Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

Merit is wont to be defined: a service rendered to the utility or honor of another, to be compensated by some reward. By this definition is expressed that to which the formal ratio of merit belongs, and this very formal ratio, which is placed in the exigency of the reward, which inheres in the work, by the fact that the work is a service rendered to the utility or honor of him from whom the reward is exacted. When reward is spoken of with regard to merit toward God, do not understand only the end or the attainment of the end, but any good whatever that is rendered to merit.

Merit can be considered in first act and in second act. Merit in first act is that which of itself is equal to exacting the reward; and therefore condignity in first act is intrinsic and essential to merit. Merit in second act is that which, moreover, on account of weak conditions, for example the acceptance of the one rewarding, exacts the reward: wherefore condignity in second act depends also on something extrinsic.

Merit is wont to be distinguished into condign (of condignity) and congruous (of congruity): but the former is properly called merit, the latter not except analogically. Certainly condign is that whose value, according to the moral estimation of the thing, is equal to the reward: congruous is that whose value is not equal to the reward, but is nevertheless of such a sort that it can attract the benevolent mind of another to conferring the reward, on account of the perfection of the work placed in it, namely that the act is an honest act existing in the same order in which the reward is, and a certain beginning, as it were, of it, or that it is from a friend or intimate of him by whom the reward is to be conferred on another. This last we lay down for that congruous merit by which the just man is said to be able to merit grace for a sinner. It is clear that condign and congruous merit do not agree univocally but analogically; for condign merit is equal to exacting the reward, congruous merit not so, except by an improper exigency: they differ therefore in the mode in which they are referred to the reward, which relation is essential to merit; therefore they cannot agree univocally but only analogically.

And so to condign merit corresponds properly a due reward; its formal ratio is the exigency of the reward by title of justice. The formal ratio of congruous merit is a certain suitability with the reward, having its foundation namely not in justice, but in a certain benevolent equity. This distinction between justice and benevolent equity is not fabricated at will. For between two opposed or diverse terms, such as mercy and justice, there can be something intermediate participating in both. Certainly, to set examples in those things which are said to have congruous merit before God; one can merit congruously either for another, or only for oneself. For another one congruously merits a gift from another on account of the friendship or familiarity by which he is bound with the powerful one to confer the gift: for oneself he congruously merits on account of the perfection of the work, inasmuch as the work which he does is a certain beginning in the same order of that good which will be repaid. For it is equitable that the desires of a friend be fulfilled, it is equitable that a complement be added to an inclination, to which that inclination is of itself ordered, although it is not yet such or so great as to exact it. But because no injustice would be done, even if with these titles being set the gift were denied, hence congruous merit rests not on true justice, but on benevolent equity. In congruous merit itself, moreover, a certain dignity of the work inheres, which can attract the other, into whose utility or honor the work is done, to rewarding, whether this dignity be by reason of the agent, in that he is a friend, or at least by reason of the perfection of the work, which is found in the same order as the reward and of which it is the beginning. Whence he who can merit congruously can begin the attainment of the reward, can contribute something of himself to its attainment.

II. Nature cannot merit grace condignly by works produced by its own powers alone. Certainly the error is numbered among the heresies of Pelagius, reprobated by the Synod of Diospolis, then by all the Fathers fighting against the Pelagians and Massilians, then by the Second Council of Orange cc. 3. 4. 18., namely that the grace of God is given according to our merits. But our merits, which the Pelagians extolled, are the merits of nature. And the Fathers appealed to the words of Paul Rom. XI, 6. «How then (says Augustine, On the Grace of Christ c. 23.) is it grace, if it is not given freely? how is it grace, if it is rendered as a debt? how is what the Apostle says true: but if by grace, then not from works, otherwise grace is no longer grace. How, I say, is this true, if such great works precede, which make for us a merit of obtaining grace, by which it is not granted to us gratuitously, but is rendered to us as a debt.» «For grace (he says, On Psalm LXX. p. 2ª.) is given freely, for unless it were free, it would not be grace. Moreover, if it is grace for this reason, because it is free, nothing of yours preceded, that you might receive.» And Gelasius epist. 6. to Honorius c. 7. «That is the peculiar and long-worn poison of the Pelagians, by which they think that the grace of God can be conferred according to the merits of men, which may God avert from Christian minds; since the Apostle testifies: grace is what is given freely, otherwise, if grace is from works, it is no longer grace; because the reward is rendered, not freely, whence grace takes its name, it is expended.» Now since condign merit brings in a debt and excludes the gratuitous, if the works of nature had the dignity of condign merit with respect to grace, this would not be given freely nor would it any longer be grace.

The Apostle testifies the same Rom. XI, 35: who has first given to him, and it shall be repaid to him? and 1 Cor. IV, 7. Who distinguishes you? what do you have that you have not received? «Against these things (namely, that the grace of God is given according to our merits) why do we not rather (says Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints cc. 2. and 5.) hear: who has first given to him, and it shall be repaid to him? since from him and through him and in him are all things? Nothing is so contrary to this sense (what do you have that you have not received) as that anyone should so glory in his own merits, as though he himself had made them for himself, not by the grace of God, but by the grace which distinguishes the good from the bad, not that which is common to the good and the bad."

The reason is evident of itself. For actual grace pertains intrinsically to the supernatural order and is the principle of supernatural operation; moreover, the works of nature can indeed exact natural goods and the natural end, but they cannot exact that which is simply unowed to nature itself, namely that which exceeds the dignity of the natural end itself, of which sort is grace. And certainly whatever nature can exact through its works is nothing but an end proportioned to itself and moreover those goods which are under the end, namely it cannot exact anything but natural goods; if therefore nature could merit condignly actual grace by its works, this would have to be called a natural gift and therefore the other goods which depend on it as on a principle would themselves be natural goods; and so at last the supernatural order would be destroyed. Therefore.

Moreover, from the demonstration brought from the Fathers and from the nature of the matter it is clear that merit for grace is lacking to the works of nature, not only in second act, in that the acceptance of God is lacking (for demonstrating which the authority of Tradition suffices), but that it is lacking also in first act, that is, that the works of nature are not of themselves equal to exacting grace. Wherefore neither can they be received by God as merits, namely such as exact grace; although he could have freely accepted them, if he willed, so that, with these being set as conditions, as it were, he would nevertheless always confer grace gratuitously.

III. Neither can congruous merit belong to the works of nature, by which nature would be prepared and made fit for receiving grace. Certainly this is the doctrine of the Fathers 1) nature of itself can do nothing in those things which pertain to piety and to the salvation of eternal life: this head of doctrine is inculcated by Innocent in the rescript to the Bishops of Milevis, by Caelestinus in the Auctoritatibus Sedis Apostolicae, by Gelasius epist. Ga. to Honorius, by the African Bishops exiled in Sardinia in their synodical epistle, by the Council

the Second Council of Orange, Augustine everywhere and Prosper, from whom this theorem is, as it were, collected: namely that the vigor of nature is unequal to any good motion, to any pious thought, that free will destitute of heavenly aids is engaged in needy poverty, that it is to the works of salvation as the eye without light is, and that it has nothing good and can do nothing good, and that grace is not given to it because it wills, but grace brings it about that it wills: but these things would not be true, if congruous merit could consist of the works of nature; for then nature itself would in reality be able to do something of itself and would contribute something of its own to the works of piety, to salvation.

The head of doctrine akin to this is that the beginning of salvation is not from us, but from God through his grace; that the determining or moving reason of God for conferring his grace is not from us, but is the divine goodness or mercy; that God expects nothing from us by which he might be bent to imparting grace; or that predestination to grace is entirely gratuitous. To this pertains chiefly the book of Augustine On the Predestination of the Saints; to this pertain canons 3. 4. 5. 8. of the Council of Orange, of which it be enough to recite canon 4: If anyone contends that God awaits our will that we be cleansed from sin, but does not confess that even our willing to be cleansed is brought about in us by the infusion and operation of the Holy Spirit, he resists the Holy Spirit saying: The will is prepared by the Lord (Prov. VIII, 35. according to the LXX.). To this pertains the disputation of Prosper adv. Collat. c. 8., proving the definition of Cassian, that is, »that not only of acts, but even of good thoughts, God is the beginning, who inspires in us the beginnings of a holy will and grants the power and opportunity of accomplishing those things which we rightly desire«. To this pertains what Peter the deacon teaches in the epistle to the African Bishops, which exhibits the faith of the whole Eastern Church; namely »he manifestly resists not us, but the Apostle altogether, who says: unless therefore I will first, grace does not come to me, which is altogether nothing other than saying that man ought to will first before God repays him. But we, following the same Apostle, say that the whole origin of good thoughts and their consent and the will are from God and through God and in God.« Now this doctrine would not be consistent with itself, if even congruous merit belonged to the works of nature; therefore.

3. Since congruous merit itself is a certain beginning of that which is repaid by the reward and is contained in the same order with it, it is repugnant to the works of nature with regard to obtaining grace; because this is entirely in another order, namely the supernatural. Wherefore that must be repeated about it which we said about condign merit at the end of n. II.

You will say that the supernatural, of which sort is grace, excludes exigency: but congruous merit is not an exigency; therefore. I answer: the supernatural excludes only the exigency of justice, I deny; it excludes the exigency of nature, lest it be in vain (De Deo Creante Th. XXXI.), I further distinguish: and this would also have a place in congruous merit, I concede; it would not have a place, I deny.

IV. The opinion of the Fathers from what has been said ought indeed to be manifest. And indeed that the Fathers excluded condign merit from nature is a thing so explored that no one can doubt it. If anyone, however, should doubt that the opinions of the Fathers can be taken only of condign merit and that therefore the Fathers did not reject that merit which we call congruous; in order that he may shake off every scruple, let him note these things. 1) The Fathers universally exclude whatever merit and deny that grace can be composed with the merit of nature: but universal expressions so frequently used are to be taken in their universality, with no limitation applied which the nature of the thing itself does not suggest; moreover, the character of grace does not suggest this limitation, that it excludes only condign merits. 2) The Fathers rejected that merit of nature which the Massilians brought forward: but the Massilians did not demand that merit which we call condign, but were content with any merit whatever, namely one which would suffice to render the reason why grace is conferred on this one, denied to that one; whence any pious desire and pious affection was enough for them. But this is nothing other than congruous merit. 3) The Fathers collected from the doctrine of the Massilians and disapproved that ratio of merit in nature which the same Fathers freely conceded to faith before justification: August. De Praedest. SS. c. 2. «Therefore there is no departing from that opinion... that the grace of God is given according to our merits, if it does not pertain to the grace of God that we have begun to believe... But who would say that he who has already begun to believe merits nothing from him in whom he has believed!» Prosper adv. Collat. c. 3. «How do you not notice that you fall into that condemned assertion, that the grace of God is given according to our merits?»Palm. De Grat.

that the grace of God is given according to our merits, when you affirm that something of good work precedes from the men themselves, on account of which they obtain grace? For the faith of one asking, the piety of one seeking, the insistence of one knocking cannot be held to be of no merit." But the merit of faith and of the works which are done from faith before justification is not condign, but is that which we call congruous; therefore the Fathers denied even that merit of nature.

4. Finally, the Massilians demanded some preceding merit, so that our salvation would not be reduced to the uncertainty of the divine will, but to some beginning whatsoever of our good will. Cf. Hilary's epistle to August. n. 4. and the epistle of Prosper to the same n. 4. Moreover, what was reprobated by the Fathers would have to be taught again, with congruous merit of nature being asserted: therefore. Cf. what we will give in the historical Synopsis of the Massilian error.

Note. Several opinions of the Fathers in this matter regard directly nature as it is, that is, fallen, and therefore incapable on account of sin of meriting anything from God. But neither do all the opinions of the Fathers suffer this limitation, and, taken together, the whole doctrine of the Fathers is most universal. For against the Pelagians and Massilians they frequently urge that argument drawn from the very nature of grace, namely that if it is rendered to merits, it is no longer grace. Since therefore the Fathers acknowledged grace to be unowed even when compared with nature whole and pure, it must be held that the same men, denying any merits of nature for grace, deny the same not only to sinful nature, but also to innocent or pure nature.

V. The Massilians objected that text of Matthew XXV, 14: To one he gave five talents, to another two, to another one, to each according to his own power, that is, the gifts of God are distributed according to natural merits.

There is not one interpretation of this passage among Catholics; Ripalda recites several, De Ente Supern. Disp. XVII. sect. 8., which see, if you please. It is enough for us to answer that these words to each according to his own power either pertain only to the symbolic part as the complement of the apologue, without anything corresponding to it in the thing signified by the parable, or have indeed something corresponding to them in the thing signified, but in this hypothesis either the talents do not signify any supernatural grace whatsoever but certain particular graces, or the merit of the receiver is not signified. The former response is certainly probable, since it is the condition of parables that they can contain something pertaining only to ornament. But if you wish something in the thing signified to correspond to this part of the parable, so that therefore God distributes his gifts, of which Christ speaks here, to individuals according to each one's power, first it is lawful to deny that the speech is about any supernatural gift whatsoever; for just as the words of Christ certainly cannot be taken of all natural gifts, so neither is it necessary to take them of all supernatural gifts. But as regards supernatural gifts, the talents can signify either graces freely given (gratis data), or other supernatural gifts which are superadded to the first gift conferred entirely gratuitously, that is, to justifying grace and to the merits born from it. Namely, just as when natural gifts are conferred on a man according to his power, he is presupposed as already constituted in the order of nature, so when supernatural gifts are said to be conferred on him according to his power, man must be presupposed as elevated and gratuitously furnished with a power with which those gifts have proportion. Then, moreover, even if we take these words of Christ of any supernatural gift whatsoever, we notice that it is not the same thing that these be distributed according to the merits of each one and that they be distributed according to the power of each one. Just as Thomas I. p. q. LXII. a. 6. contends that supernatural gifts were conferred on the Angels gratuitously and nevertheless were distributed according to the perfection of nature, so that to more excellent natures more excellent gifts of grace were conferred. Which indeed God is understood to have done most liberally by a just decision, without any reason whatsoever of exigency or equity on the part of the subjects. Therefore God can, also in men, attune grace, especially insofar as it is operative (for of this he seems to speak in the parable), to the disposition of each nature, which must work with grace; for grace does not destroy but perfects nature. But he does this from the pure counsel of his will, presupposing no merit of nature or of works in nature.

Moreover, a common interpretation of this passage among the Fathers is still wanting. Some understand natural gifts under the name of talents, some graces freely given (gratis data) of ministry, of preaching, etc.; some hold that the power is faith. Cf. Maldonatus in h. 1. They argued from Cornelius (Act. X. 4), who on account of his good works merited to be instructed by Peter. To these Augustine responded (De Praed.

SS. c. 7.) «It is wont to be said that he therefore merited to believe, because he was a good man even before he believed. Which can be said of Cornelius, whose alms were accepted and prayers heard, before he had believed in Christ; and yet not without some faith did he give alms and pray. For how did he invoke him in whom he had not believed? But if he could be saved without faith in Christ, the architect Apostle Peter would not be sent to build him up.» Namely (Serm. 199. c. 6) «his accepted alms had cleansed him in a certain way: it remained that, as clean food, he be incorporated into the Church, that is, into the body of Christ.» «Man begins (Ad Simplic. L. I. q. 2. n. 2) to receive grace from the time he begins to believe in God, moved to faith by internal or external admonition. But it matters at what points of time or by what celebration of the sacraments the fuller and more evident grace is infused. For neither do catechumens not believe, nor indeed did Cornelius not believe in God, when by alms and prayers he showed himself worthy that an Angel be sent to him. But in no way would he do those things, unless he had first believed; in no way, moreover, would he have believed, unless he were called by admonitions, either secret through the visions of the mind or of the Spirit, or more manifest through the senses of the body. But in some the grace of faith is so great as is not sufficient for obtaining the kingdom of heaven (namely, it is not yet operative through theological charity), as in catechumens, as in Cornelius himself. In some, indeed, it is so great that they are already counted with the body of Christ and the holy temple of God... Therefore certain beginnings of faith are made, similar to conceptions; yet it is necessary not only to be conceived, but also to be born, in order that one may arrive at eternal life. Nevertheless, none of these things without the grace of God's mercy.»

The Massilians argued again that God is not an acceptor of persons: therefore God expects some merit on the part of the creature, in order to bestow his grace on one rather than on another. Toletus thus declares the acceptance of persons in Iª IIae q. LXII, a. 1. «Note 1) that in distributive justice three things are considered. The first is the common good, which is distributed to particular persons; the second is the persons to whom such a good is appropriated; the third is the cause and reason on account of which the good is given to them. But whatever is in the person or about the person, which does not pertain to the cause or reason on account of which that good is to be distributed, is called by the name of person. That dispenser, therefore, who so distributes the common goods that he considers the causes and reasons on account of which such things are to be given and gives on account of them, is called just and is just: but when he does not observe the cause pertinent to the matter but gives on account of something else, he is an acceptor of persons. Whence the acceptance of persons is a crime against justice, by which there is no consideration of the cause and reason on account of which the good is to be given. Note 2) for constituting this vice the ratio of debt must intervene; for where someone gives by liberality, there is no acceptance, except when something of justice is mixed in, as if a promise precedes, as when one promises a greater reward to him who bears himself more bravely. Whence it is that in God no acceptance of persons falls with respect to grace; for it is pure liberality: although, with grace presupposed, to which a reward is promised, justice is involved. In which words you have the response to the argument: for there can be no acceptance of person where there is pure liberality of the giver. Moreover, the Massilians suppose that the grace of God is not given to all; but there is a certain prevenient and preparing grace which is given to all, through which the power of working well is conferred on all; which grace, indeed, if it lacks effect in many, that is to be traced back not to a defect of grace, but to the malice of free will.

It can be objected again that congruous merit does not stand in the way of the gratuitousness of grace, for the justification of an adult sinner is called gratuitous, although the salutary acts of the sinner precede, to which the ratio of congruous merit with respect to justification belongs. I answer. Justification, if it is taken precisely for the infusion of sanctifying grace and this is compared with the preceding congruous merits, is indeed simply gratuitous; because no merit properly so called precedes: but in a certain respect it falls short of gratuitousness; in that it presupposes some merits, that is, congruous ones. «Nor is the remission of sins itself (says Augustine, epist. 194. to Sixtus) without some merit, if faith obtains it; for there is no null merit of faith, by which faith he said: God be merciful to me a sinner.» But if justification is taken adequately, together with the actual graces which prepare man for it, it is absolutely gratuitous and presupposes no merit whatsoever. Now the gratuitousness which the Fathers claim for grace is absolute gratuitousness, which excludes all merit; therefore it is necessary that no merits precede the first grace, that is, that there be no merits of nature.