Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

I. For removing errors concerning the efficacy of grace it greatly helps to know what the Massilians erred in, and what the Fathers reproved in them; for from the perversion of the history of this controversy it came about that Jansenius foisted upon us his heresy as a catholic dogma defended by the Fathers, of which heresy this is the fourth proposition among the five condemned: «The Semi-Pelagians admitted the necessity of interior prevenient grace for each act, even for the beginning of faith, and in this they were heretics, that they wished that grace to be of such a kind that the human will could resist it or obey it.» Which indeed was condemned by the Apostolic See as false and heretical. Wherefore in the judgment

of Jansenius, the Fathers, who taught that the doctrine of the Massilians was adverse to the catholic faith, attacked as heretical the doctrine asserting that grace is of such a kind that the human will can resist it and obey it. That follows of itself from these two principles, that such was the doctrine of the Massilians and that the Fathers held the doctrine of the Massilians as heretical. There is no question about the second principle; all the poison lies hidden in the first. Therefore, in order that we may vindicate the Fathers from this calumny, since that is what we are doing in this article, the history of the controversy which engaged the Fathers with the Massilians must be faithfully set forth. We begin it briefly and in order as follows.

II. Augustine had taught that men are called to faith and salvation not according to the merits of nature, but according to the purpose of the will of God, and that it is God who by his grace distinguishes the faithful from the unbelieving, the just from sinners, and that it is not men who distinguish themselves, and that perseverance is a gratuitous gift of God, and that this preparation of graces was made from eternity in the counsel of the divine will, which mercifully prepared for whom it willed its grace, by which they are actually justified and saved. From which doctrine indeed it did not follow (as Prosper afterwards noted in the Responsionibus ad Capitula Gallorum, obj. 3.) that «those who, fallen into evil, perished without the correction of penance, had from that a necessity of perishing because they are not predestinated»: since on the contrary «they are not predestinated for this reason, because they were foreknown as about to be such from a voluntary transgression.» «For although (as the same author says ibid., obj. 15, n. 7) the omnipotence of God could have given the power of standing to those about to fall, yet his grace did not desert them before it was deserted by them. And because he foresaw that they would do this by a voluntary defection, therefore he did not have them in the election of predestination.» Or (as the same author says in the responsionibus ad capitula obiectionum vincentianarum, obj. 12) «because they were foreknown as about to fall, they are not predestinated. But they would be predestinated, if they were about to return and to remain in holiness and truth.» f. both responses. We judge that these responses of Prosper, for defending and explaining the doctrine which the same Prosper testifies that Augustine always taught, are to be greatly esteemed, not only because Prosper was most versed in the works of the holy Doctor, but also because, since he lived in the same age, he could more easily attain the force of the words and sentences and the whole manner of speaking and thinking of Augustine, than we who are so far removed: for every age has a certain manner of speaking and thinking about the same things. Therefore the doctrine of Augustine tended to this, to assert that whatever good and salutary is done by men is from the gift of the grace of God, who prepared that same grace from eternity and who by a hidden and inscrutable indeed, but just, judgment (of which thing he brings an example in little ones) prepared those graces not for all but for whom he willed, which in his prescience, which cannot be deceived, he foresaw would be congruous and efficacious. This was the manner of Augustine of explaining and defending the catholic dogma, so that he might oppose himself to the heresy of the Pelagians saying: that in the nature of free will, apart from grace, there is a sufficient power of living justly and perfectly and of obtaining salvation, and therefore that men are just and are saved for this reason, because they will it, and that others are sinners and are not saved because they do not will it. But in this sense they took those words, 'because they will it,' namely because in their natural will alone it is placed to become just and to be made saved, and therefore their will from the powers of nature is the adequate reason of justice and salvation: in the same way they took the words 'because they do not will it,' namely because the sole reason why they do not act well and are not saved is the defect of their will, not of the grace of God, which moreover would be required. Or, the words 'because they will' and 'because they do not will' being taken more mildly, they poured forth this sense: because it is for men to begin, and through good acts elicited by the powers of nature to determine, as it were, God to conferring grace, so that consequently from their will alone it depends to be saved, if they will, and not to be saved, if they do not will to begin. In order to rout this error, Augustine was compelled to show that all things at last depend not on the human but on the divine will, which distributes to whom it wills the grace by which good works are done, and therefore efficacious.

The sense of Augustine, just as a little before certain monks of Hadrumetum in Africa, so also many afterwards of the servants of Christ dwelling in the city of Massilia and in other places of the Gauls did not attain. And indeed it was easy for those not weighing well the whole doctrine of Augustine and his special manner of speaking and disputing, who had especially before his eyes congruous and efficacious grace, to receive the words of Augustine otherwise than his meaning really bore, which also happened afterwards to many others. Therefore the Massilians, as Prosper testifies in epist. to Augustine, c. 2 and3,among the Augustinian letters CCXXV, written in the year 428 or 429. did not approve whatever the holy Father had disputed in his works about the vocation of the elect according to the purpose of God. And indeed in that sense in which they themselves received the doctrine of Augustine, they disapproved not undeservedly. For according to Augustine the election of God according to purpose is a gratuitous election, namely independent of the merits of nature preceding faith, and inasmuch as it is the destination of efficacious graces for good works and for perseverance, independent also of the condign merits of the just; an election therefore depending on the purpose of the free will of God. Cf. De Corrept. et Grat., c. VIII, and cont. duas pelagg., L. II, c. ult.But the Massilians so interpreted the doctrine of Augustine, that in the counsel of the divine will there had been from eternity, without any prescience of merits, a distinction made not only of those to be elected to the Kingdom but also of those to be rejected from the Kingdom. Wherefore they said: «this purpose of the calling of God, by which, whether before the beginning of the world or in the very condition of the human race, a distinction is said to have been made of those to be elected and of those to be rejected, according to which it pleased the Creator that some should be created vessels of honor and others vessels of contumely, and which takes away from the fallen the care of rising again and brings to the holy an occasion of tepidity; because in each part the labor would be superfluous, if neither the rejected could enter by any industry, nor the elected fall out by any negligence.»

Namely, the Massilians rejected that election according to purpose, according to which, as it pleased the Creator, some are vessels of honor and others likewise vessels of contumely, no account being taken of merits. They denied, namely, that the distinction of men, both of the faithful from the unbelieving and of the elect from the reprobate (which distinction is to be taken not only causally but formally, or in second act), depends on the mere good pleasure of the divine will; for, as they themselves said, as far as concerns the part of God, God wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth, who proposes to all men, with none excepted, the propitiation which is in the Sacrament of the Blood of Christ, who admonishes and invites every man by divine institutions to believe and to hope. And because, as we have said, the distinction of men can be distinguished as twofold, the one by which the faithful are distinguished from the unbelieving, the other by which persevering faithful are distinguished from the non-persevering (as is indicated also in the Pauline testimony, God wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth), the Massilians contended that the reason of each distinction is also in us.

Thus far, however, there is no error in the opinion of the Massilians. For it is certain that besides the grace of God, which is lacking to no one, our cooperation is also required, by which we comply with the prevenient grace; and therefore that there is also in us some subordinate reason of the distinction, and that men are reprobated only on account of their evil merits. Nor did Augustine ever deny this.

IV. But the error of the Massilians was in this, that, in order to defend that, they established a certain determinate manner in which the reason of that distinction would be in us; which manner not a little conflicted with the doctrine of the faith concerning Grace.

Scilicet 1) they wanted the faithful to be distinguished from the unbelieving by this, that through some initial act of good will, a pious affection of believing, a pious desire of salvation, and faith in God, the physician and savior of souls, which act is elicited by the powers of nature, they prepare or dispose themselves to receive grace: just as a sick person, by asking the physician, disposes himself to recover health, and although he cannot heal himself, can nevertheless desire health and ask the physician (on which matter more fully in the following Th.). This natural act was said to be from initial grace, which for the Massilians was nothing other than a good of nature, by which good of nature rightly used anyone can arrive at saving grace (Prosper ad August., c. 4.). From which it follows that God, who wills to bestow his grace upon all, expects these pious movements of nature, and so leads the willing to the grace of perfect faith and justification, and abandons the unwilling. For, with Prosper as witness, ibid., c. 6., they taught «that as far as pertains to God, eternal life is prepared for all; as far as pertains, however, to the freedom of the will, it is apprehended by those who have spontaneously believed in God and have received the help of grace by the merit of their credulity... because if they professed that all merits are prevented by it (grace) and that from it is given that they are able to be, they would necessarily concede that God, according to the purpose and counsel of his will, by hidden judgment and manifest work, founds one vessel unto honor, another unto contumely... And so, since in those who received the time of free will (i.e., adults) there are two things which work out human salvation, namely the grace of God and the obedience of man; they wanted obedience to be prior to grace, so that the beginning of salvation would have to be believed to stand from him who is saved, not from him who saves, and the will of man brings forth help to divine grace, not grace subjects the human will to itself.

V. One may note that Cassian, who is held as a prince among these erring ones, so tempered the matter that he indeed sometimes conceded that the beginning of faith is from grace, but denied the necessity of grace for it. That is, he taught (in Collation XIII) that sometimes God prevents the wills by his grace so that they believe, as happened in Paul and Matthew, and sometimes he expects and requires a pious movement of the will preceding, which grace will receive, as happened in the good thief and the Centurion. And this he meant when he said that there are two principles of salutary acts, namely both the will of man and the grace of God. Cf. Prosper, adv. Collatorem, etc.

VI. That he himself had been involved in the same error denying the necessity of grace for the beginning of faith before entering upon the episcopate, Augustine testifies in De Praed. SS., c. 3. For he thought that »the faith by which we believe in God is not a gift of God, but is from us in us, and through it we obtain the gifts of God by which we live temperately, justly, and piously in this world... Which my error, he says, not a few of my little works written before my episcopate sufficiently indicate. Among which there is also that which you recalled in your letters, where there is the exposition of certain propositions from the Epistle which is to the Romans.« This error Augustine had already refuted in the Pelagians (Cont. duas epistt. pelagg., L. II, c. 8.). Into this error again, denying the necessity of grace for the beginning of faith, certain monks of Hadrumetum seem to have fallen, for whom there exists the book of Augustine de Gratia et libero arbitrio and another de Correptione et Gratia. The same error a certain Vitalis defended at Carthage, to whom Augustine wrote for the catholic doctrine an epistle, which is CCXVII, written about the year 427.

VI. Furthermore, when there were objected to the Massilians both the many infants who die without baptism without their own fault or that of another, and the many nations to whom the Gospel was never preached, they answered as regards those »that such are lost and such are saved, such as the divine science foreknew that they would be in riper years, if they were preserved to an active age and likewise as regards those they said «that those were foreseen by the Lord as about to believe, and that for each nation the times and the ministries of teachers were so dispensed that the belief of good wills was about to arise»: namely, they said «that it belongs to divine prescience, that the truth would be announced at that time and there and to those, when and where it was foreknown that it was to be believed.» Prosper, cited epist., c. 5. Hilary, epist. to Augustine (among the Augustinian letters CCXXVI), c. 3. The above-mentioned Vitalis used the same response. Cf. the cited epist. of Aug., c. 22; indeed also the Pelagians, see p. 151. Note that it is foolish, and insulting to the holy man Prosper and Hilary and to Augustine himself, to think that they fabricated this response from their own brain and imposed it on the Massilians. It is certain, therefore, that the Massilians responded thus, and wished by this reasoning to decline the difficulty which was in their opinion. But this also makes us more certain and places beyond all controversy that the opinion of the Massilians about the beginning of salvation was really that which Prosper understood and signified to Augustine. For if the Massilians had spoken of that beginning which follows prevenient grace, they had no need to use this response, especially as regards the nations; indeed there would have been no difficulty by which they could be pressed.

Now weigh accurately what was the grace whose conferral the Massilians taught to be repaid to the merits of nature: the grace of faith, the grace of salvation, namely the grace by which some are actually faithful, while others remain in unbelief. That is, they spoke of the grace which attains the effect for which it is given, of that grace namely which we are accustomed to call efficacious. This was the reason why Augustine, disputing with them, speaks deliberately about the predestination of graces of this kind.

VIII. They wanted 2) the persevering faithful to be distinguished from the non-persevering by this, that those willed to persevere, or merited perseverance for themselves from God, so that they denied the note of gratuitousness which is found in the gift of perseverance. The matter needs to be somewhat explained. For it can be asked in what sense the Massilians denied that the perseverance of those persevering to the end is a gift of God. Was this error only a consequence of the preceding error, inasmuch as if the first grace is given from the merits of nature, the rest of the series of graces connected with the first, and perseverance itself, would have to be said to be repaid, at least mediately, to the merits of nature? That indeed was contained in the opinion of the Massilians; but here there would not really be more than one error: yet it seems that the error was twofold, since the Fathers make distinct mention of each, namely of the denied gratuitous faith and of the denied gratuitous perseverance. Moreover, 1º if from this alone, that the first grace is given to the merits of nature, the Massilians had denied perseverance to be a gift of God, by the same reasoning they would have denied the other good works between faith and perseverance to be gifts of God: but they reasoned altogether otherwise, as will soon appear.

Indeed, Augustine attacks both errors separately in distinct books. But this error is wont by some to be proposed thus: God from eternity foreknew all those who would have the first faith by the sole powers of nature and by the sole powers of nature would persevere to the end Cf. Alticotium in Summa Augustiniana, p. 5a of the Preface, n. 1.] whom therefore he predestinated into his kingdom and glory. Which indeed Augustine seems to signify in De Dono Persev., c. 17., in these words: «those who place both the beginning of faith alone and perseverance to the end so in our power that they do not think them to be gifts of God, nor that God works our thoughts and wills for having and retaining these things, but concede that he himself gives the rest, when they are obtained from him by the faith of the believer, etc.» But it must be confessed that that explanation is difficult to understand.

And indeed it is most certainly established, as we shall demonstrate below and as can be clear from this very testimony of Augustine adduced, that the Massilians taught, as regards the other good works after faith, the necessity of that prevenient and helping grace which Augustine defended. Since therefore perseverance is the continuation of good works to the end, how could these two things be reconciled in the minds of the Massilians, namely that all the good works of the faithful are prevented by the grace of God and therefore are gifts of God; yet that nevertheless perseverance in good faith, to which eternal life would have to be repaid, is owed to the sole powers of nature? For perseverance in faith according to the Massilians is that perseverance which merits the eternal reward, which therefore is called by Prosper perseverance in good faith: it is therefore perseverance in good works from faith; but if all good works are effects of grace, how is perseverance an effect of the sole powers of nature?

We answer, therefore, that the Massilians denied that which Augustine defended in two books written against them. But Augustine there defends this one thing, that perseverance is a gift of God not only because it is not given in return, mediately, for a merit of nature which preceded faith, but because it is also given to the just gratuitously, inasmuch as although it can be merited by them suppliantly (which Augustine affirms), yet it cannot be obtained by true condign merit, as we now speak. Whence Augustine proves the gratuitousness of perseverance by those arguments by which he proves the gratuitousness of congruous or efficacious grace. We judge, therefore, that the Massilians, weighing the matter too little accurately, denied this special gratuitousness of perseverance, besides that gratuitousness which proceeds from the gratuitousness of the first grace; namely, they wished that men justified and helped by the grace of God can so persevere that, apart from any special predestination of the helps of God, those who would will would actually attain perseverance, and those who would not will would not attain it. «Those who are about to believe, they said, and who are about to remain in that faith which is to be helped through grace, God foreknew before the constitution of the world» (the cited epist. of Prosper, n. 3): but they denied that to the saints there is now given «such a help of perseverance that perseverance itself is given to them, not only so that without this gift they cannot be persevering, but also so that through this gift they are not otherwise than persevering.» But they wanted that gift to be given by which they could persevere if they would will, just as they noted that Augustine had spoken of the grace of persevering given to Adam (the cited epist. of Hilary, n. 6.). Thus we judge that this chapter of the doctrine of the Massilians is to be taken.

IX. You will say: In what sense then did the Massilians distinguish between good works and perseverance, so that they affirmed those to be gifts of God, but denied this one? For if perseverance is not gratuitous, by what right did the Massilians affirm that good works, i.e., the efficacious graces for them, are gratuitous?

I answer. It is certainly not established that the Massilians admitted that special gratuitousness of efficacious graces; indeed if they denied it for the grace of perseverance, they are to be said to have denied it also as regards the other efficacious graces. They professed, to be sure, that the graces for works are gifts of God, because nature can indeed desire and ask for them, but not exact them, and without them nature can do nothing good: therefore, just as in nature they did not acknowledge that merit which we call condign, but only the congruous and that of impetration, so they defended the gratuitousness of the graces for works. But that gratuitousness which is proper to efficacious graces for the just themselves (cf. the preceding Th., nn. IV. V.) was unknown to the Massilians no less than the gratuitousness of perseverance, and they are to be said to have denied it, when they denied this one. For since the gift of perseverance is not one simple actual grace but rather a series of actual graces, which are given for works, by the very fact that the gratuitousness of perseverance is denied, the gratuitousness also of efficacious graces for the just is denied. Consequently they denied that a gratuitous predestination of efficacious graces was made by God to the just, by which graces the just could be not otherwise than persevering. Indeed Augustine, disputing against them in two books, demonstrates both the gratuitousness of efficacious graces, and in the same manner as those he shows perseverance to be gratuitous.

X. There is therefore a twofold, as it were, part of the doctrine of the Massilians impugned by Augustine. The first: that the beginning of faith is from us, from which it follows that the graces afterwards given for the works, and perseverance itself, are mediately refunded into at least the congruous merit of nature. The second: that the perseverance of the just is not gratuitous in a special way. But note that the former error is the proper character of the doctrine of the Massilians, and in the Council of Arausic. 2. canons were enacted only against it; so that the other question seems to be reckoned among the more profound and more difficult parts of the questions that arose, which those who resisted the heretics treated more broadly.

The error, therefore, placing the beginning of salvation in man was called in the age of Prosper and Augustine the remnants of the Pelagians (the cited epist. of Prosper, n. 7.); later the appellation of Semi-Pelagians came into use. Furthermore, you will perhaps ask: did they not teach an error already reprobated in the Pelagians, especially since these too, from time to time, in order to exclude the gratuitousness of grace, threw in mention of this very error, wishing at least the beginning of faith or of conversion to God to be from us (cf. Synops. hist. haer, pelag. n. VII.); why therefore were they not held as heretics? I answer. The proscription of the Pelagian heresy was contained in the letters of Innocent, in the Tractoria of Zosimus, of which only fragments survive, and in the Carthaginian canons. Now indeed from all these there is gathered, as Celestine gathered after the adduced authorities of the Apostolic See,

«that God is the author of all the works by which one tends to God from the beginning of faith», but an express exclusion of the error of the Massilians is not contained, since they separated faith from works by the then customary distinction. Indeed in the Carthaginian canons there is nothing explicit about the gratuitousness of grace. In the other monuments also the dogma opposed to the error of the Massilians is contained only insofar as grace is handed down as necessary for any act, movement, thought: but, as we have warned, these things could be taken of works distinct from the beginning of faith: but the reprobation of that error, that God expects our will in order to give the first grace, was not had explicitly.

Celestine, the Roman Pontiff, having received from Prosper notice of this error, imposed silence indeed upon the erring, and proposed a norm of believing from the preceding authorities of the Apostolic See, in which the reprobation of that error also was contained virtually: but neither did he define the matter by a peremptory sentence, nor did he declare alien to the faith and the Church those who would believe otherwise.

Augustine indeed in the Pelagians (cf. L. II. cont. duas epistt. pelagg., c. 8.) and in others reprobated this very error, by which the gratuitousness of grace is denied or diminished: but he himself could not by his own authority bring it about that the matter would be of faith.

The Synod of Palestine, however, defined nothing in reality, published no canon: it received Pelagius because among other things he denied also that grace is given according to our merits. To whatever authority it had, there was added no confirmation of the Apostolic See.

XI. These things being laid down, a question is to be treated by us concerning two heads of the doctrine of the Massilians. For it is asked 1) what grace the Massilians denied to be necessary for the salutary beginning of faith. Jansenius contends that by them there were admitted not only the exterior graces of preaching and the like, but also the interior graces of illumination and inspiration, and the same as necessary; but that they were held as heretics because they judged that the will could resist interior grace, if it willed. Catholics on the contrary, i.e., those who venerate the decrees of the Apostolic See, deny that the Massilians admitted, besides the exterior graces, the necessity of interior grace for the beginning of faith, and that this is the error which was reprobated both by the Fathers and afterwards by the Synod of Arausic. II. It is asked 2) what grace the Massilians professed necessary for the other good works; for a disagreement exists in this matter among the Catholic Theologians themselves.

In order to proceed aptly and in order, let us note 1) that the question is about the opinion of those whom Hilary, Prosper, Augustine first impugned, and finally the Arausican Synod II and Boniface II, the Roman Pontiff, condemned; for we seek that opinion which was reprobated by the Fathers and by the Church in the Massilians, or remnants of the Pelagians. Whence 2) in order that it may be established what their error is concerning the necessity of grace for the beginning of faith, one must look especially at what the Church reprobated and proscribed in them. 3) As regards the first question: the question is not indeed whether the Massilians admitted grace for the beginning of faith, but whether they admitted it to be necessary for it: i.e., it is not a question whether they approved the fact, but whether they approved the necessity. Then the question is not about any beginning of faith whatsoever, but about the salutary beginning, about which alone the Fathers spoke, whether the Massilians demanded grace for this. Finally, the question is about interior immediate grace, whether they confessed this to be necessary for the beginning of faith.

XII. These things being posited, we can thus express in this thesis the opinion which we defend in the first question.

I. Before we prove this, we must briefly declare what is agreed upon by all, namely that the Massilians admitted certain exterior graces, and these necessary for the beginning of faith. Indeed, Prosper testifies, epist. ad August., c. 3, that this was the opinion of the Massilians: «every man is admonished by divine institutions to believe and to hope»; and Hilary likewise reports, epist. ad August., c. 2: «they assert what is agreeable to truth or fitting to preaching (namely, that the faithful are publicly taught), so that when the occasion of obtaining salvation is announced to those who are prostrate and will never rise by their own strength, by that very merit by which they willed and believed that they could be healed of their disease, they may obtain both the increase of faith itself and the effect of their entire healing.»

And in very truth we have heard that the Massilians, in order to extricate themselves from the difficulty taken from the fact that the preaching of the Gospel was denied to many peoples, had recourse to a certain knowledge of God of future things which would never be future; but this response indicates that they judged that some exterior calling of God is necessary for adults; for if this had not been certain to them, they would surely have answered that those peoples could and can come to faith by other means, and therefore that the lack of preaching is not an argument proving that God does not will all men to believe; as Prosper, together with others, argued against them.

Furthermore, the Massilians, in order to defend their doctrine, appealed to certain works of St. Augustine, especially to the Exposition of Certain Propositions in the Epistle to the Romans, and confessed that they accepted and approved everything which he had taught there, as Hilary testifies, epist. ad August., c. 3. Augustine himself, however, in De Praed. SS., c. 3, is a witness that when he wrote those little works he was in the same error in which the Massilians then found themselves. Now in that Exposition Augustine taught the necessity of exterior grace. For he says in that c. 3 of De Praed. SS.: «In like manner I erred, thinking that the faith by which we believe in God is not a gift of God, but that it is from us and in us, and that through it we obtain the gifts of God by which we live temperately, justly, and piously in this world. For I did not think that faith was prevented by the grace of God, so that through it there would be given to us what we might usefully ask, unless because we could not believe if the proclamation of truth did not precede; but that we should consent to the Gospel preached to us, I judged to be ours and to be from ourselves.» Therefore.

Wherefore those who, as Prosper testifies, ibid., c. 4, said that man is called to the grace of God whether through the natural law, or through the written law, or through evangelical preaching, thus distinguishing between the natural law and the written or extrinsically handed-down one, must be said to have signified by the name of natural law that state which is called that of the law of nature, which indeed did not exclude many exterior graces, whether extrinsic or also intrinsic and supernatural.

And indeed, since that first act was called by the Massilians faith, faith in Christ, credulity, desire of health, the entreaty of the physician and savior, some positive revelation was required, through which the disease and the physician might be recognized, which can be known only by revelation, and to which revelation faith would respond, which rests on the authority of God speaking.

Il. These things being settled, let us come to the demonstration of the Thesis. Theologians prove it by several arguments. And first, by the testimony of those who in the fifth and sixth centuries made mention of the errors of the Gauls concerning grace and refuted them. For it is established from these testimonies that the Massilians claimed the beginning of faith for nature alone, wished nature to take the lead and grace to follow, and grace to be conferred at length by the merit of credulity obtained by the powers of nature. But this is an open denial of the necessary interior and immediate grace for the beginning of faith; for what is asserted, that the beginning of faith is owed to nature alone, that nature takes the lead, that grace follows, etc., contradicts the necessity of interior immediate grace.

We have already given the testimony of Prosper in the preceding historical synopsis, n. VI. Hilary likewise reports to August., c. 2: «These are the things which are debated at Marseilles, or also in other places in Gaul. It is new and useless to preaching, that certain men are said to be chosen according to the purpose of election, so that they can neither receive it nor hold it, unless the will to believe is given. They think that all the vigor of preaching is excluded, if it is said that nothing which may be aroused in men through it has remained (after the sin of Adam). They agree that every man perished in Adam, and that no one is freed from there by his own free choice. But this they assert as agreeable», and the rest which we gave a little before.

Augustine, De Praedest. SS., c. 1: «These our brothers have arrived at confessing that the wills of men are prevented by the grace of God, and at agreeing that no one can suffice for himself for any good work, whether to be begun or to be completed. Therefore, retaining these things to which they have arrived, they are distinguished greatly from the error of the Pelagians.» Then, after a few intervening words, he continues, c. 2: «First, therefore, we must show that the faith by which we are Christians is a gift of God: if only we can do this more diligently than we have already done in so many and such great volumes. But now I see that I must answer those who say that the divine testimonies which we have adduced on this matter avail to this, that we should know that we have faith itself indeed from ourselves, but its increase from God, as if faith is not given to us by him but is only increased in us by him, by that merit by which it took its beginning from us.» Compare also the clear testimony on this matter recited a little before, in which he describes his old error similar to this one. And at the end of the book he concludes, saying that a new question had compelled him to dispute. He explains, indeed, of what sort the new question is, namely: «since in our earlier little works we had shown by sufficiently suitable testimonies that faith too is a gift of God, it was found that it was objected that those testimonies avail to this, that they show the increase of faith to be a gift of God; but that the beginning of faith, by which one first believes in Christ, is from man himself and is not a gift of God, but that God builds this up, so that when it has gone before, the rest, which are gifts of God, follow as by this merit.» Boniface II, in the letter to Caesarius by which he confirmed the Canons of the Second Synod of Orange, says, c. 1: «You indicate that some bishops of the Gauls, although they have already agreed that the other goods come from the grace of God, will that faith alone, by which we believe in Christ, is of nature, not of grace.» Moreover, there is no need to warn that by phrases of this sort, "gift of God", "to be in God", there is signified, in Augustine and the other Fathers of his age against the Pelagians, that which God works in us through his grace, that which nature cannot effect or attain by its own powers. And on the contrary, these phrases, "to be from us", "to be from nature" or "of nature", signified among the same authors that which would be done or obtained by us through the powers of nature alone, without the gratuitous help of God.

Then the same thing is established if the theorems are considered by which the system of the Massilians was, as it were, contained. For they maintained, first, that in nature, although vitiated and corrupted by the sin of the first man, there remained some good, namely that by which it could believe and will to be healed. Hilary, 1. c., c. 4: «Nor (they say) can it be said of this faith: what have you that you have not received? since in the same nature there remained, although vitiated, what was previously given to it sound and perfect.» They maintained, second, that the relation between faith and grace is this, that God requires faith, requires it of nature, and therefore requires it so that he may repay grace by its merit. Hilary, 1. c., c. 2: «For as to what is said: believe and you will be saved, they assert that one of these is required, the other offered, so that on account of what is required, if it has been rendered, what is offered may afterwards be repaid. Whence they think it follows that faith is to be shown by him to whose nature it was granted by the will of the Creator; and they think that none nature is so depraved or extinguished that it should not or could not will itself to be healed.» They maintained, moreover, that this is the difference between works and faith, that faith alone is foreknown by God, but works are also predestined. God is said to predestine those things which he knew he would do from an eternal decree.

Augustine, De Praed. SS., c. 19: «But these men of ours, about whom and for whom we now treat, perhaps say that the Pelagians are refuted by this apostolic testimony, where he says (Ephes. I. 13.) that we are therefore chosen in Christ and predestined before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and immaculate in his sight in charity. For they (the Pelagians) think that, having received the precepts, we are already made holy through ourselves by the choice of free will... and since God foreknew this future, they say, therefore he chose and predestined us before the foundation of the world in Christ.... But we (the Massilians), they say, say that God foreknew nothing of ours except the faith by which we begin to believe, and therefore chose us before the foundation of the world and predestined us, that we should also be holy and immaculate by his grace and work.» They maintained, finally, as we have already seen, that some are therefore not called through the preaching of the Gospel to faith, because they were foreseen as not going to believe by the good will of nature. Prosper.l. c. c. 5. Hilary.l. c. c. 3. But he who maintains all these things surely denies that grace is given and required for the beginning of faith; he denies the immediate grace through which faith is the work of God: therefore.

Now, thirdly, it is proved if the arguments are considered which the Fathers used against the Massilians, which would surely avail nothing if those men had confessed grace to be necessary for the beginning of faith. For the arguments taken up by the Fathers reduce to this. a) Testimonies of Scripture of this sort: I obtained mercy that I might be faithful: to you it is given for Christ, not only to believe in him, but also to suffer for him: By grace you have been saved through faith, and this not of yourselves; for it is the gift of God. (August., De Praed. SS., Conc. Araus. II., c. 25, and Boniface II in epist. ad Caesarium). But he who teaches that faith is the fruit of interior prevenient grace does not contradict these testimonies. b) The argument drawn from the words of the Apostle: what have you that you have not received: whence would follow what blessed Cyprian teaches, that one must glory in nothing, because nothing is ours (August., ibid., c. 3; the African bishops exiled in Sardinia, in the Synodal Letter, cc. 3, 5), from which the Fathers concluded that faith also is from God: but if the Massilians had conceded that faith also is from grace, they too would have confessed that we have nothing which we have not received and that nothing is ours; and therefore this argument could exercise no force against them. y) Of all our goods

that God is the author, and of all the virtues by which from the beginning of faith one tends toward God, as the bishops of the Apostolic See handed down (Caelestinus in Auctorit. Sedis Apostolicae): but neither would the Massilians have contradicted this doctrine, if they had agreed that faith is prevented by the immediate grace of God. d) That the Massilians destroyed the true notion of grace, in that in their opinion it would no longer be gratuitous. August., De Praed. SS, c. 2: «One does not therefore depart from that opinion which Pelagius himself was compelled to condemn in the Palestinian episcopal judgment, as the same acts testify: that the grace of God is given according to our merits, if it does not pertain to the grace of God that we have begun to believe.» But this weapon would be wrongly hurled against them, if faith were an effect of the grace of God. e) According to the Massilians, the human will precedes, grace follows, the obedience of man is prior to grace. Prosper, epist. ad August., c. 6: «They will obedience to be prior to grace, so that the beginning of salvation is to be believed to stand from the one who is saved, not from the one who saves, and the will of man procures for itself the help of divine grace, not that grace subjects the human will to itself (insofar as it prevents it).» This indeed cannot be reconciled with the notion of grace. But if the Massilians had demanded prevenient grace also for the beginning of faith, then according to them the human will would not precede and grace would follow: therefore.

The same thing is demonstrated, fourthly, by the definitions issued against them. For Boniface II censures the opinion of the Massilians, confirming the decrees of the Second Council of Orange; moreover he condemns those who teach that faith alone, by which we believe in Christ, is of nature and not of grace; who deny that right faith in Christ and the beginning of every good will are inspired into the senses of individuals by the prevenient grace of God; who say that the good of nature, which they know to have been depraved by the sin of Adam, is the author of our faith rather than Christ. The same Synod likewise condemns those who teach that grace is conferred by human invocation, that God awaits our wills, that the beginning of faith and the very affection of credulity is not a gift of God, that the mercy of God is conferred on those who without grace desire, ask, knock, that man can consent to evangelical preaching by the vigor of nature, that man can come to the grace of baptism by free will (canons 3, 4, 6, 7, 8); and finally, in canon 25, it establishes and proves by the testimonies of Scripture that faith is in us not through the good of nature but through the grace of God.

But the heresy opposed to these is that which we have declared thus far. Therefore.

Moreover, if the arguments set forth thus far are weighed, it will be clear that the Massilians denied for the beginning of faith the necessity of any interior immediate grace, that is, not only of the grace of inspiration, but also of illumination. Indeed, the testimonies of the Fathers hand down that grace was denied by the Massilians for the beginning of faith in such a way that they testify this universally, without any limitation. The theorems of the Massilians, that faith is of nature, that grace is repaid to the good will of nature, and therefore the opposition set up between nature, or the good of nature which remained after sin, and grace, manifestly exclude any supernatural interior grace which would be a necessary principle of faith. Likewise, the definitions of the Synod against them, which establish the necessity of the grace of illumination and of inspiration for consenting to evangelical preaching, persuade us that the necessity of both graces, as regards that point, was denied by the Massilians.

III. From the complete demonstration thus far adduced it is clear 1) that the Fathers most certainly convicted the Massilians of this, that they denied the necessity of grace for the beginning of faith. 2) From all the monuments, whether reporting, impugning, or proscribing the error of the Massilians, it is equally most certain that this one thing alone was reprobated in them, namely, the denial of the necessity of grace, not however the denial of a certain manner of acting of grace, by which, namely, it determines the will to one thing: indeed, there was not even a question concerning the manner of acting of grace.

IV. What, then, of Jansenius? He (a thing which cannot be sufficiently disapproved, some Catholics, not deterred by the condemnation of the fourth Jansenist proposition, assenting) lays down in De haeresi pelagiana I. VIII. c. 6. first, and rightly indeed, that the mind of not all the Semi-Pelagians is to be investigated by him, since the opinion of all was not one, «but of those only whose opinion and dogmas Prosper and Hilary submitted to Augustine to be judged and handed over to be refuted. For to know the opinions of those who err does not profit so very much, unless at the same time it be known, by the interposed certain and approved authority of some doctor, what is to be judged concerning each one, what is to be fled, what to be held, what to be tolerated.» Then concerning the opinion of these he decides thus: «The opinions of the Massilians and the doctrine of Augustine having been most diligently weighed, I think that it must be certain and undoubted that the Massilians confessed a true, and also internal and actual, grace to be necessary even for faith itself, which they ascribe to the powers of human freedom and will.For Jansenius wants the question with the Massilians to have been about the manner of acting of grace in us, and the Fathers to have contended against the Massilians denying this, that such is the grace conferred on fallen men, that it determines the will to one thing and that consequently it is not in the power of free will to use grace or not to use it, to consent or to dissent. (De haeresi pelag. L. VIII. c. 8. coll. De Gratia Christi L. II, c. 4.) That assertion of Jansenius, however, which seems to embrace all the Massilians about whom Prosper reported to Augustine, in reality does not comprehend all; for already in the preceding L. VII. c. 2. Jansenius had conceded that some Semi-Pelagians denied the necessity of interior actual grace, and had proved this from the testimony of the letter of Prosper to Augustine, in which there is indeed speech of those Massilians whose opinion Prosper handed over to Augustine to be judged and refuted. Jansenius therefore concedes that some Massilians denied the necessity of grace for the beginning of faith, indeed for all works, as he himself indeed judges, but he likewise contends that others among the Massilians, about whom Prosper and Hilary wrote to Augustine, admitted the necessity of interior actual grace for the beginning of faith.

V. But, to say this briefly, a distinction of this sort among those Massilians whose opinions Prosper and Hilary carried to Augustine (for about these we too speak) is to be rejected as being among the fictions of a vain mind. It rests chiefly on these words of Prosper in his letter to Augustine, by which Prosper designates some, as Jansenius thinks, among the Massilians themselves who would altogether agree with the Pelagians and would utterly do away with the necessity of grace. For thus c. 4 has it: «Some of these, however, do not depart from the Pelagian paths to such an extent that, when they are forced to confess that grace of Christ which prevents all human merits, lest, if it be rendered to merits, it be vainly called grace, they want this condition (creation) of each individual man to pertain to it, in which the grace of the Creator establishes him, meriting nothing beforehand, because not even existing, free and rational, so that through the discernment of good and evil he may be able to direct his will both to the knowledge of God and to... the obedience of his commandments, and to arrive at that grace by which we are reborn in Christ through the natural faculty, namely, by asking, seeking, knocking, so that for this reason he receives, for this reason he finds, for this reason he enters; because, having used well the good of nature, he has merited to arrive at that saving grace by the help of initial grace... And as much as anyone has faculty for evil, so much let him have faculty for good, and with equal moment let the mind move itself either to vices or to virtues. Behold, they say, an express Pelagian opinion denying the necessity of grace for the beginning of faith: but this is said by Prosper to be the opinion of some; therefore the others approved that necessity of grace which these denied.

I answer that those certain ones are not distinguished from the other Massilians for this reason, that they taught different dogmas, but for this reason, that, reduced to straits so as to confess a grace preventing all merits, they used other formulas, namely those which were proper to the Pelagians, saying that preventing grace is nature and free will, which were conferred gratuitously through creation. From which explicit explanation the others abstained, saying rather: not wholly corrupted and extinguished through the sin of Adam is the power received from him for good, but something has remained in nature, although vitiated. These two ways of speaking, if well considered, say the same thing; but the one is both more obscure and more modest, and savors less of Pelagian shamelessness. Therefore this distribution of the Massilians into two classes is to be rejected as fictitious. But the other things which are brought forward to prove the same distribution are more than empty.

VI. Wherefore, that they may more efficaciously demonstrate that the Massilians admitted the necessity of interior grace even for the beginning of faith, they appeal to writers certainly, as they themselves judge, Semi-Pelagian, namely Cassian, Faustus of Riez, Arnobius the Younger, Gennadius, in whose writings the profession of that necessity is openly contained; whence they gather that the Semi-Pelagians were not reprobated on account of the denial of a necessity of this sort (Jansenius De Haeresi pelag. L. VII. cc. 2.3). But concerning which Massilians is the controversy for us? Certainly concerning those whose opinions Prosper and Hilary carried to Augustine. But the opinions of Faustus, Gennadius, and Arnobius, Prosper and Hilary could not have signified to Augustine. But what those taught whose errors Prosper and Hilary reported to Augustine must be gathered entirely from the writings of these which survive, and it is only by a sophistical method, these being set aside, that appeal is made to other inept witnesses. Likewise the controversy is for us concerning those whose opinions the Synod of Orange and Boniface II proscribed. But by these was proscribed that error which denies grace to be necessary for the beginning of faith, not the error which, the necessity of grace for absolutely all acts being admitted, denies a certain special manner of the working of grace. Wherefore, to conclude the matter briefly, one of two things: either the cited authors concede grace to be necessary for absolutely all good acts, the beginning of faith not excluded, or they deny it. If they deny it, appeal is wrongly made to them; if they concede it, I deny that they are to be numbered among those about whom we dispute, namely those whose opinions Prosper and Hilary handed over to Augustine and the Synod of Orange and Boniface condemned.

VII. Moreover, how is it proved that the cited authors admitted the necessity of grace for all acts, even the beginning of faith? Namely, by certain testimonies being produced, by which they teach or seem to teach it. But that argument is similar to this: Cassian, easily the prince of that Massilian sect, expressly professed, as Prosper himself testifies against the Collator, the catholic doctrine; therefore Cassian and the rest of the Massilians thought nothing but catholicly. Surely it remains to be seen whether all the Massilians were always consistent with themselves, whether all their doctrine concerning grace was reprobated, or only that by which, contradicting themselves, they fell away from the catholic faith. But it is established that some, whose doctrine was disapproved by the Fathers, thought at times entirely catholicly, as is clear in Cassian, and that only those heads of doctrine were impugned by the Fathers by which they contradicted themselves while thinking catholicly. Therefore the testimonies of some, which assert the necessity of grace for all acts, do not prove that they themselves did not deny the necessity of grace for the beginning of faith and were not rejected by the Fathers on account of this error (Cf. Franciscus Annatus in the work Augustinus a Baianis vin-elicatus b. VII, c. 2. §. 2). Moreover, whether all those cited authors were or were not in the Semi-Pelagian error, you can learn from Alticotius Summa Augustiniana, in the Preface of part V.

VIII. The argument which they seek from the works of Augustine is similar to the preceding (Jansenius De haeresi pelag. L. VIII, c. 8.). For Augustine in De Praed. SS. c. 3 testifies that he once adhered to that opinion which was afterwards that of the Massilians, and says that this is sufficiently indicated by some little works written by him before his episcopate. What therefore do the Jansenists attempt? They turn over several works written by Augustine when not yet bishop (Lib. 83. 9q. q. 6.8 — De quantitate animae c. 28 — Lib. de beata vita n. 35 — Soliloq. I. I. c. 1. L. II. c. 6.), find in them the necessity of grace for all acts luminously handed down; therefore, they conclude, the denial of the necessity of grace for the beginning of faith is not that error with which Augustine was once imbued, which some of his little works written before the beginning of the episcopate sufficiently indicate.

But who indicated to Jansenius that those are the books in which the error of Augustine is to be sought? Or did Augustine say that all his little works written before the episcopate were infected with that error? Again, did Augustine leave us uncertain what sort this error was, so that it would be necessary to divine it? Did he not there in De Praed. SS. most openly signify the error to be this, that he did not believe faith to be prevented by the grace of God, but the other works to be so prevented? Therefore, is his error to be determined from the little works of Augustine (which ones are to be consulted we do not know, since Augustine himself at least did not indicate them all), or rather from the error which Augustine openly signified is it to be determined which are those several little works sprinkled with the Semi-Pelagian stain? This is without doubt to be done. But Jansenius preferred to enter the former path, so that he could traduce to us as heretical the catholic doctrine.

And indeed these things are in the first place certain: the one, that Augustine in his Retractationes emended and more accurately explained whatever in his works seemed to him less rightly said, especially if anything could in any way favor the Pelagian error; the other, that when at the beginning of his episcopate he wrote the books to Simplicianus, Augustine fully understood the catholic doctrine of gratuitous election to faith, as he himself testifies in De Praed. SS. c. 4. Now indeed in L. I. Retrat., reviewing in chronological order all the books written before the episcopate, in all of them up to c. 23 he notes nothing said by himself less cautiously or less truly in this matter of which we treat. But in c. 23, retracting the exposition of certain propositions from the Epistle to the Romans, he notes this his error, in which, when he wrote it, he was engaged. Likewise in c. 24 and 25, reviewing the exposition of the Epistle to the Galatians and the inchoate exposition of the Epistle to the Romans, he notes something in them which could at least obscurely indicate that error; for he says in c. 24: «Likewise what I said: grace is that by which our sins are forgiven us, that we may be reconciled to God; but peace is that by which we are reconciled to God: is to be understood thus, that we nevertheless know that both belong to the general grace of God, just as in the people of God one thing is specially Israel, another specially Judas, and yet both generally Israel.» The same he repeats in c. 25. There remains the work on Lying, written after the preceding works before the beginning of the episcopate, in which nothing is noted in this regard. Then follow the books to Simplicianus. Therefore the books in which that error is to be sought are those expositions cited above on the epistles of Paul.

IX. And surely, since, according to Jansenius, the error in which Augustine was before the episcopate is not placed in the denial of the necessity of grace for faith, but in the denial of a certain grace which, determining the will to one thing, gives the act itself, and this error, as Augustine testifies, is found in some of his writings before the episcopate; certainly, if Augustine had judged that error to be the error which Jansenius thinks, the same Augustine, retracting all his little works written before the episcopate, would have noted the same error in some of these little works. But Augustine never notes that error, never indicates that he once erred for this reason, that he denied or did not teach that determining grace. Therefore Jansenius dreams.

X. Finally Jansenius (De haeresi Pelag. L. VIII, c. 6. seq.) observes that the Massilians were reproved by the Fathers because 1) they affirmed salvation to be ready for all, if only they be willing to receive it, 2) all are called and invited by grace, but each one obeys the caller by his own free will (Prosper. carm. De Ingr. v. 253. 256), 3) grace withdraws itself from none, but aids those desirous of right and enlightens those willing (ibid. 259), 4) God awaits our will, that we may be cleansed from sin (Synod. Araus. c. 4). But, he says, these are the formulas which those use who deny grace efficacious of itself; therefore the Massilians denied this grace, and this grace the Fathers wanted to establish.

But when the Massilians said that men receive grace if they will, obey the caller by their own free will, are aided and enlightened if willing, that their will is awaited, 1) they spoke of the natural will elicited without the help of interior grace, and this is what the Fathers refute; 2) by the grace by which they said men are called, the Massilians understood exterior grace; but they wanted interior immediate grace to follow upon the merits of nature, and this again is what the Fathers condemn. Moreover, none of these is asserted by those who deny grace efficacious of itself, and efficacious in such a way that it determines the act. Nor does that prove it more, which the same Jansenius brings forth from Prosper (epist. ad August. c. 6.) reproving the Massilians because they refused to confess that grace which «subjects to itself the human will.» For this grace is not that which constrains and subjugates the will by determining it to one thing, but the grace which a good will follows, namely grace preventing, not prevented by the will of nature, as is clear from the whole context and the whole controversy with the Massilians.

Finally, that you may dissolve the argument which Jansenius proposes (De haeresi Pelag. L. VIII, c. 1. seq.), observe that the Massilians taught not only that man can come to faith by free will, but by free will alone; and therefore that by the name of nature, to which they granted this power, they understood nature destitute of any supernatural intrinsic aid. For this reason Augustine too, when he denies to the Massilians that free will and nature suffice, taking, as is fitting, those words in the same signification in which they were taken by the adversaries, understands nature and free will destitute of all interior grace. Which sense appears in that sentence (De Praed. SS. c. 5): «to be able to have faith is of the nature of men; to have it, however, is of the grace of the faithful.» Wherefore, although Augustine elsewhere by the name of nature and free will signified nature and free will increased by grace, which is sufficiently clear from the declarations of the same Augustine; it does not follow that these names were taken by Augustine in this same sense in this question with the Massilians, and consequently that the Massilians too by the name of nature and free will understood nature and free will endowed with some grace.

Therefore the first part of the proposition of Jansenius recited above was rightly proscribed by the Apostolic See as false. And indeed that censure of falsity regards the first part of the proposition, just as the censure of heresy regards the latter; for that part could not be passed over without a mark, since the other depended wholly on it, so that, if the first were permitted, the second part could no longer be condemned as heretical, unless by branding the mark of heresy or the suspicion of it upon all the Fathers who impugned the Massilians.

But that we may dispatch the other question, we lay down this second thesis.

I. We say that if it is considered in itself—for that grace labored under this very vice in the opinion of the Massilians, that it was repaid to the merits of nature—but once abstraction is made from this relation of grace, in which the error lies, of which we have already spoken, the grace admitted by the Massilians on account of works was, as regards its own nature and efficacy, that very same grace which Augustine vindicated as necessary for absolutely all good acts, even for the beginning of faith; it was, namely, the same help.

II. The demonstration is easy, with the most explicit testimonies adduced. Augustine, De Praed. SS. ch. 1, says: «Those brethren have advanced so far as to confess that the wills of men are preceded by the grace of God, and to agree that no one is sufficient for himself either to begin or to complete any good work. Holding, therefore, to these points to which they have advanced, they are distinguished very much from the error of the Pelagians.» And in de Dono Persev. ch. 17, he says: «Those who place only the beginning of faith and perseverance even to the end so in our power as not to think them to be gifts of God;... but they concede that God gives the rest, when they are obtained from him by the faith of the believer.» And ibid., ch. 24: «I think that I have taught sufficiently, or rather more than sufficiently, that both to begin to believe in the Lord and to remain in the Lord even to the end are gifts of God. But the other goods pertaining to a pious life, by which God is rightly worshipped, even those very ones on account of whom we do these things concede that they are gifts of God.» Hilary testifies the same, epist. ad Aug. ch. 2: «Moreover, they agree that no one is sufficient for himself even to begin, let alone to complete, any work; for they do not think that a sick man's willing to be healed with a terrified and suppliant will is to be counted among any of the works of their cure.»

II. But in order that our works may be gifts of God, they must, on Augustine's authority, be from the interior grace of the will—namely, from that grace which he himself defended against the Pelagians. Therefore, those whom Augustine testifies to have believed that good works are gifts of God are to be said to have admitted that grace which Augustine championed. Certainly Augustine did not hold as catholic anyone who did not confess wholly that grace of the will which he himself championed; but the same Augustine testifies that the Massilians, as regards the grace necessary for works, were separated from the Pelagians and therefore thought with the Catholics (as he openly teaches in the testimony shortly to be adduced); therefore. And in very truth, if the grace admitted by the Massilians for works had been other than that which Augustine approved, he would have had to institute with them a twofold disputation—one on the necessity of grace for faith, the other on the quality of the grace necessary for works; but this question is not raised, and it is not raised because the Massilians are said to consent that all good works are gifts of God and are given by God; therefore.

IV. The same thing is shown by the argumentation with which Augustine and, after him, Boniface II pressed the Massilians and their followers. For Augustine thus attacks them in De Dono Persev. ch. 17, who deny that there is any longer place for reproofs and exhortations, if the beginning of faith and perseverance are from the grace of God. Why, then, do they preach with us (therefore there was no difference on this point) that wisdom and continence are gifts of God? But if these are preached as being gifts of God, the exhortation by which we exhort men to be wise and continent is not impeded; what, then, is at last the reason that they think the exhortation to be impeded by which we exhort men to come to faith and to remain in it even to the end, if these too are said to be gifts of God? «But this argumentation would avail nothing ad hominem, if the Massilians had said that the other works are gifts of God in an entirely different sense from that which Augustine understood. Therefore.»

V. Wherefore the Massilians, who conceded that faith was foreknown by God but denied that it was predestined—that is, denied that it was the effect of grace prepared by God from eternity—protested that they conceded the other works to be predestined. «But we, they say, say that God did not foreknow anything of ours except the faith by which we begin to believe, and therefore chose us before the constitution of the world and predestined us, so that we might also be holy and immaculate by his grace and work» (De Praed. SS. ch. 19). But Augustine, that they might think catholicly about grace, demands nothing else from the Massilians except that they concede predestination also for faith and perseverance (ibid., coll. ch. 1 and ch. 10, n. 19); therefore the profession of predestination is the profession of that necessary grace which Augustine asserted; but the Massilians conceded that the other works besides faith are predestined; therefore.

VI. Therefore the Massilians professed that help is supplied by God for works, that this help is necessary, and they professed that same help which was admitted by the other Catholics; for by the profession of this help they were distinguished very much from the Pelagians, and nothing else was demanded of them, that they might think entirely catholicly, than that they preach that grace is necessary also for the beginning of faith and for persevering; therefore.

Therefore the Massilians, as regards works, confessed the necessity of interior immediate grace—not only of illumination, but also of inspiration; for Augustine always championed this grace.

VII. Note that the ontological nature of the divine help and its efficacy is not denied by anyone by the very fact that he says it is repaid to the merit of some nature. For it can be conceived that the grace is the same in itself, inasmuch as it is necessary help, even if it is said to be repaid to the merit of nature. For it can remain—or at least it can be conceived to remain (albeit through error)—still an entitatively supernatural gift, even if, in order to confer it, God requires some congruous merit of nature. The ratio of the gratuitous, that is, of the benefit, is indeed changed; but the thing, as it is in itself, can remain the same, or at least it can be conceived (albeit through error) that it remains the same.

COROLLARY. Although the Massilians and Augustine differed among themselves on the question of the term which grace attains and of its gratuitousness, they nevertheless agreed plainly in that which pertains to the character of grace, insofar as it is help for acting. But, as Jansenius himself teaches, the Massilians did not confess that grace which would determine the will to one thing, but rather that grace whose use was in the power of free will; therefore neither did Augustine ever teach a grace determining the will to one thing, but on the contrary he is to be said to have asserted that grace whose use is in the power of free will, to which the will can consent and likewise dissent.