauls, although they have already agreed that the other goods come from the grace of God, will that faith alone, by which we believe in Christ, is of nature, not of grace.» Moreover, there is no need to warn that by phrases of this sort, "gift of God", "to be in God", there is signified, in Augustine and the other Fathers of his age against the Pelagians, that which God works in us through his grace, that which nature cannot effect or attain by its own powers. And on the contrary, these phrases, "to be from us", "to be from nature" or "of nature", signified among the same authors that which would be done or obtained by us through the powers of nature alone, without the gratuitous help of God.

Then the same thing is established if the theorems are considered by which the system of the Massilians was, as it were, contained. For they maintained, first, that in nature, although vitiated and corrupted by the sin of the first man, there remained some good, namely that by which it could believe and will to be healed. Hilary, 1. c., c. 4: «Nor (they say) can it be said of this faith: what have you that you have not received? since in the same nature there remained, although vitiated, what was previously given to it sound and perfect.» They maintained, second, that the relation between faith and grace is this, that God requires faith, requires it of nature, and therefore requires it so that he may repay grace by its merit. Hilary, 1. c., c. 2: «For as to what is said: believe and you will be saved, they assert that one of these is required, the other offered, so that on account of what is required, if it has been rendered, what is offered may afterwards be repaid. Whence they think it follows that faith is to be shown by him to whose nature it was granted by the will of the Creator; and they think that none nature is so depraved or extinguished that it should not or could not will itself to be healed.» They maintained, moreover, that this is the difference between works and faith, that faith alone is foreknown by God, but works are also predestined. God is said to predestine those things which he knew he would do from an eternal decree.

Augustine, De Praed. SS., c. 19: «But these men of ours, about whom and for whom we now treat, perhaps say that the Pelagians are refuted by this apostolic testimony, where he says (Ephes. I. 13.) that we are therefore chosen in Christ and predestined before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and immaculate in his sight in charity. For they (the Pelagians) think that, having received the precepts, we are already made holy through ourselves by the choice of free will... and since God foreknew this future, they say, therefore he chose and predestined us before the foundation of the world in Christ.... But we (the Massilians), they say, say that God foreknew nothing of ours except the faith by which we begin to believe, and therefore chose us before the foundation of the world and predestined us, that we should also be holy and immaculate by his grace and work.» They maintained, finally, as we have already seen, that some are therefore not called through the preaching of the Gospel to faith, because they were foreseen as not going to believe by the good will of nature. Prosper.l. c. c. 5. Hilary.l. c. c. 3. But he who maintains all these things surely denies that grace is given and required for the beginning of faith; he denies the immediate grace through which faith is the work of God: therefore.

Now, thirdly, it is proved if the arguments are considered which the Fathers used against the Massilians, which would surely avail nothing if those men had confessed grace to be necessary for the beginning of faith. For the arguments taken up by the Fathers reduce to this. a) Testimonies of Scripture of this sort: I obtained mercy that I might be faithful: to you it is given for Christ, not only to believe in him, but also to suffer for him: By grace you have been saved through faith, and this not of yourselves; for it is the gift of God. (August., De Praed. SS., Conc. Araus. II., c. 25, and Boniface II in epist. ad Caesarium). But he who teaches that faith is the fruit of interior prevenient grace does not contradict these testimonies. b) The argument drawn from the words of the Apostle: what have you that you have not received: whence would follow what blessed Cyprian teaches, that one must glory in nothing, because nothing is ours (August., ibid., c. 3; the African bishops exiled in Sardinia, in the Synodal Letter, cc. 3, 5), from which the Fathers concluded that faith also is from God: but if the Massilians had conceded that faith also is from grace, they too would have confessed that we have nothing which we have not received and that nothing is ours; and therefore this argument could exercise no force against them. y) Of all our goods

that God is the author, and of all the virtues by which from the beginning of faith one tends toward God, as the bishops of the Apostolic See handed down (Caelestinus in Auctorit. Sedis Apostolicae): but neither would the Massilians have contradicted this doctrine, if they had agreed that faith is prevented by the immediate grace of God. d) That the Massilians destroyed the true notion of grace, in that in their opinion it would no longer be gratuitous. August., De Praed. SS, c. 2: «One does not therefore depart from that opinion which Pelagius himself was compelled to condemn in the Palestinian episcopal judgment, as the same acts testify: that the grace of God is given according to our merits, if it does not pertain to the grace of God that we have begun to believe.» But this weapon would be wrongly hurled against them, if faith were an effect of the grace of God. e) According to the Massilians, the human will precedes, grace follows, the obedience of man is prior to grace. Prosper, epist. ad August., c. 6: «They will obedience to be prior to grace, so that the beginning of salvation is to be believed to stand from the one who is saved, not from the one who saves, and the will of man procures for itself the help of divine grace, not that grace subjects the human will to itself (insofar as it prevents it).» This indeed cannot be reconciled with the notion of grace. But if the Massilians had demanded prevenient grace also for the beginning of faith, then according to them the human will would not precede and grace would follow: therefore.

The same thing is demonstrated, fourthly, by the definitions issued against them. For Boniface II censures the opinion of the Massilians, confirming the decrees of the Second Council of Orange; moreover he condemns those who teach that faith alone, by which we believe in Christ, is of nature and not of grace; who deny that right faith in Christ and the beginning of every good will are inspired into the senses of individuals by the prevenient grace of God; who say that the good of nature, which they know to have been depraved by the sin of Adam, is the author of our faith rather than Christ. The same Synod likewise condemns those who teach that grace is conferred by human invocation, that God awaits our wills, that the beginning of faith and the very affection of credulity is not a gift of God, that the mercy of God is conferred on those who without grace desire, ask, knock, that man can consent to evangelical preaching by the vigor of nature, that man can come to the grace of baptism by free will (canons 3, 4, 6, 7, 8); and finally, in canon 25, it establishes and proves by the testimonies of Scripture that faith is in us not through the good of nature but through the grace of God.

But the heresy opposed to these is that which we have declared thus far. Therefore.

Moreover, if the arguments set forth thus far are weighed, it will be clear that the Massilians denied for the beginning of faith the necessity of any interior immediate grace, that is, not only of the grace of inspiration, but also of illumination. Indeed, the testimonies of the Fathers hand down that grace was denied by the Massilians for the beginning of faith in such a way that they testify this universally, without any limitation. The theorems of the Massilians, that faith is of nature, that grace is repaid to the good will of nature, and therefore the opposition set up between nature, or the good of nature which remained after sin, and grace, manifestly exclude any supernatural interior grace which would be a necessary principle of faith. Likewise, the definitions of the Synod against them, which establish the necessity of the grace of illumination and of inspiration for consenting to evangelical preaching, persuade us that the necessity of both graces, as regards that point, was denied by the Massilians.

III. From the complete demonstration thus far adduced it is clear 1) that the Fathers most certainly convicted the Massilians of this, that they denied the necessity of grace for the beginning of faith. 2) From all the monuments, whether reporting, impugning, or proscribing the error of the Massilians, it is equally most certain that this one thing alone was reprobated in them, namely, the denial of the necessity of grace, not however the denial of a certain manner of acting of grace, by which, namely, it determines the will to one thing: indeed, there was not even a question concerning the manner of acting of grace.

IV. What, then, of Jansenius? He (a thing which cannot be sufficiently disapproved, some Catholics, not deterred by the condemnation of the fourth Jansenist proposition, assenting) lays down in De haeresi pelagiana I. VIII. c. 6. first, and rightly indeed, that the mind of not all the Semi-Pelagians is to be investigated by him, since the opinion of all was not one, «but of those only whose opinion and dogmas Prosper and Hilary submitted to Augustine to be judged and handed over to be refuted. For to know the opinions of those who err does not profit so very much, unless at the same time it be known, by the interposed certain and approved authority of some doctor, what is to be judged concerning each one, what is to be fled, what to be held, what to be tolerated.» Then concerning the opinion of these he decides thus: «The opinions of the Massilians and the doctrine of Augustine having been most diligently weighed, I think that it must be certain and undoubted that the Massilians confessed a true, and also internal and actual, grace to be necessary even for faith itself, which they ascribe to the powers of human freedom and will.For Jansenius wants the question with the Massilians to have been about the manner of acting of grace in us, and the Fathers to have contended against the Massilians denying this, that such is the grace conferred on fallen men, that it determines the will to one thing and that consequently it is not in the power of free will to use grace or not to use it, to consent or to dissent. (De haeresi pelag. L. VIII. c. 8. coll. De Gratia Christi L. II, c. 4.) That assertion of Jansenius, however, which seems to embrace all the Massilians about whom Prosper reported to Augustine, in reality does not comprehend all; for already in the preceding L. VII. c. 2. Jansenius had conceded that some Semi-Pelagians denied the necessity of interior actual grace, and had proved this from the testimony of the letter of Prosper to Augustine, in which there is indeed speech of those Massilians whose opinion Prosper handed over to Augustine to be judged and refuted. Jansenius therefore concedes that some Massilians denied the necessity of grace for the beginning of faith, indeed for all works, as he himself indeed judges, but he likewise contends that others among the Massilians, about whom Prosper and Hilary wrote to Augustine, admitted the necessity of interior actual grace for the beginning of faith.

V. But, to say this briefly, a distinction of this sort among those Massilians whose opinions Prosper and Hilary carried to Augustine (for about these we too speak) is to be rejected as being among the fictions of a vain mind. It rests chiefly on these words of Prosper in his letter to Augustine, by which Prosper designates some, as Jansenius thinks, among the Massilians themselves who would altogether agree with the Pelagians and would utterly do away with the necessity of grace. For thus c. 4 has it: «Some of these, however, do not depart from the Pelagian paths to such an extent that, when they are forced to confess that grace of Christ which prevents all human merits, lest, if it be rendered to merits, it be vainly called grace, they want this condition (creation) of each individual man to pertain to it, in which the grace of the Creator establishes him, meriting nothing beforehand, because not even existing, free and rational, so that through the discernment of good and evil he may be able to direct his will both to the knowledge of God and to... the obedience of his commandments, and to arrive at that grace by which we are reborn in Christ through the natural faculty, namely, by asking, seeking, knocking, so that for this reason he receives, for this reason he finds, for this reason he enters; because, having used well the good of nature, he has merited to arrive at that saving grace by the help of initial grace... And as much as anyone has faculty for evil, so much let him have faculty for good, and with equal moment let the mind move itself either to vices or to virtues. Behold, they say, an express Pelagian opinion denying the necessity of grace for the beginning of faith: but this is said by Prosper to be the opinion of some; therefore the others approved that necessity of grace which these denied.

I answer that those certain ones are not distinguished from the other Massilians for this reason, that they taught different dogmas, but for this reason, that, reduced to straits so as to confess a grace preventing all merits, they used other formulas, namely those which were proper to the Pelagians, saying that preventing grace is nature and free will, which were conferred gratuitously through creation. From which explicit explanation the others abstained, saying rather: not wholly corrupted and extinguished through the sin of Adam is the power received from him for good, but something has remained in nature, although vitiated. These two ways of speaking, if well considered, say the same thing; but the one is both more obscure and more modest, and savors less of Pelagian shamelessness. Therefore this distribution of the Massilians into two classes is to be rejected as fictitious. But the other things which are brought forward to prove the same distribution are more than empty.

VI. Wherefore, that they may more efficaciously demonstrate that the Massilians admitted the necessity of interior grace even for the beginning of faith, they appeal to writers certainly, as they themselves judge, Semi-Pelagian, namely Cassian, Faustus of Riez, Arnobius the Younger, Gennadius, in whose writings the profession of that necessity is openly contained; whence they gather that the Semi-Pelagians were not reprobated on account of the denial of a necessity of this sort (Jansenius De Haeresi pelag. L. VII. cc. 2.3). But concerning which Massilians is the controversy for us? Certainly concerning those whose opinions Prosper and Hilary carried to Augustine. But the opinions of Faustus, Gennadius, and Arnobius, Prosper and Hilary could not have signified to Augustine. But what those taught whose errors Prosper and Hilary reported to Augustine must be gathered entirely from the writings of these which survive, and it is only by a sophistical method, these being set aside, that appeal is made to other inept witnesses. Likewise the controversy is for us concerning those whose opinions the Synod of Orange and Boniface II proscribed. But by these was proscribed that error which denies grace to be necessary for the beginning of faith, not the error which, the necessity of grace for absolutely all acts being admitted, denies a certain special manner of the working of grace. Wherefore, to conclude the matter briefly, one of two things: either the cited authors concede grace to be necessary for absolutely all good acts, the beginning of faith not excluded, or they deny it. If they deny it, appeal is wrongly made to them; if they concede it, I deny that they are to be numbered among those about whom we dispute, namely those whose opinions Prosper and Hilary handed over to Augustine and the Synod of Orange and Boniface condemned.

VII. Moreover, how is it proved that the cited authors admitted the necessity of grace for all acts, even the beginning of faith? Namely, by certain testimonies being produced, by which they teach or seem to teach it. But that argument is similar to this: Cassian, easily the prince of that Massilian sect, expressly professed, as Prosper himself testifies against the Collator, the catholic doctrine; therefore Cassian and the rest of the Massilians thought nothing but catholicly. Surely it remains to be seen whether all the Massilians were always consistent with themselves, whether all their doctrine concerning grace was reprobated, or only that by which, contradicting themselves, they fell away from the catholic faith. But it is established that some, whose doctrine was disapproved by the Fathers, thought at times entirely catholicly, as is clear in Cassian, and that only those heads of doctrine were impugned by the Fathers by which they contradicted themselves while thinking catholicly. Therefore the testimonies of some, which assert the necessity of grace for all acts, do not prove that they themselves did not deny the necessity of grace for the beginning of faith and were not rejected by the Fathers on account of this error (Cf. Franciscus Annatus in the work Augustinus a Baianis vin-elicatus b. VII, c. 2. §. 2). Moreover, whether all those cited authors were or were not in the Semi-Pelagian error, you can learn from Alticotius Summa Augustiniana, in the Preface of part V.

VIII. The argument which they seek from the works of Augustine is similar to the preceding (Jansenius De haeresi pelag. L. VIII, c. 8.). For Augustine in De Praed. SS. c. 3 testifies that he once adhered to that opinion which was afterwards that of the Massilians, and says that this is sufficiently indicated by some little works written by him before his episcopate. What therefore do the Jansenists attempt? They turn over several works written by Augustine when not yet bishop (Lib. 83. 9q. q. 6.8 — De quantitate animae c. 28 — Lib. de beata vita n. 35 — Soliloq. I. I. c. 1. L. II. c. 6.), find in them the necessity of grace for all acts luminously handed down; therefore, they conclude, the denial of the necessity of grace for the beginning of faith is not that error with which Augustine was once imbued, which some of his little works written before the beginning of the episcopate sufficiently indicate.

But who indicated to Jansenius that those are the books in which the error of Augustine is to be sought? Or did Augustine say that all his little works written before the episcopate were infected with that error? Again, did Augustine leave us uncertain what sort this error was, so that it would be necessary to divine it? Did he not there in De Praed. SS. most openly signify the error to be this, that he did not believe faith to be prevented by the grace of God, but the other works to be so prevented? Therefore, is his error to be determined from the little works of Augustine (which ones are to be consulted we do not know, since Augustine himself at least did not indicate them all), or rather from the error which Augustine openly signified is it to be determined which are those several little works sprinkled with the Semi-Pelagian stain? This is without doubt to be done. But Jansenius preferred to enter the former path, so that he could traduce to us as heretical the catholic doctrine.

And indeed these things are in the first place certain: the one, that Augustine in his Retractationes emended and more accurately explained whatever in his works seemed to him less rightly said, especially if anything could in any way favor the Pelagian error; the other, that when at the beginning of his episcopate he wrote the books to Simplicianus, Augustine fully understood the catholic doctrine of gratuitous election to faith, as he himself testifies in De Praed. SS. c. 4. Now indeed in L. I. Retrat., reviewing in chronological order all the books written before the episcopate, in all of them up to c. 23 he notes nothing said by himself less cautiously or less truly in this matter of which we treat. But in c. 23, retracting the exposition of certain propositions from the Epistle to the Romans, he notes this his error, in which, when he wrote it, he was engaged. Likewise in c. 24 and 25, reviewing the exposition of the Epistle to the Galatians and the inchoate exposition of the Epistle to the Romans, he notes something in them which could at least obscurely indicate that error; for he says in c. 24: «Likewise what I said: grace is that by which our sins are forgiven us, that we may be reconciled to God; but peace is that by which we are reconciled to God: is to be understood thus, that we nevertheless know that both belong to the general grace of God, just as in the people of God one thing is specially Israel, another specially Judas, and yet both generally Israel.» The same he repeats in c. 25. There remains the work on Lying, written after the preceding works before the beginning of the episcopate, in which nothing is noted in this regard. Then follow the books to Simplicianus. Therefore the books in which that error is to be sought are those expositions cited above on the epistles of Paul.

IX. And surely, since, according to Jansenius, the error in which Augustine was before the episcopate is not placed in the denial of the necessity of grace for faith, but in the denial of a certain grace which, determining the will to one thing, gives the act itself, and this error, as Augustine testifies, is found in some of his writings before the episcopate; certainly, if Augustine had judged that error to be the error which Jansenius thinks, the same Augustine, retracting all his little works written before the episcopate, would have noted the same error in some of these little works. But Augustine never notes that error, never indicates that he once erred for this reason, that he denied or did not teach that determining grace. Therefore Jansenius dreams.

X. Finally Jansenius (De haeresi Pelag. L. VIII, c. 6. seq.) observes that the Massilians were reproved by the Fathers because 1) they affirmed salvation to be ready for all, if only they be willing to receive it, 2) all are called and invited by grace, but each one obeys the caller by his own free will (Prosper. carm. De Ingr. v. 253. 256), 3) grace withdraws itself from none, but aids those desirous of right and enlightens those willing (ibid. 259), 4) God awaits our will, that we may be cleansed from sin (Synod. Araus. c. 4). But, he says, these are the formulas which those use who deny grace efficacious of itself; therefore the Massilians denied this grace, and this grace the Fathers wanted to establish.

But when the Massilians said that men receive grace if they will, obey the caller by their own free will, are aided and enlightened if willing, that their will is awaited, 1) they spoke of the natural will elicited without the help of interior grace, and this is what the Fathers refute; 2) by the grace by which they said men are called, the Massilians understood exterior grace; but they wanted interior immediate grace to follow upon the merits of nature, and this again is what the Fathers condemn. Moreover, none of these is asserted by those who deny grace efficacious of itself, and efficacious in such a way that it determines the act. Nor does that prove it more, which the same Jansenius brings forth from Prosper (epist. ad August. c. 6.) reproving the Massilians because they refused to confess that grace which «subjects to itself the human will.» For this grace is not that which constrains and subjugates the will by determining it to one thing, but the grace which a good will follows, namely grace preventing, not prevented by the will of nature, as is clear from the whole context and the whole controversy with the Massilians.

Finally, that you may dissolve the argument which Jansenius proposes (De haeresi Pelag. L. VIII, c. 1. seq.), observe that the Massilians taught not only that man can come to faith by free will, but by free will alone; and therefore that by the name of nature, to which they granted this power, they understood nature destitute of any supernatural intrinsic aid. For this reason Augustine too, when he denies to the Massilians that free will and nature suffice, taking, as is fitting, those words in the same signification in which they were taken by the adversaries, understands nature and free will destitute of all interior grace. Which sense appears in that sentence (De Praed. SS. c. 5): «to be able to have faith is of the nature of men; to have it, however, is of the grace of the faithful.» Wherefore, although Augustine elsewhere by the name of nature and free will signified nature and free will increased by grace, which is sufficiently clear from the declarations of the same Augustine; it does not follow that these names were taken by Augustine in this same sense in this question with the Massilians, and consequently that the Massilians too by the name of nature and free will understood nature and free will endowed with some grace.

Therefore the first part of the proposition of Jansenius recited above was rightly proscribed by the Apostolic See as false. And indeed that censure of falsity regards the first part of the proposition, just as the censure of heresy regards the latter; for that part could not be passed over without a mark, since the other depended wholly on it, so that, if the first were permitted, the second part could no longer be condemned as heretical, unless by branding the mark of heresy or the suspicion of it upon all the Fathers who impugned the Massilians.

But that we may dispatch the other question, we lay down this second thesis.

Thesis II: Gratia, quam Massilienses ad cetera opera necessariam fussi sunt, si in se spectetur prout est auxilium ad operandum, est illa eadem gratia, quam Augustinus contra pelagianos defendit.

Articulus II: Controversia circa gratiae efficaciam

Controversia cum haereticis

Thesis I: Haeretica est sententia, quae statuit ita voluntatem humanam per gratiam Dei antecedenter moveri, ut libertate indifferentiae sub eadem gratia sit destituta.

Thesis II: Sententia Iansenii: gratiam Dei ita esse efficacem, ut inter ipsam et libertatem exsistat habitus line quidem delectationis inde liberatae praevenientis victricis, inde autem voluntatis victae et ad unum insuperabiliter determinatae, qua parte statuit gratiam necessitatem inferentem, haeretica est nec a praecedente differt; quatenus vero gratiam, quae necessitatem infert, in delectatione collocat, falsa est.

Thesis III: Haeretica est haec divinae gratiae notio, quam Quesnellus systema Iansenii emendaturus tradidit, ut sit nempe ipsa omnipotens Dei voluntas vel operatio manus sive voluntatis Dei omnipotentis.

Thesis IV: Inepte vero ad plures Scripturarum locutiones provocant haeretici, ut suam haeresim tueantur.

Thesis V: Perperam ex iis, quae pelagiani ac massilienses contra Augustini doctrinam obiciebant atque ex difficultate, quam ipse Augustinus se experiri fatebatur in conciliando utroque dogmate libertatis et gratiae, colligunt haeretici sententiam, quam ipsi defendunt, esse ipsam Augustini doctrinam.

Thesis VI: Neque proficiunt magis afferentes doctrinam Augustini, qua traditur et explicatur sive gratiam operari ipsum velle, facere ut velimus, dare bonam voluntatem, dare omnia merita, totum esse gratiae, sive gratiam esse, quae nos discernit et opus bonum non esse volentis aut currentis, sed miserentis Dei, sive gratiam esse omnipotentissimam, efficacissimam, insuperabilem, indeclinabilem et a nullo duro corde respui.

Thesis VII: Inscite quoque Jansenius abutitur Augustini doctrina in Expositione Epistolae ad Galatas: quod amplius nos delectat, secundum id operemur necesse est atque appellatione victricis facta gratiae, ut evincat a maiori delectatione voluntatis consensum necessario extorqueri.

Thesis VIII: Falsa est doctrina, quam Iansenius asserit, enarrans distinctionem ab Augustino (*De Correp. et Grat.* cc. 10. 11. 12.) traditam duplicis adiutorii, nempe adiutorii sine quo non et adiutorii quo; falsaque est pariter interpretatio ab eodem Iansenio adlibita in Augustini locis.

Thesis IX: Gratia omnis potestatem tribuens operandi est vere sufficiens ad id propter quod datur, sive operatio consequatur sive non.

Thesis X: Ut gratiae pure sufficientis doctrina catholica impugnetur, frustra obiicitur 1) quod Augustinus aliam gratiam non agnoverit nisi efficacem sive praeter hanc non agnoverit nisi naturalem possibilitatem pelagianam, quod docuerit gratiam Dei nullo duro corde respui negaveritque gratiam Dei omnibus dari; 2) quod idem censuerit frequenter gratiam deesse, qua tentationes superari ac praecepta servari possint.

Controversia inter scholasticos

Thesis I: Sunt qui putant gratiam efficacem, per quam Deus praestat ut velimus, esse motionem Dei in voluntate receptam eamque praeviam prioritate saltem naturae ad actum secundum, quae ex ipsa sua natura sit efficax ita, ut eam necessario necessitate consequentiae sequatur voluntatis consensus atque ita necessario sequatur, ut quamvis voluntas libere vere agat, attamen contradictionem implicet ea gratia praeparari voluntatem eandemque voluntatem ei gratiae non consentire.

Thesis II: Omissa, quia non amplius necessaria, responsione ad argumenta quae ex testimoniis Scripturarum petuntur, ad Augustinum quod spectat, cui praecipue vel unice ex Patribus innituntur Thomistae, docemus Augustinum eam tradere notionem gratiae, quae theoriam gratiae physice praedeterminantis prorsus excludat.

Thesis III: Ex principio philosophico, cui sententia gratiae praedeterminantis innititur, petito ex dignitate causae primae, necessario consequitur Deum praedeterminare ad entitatem actus mali, quod nequit admitti.

Thesis IV: Alterum principium philosophicum, cui doctrina gratiae praedeterminantis innititur: nempe voluntatem, utpote facultatem indifferentem, indigere determinatione accepta ab alio, si eo intelligatur sensu, quo in hac quaestione adhiberi solet, infert libertatis interemptionem et est idcirco prorsus falsum.

Thesis V: Immerito tandem Thomistae obiiciunt nobis doctrinam s.

Thesis VI: lisdem pene omnibus argumentis hactenus allatis reiiciendum censemus quoque systema illud circa gratiam, quod Augustinianum audit. 1.

Thesis VII: Suppositis principiis fidei in hac materia: gratiam nempe interiorem praevenire et adiuvare nostram voluntatem, omnium actuum salutarium principium esse gratiam Dei, gratiam Dei vere sufficientem dari, liberum arbitrium integrum manere sub gratia gratiamque Dei abiicere posse seu Dei gratiae resistere: ita doctrinam catholicam hanc explicandam censemus.

Thesis VIII: Infallibilis proinde connexio futura gratiae, si haec datur, cum bono opere non est adaequate petenda ex efficacia virtutis gratiae et ex divina omnipotentia, sed ea supposita, formaliter petenda est ex divina praescientia, quae noscit quid sub qualibet gratia actura sit voluntas creata, si ea gratia ipsi donetur.

Thesis IX: Quum non modo bene agendi facultas, sed ipse bonus actus et consensus voluntatis a gratia pendeant, si fiat, quippe qui est a voluntate non per se sed per gratiam praeparata ut fiat; pronum est colligere, eum, qui bene operatur, nihil habere quod non acceperit Deumque esse qui illum discernit.

Thesis X: Talis autem explicatio doctrinae catholicae idoneis fundamentis innititur.

Caput V: De distributione gratiarum

Thesis I: Nulla Dei praecepta hominibus iustis volentibus et conantibus secundum praesentes, quas habent, vires, sunt impossibilia: praesto quoque illis est semper gratia necessaria, qua possibilia fiant.

Thesis II: Nemo est in hac vita adeo obstinatus in malo, ut quavis gratia sufficiente ad resipiscendum et salutem consequendam sit destitutus.

Thesis III: Nullis hominibus adultis vel infidelibus media opportuna aut gratiae sufficientes negantur, quibus ad agnitionem valeant venire veritatis salutemque tandem obtinere.

Thesis IV: Quemadmodum Deus nemini neget auxilia sufficientia ad salutem assequendam, non eadem tamen est quoad singulos distributio gratiarum.

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