Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

Stephen Brulifer, a theologian at the end of the fifteenth century, calls the cited axiom a theological rule, in II. D. 28. q. 3. Ripalda, De Ente Supern., Disp. XX. Sect. 1., adduces several interpretations of it handed down by the Scholastics, which can be reduced to the following:] we judge that it is not certain what some contend, namely, that this same interpretation was actually in use among the theologians of the old school for several centuries.

Namely, to one who does what is in him by the powers of actual grace which he has, God confers further graces and sanctification. Or, to one who does what is in him by the powers of nature, God confers supernatural grace, as to one meriting it de congruo, or at least as to one positively disposing himself to it. Finally, to one who does what is in him by the powers of nature, God confers grace, not inasmuch as the works of nature contribute anything positively to receiving grace, but only inasmuch as they contribute negatively, i.e., because they do not hinder by sins the grace prepared by God. This is the interpretation set forth in the Thesis. Suarez, moreover, explains this last interpretation thus, De Auxiliis, Book III. c. 2. § 3.: «Some Scholastic Doctors suppose what is… most certain, that God, as far as in Him lies, is prepared to give His grace to all and to call all adults (who alone are properly capable of vocation)... in this way, therefore, it is in the power of any man whatsoever to be saved, because it is in his power to have this divine help, not from his merit or disposition, but from the liberal and general bounty of God. Although man can effect nothing of himself by which he might obtain this divine help, but God offers it by His gratuitous will alone, man can nevertheless hinder sufficiently by his will, and as far as in him lies, lest he actually receive from God this help and this vocation, if, by multiplying sins, he renders himself more and more unworthy of it... Hence it is that if a man having only the natural light of reason conducted himself in such a way that he placed no new obstacle to grace, he would infallibly receive in due time the help or vocation of grace, not from his own merit, but from that general liberality of God, by which He stands at the door of all and knocks. In this sense, therefore, those authors said that God does not deny grace to one who does what is in him; and it would be said more clearly: to one not placing an obstacle and hindrance through that which he can do of himself, God gives from His liberality the grace which man cannot merit... It is true that God gives His grace to one not placing an obstacle, nor is anything thereby attributed to man by which he might merit grace, but only that he can hinder it through sin, or at most, that he can avoid the sin against the law of nature, which could hinder it; and this man can do through free will. Moreover, the observation of Ericus cited by Ripalda ibid. contributes to this point, namely, that it is one thing for grace to be given to one who does what is in him, and another for it to be given because he does what is in him. For the first signifies only the fact of the connection of a natural honest work with grace; the second, however, further signifies a certain order of causality between the grace of God and the natural work.

I. But he who so interprets that axiom as to concede to one doing what is in him by the powers of nature only a negative disposition to grace, he surely does not place the reason of the connection of grace with the work in any way in the work itself, but entirely in the liberal will of God, who gratuitously decreed to give His grace to all. The natural work, however, is a condition, but 1) it is a negative condition, i.e., it is not a condition inasmuch as it is a work good and worthy of some esteem, but inasmuch as, the good work existing, there does not exist the sin which can be a sufficient reason why God denies grace.2) It is a non-necessary condition, because even to the greatest sinner God can confer, and sometimes does confer, the grace by which he is called to faith or penance. And one must note the difference in this regard between a good work and an evil work. For although a good natural work cannot be a reason why God gives supernatural gifts, an evil work can nevertheless be a reason why God denies His gratuitous supernatural gifts, just as His other gifts as well.

Therefore, by this axiom two things are asserted; one implicitly, the other explicitly. The first is: that man can by his sins place an obstacle, lest God confer grace on him, God who is prepared to give it to all. The second is: since God wills to give His grace to all, if any man living naturally admits no sin, God will certainly confer His grace on him; for if He did not do this, it would no longer be true that God wills to give His grace to all.

One must note accurately what is the point of the question in this part. It is not asked whether that axiom, expounded as it is proposed in the Thesis and has so far been explained, has historical value; nor is it asked whether the same axiom, so expounded, coheres with the whole economy of grace, with the divine salvific will, such as we profess; but only this is asked: whether this axiom, so expounded, derogates or not from the gratuitousness of grace.

III. And indeed it can seem that it derogates. For by that axiom an infallible connection of grace with one operating well naturally is established, and a non-infallible connection of grace with one acting badly naturally is established: for if in regard to both there is an infallible connection, what does it matter to say: to one who does what is in him? It would rather have to be said: God denies grace to no man. But if there is no infallible connection even for one operating well, that axiom is no longer certain. Now the reason of this difference, or the reason of the infallible connection of grace with one operating well, is the good operation itself of one doing what is in him; for this reason cannot be said to be the will of God, which of itself is prepared to give grace to all men, no one excepted. Therefore, one who does what is in him contributes something to the reception of grace; he contributes as determining this infallible bond; he contributes as the reason why grace is given to him rather than to another. Indeed, a certain exigency of grace seems to belong to one doing what is in him by the powers of nature; which exigency is opposed to the gratuitousness of grace.

Nevertheless, it must be conceded that by that axiom, accepted in the way in which it is proposed in the Thesis, concerning man doing what is in him by the powers of nature, the dignity, i.e., the gratuitousness, of grace is not derogated from. Certainly, in order that the conferral of grace be totally gratuitous, it is necessary that there be in man no exigency of it, no dignity or positive disposition, and consequently that the whole reason for giving be the liberal will of God. It is not required, however, that there be in man no negative dignity or disposition either, i.e., a lack of positive unworthiness or indisposition; otherwise the grace conferred on Adam and the Angels would not have been given totally gratuitously. But by that axiom no exigency of grace, no dignity or positive disposition, but only a negative one, is placed in nature, and the whole reason for giving grace is asserted to be the divine liberal will; therefore.

Which indeed can be conceived in this way. Let us suppose that there is no sin in men and no good work; since God had antecedently decreed to give grace to all, He would certainly confer it on all, nor would anyone say that it is not given freely. But if sin exists in someone, then there is a special reason why grace is denied to him. Hence it is said that he who acts well does not place the sin which can be an obstacle to grace; nevertheless grace is given to him freely, because it is given to him for this reason alone, namely, because God wills it.

In order that this may be better understood, we will answer the argument proposed to the contrary. Namely, 1) an infallible connection of grace with one operating well, or with the good operation, is established — inasmuch as it is a good operation worthy of some reward, I deny; inasmuch as it is the exclusion of that which can be an obstacle to grace, I distinguish — the reason of which connection is the good work or the exclusion of the obstacle, I deny; it is the divine liberal will, I concede.

2. The good operation is the reason of the very conferral of grace — I deny; for the reason of this is the divine will alone, which freely and gratuitously destined its grace. The good operation is the reason why, given the will of God to confer grace, grace is infallibly given to one doing what is in him — I distinguish: inasmuch as through it man merits, exacts, or becomes positively disposed to grace, I deny; inasmuch as through it there is lacking in man that on account of which God can deny the grace which He decreed to give to all, I concede.

3. Therefore one who does what is in him contributes something to the reception of grace, i.e., man can naturally dispose himself to grace — I deny. He can naturally place an obstacle to it, which however he does not place — I concede. Hence one who does what is in him naturally determines the conferral of the grace that is given to him, i.e., he does not place that which could determine the denial of grace — I concede; he places that which determines God to confer grace on him — I deny.

Therefore, man can indeed naturally hinder for himself the grace of God; but he cannot naturally dispose himself positively to grace, nor is this power necessarily connected with the former; for less is required for the former than for the latter: for the former it suffices to be able to sin, but for the latter a certain proportion of the dignity of works with grace is required, which proportion is lacking to the works of nature. Innocent III. in Serm. 2. de Conversione s. Pauli: «It is one thing to merit and another to demerit. No one can merit grace, but anyone can demerit grace.»

IV. Lessius, Opusc. De Gratia efficaci, c. 10, Suarez, loc. cit., and others whom Ripalda mentions, loc. cit., contend that the axiom thus accepted is in no way Semi-Pelagian and coheres fitly with the Catholic doctrine on the gratuitousness of grace; and it is a view already publicly defended in this university. Cf. Theses De Gratia Christi, anno MDCCCLXII. Th. 35. Therefore, to contract into a summary what we have disputed, our proof comes back to this: that grace be entirely gratuitous, it is not required that the subject to whom it is conferred also lack a negative disposition; the reason is that Adam and the Angels had this negative disposition, i.e., the lack of positive indisposition to grace, and the very humanity of Christ had this negative disposition to uncreated grace, and yet both according to the truth of the matter and according to the express doctrine of Augustine and the Fathers, grace in Adam and in the Angels was entirely gratuitous, and entirely gratuitous too was the hypostatic union of the Word with human nature — which gratuitous union Augustine proposes as the type and exemplar of the gratuitousness of the grace that is conferred on us, De Praed. SS. c. 15. alibique. Therefore, he who places in nature only a negative disposition is in no way opposed to the gratuitousness of grace. But he who defends that saying accepted in the way in which we have said places in nature nothing but a negative disposition; therefore. Hence those things which Vasquez decrees on this matter, in I. p. Disp. XCI. cc. 10. 11., cannot be approved by us.

V. One who does what is in him is one who does that which is in his power (St. Thomas qq. De Verit. q. 24. a. 15); one who does what he can (St. Bonaventure in II. D. 28. a. 2. q. I.); one who acts according to the powers which he actually has (John Gerson in the book de vita spirituali). Moreover, the powers which one actually has can be powers of grace, or the powers of nature alone. No one doubts that the Scholastics understood that axiom also of those doing what is in them by the powers of grace, to whom further grace is given. But the question is whether they also accepted it of one doing what is in him by the powers of nature alone. Some indeed, like Lessius in the place cited above, affirm that the old Scholastics, with very few exceptions, for 300 years and more accepted that saying — God does not deny grace to one who does what is in him — as concerning one doing what is in him by the powers of nature, who, so doing what was in him, would dispose himself by that disposition which we have called negative to supernatural grace. But if 1) one accurately considers the common manner of speaking of those theologians, if 2) one weighs the explanation of that saying handed down in every century by theologians, if 3) account is taken of the express testimonies of quite many theologians of that age, which indeed preceded the Synod of Trent; it will be clearly established that what Lessius affirms is not certain.

VI. Indeed, as to the first, since the old Scholastics distinguished the grace which justifies and constitutes us friends of God from that which is the principle of the good work, disposes to justification, and helps the justified man to operate, frequently among them the appellation of grace taken simply signifies that grace which is more excellent, which makes us pleasing, i.e., friends of God. This can be seen in those testimonies of so many Scholastics which Charles de Plessis D'Argentrée collected (in the Dissertation whose title is: Observationes in testimonia Doctorum Scholasticorum, per duodecimum seculo ineunte ad hanc usque aetatem de gratia pro conditione corruptae naturae disputarunt). But from the testimonies which we shall cite, this too will be sufficiently established. Hence, for them, a man without grace is frequently a man not yet justified, namely, destitute of habitual sanctifying grace. And in very truth, not a few old Scholastics say that the first parents were created in their natural endowments and so disposed themselves to grace; but they do not exclude actual graces. Thus, e.g., St. Bonaventure in II. D. 29. a. 1. q. 2. teaches that the first man had the natural goods prior in time to the gratuitous ones, and brings forward among other reasons this one, because «God, according to the common law, requires some disposition and preparation on our part in order that He may infuse grace into someone... and therefore grace was not concreated with man, but was deferred until man, by an act and use of reason, would in some way dispose himself to receive it, so that thus that saying of Augustine would be verified in the first man; He who created you without you does not justify you without you.» By which words, indeed, some positive disposition is signified. But the same Doctor, ibid. D. XXVIII. a. 2. q. 1., teaches both that one who has the use of free will is hardly ever or never found without grace freely given,¹ and that without it man cannot dispose himself to sanctifying grace; namely, that the exciting grace and the first disposition which is toward sanctifying grace is a thought, and that this is not without the gift of grace freely given; which grace holds, as it were, a middle place between sanctifying grace and natural freedom. That grace freely given, however, is required for this reason, because sanctifying grace is something divine and existing above free will. Now, in order that these things may be reconciled, one must say that man created in natural endowments and operating in natural endowments, or according to natural powers, is a man lacking sanctifying grace, but not lacking any actual grace. Therefore, if some testimonies of the Scholastics say that a man without grace, existing in natural endowments or in purely natural endowments, prepares himself for grace, they can be conveniently taken of a man lacking indeed justifying grace, but not lacking actual graces, unless the context of the whole opinion required that, which indeed seems to take place in very few cases.

From this observation and from that one it follows in turn, namely, that in that formula of the Scholastics — man prepares himself for grace from natural endowments — one must distinguish both the principle by which man acts and that which man does; and that that formula can legitimately yield this sense, namely, that man operating those things which are of themselves natural and, according to the very light of reason, right and knowable, and not yet operating those things which are also objectively supernatural, prepares himself for grace. But with this interpretation applied, the act that is also objectively supernatural is indeed excluded, but the act that is at least subjectively supernatural is not excluded, inasmuch as it is done with the help of grace. That formulas of this kind can be so taken among the Scholastics will be evident both from the preceding observation and especially from what follows.

VII. And indeed 2) A detailed explanation of the sense of this saying — that God does not deny grace to one who does what is in himself — exists among the older theologians themselves, who can and ought to be regarded as interpreters of the common opinion. To the thirteenth century can deservedly be referred the author of that compendium of theological truth which was assigned to Albert the Great or to Thomas. He, however, says in Bk. V, ch. 2: «Man is inaccessible if he does not receive sanctifying grace; because grace freely given (gratis data) is always at hand to arouse and admonish free will, whose part it is to consent to this admonition, and this is to do what is in oneself: which done, a man can prepare himself for sanctifying grace.» Marsilius of Inghen, in the fourteenth century, has these things in II, q. 18, a. 3. Having first handed down the definition of merit of congruity (that someone merits de congruo when, from the quality of the deed done, a reward is not owed to him but only from the liberality of the giver, with the quality and liberality of the giver himself attended to and the quality of the work that the worker does weighed), and with no mention made of a negative disposition, he lays down, among others, these conclusions. Third conclusion: «Just as in the state of fallen nature a man cannot merit the first grace de condigno, so neither can he merit it de congruo from purely natural things.» Fourth conclusion: «Although no one can merit the first grace after the fall from purely natural things even de congruo, still anyone can merit it de congruo through the special helps of God freely given to him.» He concludes the article thus: «And in this the opinions of my masters seem to me to agree.»

For those who say that a sinner can merit the first grace de congruo from purely natural things understand the conclusion already laid down, namely that he can merit it from those things, when he has been prevented by the special help of God. But those who say the contrary understand the third conclusion, namely that he cannot merit it from purely natural things that are not specially helped by God.And in article IV, answering the objection which he had proposed to himself in article I in these words: «Seventh: because for merit of grace de congruo either it suffices that a man do what is in himself, and if so, since a man can do this from natural things, it is clear that he can merit the first grace de congruo from them; or something beyond the common natural powers is required, and if so, then those to be damned, who die in continued mortal sin, seem to be unjustly damned:» he says, to the seventh point, that it must be said «that for merit of grace de congruo in the state of fallen nature it does not suffice that a man do everything that is in his purely natural powers, but something beyond all natural powers is required, namely faith.» Whence he explains those words of Scripture: «Turn to me and I will turn to you», thus: «It can be explained more clearly, that the Lord's meaning is: turn to me by serving my interior preveniences, by which I call you from the state of guilt, and I will turn to you by the infusion of grace.» But those who said that a man can merit grace de congruo from purely natural things were the ones who wanted the axiom: «God does not deny grace to one who does what is in himself», to hold also for the acquisition of the first grace; but what their interpretation would be, we have heard from Marsilius.

To the fifteenth century belongs John Gerson, who among his Moral Rules says: «To no one doing what is in himself — that is, using well the gifts of God already had — is God lacking in the things necessary for salvation.» In his sermon on the Holy Spirit, moreover, he says: «The Sacred Scriptures constrain the soul itself, that it dispose itself, that it do what is in itself, in the aforesaid and similar ways — by praying, weeping, groaning, or that it work something toward the reception of the Holy Spirit. For the Apostle hands down that we are God's co-workers, and certainly if the will contributed absolutely nothing, whence would there be merit? It must plainly be admitted: it contributes by a spontaneous consent obedient to the premotion of the Holy Spirit; but that it so contribute and obey, this already is not from itself without grace, inasmuch as it has been prevented by grace and salutarily drawn by him.»

Toward the beginning of the sixteenth century flourished John Driedo: he indeed, in Tractate 5, On the Captivity and Redemption of the Human Race, argues thus: «that we say a man does as much as is in himself can be understood in three ways. In one way indeed, to do as much as is in oneself is to do as much as nature itself can do of itself, that is, from its own powers alone implanted by the author of nature, not peculiarly drawn by God the Father... And one doing what is in himself in this way neither merits grace nor prepares himself for acquiring grace, because the will is prepared by the Lord for having grace. Secondly, to do as much as is in oneself is, for the time and place, to do as much as nature without the gift of habitual grace can do from its rational powers peculiarly drawn by God the Father toward the beginnings of faith. And to one doing as much as is in himself in this way, God bestows the beginning of faith, from which he may also be able to pray, invoke, seek, implore the mercy of God. And this is already the first drawing of the rational soul, which is to be posited not as a general influx of God... but is a peculiar and gratuitous drawing... Thirdly, to do as much as is in oneself is to do as much as nature, aided by faith given from above, can do for the remission of sin or for obtaining the perseverance of grace; and thus God gives grace to one doing as much as is in himself: but in this way no one can do as much as is in himself without the help of habitual grace... And in these two latter ways did the interpreters of sacred theology understand the saying, who teach that God illumines and gives grace to those who do as much as is in themselves.»

VIII. And indeed 3) The greater and more excellent part of the theologians received that saying in no other way, as Driedo testifies. That we may bring forward only the testimonies of the greatest, let these be had. St. Thomas, I. II. q. CIX. a. 6, asks whether a man can prepare himself for grace by himself without the exterior help of grace (which namely is from an extrinsic principle, which is God), and among the objections for the affirmative side he proposes that axiom, because if a man does what is in himself, God does not deny him grace. Now he solves the question by teaching that, in order that a man be prepared to work meritoriously for the attainment of beatitude, habitual grace is necessary; but that he be prepared for habitual grace itself, some gratuitous help of God interiorly moving the soul or inspiring a good purpose must be presupposed..., That a man be converted to God — this cannot be unless God converts him. This, however, is to prepare oneself for grace, namely, to be converted to God...

A man cannot prepare himself to receive the light of grace except through the gratuitous help of God interiorly moving.To the objection, moreover, he responds, «that a man can do nothing unless he is moved by God, according to that saying of John: Without me you can do nothing. And therefore when a man is said to do what is in himself, this is said to be in the man's power according as he is moved by God (i.e., as he said above: according as a good purpose is inspired in him by God through gratuitous help).» «And in q. CXII. a. 3, whether grace is necessarily given to one preparing himself for grace, or doing what is in himself; he responds that, if the preparation be considered insofar as it is from free will alone, there is no necessity of the attainment of grace, because the gift of grace exceeds every preparation of human power. But if the preparation be considered insofar as it is from God moving, then it has a necessity of infallibility with respect to that to which it is ordained by God.» Whence the words of the Gloss adduced in the first objection: God receives him who flees to him, otherwise there would be iniquity in him, he so explains, that «if the gloss be referred to the movement of free will before grace (habitual), it speaks according as the very flight of man to God is through a divine motion, which it is just should not fail.» Moreover, if St. Thomas had thought that that axiom is also to be taken of a man doing what is in himself by the powers of nature, he would not have denied that there is any necessity of the attainment of grace, namely a necessity of infallibility, given the preparation from free will, but he would have indicated that actual grace infallibly follows. The same holy Doctor had taught this in the QQ. disputatis. De Verit. q. 24. a. 15 and in II. D. 28. q. 1. a. 4.

St. Bonaventure, in II. D. 28. a. 2. q. 1, asks whether free will destitute of grace given can sufficiently dispose itself for sanctifying grace: he argues, moreover, for the affirmative side that he who does what is in himself sufficiently disposes himself for grace. He responds, however, that «it is impossible that free will destitute of all grace dispose itself for sanctifying grace:» «because free will never rises up either to know grace or to ask for it unless it is in some way stirred from on high and is led through the help of grace freely given.» To the argument, however, he responds thus: «it must be said that to do what is in oneself can be understood in two ways. In one way positively, because one does something ordained to grace» (namely, something that has an order to sanctifying grace, i.e., something supernatural by the excitation of God), and does as much as he can, and in this way the aforesaid saying has truth. In the other way it can be understood privatively, so that one is said to do what is in oneself because one does what one can, although it is not ordained to the reception of grace (i.e., only something natural), and in this way free will destitute of grace can do what is in itself, and thus the aforesaid saying does not have truth." Therefore the aforesaid saying does not hold for that man who does what is in himself, destitute of grace freely given.

You will say that St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure do not properly treat our question — which is whether God does not deny actual graces to one doing what is in himself by the powers of nature — but another, namely whether habitual grace is not denied to him. I answer that this very thing is an argument that those Doctors did not understand that saying of one doing what is in himself by the powers of nature, to whom actual grace is not denied; for if they never have this special question, how do you prove that they thought that actual graces are not denied to those who do what is in themselves through the powers of nature? Moreover, if they had been of that opinion — that actual grace is not denied to one doing what is in himself by the powers of nature — even if they instituted the question about habitual grace, they would have warned that one doing what is in himself by the powers of nature is disposed to it remotely; because he is disposed, albeit negatively but infallibly, to actual graces, by which he is afterwards positively disposed to habitual grace. But those Doctors either simply affirm that a man does as much as is in himself toward attaining grace insofar as he is moved by God; or they simply deny that that axiom has truth, if a man acts only according to the powers of nature.

The author of the ancient compendium of theological truth, already cited, in I. V. c. 3, having distinguished the general help of God from the special help, which is the grace of grace freely given and the gift by which a man prepares himself to receive the gift of the Holy Spirit, adds that »it is the part of this grace to recall free will from evil and to excite it to good; without which no one does sufficiently what is in himself, so as to prepare himself for salvation.

Aegidius Romanus, in II. d. 28. q. 1. a. 3; »Because grace is something supernatural, it is never infused into the soul unless the supernatural agent, which is God, moves and impels the soul to the reception of grace. This impulse, moreover, and this divine motion toward grace are the compunctions and good thoughts which God sends into the sinner not converted, that he may be converted to him, and which he sends into the converted, that he may be converted more to him. Therefore, to the infusion of grace there first precedes the divine calling, or the sending of divine thoughts; afterwards follows the conversion of free will to God, and afterwards the infusion of grace. It is clear, therefore, how without grace we cannot sufficiently prepare ourselves for grace. Unless perhaps someone should say that it is in our power to do what is in us, and if we do what is in us, God will infuse grace into us. But as is clear through what has already been said, unless the divine calling and the sending of good thoughts by God precedes, which is a certain grace, we cannot through free will sufficiently move ourselves to grace.

Thomas of Strasbourg, in II. D. 27. a. 3. concl. 2. «One existing without grace can merit grace de congruo: because it seems fitting that the merciful Father receive with piety the prodigal and wandering son returning to the bosom of the paternal home. Whence if he did all that is in himself, even if he were a pagan, God would never fail but that he would lay open to him the truth of his faith and infuse the grace of the Holy Spirit. The manner, however, of returning, or of obtaining grace (i.e., by doing what is in oneself), although it is sufficiently expressed in the aforesaid parable, can still be said to be this: that first, through prevenient grace, God himself admonishes the sinner himself through certain spiritual impulses. For by such admonitions God stands at the door (even of a pagan) and knocks, and asks of us our conversion.»

Cajetan, I IIe. q. CIX., a. 6: «Nor does this stand in the way here, that it is commonly said that a man, by doing what is in himself, disposes himself for grace. For this is understood of the disposition and preparation not simply, but insofar as it is on his part. And again, taking disposition simply, it is understood that he does what is in himself, moved specially by God.»

Many other Scholastics could be cited for this opinion, whom you may see in Charles de Argentrée, in the cited Dissertation. Not a few are also wont to be brought forward to the contrary: but 1) if those observations be applied which we gave in this part under number

VI, it will be clear that, with very few exceptions, as regards the rest as well, the matter is left in uncertainty; and with that uncertainty existing, if, as is fitting, their doctrine be measured against the doctrine of others who have spoken clearly on this matter, scarcely any doubt will remain that the opinion of these was the common one. Moreover 2) since several, even among the principal ones, manifestly take the saying of one doing what is in himself by the powers of grace, it follows that at least it is not certain that the contrary interpretation was common.

IX. This saying, however, so frequent among theologians, had already been pre-formed by the Fathers with a pre-formation both real and verbal. The real pre-formation is contained in those sentences by which it is said that God illumines every man coming into this world, that the grace of God is offered to all, and that only those are deprived of it who refuse to receive it. Cf. the testimony of Chrysostom, pag. 261. The verbal pre-formation through equivalent words is contained in those formulas customary among the Fathers, by which it is said that it is ours to begin, God to perfect, that God is to be stirred up by us, that it is ours to ask, God's to give, that we ought to show ourselves such that God may call us — which formulas see in Thesis XXXIII.