Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

I. Since perseverance is said in many ways (1. II. q. CIX, a. 10.), we now speak only of final perseverance in the state of grace, which eternal life follows; before which perseverance several partial perseverances can be distinguished, although not always and necessarily. The name of perseverance properly signifies an act, not the bare power of persevering; and in this signification it was employed by Augustine in the book on the Gift of Perseverance; for he says in ch. 1: «Assuredly this perseverance, of which we now treat, by which one perseveres in Christ even to the end, he is in no way to be said to have had who has not persevered to the end; rather, a faithful man of one year had it, and as much as can be thought below it, if, until he died, he lived faithfully, than one of many years, if a short time before death he fell away from the firmness of the faith.» This is formal or actual perseverance, which indeed depends on a twofold element, as it were, intrinsic and extrinsic. The intrinsic element is the preservation of the state of grace, which in adults having the use of reason is obtained through holy operations or through the due use of the graces conferred on the just man; so that the just man, from that justification at least in which he perseveres, always lives justly, that is, does not sin. The extrinsic element is death then arriving, when the man is in the state of grace. Moreover, the preservation of the state of grace, considered actively, namely when it depends on the operation of man, is called active perseverance; but the conjunction of death with the state of grace, insofar as it is referred to man, is called passive perseverance, because man is passively disposed with respect to it; for the instant of death depends on the will of God alone.

The gift of perseverance is taken both formally and causally. Formally, it is formal perseverance itself, which we have explained; causally, they are those helps, whether internal or external, by which not only the ability to persevere, but actual perseverance itself is infallibly obtained.

II. We teach first that formal perseverance is in the power of the just man, namely one furnished with the grace of God, that is, that the just man, if he wills, can through the grace of God, which is at hand for him, attain formal perseverance itself, so that the terminus of his active perseverance is at last formal perseverance itself. To demonstrate this, these two things must be proved: a) that helps sufficient for acting rightly are always at hand for the just man; b) that, these being granted, he can attain formal perseverance.

Thus «) to begin with the first point, we teach that to the justified there are always supplied helps necessary and sufficient for acting as one ought for salvation. We are not now speaking of all men in general, but of the justified; yet not in an exclusive sense, as if the necessary helps were given to the just alone, but in a precisive sense: we prescind, namely, from the rest and consider the just alone; for these alone can persevere. The discourse is about the supply of helps, which is made successively to the just man; and therefore when we say that helps are always supplied to the just man, this proposition is equivalent to this: if the just man has used the first helps well and has remained just, other helps necessary for the following time will again be supplied to him, and so on. When we say that the necessary and sufficient helps are at hand continuously, this is to be understood at least at the time when the just man must act salutarily, which he cannot do without the help of God. We are speaking, as is evident, of sufficient helps, by which a man can, if he wills, act justly; not of efficacious ones, which, namely, are, with man cooperating, joined with the effect, that is, with the salutary act. And now in this way what we proposed is demonstrated.

a) The state of the just man requires helps of this kind. For the just man is actually and formally constituted in the supernatural order, existing as an adopted son of God and heir of the kingdom of heaven, who by the law of God is bound to perform works suitable to his state and proportionate to his end, so that at last he may merit to enter into his inheritance. But, this law being granted, God must supply the just man with the means necessary and sufficient for acting as one ought; for means of this kind are not in man's power, since they are supernatural helps; therefore God really confers on all the just these helps necessary and sufficient; for what God owes by the law established by Himself, He certainly does.

β) This will of God to confer on the just helps necessary and sufficient is evident also from the doctrine of the Scriptures. Assuredly we are taught by the Scriptures 1) that the just, by the very fact that they are just, not because they are predestined, are loved by God, and are loved with an active and fruitful love, conferring, namely, the means and helps which they need; Prov. VIII, 17. 20. 21. X, 6. XII, 2. Ioan. XIV, 21. Matth. XI, 28. seg. Roman. V. 8. 9. Psalm. XXII, 4. XXVI, 1. XXXII, 18. 19. 1a. Cor. X, 13. we are taught 2) that the just are made certain that eternal life will be repaid to them, that is, as far as it is from God's part, God is prepared and wills to repay eternal life to them, unless they themselves fail themselves, Sapient. V. 16. Psal. XXXVI, 18. Marci XVI, 16. we are taught 3) that the just are not deserted by God, unless they first desert God, Psal. XXXVI, 21. 33. 39. 10. Eccli. II. 12. XXVII, 9. XXXIV, 19. Ezech. XVIII, 21—32. But these things would be wholly false, if God denied to the just the helps necessary and sufficient: therefore. And surely we are commanded to hope for beatitude and for the helps to its attainment, nor is there any time in which it is lawful to despair: therefore God is always prepared to confer helps of this kind, and if we ask for them as we ought, He certainly confers them, and we can always pray as we ought; otherwise there would be a just reason for despairing again and again. The same is handed down by the Fathers, Conc. Arausic. II. c. 25., namely that all the baptized, with Christ helping and cooperating, can fulfill those things which pertain to salvation, if they will labor faithfully. And the Trid. Syn., Sess. VI. cp. 11., teaching that God does not command impossibilities, but by commanding admonishes you both to do what you can and to ask for what you cannot, and aids you that you may be able.

y) Furthermore, the relation of Christ with the just, which is both that of a spouse loving and never hating the bride, Ephes. V, 23. seq., and that of a head uniting to himself and ruling the members of his body, Colos. I, 18., compared with I Cor. XII, 27., persuades us that the participation of the goods which are communicated by Christ to the just is continual, and that the influx which flows from Christ to the just is unceasing. But this again would be false, if God denied to His just the necessary helps: therefore. Cf. Conc. Trid. ibid.

β) Indeed, we add, for the further confirmation of the same point, that the just can merit helps of this kind, and therefore on account of the merit, and indeed the condign merit, of the just, God confers on the just those helps which are sufficient; except, however, the first one. For the first help, which is conferred on the justified man for acting, must be excluded from merit; for this the justified man cannot merit, and we are speaking of the justified man insofar as he is justified: namely, we say that the first help cannot be the object of merit existing after justification. For a help of this kind the justified man cannot merit, because it is the principle of any merit whatsoever which the justified man acquires. This help is therefore conferred on the justified man by that law which we stated in this part a) in the first argument. And because it is bound up with sanctifying grace, on account of which it is owed; just as that grace is not obtained by condign merit, but can be obtained only by congruous merit, so too that help cannot be the object of condign merit, but at most of the congruous merit which preceded justification.

Now, however, it is the common opinion of theologians that the just man merits of condignity the helps necessary and sufficient. Several prove this because the just man merits of condignity glory, and therefore also the means necessary for attaining it; which reason, however, is not approved by all. Cf. Ripalda, De Ente Supernat. Disp. 93. Suarez, however, De Gratia I. XII, c. 26, proves it by this reason. Namely, the just man can certainly merit by condign merit the increase of grace (Synod. Trid. Sess. VI. Can. 32.); but the fruits of the increase of grace are those actual helps which correspond to it and are owed on account of it; therefore the just man, by meriting the increase of grace, merits at the same time those actual helps which are connected with it. Moreover, it is certain that the just man, through the grace which he has, can so always act that he merits the increase of habitual grace, and therefore that he merits also the actual helps which correspond to it.

Ripalda denies, l. c., that the just man merits the actual helps — not indeed because the dignity sufficient for meriting is lacking to the works of the just man, but because the helps necessary and sufficient are not the object of merit, since they are already owed and destined before the prevision of any merit, as is clear from what we said in the first argument. But nothing prevents something from being owed on several different titles, just as glory is owed to adult just men both by the title of inheritance and by the title of reward. Ripalda must at least concede this, that the merits of the just are such that, if the actual helps were not owed to the just by some law, those helps which correspond to the increase of grace would certainly be owed to them on account of merit; and therefore he must concede that in the just acting well there is really a twofold title by which the helps can be claimed.

III. Now the other point must be proved: namely, that with these helps granted, the just man can attain formal perseverance. And this indeed is evident. For if the just man has these helps, he can always act justly; but acting always justly, he will arrive in the state of grace at the end of life, however far it may be prolonged; arriving in the state of grace at the end of life, the just man obtains formal perseverance, that is, he actually and formally perseveres: therefore, since through the grace of God the just man can always act holily, formal perseverance is in his power. And surely every just man can be saved, if he wills; but he cannot be saved except by persevering in grace (that is, by attaining formal perseverance): therefore he can persevere, if he wills. The consequence (says Suarez, De Gratia I. X. c. 3.) is excellent and evident per se; and each premise is most certain in faith: therefore.

IV. Now that must be proved which, when inspected at first glance, seems a paradox: namely, that formal perseverance is nevertheless a gratuitous gift. Formal perseverance is had when the just man existing in the state of grace is overtaken by death.

So that perseverance may be had, it is not enough that the just man, through grace, can persevere by always acting holily, but it is necessary that he really persevere, that is, preserve the state of grace for that instant in which he must die. Now, this formal final perseverance is a gift or benefit of God, and a gift distinct from the gift of justification and of the power of persevering, and it is a gratuitous gift. What we say is a gift distinct from the gift of justification and of the conferred power of persevering, we can call a special gift, so that by this term "special" is signified not its rarity, but its distinction from the other gifts, at least inadequately. But what we assert we demonstrate from a twofold head, yet in such a way that for adults we especially press the second, as will be declared later, so that the first is not to be taken separately from the other, although in it a certain special reason is also found.

Thus 1) perseverance depends on this, that death be conjoined with the state of grace, or that it happen in that instant in which the man is in grace. But a conjunction of this kind is a gift or benefit of God; for the man could have died in another instant, in which he either was, or would have been, in sin: b) it is a benefit distinct from the other gifts; for it was not given even to many who had sanctifying grace and the power of persevering: c) it is a gratuitous gift; because the just man, however holily he has acted and acts, in no instant acquires the right of demanding that he be snatched away by death at that time when he is in the state of grace; for the terminus of probation is placed wholly in the power and free will of God, the Lord of life and death, whose act of dominion it is to preset for each one the terminus of probation. See (says August. De Dono perseverantiae c. 17.) how far from the truth it is to deny that perseverance to the end of this life is a gift of God, since He Himself gives an end to this life, whenever He wills; and if He gives it before an imminent fall, He makes the man persevere to the end." And to prove the same thing he appeals to the words

Sap. IV. 11. He was taken away lest malice should change his understanding. (De Praedest. SS. c. 14.).

This grace, by which perseverance is given, is not an interior grace, but is an exterior providence, which fixes the end of life for that instant in which one has justice. But this gift of perseverance alone is conferred on baptized infants and on those who, after receiving justification, up to death are not capable of free acts.

But 2°. in order that in adults, whom it behooves to act holily after receiving justification, death may be conjoined with the state of grace, it is necessary that the state of grace have been preserved by them; wherefore the very preservation of the state of grace, with which death is at last conjoined, is an element of the gift of perseverance. But this preservation depends on this, that the just man has acted holily, that is, has consented to the graces received from God and has acted through them. Moreover, all the graces indeed by which men are excited to act holily are accommodated to those to whom they are given, so that they can follow the one exciting them, if they will: several, however, of these, on account of man's fault, lack their effect: others, with man cooperating, obtain their effect, and these are called efficacious and congruous in a special manner, whose effect God, when He destines them, knows to be infallibly obtained. God indeed destines these graces with the intention that a good act be produced; which indeed is common to the destination of each grace. Now these congruous graces are those which the persevering have, and on account of which they actually persevere: but these, insofar as they are such, although the just man could humbly merit several of them, God nevertheless gives gratuitously; as we are about to demonstrate here shortly. We ask, namely, of God that He Himself work the good in us, make us do it, help us, and work with us, which is to ask the conferral of those graces which God knows will be efficacious; we therefore obtain them by prayer, yet we do not merit them of condignity. The conferral, therefore, of graces which are not only sufficient but will also be infallibly efficacious is causally the conferral of the preservation of the state of grace, and therefore also of perseverance. Now the conferral of graces of this kind a) is a gift or benefit of God; for by them is given the perseverance which would not be had without them: b) it is a gift distinct from the gift of justification and of the power of persevering, which is had through sufficient graces; a special gift therefore; for these can be without that, and that adds something over and above the former: c) it is a gratuitous gift to the just; because the just man has a right only to attaining glory after life and to the means necessary for this: but these means are the sufficient graces, by which he can, if he wills, persevere; for that the graces which he has are not actually efficacious, man must impute to himself, who does not use the sufficient means. Wherefore the just man can never merit of condignity that those graces be conferred on him which have been foreseen by God to be efficacious.

Therefore from this part also, namely with a view to the helps by which the just man is aided in preserving the justice which he received, and thus in persevering, perseverance is a gift of God, distinct from the others, and a gratuitous gift. Whence Augustine, l. c. cp. 6.: «But indeed (they said, who denied that perseverance is a gift of God) each one deserts God by his own will, so that he is deservedly deserted by God. Who (answers Augustine) would deny this? but we therefore pray that we be not led into temptation, so that this may not happen. And if we are heard, assuredly it does not happen; because God does not permit it to happen. For nothing happens except what He Himself does or permits to be done. He is able, therefore, both to bend wills from evil to good, and to convert those prone to falling, and to direct the step that pleases Him.»

The efficacious graces, moreover, by which good operation and the preservation of the state of grace are obtained, are not only interior graces but also exterior ones, of which kind are the removal of occasions of sin, the restraint of temptations, occasions of acting well, counsels, holy examples, and the like (cf. Th. II.).

From these things, moreover, it is gathered that the gift of perseverance, as regards adults, is not one simple grace, but is put together from a collection of many graces, both internal and external, among which latter the principal is the death appointed for that instant in which a man attains justice.

V. Now, moreover, one may observe that, as regards adults, the deeper reason why perseverance is a distinct benefit of God is that which we adduced in the second place. For if you suppose that someone is going to live always holily (for this can come to pass if he wills it), the death, which must happen at some time, will have to find him in the state of grace; and therefore, from the fact that he is snatched away now rather than at another time, he does not obtain that special benefit of persevering, which he would certainly obtain in whatever other instant he might be called. You have an example in the most blessed Mother of God. But even then it is a special gift of perseverance; because those efficacious graces, both internal and external, by which the just man has worked holily and would work holily, are a special gift of grace. And thus this part of the thesis has been demonstrated.

VI. It is a certain opinion that the just man can obtain, that is, humbly merit, and indeed infallibly, final formal perseverance — obtain, namely, that efficacious graces not be lacking and that he be snatched away at that time when he is in the state of grace, and therefore obtain that gift which we have said to be gratuitous. This is the opinion of Augustine, which he taught in De Dono perseverantiae, c. 12: «This gift of God can be humbly merited; but once it has been given, it cannot be lost by contumacy» (he is speaking of perseverance itself formally taken). And indeed in that book Augustine proves that perseverance is a gift of God because it is to be asked of God by us; but what we are commanded to ask of God we can also certainly obtain, if we pray, as is fitting. And in truth the most universal words of Christ are: ask and you shall receive: everyone who asks, receives, which words therefore also comprehend perseverance. Therefore formal perseverance, which we are taught by the Holy Spirit to ask of God, we can certainly obtain, if we pray as we ought. Surely we can certainly obtain from God what is contained in the Lord's Prayer; but, if Augustine is to be believed, «by the very prayer which is called the Lord's, because the Lord taught it, when it is prayed by the saints, almost nothing else is understood to be asked than perseverance.» Lib. citato c. 2. To this indeed the second, third, fifth, sixth, and seventh petitions look; by which, if the just attain what they ask, they will certainly obtain perseverance.

But because the obtaining power of prayer rests on the manifest promise of God, which cannot fail; hence the obtaining of perseverance, when it is asked as it ought to be, is infallible.

VII. We have said: if it is prayed as it ought to be; for the conditions required in prayer must be observed, in order that it may obtain its effect, about which there is no need to dispute here. We shall indicate only two, which will also serve to declare the matter. Namely, first, as long as the just man lives, the petition for this gift must be continual and constant. For, as Suarez says, De Gratia I. XII. c. 38. n. 14: «The just man can be understood to merit or obtain the gift of perseverance in two ways. First, by one act or by several acts made in a certain time or up to a certain instant of life, obtaining perseverance and, as it were, confirmation in grace for the remaining time of life. Second, successively through the whole time of life, obtaining perseverance as it were by parts — for example, now obtaining efficacious help so as not to fall in the present occasion, and after that praying again and obtaining another help for keeping the precept that again occurs, and so on, always praying and never failing. I say, therefore, that the former way of meriting or obtaining perseverance is not infallible. The a posteriori argument of Medina urges this (namely, because most holy men often fall after many similar prayers, and because otherwise a just man praying thus could be secure and work out his salvation without fear and trembling, which seems to be against Paul). The a priori reason, however, is that no divine promise exists on this matter... because such infallibility cannot be gathered from the promise made to prayer. It is proved, because that promise was made under certain conditions, which not concurring, prayer does not infallibly obtain,... and one of these is perseverance» (namely, in praying). The other condition is that which Suarez teaches in the same place: «although, absolutely speaking, prayer can be obtaining even if the one praying is not in grace; nevertheless this prayer by which perseverance in grace is asked, by reason of the thing asked, which intrinsically supposes grace, requires grace in the one praying, in order that it may be obtaining, and consequently requires perseverance in grace, in order that it may be infallibly obtaining; because, in order that prayer may have due perseverance, it must endure with those moral circumstances which it also ought to have had from the beginning, in order that it be made fittingly. Hence, by the very fact that a new impediment is placed (by sinning) to the effect of the prayer, perseverance in praying fails, at least in the due manner.»

VIII. You ask whether the just man can also merit congruously this gift of perseverance? I answer that theologians are wont to use together the names of obtaining and of congruous merit in this matter, as may be seen in the cited words of Suarez; cf. also Bellarmine, De Iustificatione L. V. cap. ultimo. Moreover, Ripalda answers the question in the affirmative, De Ente supern. Disput. XCIV.

Sect. 2. because in the order of present Providence the power of obtaining is bound up with at least congruous merit, which that theologian proves from this, that the Fathers, in order to remove the natural merits of grace, deny that it is given to natural desires and petitions, because it would not be given without merit of nature, since it would be obtained by natural prayers. The Fathers therefore judge that every prayer is also meritorious. Therefore the act of praying is also meritorious. But if the act of praying is meritorious, why not also other acts, which in respect of the ratio of merit can be more excellent than prayer? And in general, as regards all the good acts of the just, Ripalda proves the same a priori — not indeed that all acts merit, but that some, namely the most excellent, can merit; because, namely, such great dignity inheres in those acts that it is able to move God to confer the gift of perseverance. This opinion is at least probable; but it must be noted with Suarez, loc. cit., that «infallibility (of the attainment of perseverance) does not belong to merit of congruity by reason of itself, so to speak (that is, from the dignity of the perfection of the work), but by reason of the obtaining, which properly corresponds to prayer alone, as such. The reason is that this infallibility is founded only on the divine promise, which is not found to have been made to the works of the just, insofar as they are meritorious of congruity, but only to prayer. Wherefore, in order that the fruit of this merit be more certain, the petition for perseverance must always be joined to it.»

Corollary. Therefore the just man can attain final perseverance not only because he can persevere through the sufficient graces owed to him; but also because, by praying as he ought, he can infallibly obtain the gift of perseverance. This, however, does not stand in the way of the doctrine handed down under n. IV.; for prayer too, and such prayer as is fitting, is a fruit of efficacious grace.

IX. As far as this question is concerned, the Council of Trent teaches four things. First, that the gift of perseverance is great, Sess. VI. cn. 16. Second, that without the special help of God the just man cannot persevere in the justice received, ibid. cn. 22. Third, that with that special help he can, ibid. cn. 22. Fourth, that no one ought to promise himself the gift of perseverance with absolute certainty, although all ought to place and repose the firmest hope in the help of God, ibid. and cp. 13. Now the first of these is easily understood. For only habitual grace persisting in us up to the end of life introduces us into the kingdom of heaven; and therefore perseverance, which includes sanctifying grace itself, is a gift more excellent by reason of the benefit than habitual grace alone, which is included in it and which, nevertheless, eternal perdition can follow. Perseverance is therefore a great gift of God; for, compared with the other preceding gifts, it is their complement, or it is the reason why we have not obtained them in vain. As to the second and the third, the question arises what that special help is. Note that it is not called a special privilege, but only a special help. It is asked, therefore, what this special help is, or wherein the specialness of this help lies. To wit, a threefold interpretation can be adduced. For either the special help is the sufficient actual graces, both external and internal, insofar as they are sufficient; or they are actual graces insofar as they are congruous and efficacious; or, finally, they are simply actual graces, comprising in a confused way both determinations, which are efficacious in those who persevere, inefficacious in those who do not persevere. But before we settle the question, we note that it is not probable that the Synod willed to comprehend among the helps mentioned in that canon 22°. the very conjunction of death with the state of grace, or the death which then occurs when a man is in the state of grace. For 1) this grace, rather than a help to persevering, is formal perseverance itself conferred, 2) about that help the Synod speaks, by which, even when it is given, it is supposed by the Synod that there can be someone who says that the just man cannot persevere, as is clear from the second part of the canon; but it was not lawful for the Tridentine Fathers to imagine that there is someone who says that a just man dying in the state of grace cannot persevere. Hence the Tridentine Fathers speak of those helps, whether external or internal, which precede formal perseverance. From the observation made it is also clear that the canon speaks of the perseverance of adult just men, not of infants.

Therefore, in the first place, it is certain that this special help is not the sufficient actual graces under this precise ratio, insofar as they remain only sufficient and are not efficacious; for neither under this ratio are these helps given by God, nor can any cause be thought up why the Synod should have regarded the help of God under this respect. There will be some, however, who judge that the special help of God is the actual graces, both extrinsic and intrinsic, congruous and efficacious, insofar as they are such; for such are in reality a special help, since it is not given to all, and by them perseverance is truly obtained. But a difficulty immediately occurs; for we are taught by that canon that without that special help the just man cannot persevere, and with it he can; but without those congruous helps the just man indeed will not persevere, yet he has a true power of persevering. And although, supposing the knowledge of God, which sees that certain helps will be inefficacious, it may be said that a man cannot persevere with those helps, just as God cannot be deceived; this, however, is an impotence consequent upon the very fact, which is certainly foreseen by God, and it comes back to saying that someone cannot persevere with those helps; because he who does not persevere cannot persevere. Now we do not judge that the Synod speaks of an impotence of this kind consequent; for who denied it, or what controversy could there be about it?

You will say that the special help is the congruous helps, which are in our power, because congruous helps can be infallibly obtained, and in this way they are in our power, like prayer. But one must pray, and pray as one ought; prayer itself, however, is also made through a congruous help. Moreover, this help is not given to all; otherwise all would pray as they ought and so would infallibly attain perseverance. The Synod, therefore, does not speak of this help; for the prior difficulty returns: for without it there is the power of praying, and so the power of obtaining perseverance, and yet it is denied that one can persevere without the special help of God.

There remains, therefore, the third interpretation; and nothing else is needed except that it be declared why these actual graces are called a special help. Namely, it is a special help because it is diverse and distinct from that by which one becomes just, that is, from sanctifying grace and the habits of the virtues. For we are taught that for persevering it is not enough to be just and equipped with sanctifying grace, but besides, other helps are required so that we may be able to persevere in the justice received through good works. These are the helps that St. Thomas demands, helps, namely, directing and protecting against the impulses of temptations, which are actual graces, I. II. q. CIX. a. 10.

The fourth thing that the Synod teaches, after those things which have so far been said in this Thesis, no longer needs explanation.

Corollary. The doctrine of this thesis is most practical. It is established that all the just can persevere if they will: it is established that all the just can infallibly attain formal perseverance; but it matters nothing that they cannot merit it of condignity, when it is certain that they can attain it infallibly, if they pray as they ought, which is most certainly in their power through the help of God. With fear and trembling, indeed, our salvation must be worked out; because it is God who works in us both to will and to accomplish, namely, because our salvation depends on the help of God, who on account of our negligence can deny us efficacious helps; but if we are not wanting to the grace of God, which is conferred on us from time to time, we ought to conceive the firmest hope that he who has begun in us a good work will himself perfect it.

X. You will object. It is the opinion of Augustine that perseverance is given to the just man by God gratuitously; but if it is in the power of the just man to persevere, the gift of perseverance is not truly gratuitous. Furthermore, these two do not seem to cohere sufficiently: that it is in the power of the just man to persevere if he wills, and yet that the gift of perseverance is gratuitous.

I answer to the first. Augustine, teaching that perseverance is a gratuitous gift, first excludes the merits of nature, by which perseverance would be rendered mediately, as will become known in the following Synopsis. Then, because although it is in the power of the just man to persevere; nevertheless that he actually perseveres is a gratuitous gift of God, who, knowing, gives those graces which he foresaw as efficacious, not those which he foresaw as inefficacious, and sets the end of life when a man is acceptable to God, who could die at another time.

To the second, we say that for persevering actively the sufficient helps are enough, which surely would not be sufficient if they were not enough. Indeed, these helps must be efficacious or joined with effect, but this conjunction depends on the very will of the recipient of the helps; whence it is in his power to persevere. Nor do we deny that the just man can merit the helps which, with his consent supervening, can be efficacious; but we deny that he can merit of condignity, or demand, that those helps be conferred on him which will certainly be efficacious, and not others, however most sufficient, and that he be overtaken by death in that instant in which he is acceptable to God. Now in these things the gift of perseverance consists, and this we have proved to be gratuitous.

XI. But if you ask why to this one are granted graces which, from middle knowledge, are foreseen as efficacious, while to another are granted graces which God foresees will lack effect through the fault, indeed, of the man; just as if you ask why God recalls this one from life when he is in the state of grace, while that just man is permitted to fall and to die before reparation; if you ask these things, I say, you touch upon the question of the gratuitous distribution of graces, in which we gladly confess that there is a mystery. Cf. ultimam Th.

The rest is to be sought in the question on predestination.