Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

I. A disposition is called negative in one sense, positive in another. The negative disposition comes down to this, that it removes only that which would impede the entry of the form. We are not speaking of this disposition. The positive disposition seems to us to be defined thus: a real relation of the subject, by which the subject, in itself indifferent, is constituted as actuated more or less proximately suited to receiving the form. It is called a real relation because it is a certain mode of the subject consisting not in a negation, but in positive reality. The subject is called in itself indifferent because a disposition is properly something supervening accidentally upon the subject and determining it to this rather than to that. For if this mode is essential to the subject, and therefore the subject is already of itself determined to something, it ought to be called not properly a disposition, but a potency. It is said to be more or less proximate, i.e., through the disposition the subject, coming out of the state of indifference, approaches or draws near to the form, for which it becomes suited: but it can approach more or less: for certain positive dispositions are connected with the form immediately, certain ones mediately. Moreover, that suitableness or aptitude for receiving the form is the formal effect of the disposition; indeed, it is formally the disposition itself.

The concept of positive disposition and that of merit, even of congruous merit, are not adequately the same. For 1) merit includes in its concept a service rendered to another, and is referred to another, from whom the reward must come; a disposition can be had without any service rendered to another, and of itself denotes an order to the subject of which it is the mode and which is made apt to attain the form. 2) Merit regards a good to be repaid by another, whether to the one who merits or even to another; disposition regards only the form to be induced into the subject, of which it is the disposition; for the disposition of one cannot be the disposition of another.

But indeed congruous merit is a certain positive disposition, and a positive disposition which consists in moral acts has the character, at least, of congruous merit, as we shall say.

IT. It is certain 1) that nature of itself alone is not positively disposed to grace. For then grace would not be a supernatural good, but a natural one, and consequently there would be in nature a certain exigency for grace; for a positively disposed subject in some way requires the form, or something equivalent. But that these things are false is clear from the theory of the supernatural order. 2) Nor can nature through moral acts dispose itself positively to grace. For a) the principal terminus toward which nature can dispose itself through moral acts is the ultimate natural end: but the order of grace exceeds the perfection of the natural end; therefore. b) If nature could so dispose itself, in reality nature through its own acts would at least congruously merit grace, for a disposition induced through moral acts is certainly a certain dignity of reward on account of honest acts freely placed: but nature cannot merit grace; therefore. If nature could through moral acts dispose itself to grace, there would exist in nature itself, or there could exist, a reason why God would confer grace upon man, namely that disposition effected by the powers of nature: but this is the error of the Massilians, reprobated by the Fathers. «Nor, says Hilary, epist. to Augustine n. 4, do they wish to be led to the uncertainty of the will of God, where, as they think, some beginning of will, of whatever sort, is evident to them for obtaining or losing.» But the Fathers defended that gratuitousness of grace in all things, which manifestly appears in little children, in whom no positive disposition, no reason on their part preceding grace, can be assigned. August. De Praedest. SS. c. 12. «All this argument, by which we defend that the grace of God through I. C. D. N. is truly grace, that is, is given not according to our merits, although it is asserted by the clearest testimonies of the divine utterances; nevertheless among those who, unless they assign to themselves something which they give first, so that it may be repaid to them, think themselves restrained from all zeal of piety, labors somewhat in the age of adults already using the free choice of the will; but when one comes to little children and to the Mediator Himself of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, every assertion of human merits preceding the grace of God fails; because neither are they distinguished from the rest by any preceding good merits, so that they belong to the liberator of men, nor did He become the liberator of men by any preceding human merits, since He Himself is also a man.»

Therefore a positive disposition to grace procured by the powers of nature conflicts directly with the doctrine which the Fathers defended against the Massilians and with the theory of the supernatural order.

III. And so much for nature considered in itself. But if you add that in the present order nature is, before grace, in a state of sin and of enmity with God, again from this source it is clear that it cannot come about that nature disposes itself positively to grace; for it is positively turned away, and therefore it is much more hindered from being able to dispose itself positively to grace.