Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

Merit is wont to be defined: a service rendered to the utility or honor of another, to be compensated by some reward. By this definition is expressed that to which the formal ratio of merit belongs, and this very formal ratio, which is placed in the exigency of the reward, which inheres in the work, by the fact that the work is a service rendered to the utility or honor of him from whom the reward is exacted. When reward is spoken of with regard to merit toward God, do not understand only the end or the attainment of the end, but any good whatever that is rendered to merit.

Merit can be considered in first act and in second act. Merit in first act is that which of itself is equal to exacting the reward; and therefore condignity in first act is intrinsic and essential to merit. Merit in second act is that which, moreover, on account of weak conditions, for example the acceptance of the one rewarding, exacts the reward: wherefore condignity in second act depends also on something extrinsic.

Merit is wont to be distinguished into condign (of condignity) and congruous (of congruity): but the former is properly called merit, the latter not except analogically. Certainly condign is that whose value, according to the moral estimation of the thing, is equal to the reward: congruous is that whose value is not equal to the reward, but is nevertheless of such a sort that it can attract the benevolent mind of another to conferring the reward, on account of the perfection of the work placed in it, namely that the act is an honest act existing in the same order in which the reward is, and a certain beginning, as it were, of it, or that it is from a friend or intimate of him by whom the reward is to be conferred on another. This last we lay down for that congruous merit by which the just man is said to be able to merit grace for a sinner. It is clear that condign and congruous merit do not agree univocally but analogically; for condign merit is equal to exacting the reward, congruous merit not so, except by an improper exigency: they differ therefore in the mode in which they are referred to the reward, which relation is essential to merit; therefore they cannot agree univocally but only analogically.

And so to condign merit corresponds properly a due reward; its formal ratio is the exigency of the reward by title of justice. The formal ratio of congruous merit is a certain suitability with the reward, having its foundation namely not in justice, but in a certain benevolent equity. This distinction between justice and benevolent equity is not fabricated at will. For between two opposed or diverse terms, such as mercy and justice, there can be something intermediate participating in both. Certainly, to set examples in those things which are said to have congruous merit before God; one can merit congruously either for another, or only for oneself. For another one congruously merits a gift from another on account of the friendship or familiarity by which he is bound with the powerful one to confer the gift: for oneself he congruously merits on account of the perfection of the work, inasmuch as the work which he does is a certain beginning in the same order of that good which will be repaid. For it is equitable that the desires of a friend be fulfilled, it is equitable that a complement be added to an inclination, to which that inclination is of itself ordered, although it is not yet such or so great as to exact it. But because no injustice would be done, even if with these titles being set the gift were denied, hence congruous merit rests not on true justice, but on benevolent equity. In congruous merit itself, moreover, a certain dignity of the work inheres, which can attract the other, into whose utility or honor the work is done, to rewarding, whether this dignity be by reason of the agent, in that he is a friend, or at least by reason of the perfection of the work, which is found in the same order as the reward and of which it is the beginning. Whence he who can merit congruously can begin the attainment of the reward, can contribute something of himself to its attainment.

II. Nature cannot merit grace condignly by works produced by its own powers alone. Certainly the error is numbered among the heresies of Pelagius, reprobated by the Synod of Diospolis, then by all the Fathers fighting against the Pelagians and Massilians, then by the Second Council of Orange cc. 3. 4. 18., namely that the grace of God is given according to our merits. But our merits, which the Pelagians extolled, are the merits of nature. And the Fathers appealed to the words of Paul Rom. XI, 6. «How then (says Augustine, On the Grace of Christ c. 23.) is it grace, if it is not given freely? how is it grace, if it is rendered as a debt? how is what the Apostle says true: but if by grace, then not from works, otherwise grace is no longer grace. How, I say, is this true, if such great works precede, which make for us a merit of obtaining grace, by which it is not granted to us gratuitously, but is rendered to us as a debt.» «For grace (he says, On Psalm LXX. p. 2ª.) is given freely, for unless it were free, it would not be grace. Moreover, if it is grace for this reason, because it is free, nothing of yours preceded, that you might receive.» And Gelasius epist. 6. to Honorius c. 7. «That is the peculiar and long-worn poison of the Pelagians, by which they think that the grace of God can be conferred according to the merits of men, which may God avert from Christian minds; since the Apostle testifies: grace is what is given freely, otherwise, if grace is from works, it is no longer grace; because the reward is rendered, not freely, whence grace takes its name, it is expended.» Now since condign merit brings in a debt and excludes the gratuitous, if the works of nature had the dignity of condign merit with respect to grace, this would not be given freely nor would it any longer be grace.

The Apostle testifies the same Rom. XI, 35: who has first given to him, and it shall be repaid to him? and 1 Cor. IV, 7. Who distinguishes you? what do you have that you have not received? «Against these things (namely, that the grace of God is given according to our merits) why do we not rather (says Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints cc. 2. and 5.) hear: who has first given to him, and it shall be repaid to him? since from him and through him and in him are all things? Nothing is so contrary to this sense (what do you have that you have not received) as that anyone should so glory in his own merits, as though he himself had made them for himself, not by the grace of God, but by the grace which distinguishes the good from the bad, not that which is common to the good and the bad."

The reason is evident of itself. For actual grace pertains intrinsically to the supernatural order and is the principle of supernatural operation; moreover, the works of nature can indeed exact natural goods and the natural end, but they cannot exact that which is simply unowed to nature itself, namely that which exceeds the dignity of the natural end itself, of which sort is grace. And certainly whatever nature can exact through its works is nothing but an end proportioned to itself and moreover those goods which are under the end, namely it cannot exact anything but natural goods; if therefore nature could merit condignly actual grace by its works, this would have to be called a natural gift and therefore the other goods which depend on it as on a principle would themselves be natural goods; and so at last the supernatural order would be destroyed. Therefore.

Moreover, from the demonstration brought from the Fathers and from the nature of the matter it is clear that merit for grace is lacking to the works of nature, not only in second act, in that the acceptance of God is lacking (for demonstrating which the authority of Tradition suffices), but that it is lacking also in first act, that is, that the works of nature are not of themselves equal to exacting grace. Wherefore neither can they be received by God as merits, namely such as exact grace; although he could have freely accepted them, if he willed, so that, with these being set as conditions, as it were, he would nevertheless always confer grace gratuitously.

III. Neither can congruous merit belong to the works of nature, by which nature would be prepared and made fit for receiving grace. Certainly this is the doctrine of the Fathers 1) nature of itself can do nothing in those things which pertain to piety and to the salvation of eternal life: this head of doctrine is inculcated by Innocent in the rescript to the Bishops of Milevis, by Caelestinus in the Auctoritatibus Sedis Apostolicae, by Gelasius epist. Ga. to Honorius, by the African Bishops exiled in Sardinia in their synodical epistle, by the Council

the Second Council of Orange, Augustine everywhere and Prosper, from whom this theorem is, as it were, collected: namely that the vigor of nature is unequal to any good motion, to any pious thought, that free will destitute of heavenly aids is engaged in needy poverty, that it is to the works of salvation as the eye without light is, and that it has nothing good and can do nothing good, and that grace is not given to it because it wills, but grace brings it about that it wills: but these things would not be true, if congruous merit could consist of the works of nature; for then nature itself would in reality be able to do something of itself and would contribute something of its own to the works of piety, to salvation.

The head of doctrine akin to this is that the beginning of salvation is not from us, but from God through his grace; that the determining or moving reason of God for conferring his grace is not from us, but is the divine goodness or mercy; that God expects nothing from us by which he might be bent to imparting grace; or that predestination to grace is entirely gratuitous. To this pertains chiefly the book of Augustine On the Predestination of the Saints; to this pertain canons 3. 4. 5. 8. of the Council of Orange, of which it be enough to recite canon 4: If anyone contends that God awaits our will that we be cleansed from sin, but does not confess that even our willing to be cleansed is brought about in us by the infusion and operation of the Holy Spirit, he resists the Holy Spirit saying: The will is prepared by the Lord (Prov. VIII, 35. according to the LXX.). To this pertains the disputation of Prosper adv. Collat. c. 8., proving the definition of Cassian, that is, »that not only of acts, but even of good thoughts, God is the beginning, who inspires in us the beginnings of a holy will and grants the power and opportunity of accomplishing those things which we rightly desire«. To this pertains what Peter the deacon teaches in the epistle to the African Bishops, which exhibits the faith of the whole Eastern Church; namely »he manifestly resists not us, but the Apostle altogether, who says: unless therefore I will first, grace does not come to me, which is altogether nothing other than saying that man ought to will first before God repays him. But we, following the same Apostle, say that the whole origin of good thoughts and their consent and the will are from God and through God and in God.« Now this doctrine would not be consistent with itself, if even congruous merit belonged to the works of nature; therefore.

3. Since congruous merit itself is a certain beginning of that which is repaid by the reward and is contained in the same order with it, it is repugnant to the works of nature with regard to obtaining grace; because this is entirely in another order, namely the supernatural. Wherefore that must be repeated about it which we said about condign merit at the end of n. II.

You will say that the supernatural, of which sort is grace, excludes exigency: but congruous merit is not an exigency; therefore. I answer: the supernatural excludes only the exigency of justice, I deny; it excludes the exigency of nature, lest it be in vain (De Deo Creante Th. XXXI.), I further distinguish: and this would also have a place in congruous merit, I concede; it would not have a place, I deny.

IV. The opinion of the Fathers from what has been said ought indeed to be manifest. And indeed that the Fathers excluded condign merit from nature is a thing so explored that no one can doubt it. If anyone, however, should doubt that the opinions of the Fathers can be taken only of condign merit and that therefore the Fathers did not reject that merit which we call congruous; in order that he may shake off every scruple, let him note these things. 1) The Fathers universally exclude whatever merit and deny that grace can be composed with the merit of nature: but universal expressions so frequently used are to be taken in their universality, with no limitation applied which the nature of the thing itself does not suggest; moreover, the character of grace does not suggest this limitation, that it excludes only condign merits. 2) The Fathers rejected that merit of nature which the Massilians brought forward: but the Massilians did not demand that merit which we call condign, but were content with any merit whatever, namely one which would suffice to render the reason why grace is conferred on this one, denied to that one; whence any pious desire and pious affection was enough for them. But this is nothing other than congruous merit. 3) The Fathers collected from the doctrine of the Massilians and disapproved that ratio of merit in nature which the same Fathers freely conceded to faith before justification: August. De Praedest. SS. c. 2. «Therefore there is no departing from that opinion... that the grace of God is given according to our merits, if it does not pertain to the grace of God that we have begun to believe... But who would say that he who has already begun to believe merits nothing from him in whom he has believed!» Prosper adv. Collat. c. 3. «How do you not notice that you fall into that condemned assertion, that the grace of God is given according to our merits?»Palm. De Grat.

that the grace of God is given according to our merits, when you affirm that something of good work precedes from the men themselves, on account of which they obtain grace? For the faith of one asking, the piety of one seeking, the insistence of one knocking cannot be held to be of no merit." But the merit of faith and of the works which are done from faith before justification is not condign, but is that which we call congruous; therefore the Fathers denied even that merit of nature.

4. Finally, the Massilians demanded some preceding merit, so that our salvation would not be reduced to the uncertainty of the divine will, but to some beginning whatsoever of our good will. Cf. Hilary's epistle to August. n. 4. and the epistle of Prosper to the same n. 4. Moreover, what was reprobated by the Fathers would have to be taught again, with congruous merit of nature being asserted: therefore. Cf. what we will give in the historical Synopsis of the Massilian error.

Note. Several opinions of the Fathers in this matter regard directly nature as it is, that is, fallen, and therefore incapable on account of sin of meriting anything from God. But neither do all the opinions of the Fathers suffer this limitation, and, taken together, the whole doctrine of the Fathers is most universal. For against the Pelagians and Massilians they frequently urge that argument drawn from the very nature of grace, namely that if it is rendered to merits, it is no longer grace. Since therefore the Fathers acknowledged grace to be unowed even when compared with nature whole and pure, it must be held that the same men, denying any merits of nature for grace, deny the same not only to sinful nature, but also to innocent or pure nature.

V. The Massilians objected that text of Matthew XXV, 14: To one he gave five talents, to another two, to another one, to each according to his own power, that is, the gifts of God are distributed according to natural merits.

There is not one interpretation of this passage among Catholics; Ripalda recites several, De Ente Supern. Disp. XVII. sect. 8., which see, if you please. It is enough for us to answer that these words to each according to his own power either pertain only to the symbolic part as the complement of the apologue, without anything corresponding to it in the thing signified by the parable, or have indeed something corresponding to them in the thing signified, but in this hypothesis either the talents do not signify any supernatural grace whatsoever but certain particular graces, or the merit of the receiver is not signified. The former response is certainly probable, since it is the condition of parables that they can contain something pertaining only to ornament. But if you wish something in the thing signified to correspond to this part of the parable, so that therefore God distributes his gifts, of which Christ speaks here, to individuals according to each one's power, first it is lawful to deny that the speech is about any supernatural gift whatsoever; for just as the words of Christ certainly cannot be taken of all natural gifts, so neither is it necessary to take them of all supernatural gifts. But as regards supernatural gifts, the talents can signify either graces freely given (gratis data), or other supernatural gifts which are superadded to the first gift conferred entirely gratuitously, that is, to justifying grace and to the merits born from it. Namely, just as when natural gifts are conferred on a man according to his power, he is presupposed as already constituted in the order of nature, so when supernatural gifts are said to be conferred on him according to his power, man must be presupposed as elevated and gratuitously furnished with a power with which those gifts have proportion. Then, moreover, even if we take these words of Christ of any supernatural gift whatsoever, we notice that it is not the same thing that these be distributed according to the merits of each one and that they be distributed according to the power of each one. Just as Thomas I. p. q. LXII. a. 6. contends that supernatural gifts were conferred on the Angels gratuitously and nevertheless were distributed according to the perfection of nature, so that to more excellent natures more excellent gifts of grace were conferred. Which indeed God is understood to have done most liberally by a just decision, without any reason whatsoever of exigency or equity on the part of the subjects. Therefore God can, also in men, attune grace, especially insofar as it is operative (for of this he seems to speak in the parable), to the disposition of each nature, which must work with grace; for grace does not destroy but perfects nature. But he does this from the pure counsel of his will, presupposing no merit of nature or of works in nature.

Moreover, a common interpretation of this passage among the Fathers is still wanting. Some understand natural gifts under the name of talents, some graces freely given (gratis data) of ministry, of preaching, etc.; some hold that the power is faith. Cf. Maldonatus in h. 1. They argued from Cornelius (Act. X. 4), who on account of his good works merited to be instructed by Peter. To these Augustine responded (De Praed.

SS. c. 7.) «It is wont to be said that he therefore merited to believe, because he was a good man even before he believed. Which can be said of Cornelius, whose alms were accepted and prayers heard, before he had believed in Christ; and yet not without some faith did he give alms and pray. For how did he invoke him in whom he had not believed? But if he could be saved without faith in Christ, the architect Apostle Peter would not be sent to build him up.» Namely (Serm. 199. c. 6) «his accepted alms had cleansed him in a certain way: it remained that, as clean food, he be incorporated into the Church, that is, into the body of Christ.» «Man begins (Ad Simplic. L. I. q. 2. n. 2) to receive grace from the time he begins to believe in God, moved to faith by internal or external admonition. But it matters at what points of time or by what celebration of the sacraments the fuller and more evident grace is infused. For neither do catechumens not believe, nor indeed did Cornelius not believe in God, when by alms and prayers he showed himself worthy that an Angel be sent to him. But in no way would he do those things, unless he had first believed; in no way, moreover, would he have believed, unless he were called by admonitions, either secret through the visions of the mind or of the Spirit, or more manifest through the senses of the body. But in some the grace of faith is so great as is not sufficient for obtaining the kingdom of heaven (namely, it is not yet operative through theological charity), as in catechumens, as in Cornelius himself. In some, indeed, it is so great that they are already counted with the body of Christ and the holy temple of God... Therefore certain beginnings of faith are made, similar to conceptions; yet it is necessary not only to be conceived, but also to be born, in order that one may arrive at eternal life. Nevertheless, none of these things without the grace of God's mercy.»

The Massilians argued again that God is not an acceptor of persons: therefore God expects some merit on the part of the creature, in order to bestow his grace on one rather than on another. Toletus thus declares the acceptance of persons in Iª IIae q. LXII, a. 1. «Note 1) that in distributive justice three things are considered. The first is the common good, which is distributed to particular persons; the second is the persons to whom such a good is appropriated; the third is the cause and reason on account of which the good is given to them. But whatever is in the person or about the person, which does not pertain to the cause or reason on account of which that good is to be distributed, is called by the name of person. That dispenser, therefore, who so distributes the common goods that he considers the causes and reasons on account of which such things are to be given and gives on account of them, is called just and is just: but when he does not observe the cause pertinent to the matter but gives on account of something else, he is an acceptor of persons. Whence the acceptance of persons is a crime against justice, by which there is no consideration of the cause and reason on account of which the good is to be given. Note 2) for constituting this vice the ratio of debt must intervene; for where someone gives by liberality, there is no acceptance, except when something of justice is mixed in, as if a promise precedes, as when one promises a greater reward to him who bears himself more bravely. Whence it is that in God no acceptance of persons falls with respect to grace; for it is pure liberality: although, with grace presupposed, to which a reward is promised, justice is involved. In which words you have the response to the argument: for there can be no acceptance of person where there is pure liberality of the giver. Moreover, the Massilians suppose that the grace of God is not given to all; but there is a certain prevenient and preparing grace which is given to all, through which the power of working well is conferred on all; which grace, indeed, if it lacks effect in many, that is to be traced back not to a defect of grace, but to the malice of free will.

It can be objected again that congruous merit does not stand in the way of the gratuitousness of grace, for the justification of an adult sinner is called gratuitous, although the salutary acts of the sinner precede, to which the ratio of congruous merit with respect to justification belongs. I answer. Justification, if it is taken precisely for the infusion of sanctifying grace and this is compared with the preceding congruous merits, is indeed simply gratuitous; because no merit properly so called precedes: but in a certain respect it falls short of gratuitousness; in that it presupposes some merits, that is, congruous ones. «Nor is the remission of sins itself (says Augustine, epist. 194. to Sixtus) without some merit, if faith obtains it; for there is no null merit of faith, by which faith he said: God be merciful to me a sinner.» But if justification is taken adequately, together with the actual graces which prepare man for it, it is absolutely gratuitous and presupposes no merit whatsoever. Now the gratuitousness which the Fathers claim for grace is absolute gratuitousness, which excludes all merit; therefore it is necessary that no merits precede the first grace, that is, that there be no merits of nature.

I. A disposition is called negative in one sense, positive in another. The negative disposition comes down to this, that it removes only that which would impede the entry of the form. We are not speaking of this disposition. The positive disposition seems to us to be defined thus: a real relation of the subject, by which the subject, in itself indifferent, is constituted as actuated more or less proximately suited to receiving the form. It is called a real relation because it is a certain mode of the subject consisting not in a negation, but in positive reality. The subject is called in itself indifferent because a disposition is properly something supervening accidentally upon the subject and determining it to this rather than to that. For if this mode is essential to the subject, and therefore the subject is already of itself determined to something, it ought to be called not properly a disposition, but a potency. It is said to be more or less proximate, i.e., through the disposition the subject, coming out of the state of indifference, approaches or draws near to the form, for which it becomes suited: but it can approach more or less: for certain positive dispositions are connected with the form immediately, certain ones mediately. Moreover, that suitableness or aptitude for receiving the form is the formal effect of the disposition; indeed, it is formally the disposition itself.

The concept of positive disposition and that of merit, even of congruous merit, are not adequately the same. For 1) merit includes in its concept a service rendered to another, and is referred to another, from whom the reward must come; a disposition can be had without any service rendered to another, and of itself denotes an order to the subject of which it is the mode and which is made apt to attain the form. 2) Merit regards a good to be repaid by another, whether to the one who merits or even to another; disposition regards only the form to be induced into the subject, of which it is the disposition; for the disposition of one cannot be the disposition of another.

But indeed congruous merit is a certain positive disposition, and a positive disposition which consists in moral acts has the character, at least, of congruous merit, as we shall say.

IT. It is certain 1) that nature of itself alone is not positively disposed to grace. For then grace would not be a supernatural good, but a natural one, and consequently there would be in nature a certain exigency for grace; for a positively disposed subject in some way requires the form, or something equivalent. But that these things are false is clear from the theory of the supernatural order. 2) Nor can nature through moral acts dispose itself positively to grace. For a) the principal terminus toward which nature can dispose itself through moral acts is the ultimate natural end: but the order of grace exceeds the perfection of the natural end; therefore. b) If nature could so dispose itself, in reality nature through its own acts would at least congruously merit grace, for a disposition induced through moral acts is certainly a certain dignity of reward on account of honest acts freely placed: but nature cannot merit grace; therefore. If nature could through moral acts dispose itself to grace, there would exist in nature itself, or there could exist, a reason why God would confer grace upon man, namely that disposition effected by the powers of nature: but this is the error of the Massilians, reprobated by the Fathers. «Nor, says Hilary, epist. to Augustine n. 4, do they wish to be led to the uncertainty of the will of God, where, as they think, some beginning of will, of whatever sort, is evident to them for obtaining or losing.» But the Fathers defended that gratuitousness of grace in all things, which manifestly appears in little children, in whom no positive disposition, no reason on their part preceding grace, can be assigned. August. De Praedest. SS. c. 12. «All this argument, by which we defend that the grace of God through I. C. D. N. is truly grace, that is, is given not according to our merits, although it is asserted by the clearest testimonies of the divine utterances; nevertheless among those who, unless they assign to themselves something which they give first, so that it may be repaid to them, think themselves restrained from all zeal of piety, labors somewhat in the age of adults already using the free choice of the will; but when one comes to little children and to the Mediator Himself of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, every assertion of human merits preceding the grace of God fails; because neither are they distinguished from the rest by any preceding good merits, so that they belong to the liberator of men, nor did He become the liberator of men by any preceding human merits, since He Himself is also a man.»

Therefore a positive disposition to grace procured by the powers of nature conflicts directly with the doctrine which the Fathers defended against the Massilians and with the theory of the supernatural order.

III. And so much for nature considered in itself. But if you add that in the present order nature is, before grace, in a state of sin and of enmity with God, again from this source it is clear that it cannot come about that nature disposes itself positively to grace; for it is positively turned away, and therefore it is much more hindered from being able to dispose itself positively to grace.

I. Impetration, properly so called, is a moral motion of the liberality or mercy of someone through the humble supplication of another. Wherefore the power of impetrating is properly attributed to prayer. The question is whether impetration is a kind of merit. If the matter is considered materially, it is evident that man's prayer to God, since it is a good act, conducive to salvation and offering obedience to God, is also a meritorious act. But if both are considered formally, is the account of impetration one thing and the account of merit another, so that impetration in its essence includes no account of merit; or, albeit imperfectly, is impetration also contained under the genus of merit? Certain theologians, as Vasquez (1°. 2ae. D. 216. c. 4.), do not distinguish between impetration and congruous merit. Suarez (De Grat. L. XII. c. 34.) distinguishes in such a way that he assigns impetration, as proper, to prayer alone, while merit is common to all works. Ripalda (De E. S. D. XV. § I.) notes that impetration chiefly and primarily denotes the power of obtaining something from a superior by prayers, which St. Thomas taught in 1. 2ae, q. LXXXIII. aa. 15. 16., distinguishing in prayer the efficacy of meriting, common to all works, from the efficacy of impetrating, proper to prayer. There is added the common way of speaking of theologians who assert that among the acts of the virtues prayer is more impetratory before God, and the act of charity more meritorious. Therefore in the strict and principal signification impetration denotes the power of bending another, which is proper to humble prayers.

This same point is declared a priori as follows. For God is moved in one way by merits, in another way by the prayers of the faithful; therefore the motion proper to pious prayers is rightly signified by impetration, since it cannot be signified by any more apt word. The proof of the antecedent comes down to this. The motion of God on account of merits rests upon justice or upon a certain equity; but the motion proper to impetration rests upon the mercy of him who is prayed to: indeed, in him who prays, the exclusion of any positive demerit is presupposed, of such a kind that it could impede the exercise of the other's mercy, but this is presupposed as a condition or disposition of the subject; yet no positive merit is presupposed beyond what is intrinsic to the prayer itself, for prayer itself is certainly a certain obedience rendered to him who is entreated; but again, this merit is so constituted that on account of it the other is moved properly inasmuch as he is merciful and liberal, not inasmuch as he is just or acting from a certain equity, but inasmuch as he freely lets himself be bent out of his innate goodness on account of another's misery: this, however, is the motion proper to impetration, by which mercy is bent, and so it is proper to prayer to impetrate. Thus a poor man asking alms of a rich man certainly renders him obedience, but this obedience, from the intention of the poor man and the acceptance of the rich man, is directed to this, that it bend his liberality and mercy and as it were determine them to act by the display of his misery; so that the reason why the rich man is bent is that out of his innate goodness he lets himself be bent to relieving the misery of the poor man, not on account of any exigency of his. Let the same be said of God insofar as prayers impetrate before him.

Therefore impetration agrees with merit; because the prayer that impetrates is a certain obedience in honor of another, nor can a prayer be acceptable which is not such: it differs from merit, or from congruous merit strictly taken, because prayer as such is purely referred to the mercy or liberality of God and is directed to bending it, which accordingly, if it is bent, is bent because He freely lets Himself be bent out of His innate goodness: on the contrary, merit is referred to justice or benevolent equity.

But because in congruous merit mercy also has a place, since nothing is owed to it from justice properly so called, hence congruous merit too is wont to be called impetration, and we are said to impetrate what we obtain by merits of this kind. Whence the Council of Trent, Sess. XIV. c. 4., says that attrition impetrates grace in the sacrament.

Of Penance. Hence, conversely, impetration is reckoned under the genus of congruous merit; for prayer bends mercy and is a certain obedience: whence Augustine used to say of the gift of perseverance that it can be suppliantly merited. It is clear, nevertheless, from what has been said, that impetration strictly taken, if it is reckoned under congruous merit, constitutes a certain proper species, inasmuch as it moves not the justice or equity, but the mercy of God.

Finally, just as in the act of prayer the account of impetration and the account of merit can be distinguished, so too the impetratory power can be participated in by other meritorious works: whence theologians distinguish in every good work the account of merit and of impetration. The account of merit, because the good work is an obedience exacting a reward; the account of impetration, because even setting aside the fact that the good work is one exacting a reward, from the mere fact that the good act is an obedience it can move the mercy of God to confer goods.

We are speaking, however, of the impetratory power of prayers not only in first act, but also in second act (cf. what we said about merit in Th. XXX. p. 1.). We add in the thesis, at least having regard to this order of Providence in which we are situated. For whether in another order of Providence, or whether it is absolutely possible that nature impetrate grace by its prayers, we shall discuss separately at the end of the thesis.

II. The question, therefore, comes back to this: whether God wills to accept the prayers of nature for conferring grace. The solution of this question depends upon the known will of God. For if it is certain that God does not will it, it is evident that no impetratory power, at least in second act, belongs to the prayers of nature with respect to grace. But it is a certain law that God wills not to be moved to confer supernatural gifts except by prayers made from grace, that is, by prayers of which He Himself is the inspirer and author. This is certain from the doctrine of Scripture and the Fathers, which we adduced in Th. XXXIII., by which doctrine there is asserted both the inability of nature to pray as it ought, that is, so that God be bent to confer grace, and hence the necessity of grace that we pray as we ought. Let the proof of this matter in that thesis, ibid. p. II., be compared; for there is no need to add other proofs.

You will say that the Fathers therefore teach the impotence of the prayer of nature because the Fathers consider prayer as a meritorious act, or because they do not distinguish the account of impetration from the account of merit, which belongs to prayer; for that reason indeed they deny the power of impetrating, because otherwise grace would be given according to merits.

I answer 1) that from this observation what we defend is confirmed; for it follows from it that according to the Fathers no prayer is accepted by God unless it is at the same time meritorious; for, this being supposed, it can be said that because nature cannot merit, neither can it pray in such a way as to impetrate. Therefore it is true that natural prayers have no power of impetrating; for they have no power of meriting, and so it is true that God does not will to accept the prayers of nature alone.

Furthermore 2) when the Fathers deny to natural prayer the power of impetrating grace, because otherwise grace would be given according to merits, they are to be said to have taken the signification of merit so broadly that it would comprehend whatever reason moves God to confer grace, on account of which it would be true in some sense that man begins the business of salvation and God follows, which the Massilians contended; and therefore the Fathers took merit so broadly that it would embrace the very power of impetrating. Therefore the Fathers also excluded from nature the power of impetrating by prayers.

Therefore in the present order at least, no efficacy of impetrating grace can be asserted for the prayers which nature pours forth by its own powers.

III. But if the question is raised whether it is repugnant that God be moved by the prayers of nature to confer grace, the opinion of Ripalda seems true to us, who denies it and asserts that it is absolutely possible that the impetratory power of grace be in the prayers of nature (De Ente Supern. Disp. XIX. Sect. 3.). Surely, as we have said, merit is to be distinguished formally from impetration. For in merit there is, before God's acceptance, some dignity of reward in first act, which is repaid out of justice or benevolent equity: but in impetration, as such, there is no dignity of reward which would be repaid out of justice or equity, but impetration is referred to the liberality or mercy of him who accepts the prayers and moves it. Whence that someone merits is not from the benign will alone of the other, who accepts the merit, but something is presupposed in the one meriting, which is a reason requiring a reward; although that thing by itself alone is not a sufficient reason, or it could have proceeded from another grace of the giver. Hence merit is opposed of itself to the gratuitousness of grace. But that someone impetrates, that proceeds from the pure mercy or liberality of him who hears the prayers; the mercy or benignity is the giver's own, who is such as to let himself be bent to the prayers of another who shows his misery. Therefore the power of impetrating does not of itself stand in the way of the gratuitousness of any gift.

Now indeed God could have willed to be bent even by the prayers of nature alone: for in this no repugnance appears. And in very truth the poverty of nature alone moved divine liberality to elevate it, and the misery of fallen nature alone moved divine mercy to redeem nature: but the liberality and mercy which poor and miserable nature stirred up, nature itself could certainly have stirred up by entreating, that is, by confessing its poverty and misery to God and imploring his beneficence; therefore if God had so willed, He could also have been bent by the prayers of nature.

You will say that nature could not have entreated grace, because it would have lacked knowledge of it.

I answer 1) that this is entirely per accidens, so far as this question is concerned.

I answer 2) that nature by itself could have had sufficient knowledge for praying. For rational nature could have thought that God, certainly visible to Himself, could perhaps be visible to created intellects; nay, in this matter it could have known that there is no repugnance: but even the former cognition was sufficient to move the will to desire and ask this gratuitous gift from God.

From these things, however, it is not lawful to infer that the prayers of nature have absolutely, in first act, the power of impetrating, and that it is rendered futile by the denied acceptance of God: but only that the power of impetrating is in them hypothetically, if namely God should deign to accept. For prayers as such do not move by impetrating anyone except him who wills to let himself be bent. Wherefore the prayers of nature neither have absolutely the power of impetrating grace in first act, nor do they have it in any way in the present order of Providence; but they could have had it in another order.

Sayings of this kind are adduced from the Greek Fathers, by which they seem to have given a foretaste of the Pelagian or Semi-Pelagian heresy: that God waits, that the sincere election is each one's own, that He confers grace on those who believe, that he who prepares himself for it receives grace — Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech. 1 and 17; that we are sufficient of ourselves to know the life that leads to God — Athanasius, Orat. cont. Gentes n. 30; that the divine help is placed in our will — Basil, epist. 294; that it is opened to everyone who knocks, and therefore that entering in is in our power — Nyssen, De Beat. or. 5; that we withdraw from vices when we use reason and free will — Nazianzen, orat. 31; that the election of the good is a work of the will, that we obtain the help of God by willing and running — Chrysostom, in epist. ad Rom. hom. 2; that Abraham was therefore elected by God because he himself used his faculties, so as to render himself fit to receive that calling — Chrysostom, hom. 42 in Gen.; that the beginning of every honorable action is placed in our will — Methodius, in Damascene, in the Eclogae. And other like sayings of the other Greek Fathers.

II. But now in this way we prove the Thesis in order. The Greek Church, before the sentence of Innocent and Zosimus was pronounced against the Pelagian heresy, professed the Catholic doctrine no less than the Latin Church. For in the year 415 a Synod of fourteen bishops was held by Eulogius, Bishop of Caesarea, at Lydda, which is Diospolis; in which Synod Pelagius, lest he be condemned, himself condemned his own errors and those of Caelestius, among which also that one: that the grace of God is not given for individual acts, and the other: that the grace of God is given according to our merits. Concerning the acts of this Synod Augustine wrote the book De Gestis Pelagii, in which book he showed that the whole Pelagian heresy was condemned in that Synod, although Pelagius was regarded as a Catholic; for he was absolved only to that extent, because he himself condemned all those things which were objected against him as spoken by himself contrary to the Catholic faith concerning grace.

In the same year in which the heresy was proscribed at Rome by Innocent, namely the year 417, at Constantinople, a Synod having been convened by Atticus, Bishop of that city, Caelestius was condemned, and Atticus sent synodal letters of condemnation to Asia, Thessalonica and Carthage, and Caelestius himself was cast out of the city of Constantinople. Mercator testifies to these things in his Commonitorium De Causa Caelestii, Cap. 1.

In the same year again and, as Garnerius reckons, in the month of October, Theodotus, Patriarch of Antioch, held a Synod, perhaps at Antioch, in which, the case of Pelagius, who had been absolved at Diospolis, being retried, he was himself detected and condemned. Marius Mercator makes mention of this Synod, different from the Synod of Diospolis, in the cited Commonitorium c. 3, in these words: «While Pelagius was still at Jerusalem he was accused before a Synod, and at first indeed, evading the issue, covering himself with certain ambiguous professions and pursuing doubtful replies or answers, he seems then to have deceived that audience of bishops (namely, the Synod of Diospolis); but after he was clearly caught, the accusers pressing on, and detected by a later Synod, at which Theodotus, Bishop of Antioch of holy memory, presided (at the Synod of Diospolis presided Eulogius of Caesarea, Primate of the Province of Palestine), he was also driven out from the holy and venerable places of Jerusalem, as the letters sent by the same holy Theodotus to the most reverend Bishop of the city of Rome and to Praylius of holy memory, Bishop of Jerusalem, testify, copies of which we have in our hands as evidence.»

You have here, therefore, a great part of the Eastern Church, which, gathered in Synods, condemns the universal Pelagian heresy and especially the error against the gratuitousness of grace — and condemns it before Zosimus sent his Tractoria to the whole Church (read Cap. 3 of the cited Commonitorium), which was sent in the year 418, indeed before Innocent himself gave his Apostolic letters to the African Churches. Now from these facts it clearly appears that in that age the Greek Church consented wholly with the Latin, inasmuch as, without any controversy, as soon as it heard the doctrine of Pelagius and Caelestius, it solemnly condemned it: and this too is a most certain indication that the Greek Fathers of that age and of preceding ages were of the same opinion; for Synods define both what is commonly held by all and what has been received from the Elders. Whence Augustine, Cont. duas epistt. pelagg. L. IV. c. 8, testifies that «the Church of Christ, both Western and Eastern, shuddered at their (i.e. the Pelagians') profane novelties of words.»Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum, lib. IV, cap. 8.

III. The doctrine of Pelagius, as soon as it showed itself, was regarded as new in the Church. Augustine so frequently called it this, and R. P. Caelestinus and Vincentius Lirinensis called it this too (cf. Th. XXVI. n. I.); moreover, Augustine had read the Greek Fathers, whom he also repeatedly cites in the Pelagian cause and whose arguments, which the Pelagians gathered from them for vindicating their heresy, he dissolves (cf. De Natura et Gratia c. 61. Contra Iulianum L. I. c. 5. seqq. et L. VI. c. 23. Operis imperf. L. VI. c. 7. et 9. De dono Perseverantiae c. 19.); and Caelestinus the Roman Pontiff certainly knew the doctrine of those Greek Fathers, and Vincentius Lirinensis knew it too, who in the condemnation of the Pelagian heresy sets an example of that consensus of the Church with antiquity which he so excellently illustrates in his Commonitorium.

And yet the Pelagian doctrine could not be said to be new, if, as regards the sum of it or one of its principal heads, i.e. the gratuitousness of grace, it had already been handed down by the Greek Fathers of preceding ages. For how would it have come about that the Church noticed and shuddered at this error in the writings of one monk secretly disseminated, but never noticed it in the works of several Fathers who taught publicly in the Church and whose writings were worn in the hands of many? And indeed, what would those words of Augustine mean, by which he answers the Massilians appealing to the preceding Fathers, de Praed. SS. c. 14: «What need, therefore, is there that we scrutinize their little works, who, before this heresy arose, had no necessity of engaging in this question so difficult to solve?» If this heresy had really arisen long before, if most Greek Fathers had handed it down? Would it not then have been supremely necessary that, just as Augustine fought against Pelagius, so others, earlier, would have fought against the preceding authors of the heresy and explained the matter at length? Therefore Augustine did not even suspect that several Greek Fathers had been in that opinion which he himself condemned in the Pelagians and Massilians; rather, he held for certain that the Catholic opinion had been altogether common to the preceding Fathers. For he points out no one about whose doctrine we could rightly be suspicious, but only warns in general that they touched the doctrine of grace in their writings not deliberately, but briefly and in passing (ibid.); which certainly is quite other than teaching a defective or false doctrine. Therefore, if this heresy arose then, when Pelagius and Caelestius began to teach, those are wholly inept who think that they have found it not merely in some one, but in almost all the preceding Greek Fathers.

IV. Furthermore, in order that we may pass judgment on the formulas of the Greek Fathers recited above, we note that the formulas which occur in the Greek Fathers and which seem to contain the Pelagian error are found, more or less, among the Latin Fathers of the first four centuries as well. Certainly, sayings of this kind — that the beginning is from us, so that God perfects; that the origin of beginning is from us; that the commencement is from us when we pray — occur in St. Hilary on Psalm 118; and these — that the Lord is with us as long as we too are with Him; that each one receives from the help of God according to the Lord's promises and the merits of his faith — are found in St. Cyprian in Exhort. ad Martyr.; and these — that we ought to present ourselves such, by good pursuits and ready faith, that God may have mercy on us and call us, and that we must not wait for Christ to rouse us, but rather Christ must be roused by us — are read in St. Ambrose, the former in lib. II. de Abraham n. 74, the latter in Psalm. 36; and these again — that the beginnings of the will are in us, that it is ours to ask, God's to bestow, ours to begin, His to perfect — can be seen in St. Jerome, the former in Ezech. c. 3, the latter in Dialogue 3. against the Pelagians; these finally — that the whole freedom of the will was conceded in both directions, that the freedom of believing or not believing is placed in the will, that God leaves His power to our will — the first is Tertullian's, cont. Marcionem L. II; the second Cyprian's, Testim. L. III., c. 52; the third Jerome's, in Isaiam c. 49. And yet no propositions can be adduced from the Greek Fathers which seem more, in appearance, to favor the Pelagians than these. What, therefore, will be the consequence? If because of these, which occur among the Greeks, the Greek Fathers are said to have really been in the Pelagian opinion, then not only the Eastern Church, but also the Western, i.e. the whole Church, was Pelagian in the first four centuries. Clearly, no longer is the doctrine of Pelagius different from the tradition of the Elders, but the doctrine of Augustine will have to be called different; and the doctrine of Pelagius old, of Augustine new; the doctrine of Pelagius Catholic, the doctrine of Augustine heretical will have to be held. This, indeed, is what the zeal of certain theologians comes to, who, out of love of Catholic truth, preach only Augustine. Therefore, just as it is repugnant that the whole Church should have fallen away from the truth, so also it must be judged false that several Greek Fathers gave a foretaste of the Pelagian doctrine.

V. Nor was there lacking a reason why the Fathers of the first centuries should inculcate those heads of doctrine which are expressly contained in those formulas. Namely, it must be recalled that in the first centuries of the Church both the Gnostics and the Manichees flourished, against whom the Fathers had to fight: these heretics, distinguishing a twofold principle, both good and evil, by which men were determined either to good or to evil, and introducing fate, left no place to free will, and held that the good God so prevented the wills toward good as to impose necessity. It was necessary, therefore, to exclude such a prevenient operation of God even with respect to good and to defend freedom, whose existence was being denied, without its being necessary to warn that grace and its necessity were not thereby denied, concerning which no special controversy had arisen.

Moreover, that every difficulty in these formulas may be removed, it must be considered that it can happen that some formulas, materially considered, are the same among Catholics and heretics, without, however, the sense of them being the same among both. And in truth, that this can happen and repeatedly does happen we can prove from Augustine himself, who determines that certain formulas of the Pelagians, considered in themselves, can be accepted, yet disapproves of them because of the sense which the Pelagians subjoined to them. Thus, Cont. duas epistt. pelagg. I. IV. c. 6, to the proposition of the Pelagians, that grace helps the good purpose of each one, he notes: «this would be accepted without scruple as spoken catholically, if they did not place merit in the good purpose, to which merit the reward would then be rendered according to debt, not according to grace.» And when the Pelagians returned this other one to the former proposition, that it nevertheless does not infuse the zeal of virtue into the reluctant, Augustine himself again warns that «it could be understood well, if it were not said by those whose» sense is known." Further, from this observation we wish to gather, with Augustine himself leading the way,1) that turns of speech can be common to Catholics and heretics, 2) and therefore that it is not lawful to argue from the mere use of some formulas the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of the one employing those formulas, 3) but that their sense must be gathered from the context and the other circumstances and from the mind itself of the speaker or writer, already known from elsewhere. These things certainly are evident, if they are transferred to the Latin Fathers of the first centuries; for they, if we believe Augustine, handed down the Catholic doctrine, and yet, as we have just seen, they sometimes used formulas most similar to those which the Pelagians and Massilians employed: but nevertheless their opinion has always been held Catholic, because from other testimonies their doctrine plainly appeared.

VI. But now, by what testimonies the orthodoxy of the Latin Fathers is demonstrated, by the same the orthodoxy of the Greek Fathers can be demonstrated. Thus Justin, in the dialogue with Trypho n. 102, says »that what (Christ) said: Thou art my God, depart not from me, is at the same time the word of one teaching that all ought to hope in God, who created all things, and to seek salvation and help from Him alone... For if the Son of God says that He can be saved neither because He is the Son of God, nor because He is strong, nor because He is wise, but declares that, since He is immune from sin, He cannot be saved without God; how do you and the rest, who expect salvation without that hope, not think that you deceive yourselves?" Clement of Alexandria, Strom. L. V. c. 1. »We are saved by grace, but not without good works: but it is indeed fitting that, since we are by nature apt for the good, we apply some study to it. It is fitting also to have a sound mind, one that is not retarded by any repentance from the pursuit of the beautiful, for which indeed we have the greatest need of divine grace and right doctrine and a chaste and pure affection of soul and the Father's attraction to it." Origen in Philocalia c. 25: »Whoever makes progress builds a house, whoever is perfect guards the city: but the work of the builder is vain and the guard of the guarder vain, unless the Lord has built and the Lord guards... Not only, therefore, for a man to become honorable and good is there need of our will and of the conspiring divine help, which as far as concerns us is not arbitrary; but also for this, that he who has come out honorable and good should persevere in virtue: since certainly even the perfect will be about to fall into ruin, if he has been elated in his honorableness and arrogates to himself the cause of it and does not render due glory to Him who contributed much more to acquiring and retaining it." And again in Epist. ad Rom. L. VII. c. 9: «But now, since the election of them (Jacob and Esau) was made not from works, but from the purpose of God and from the will of the one calling; the grace of the promise is fulfilled not in the children of the flesh, but in the children of God, who, like they themselves, are elected by purpose and adopted into sons.» Basil in Constit. monast. c. 15: «Neither will any endeavor of men in good things come to pass without heavenly help, nor will heavenly grace ever come to a man who is not studious. But for the perfect summit of virtue, both these must be joined together: human study and celestial help summoned from above through faith. And indeed, in all things that are rightly done by us, let the soul refer to the Lord, as received, the causes of its right action, thinking that it does nothing at all rightly by its own strength.» And in orat. De Humilitate n. 3: «Nothing is left to you whence you could glory, O man... What, therefore, I ask, do you exalt yourself as if over your own goods, when you ought to render thanks to the giver for the gifts received.» Nyssen in Orat. Domin. Serm. 4: «But why do we entreat that the good election, which is from God, may be ours? because human nature is powerless for the good, once weakened on account of malice.» And De differ. essent. et hypost.: «We say that the efficacy is from grace working all things.» Nazianzen, Orat. 31, interpreting the words of the Apostle: not of the willing nor of the running, but of the showing-mercy God, says: «by these words Paul teaches that right willing itself also stands in need of divine help; rather, to speak more rightly, the will itself also and the election of those things which are right and joined with duty is a certain divine benefit. Thus, since the willing itself also is from God, with the best right he assigned the whole to God.» Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech. 1: «It is His (God's) indeed, who brings light to all, to plant and to water, but yours to bear fruit. It is God's to confer grace, yours to accept and keep it. Do not therefore despise grace because it is given freely; but rather, with devotion, once you have received it, keep it.» The holy Bishop indeed speaks of the grace of baptism, but since he says that it is given freely and that God is He who illuminates, plants and waters so that fruits may come forth, he sufficiently signified that grace is not preceded by any merits of nature, in nearly that manner, in which the Council of Trent afterwards declared the same in session VI. chapter 8.

But now, in testimonies of this kind is contained that doctrine, which extends the necessity of grace to all salutary works, and whether ex- plicitly or at least implicitly also to the beginning of faith. In these testimonies are contained those formulas, or ones equivalent to them, on account of which the doctrine of Cyprian and Ambrose was highly approved by Augustine as a norm of Catholic tradition. This saying of Cyprian, indeed, Augustine frequently inculcates against the Pelagians and Massilians: that nothing is to be gloried in, when nothing is ours, as in De Praed. SS. c. 4. and Cont. duas epistt. pelagg. L. IV. c. 9. And in the same question — whether merit begins from man through free will, to which God, fol- lowing, renders the assistance of grace, or rather begins from God, which was afterwards the question of the Massilians, the Catholic doctrine he proves by these words of Ambrose, by which he says the Pelagians are refuted, namely «because human care without divine help is weak for healing, it requires God as its helper» and by these others, «You see that everywhere the power of the Lord cooperates with human efforts, so that no one can build without the Lord, no one can keep without the Lord, no one can begin anything without the Lord.» Cont. duas epistt. pelagg. L. IV. c. 11. But equivalent phrases among the Greek Fathers occur, as one comparing can see; therefore it must truly be affirmed that the orthodoxy of the Greek Fathers is proved by testimonies not dissimilar to those by which the orthodoxy of the Latins is proved.

VII. How, then, are those sayings of the Greek Fathers, or those similar to them, which we recited at the beginning of the thesis, to be taken? It can be answered briefly that they are to be understood in the same way as not dissimilar formulas are understood among the Latin Fathers: if these can present a Catholic sense, reason requires that we interpret the expressions of the Greek Fathers in the same way.

VIII. But it is especially St. John Chrysostom who is brought forward, and therefore one must dwell on him a little more attentively. Sayings of his are adduced which seem to savor of the Pelagian or Semi-Pelagian doctrine, and which occur in his works not once or twice, but very frequently; so that some dare to affirm that he himself held a Pelagian mind. For the sake of example, let these suffice: homily 42a in Genesim teaches that Abraham arrived at the great summit of virtue not through the faith received from his parents, but through the knowledge placed in nature (γνῶσιν ἐν τῇ φύσει κειμένην) and from himself; and therefore that Abraham, who was before grace and before the law, obtained much grace from God, because he himself first did what was his own: further, he concludes that we ought to act in the same way, if we wish to enjoy the heavenly grace; for when God has seen us striving and pressing on to the contest of virtue, He immediately also helps us with His nod: homil. 12. in epist. ad Hebr. says that we ought first to choose the things that are good, and then God introduces the things that are His own. And objecting to himself that saying of the Apostle: Not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy, he answers that it was said for this reason, ὅτι οὗ ἐστιν ἀπλῶς, τὸ πᾶν εἶναι δίκαιον. For ours is only to choose and to will, but God's is to effect and to lead to perfection, and God does not precede our wills, lest free will be harmed: and homil. 17. in Ioannem, on those words: But Jesus turned and, seeing them following, he gathers from this that we are admonished that God does not prevent our wills with His benefits toward us, but that the beginning must be made by us, and when we have begun and have shown our will, then God confers many occasions of salvation upon us. Who here, they say, does not see the master of Cassian, who could not have set forth his error more clearly? Chrysostom therefore was not only a Semi-Pelagian, but was also the author of Semi-Pelagianism for Cassian.

IX. But if we may first use extrinsic arguments, those are at hand which compel us at least to doubt whether that is true which is affirmed with such great confidence by the adversaries. For Celestine, who knew well the Pelagian and Semi-Pelagian heresy, in the letter to Maximian, Bishop of Constantinople, in which he speaks deliberately about the Pelagian heresy, exhorting that Bishop to resist it — in that letter, I say, he praises the learning of Chrysostom and exhorts Maximian to follow his footsteps: «Follow, he says, the examples of the former pontiffs, by whom you have been instructed and nourished: the learning of the most blessed John in preaching, the vigilance of holy Atticus in repelling heresies.» But the Roman Pontiff, proposing to a Bishop, who had to resist not only the Nestorian but also the Pelagian heresy, the learning of John Chrysostom to be followed, had both to know it and to hold it as Catholic in the matter of grace.

Likewise Pope Gelasius, in the decree on the books which the Roman Church receives and which it does not receive, places among those which it receives, together with the works of Athanasius, Cyril, Augustine and others, also the works of Blessed John, Bishop of Constantinople, while nevertheless he places among the apocrypha the works of Faustus of Riez in Gaul; but if the works of Chrysostom had been sprinkled with the Pelagian or Semi-Pelagian stain, they ought to have been rejected by Gelasius no otherwise than the writings of Faustus.

Again, Atticus, Bishop of Constantinople, in the year 407 condemned the Coelestian heresy in a convoked Synod, and Marius Mercator makes no mention of any dissension or discrepancy of opinions in that Church; one may therefore think that in that age the Catholic doctrine was in tranquil possession in the Church of Constantinople; but if Chrysostom, who had won for himself such great authority, whom the same Church venerated so greatly, had taught otherwise, would not Atticus have encountered discrepant and adverse opinions, especially since as yet no universal decree of the Church or of the Roman See on this matter was known?

X. But that we may proceed from conjectures to arguments, it is certain that Chrysostom in many places and in the most eloquent words set forth and vindicated the Catholic doctrine, no otherwise than any other Father did. In Psalm. 118. he says «Let no one ascribe to his own goodness what he has, or claim for himself as his own what he has received from God.... You who are good, ascribe that to the gift of God ... lest you lose what you have and the truth say to you: what have you that you have not received!» Hom. 29. in Matth. «In the grace of God we can do all things, but without grace nothing, as the Apostle says: I can do all things in him who strengthens me.» Hom. 4. in epist. ad Ephesios, on those words: By grace you have been saved through faith, he says «He removed the swelling, saying: and this not from yourselves, as if he were saying: how could we already have believed in him? Therefore what is the merit of faith is not to be ascribed even to us; for it is the gift of God.» Hom. 12. in epist. 1. ad Corinth. on those words: who distinguishes you etc., he says: «But suppose you are to be praised and certainly hold grace, yet even so you ought not to be lifted up with pride, seeing that you have it not from yourself, but have received it from God. Therefore what you have, you have received — and not only this and that, but what you have. For these are not your merits, but the grace of God. Although you may bring forward faith, you received it from the calling... all things came to you from there.»

What, I ask, have you, then, that you have not received?" Hom. 8. in 2. Timoth. «Know this alone, that God provides for all things, that He works some things but permits others, that He wills nothing evil to be done, that not all things are done from His will alone, but from ours also: all evil things are done from our will alone, all good things from our will and His assistance.» What more can be required for the Catholic profession of the necessity of grace, which was to be proposed by way of thesis, not of polemic, when as yet no heresy existed?

How, then, are these things reconciled? The difficulty comes back to a twofold proposition which occurs in Chrysostom: the one is affirming — the will begins and first offers from itself what is its own; the other, equivalent to this, is denying — God does not prevent human wills with His grace. Now, just as there is a twofold series of acts, namely indeliberate and deliberate, so a twofold beginning corresponding to each must be distinguished. That indeed which is the beginning of the indeliberate acts is simply first; but the other also is a beginning in its own order. And it is of this that Chrysostom speaks. For since Chrysostom teaches that all our good things, all our merits, are from God, it is clear that the beginning which is said to be from us is not the first beginning placed in the indeliberate acts, but is a subsequent beginning placed in the deliberate acts, insofar as it depends on us deliberately to will that to which we are excited and aided by prevenient grace; it is not grace that determines us to that. By such a free consent, rendered indeed with the help of grace, we dispose ourselves to obtain more abundant graces; whence that prior consent, compared with these, has the character of a beginning. This answer — namely, that Chrysostom speaks of the beginning placed in the deliberate acts — holds also with regard to the testimonies of the other Fathers who seem to trace the beginning of a good work back to us, while at the same time they teach that all our good things are from grace. For only in this way can these things be reconciled.

Indeed, to persuade this the more, if that should be necessary, these observations will help: a) The first prevenient grace and some subsequent cooperating grace are so related that the former is common to all and is not in our power, and was contained in the common knowledge of the faithful in the age of those Fathers, while the latter is private, depending also on our cooperation. Now, when two things are so related, that which is common and known to all can be passed over in silence with impunity, and special mention only be made; especially since the discourse is directed to the faithful, who have already been furnished with the first wholly gratuitous graces, and whom we wish to exhort to progress in virtue. And this was almost the condition of those Fathers who in certain of their sayings seemed to judge that the grace of God is preceded by the efforts of free will. Weight will still accrue to this observation if you add that in that age there existed a special need of defending free will and its indifference to good and to evil under the governance of divine Providence. That aim of its own accord directed the minds of the Fathers to that which was impugned by the heretics, not to that which was known to all and conceded by all.

β) It must be held that the Fathers frequently understood by the name of grace not any grace whatsoever, but a certain special grace, and namely either sanctifying grace or also the grace of illumination and inspiration, but one which referred to supernatural objects and to the revelation of the Gospel. This Petavius proves by the adduced testimonies of the Fathers De Deo Lib. IX. cc. 4. 5.. And in truth sanctifying grace, which is the term and complement of the preceding actual graces, claims for itself the name of grace with a certain stronger right; while the revelation of supernatural truths and of the Gospel, in which the economy of the divinely instituted religion is contained, is a special grace not granted to all, but to those to whom the Word of God has been preached — a grace which presupposes the other preceding interior graces (cf. propos. 27. condemned, of Quesnel). Hence also the interior immediate illumination and inspiration following upon it, determined by this extrinsic supernatural revelation, are special graces, more excellent than the other actual graces; whence they too can be honored with the name of grace taken simply, with a certain stronger right: because they are properly the Christian grace. And this manner of speaking could be frequent especially among those who either addressed the nations and exhorted them to the faith which Christ brought to the world and without which they could not be saved, or addressed the faithful, whom it behooved to exhort to progress in virtue, and to whom the grace which they had received from God, by which they were distinguished from the rest, was to be preached and praised, so that, esteeming it greatly, they might persevere in it.

You will say: Chrysostom, or any other Greek Father, could have been in that opinion in which Augustine himself, with others, was before his episcopate. I answer: the question is not what he could have been, but what he really was. Besides, since the testimonies recited for the Catholic opinion of Chrysostom are so clear that those which Augustine recites from Cyprian and Ambrose against the Massilians are not clearer, it must be said both that Augustine, had he inspected those testimonies, would have held Chrysostom to be Catholic in the highest degree, and that he who loves to follow Augustine in all things ought not to judge otherwise.

Stephen Brulifer, a theologian at the end of the fifteenth century, calls the cited axiom a theological rule, in II. D. 28. q. 3. Ripalda, De Ente Supern., Disp. XX. Sect. 1., adduces several interpretations of it handed down by the Scholastics, which can be reduced to the following:] we judge that it is not certain what some contend, namely, that this same interpretation was actually in use among the theologians of the old school for several centuries.

Namely, to one who does what is in him by the powers of actual grace which he has, God confers further graces and sanctification. Or, to one who does what is in him by the powers of nature, God confers supernatural grace, as to one meriting it de congruo, or at least as to one positively disposing himself to it. Finally, to one who does what is in him by the powers of nature, God confers grace, not inasmuch as the works of nature contribute anything positively to receiving grace, but only inasmuch as they contribute negatively, i.e., because they do not hinder by sins the grace prepared by God. This is the interpretation set forth in the Thesis. Suarez, moreover, explains this last interpretation thus, De Auxiliis, Book III. c. 2. § 3.: «Some Scholastic Doctors suppose what is… most certain, that God, as far as in Him lies, is prepared to give His grace to all and to call all adults (who alone are properly capable of vocation)... in this way, therefore, it is in the power of any man whatsoever to be saved, because it is in his power to have this divine help, not from his merit or disposition, but from the liberal and general bounty of God. Although man can effect nothing of himself by which he might obtain this divine help, but God offers it by His gratuitous will alone, man can nevertheless hinder sufficiently by his will, and as far as in him lies, lest he actually receive from God this help and this vocation, if, by multiplying sins, he renders himself more and more unworthy of it... Hence it is that if a man having only the natural light of reason conducted himself in such a way that he placed no new obstacle to grace, he would infallibly receive in due time the help or vocation of grace, not from his own merit, but from that general liberality of God, by which He stands at the door of all and knocks. In this sense, therefore, those authors said that God does not deny grace to one who does what is in him; and it would be said more clearly: to one not placing an obstacle and hindrance through that which he can do of himself, God gives from His liberality the grace which man cannot merit... It is true that God gives His grace to one not placing an obstacle, nor is anything thereby attributed to man by which he might merit grace, but only that he can hinder it through sin, or at most, that he can avoid the sin against the law of nature, which could hinder it; and this man can do through free will. Moreover, the observation of Ericus cited by Ripalda ibid. contributes to this point, namely, that it is one thing for grace to be given to one who does what is in him, and another for it to be given because he does what is in him. For the first signifies only the fact of the connection of a natural honest work with grace; the second, however, further signifies a certain order of causality between the grace of God and the natural work.

I. But he who so interprets that axiom as to concede to one doing what is in him by the powers of nature only a negative disposition to grace, he surely does not place the reason of the connection of grace with the work in any way in the work itself, but entirely in the liberal will of God, who gratuitously decreed to give His grace to all. The natural work, however, is a condition, but 1) it is a negative condition, i.e., it is not a condition inasmuch as it is a work good and worthy of some esteem, but inasmuch as, the good work existing, there does not exist the sin which can be a sufficient reason why God denies grace.2) It is a non-necessary condition, because even to the greatest sinner God can confer, and sometimes does confer, the grace by which he is called to faith or penance. And one must note the difference in this regard between a good work and an evil work. For although a good natural work cannot be a reason why God gives supernatural gifts, an evil work can nevertheless be a reason why God denies His gratuitous supernatural gifts, just as His other gifts as well.

Therefore, by this axiom two things are asserted; one implicitly, the other explicitly. The first is: that man can by his sins place an obstacle, lest God confer grace on him, God who is prepared to give it to all. The second is: since God wills to give His grace to all, if any man living naturally admits no sin, God will certainly confer His grace on him; for if He did not do this, it would no longer be true that God wills to give His grace to all.

One must note accurately what is the point of the question in this part. It is not asked whether that axiom, expounded as it is proposed in the Thesis and has so far been explained, has historical value; nor is it asked whether the same axiom, so expounded, coheres with the whole economy of grace, with the divine salvific will, such as we profess; but only this is asked: whether this axiom, so expounded, derogates or not from the gratuitousness of grace.

III. And indeed it can seem that it derogates. For by that axiom an infallible connection of grace with one operating well naturally is established, and a non-infallible connection of grace with one acting badly naturally is established: for if in regard to both there is an infallible connection, what does it matter to say: to one who does what is in him? It would rather have to be said: God denies grace to no man. But if there is no infallible connection even for one operating well, that axiom is no longer certain. Now the reason of this difference, or the reason of the infallible connection of grace with one operating well, is the good operation itself of one doing what is in him; for this reason cannot be said to be the will of God, which of itself is prepared to give grace to all men, no one excepted. Therefore, one who does what is in him contributes something to the reception of grace; he contributes as determining this infallible bond; he contributes as the reason why grace is given to him rather than to another. Indeed, a certain exigency of grace seems to belong to one doing what is in him by the powers of nature; which exigency is opposed to the gratuitousness of grace.

Nevertheless, it must be conceded that by that axiom, accepted in the way in which it is proposed in the Thesis, concerning man doing what is in him by the powers of nature, the dignity, i.e., the gratuitousness, of grace is not derogated from. Certainly, in order that the conferral of grace be totally gratuitous, it is necessary that there be in man no exigency of it, no dignity or positive disposition, and consequently that the whole reason for giving be the liberal will of God. It is not required, however, that there be in man no negative dignity or disposition either, i.e., a lack of positive unworthiness or indisposition; otherwise the grace conferred on Adam and the Angels would not have been given totally gratuitously. But by that axiom no exigency of grace, no dignity or positive disposition, but only a negative one, is placed in nature, and the whole reason for giving grace is asserted to be the divine liberal will; therefore.

Which indeed can be conceived in this way. Let us suppose that there is no sin in men and no good work; since God had antecedently decreed to give grace to all, He would certainly confer it on all, nor would anyone say that it is not given freely. But if sin exists in someone, then there is a special reason why grace is denied to him. Hence it is said that he who acts well does not place the sin which can be an obstacle to grace; nevertheless grace is given to him freely, because it is given to him for this reason alone, namely, because God wills it.

In order that this may be better understood, we will answer the argument proposed to the contrary. Namely, 1) an infallible connection of grace with one operating well, or with the good operation, is established — inasmuch as it is a good operation worthy of some reward, I deny; inasmuch as it is the exclusion of that which can be an obstacle to grace, I distinguish — the reason of which connection is the good work or the exclusion of the obstacle, I deny; it is the divine liberal will, I concede.

2. The good operation is the reason of the very conferral of grace — I deny; for the reason of this is the divine will alone, which freely and gratuitously destined its grace. The good operation is the reason why, given the will of God to confer grace, grace is infallibly given to one doing what is in him — I distinguish: inasmuch as through it man merits, exacts, or becomes positively disposed to grace, I deny; inasmuch as through it there is lacking in man that on account of which God can deny the grace which He decreed to give to all, I concede.

3. Therefore one who does what is in him contributes something to the reception of grace, i.e., man can naturally dispose himself to grace — I deny. He can naturally place an obstacle to it, which however he does not place — I concede. Hence one who does what is in him naturally determines the conferral of the grace that is given to him, i.e., he does not place that which could determine the denial of grace — I concede; he places that which determines God to confer grace on him — I deny.

Therefore, man can indeed naturally hinder for himself the grace of God; but he cannot naturally dispose himself positively to grace, nor is this power necessarily connected with the former; for less is required for the former than for the latter: for the former it suffices to be able to sin, but for the latter a certain proportion of the dignity of works with grace is required, which proportion is lacking to the works of nature. Innocent III. in Serm. 2. de Conversione s. Pauli: «It is one thing to merit and another to demerit. No one can merit grace, but anyone can demerit grace.»

IV. Lessius, Opusc. De Gratia efficaci, c. 10, Suarez, loc. cit., and others whom Ripalda mentions, loc. cit., contend that the axiom thus accepted is in no way Semi-Pelagian and coheres fitly with the Catholic doctrine on the gratuitousness of grace; and it is a view already publicly defended in this university. Cf. Theses De Gratia Christi, anno MDCCCLXII. Th. 35. Therefore, to contract into a summary what we have disputed, our proof comes back to this: that grace be entirely gratuitous, it is not required that the subject to whom it is conferred also lack a negative disposition; the reason is that Adam and the Angels had this negative disposition, i.e., the lack of positive indisposition to grace, and the very humanity of Christ had this negative disposition to uncreated grace, and yet both according to the truth of the matter and according to the express doctrine of Augustine and the Fathers, grace in Adam and in the Angels was entirely gratuitous, and entirely gratuitous too was the hypostatic union of the Word with human nature — which gratuitous union Augustine proposes as the type and exemplar of the gratuitousness of the grace that is conferred on us, De Praed. SS. c. 15. alibique. Therefore, he who places in nature only a negative disposition is in no way opposed to the gratuitousness of grace. But he who defends that saying accepted in the way in which we have said places in nature nothing but a negative disposition; therefore. Hence those things which Vasquez decrees on this matter, in I. p. Disp. XCI. cc. 10. 11., cannot be approved by us.

V. One who does what is in him is one who does that which is in his power (St. Thomas qq. De Verit. q. 24. a. 15); one who does what he can (St. Bonaventure in II. D. 28. a. 2. q. I.); one who acts according to the powers which he actually has (John Gerson in the book de vita spirituali). Moreover, the powers which one actually has can be powers of grace, or the powers of nature alone. No one doubts that the Scholastics understood that axiom also of those doing what is in them by the powers of grace, to whom further grace is given. But the question is whether they also accepted it of one doing what is in him by the powers of nature alone. Some indeed, like Lessius in the place cited above, affirm that the old Scholastics, with very few exceptions, for 300 years and more accepted that saying — God does not deny grace to one who does what is in him — as concerning one doing what is in him by the powers of nature, who, so doing what was in him, would dispose himself by that disposition which we have called negative to supernatural grace. But if 1) one accurately considers the common manner of speaking of those theologians, if 2) one weighs the explanation of that saying handed down in every century by theologians, if 3) account is taken of the express testimonies of quite many theologians of that age, which indeed preceded the Synod of Trent; it will be clearly established that what Lessius affirms is not certain.

VI. Indeed, as to the first, since the old Scholastics distinguished the grace which justifies and constitutes us friends of God from that which is the principle of the good work, disposes to justification, and helps the justified man to operate, frequently among them the appellation of grace taken simply signifies that grace which is more excellent, which makes us pleasing, i.e., friends of God. This can be seen in those testimonies of so many Scholastics which Charles de Plessis D'Argentrée collected (in the Dissertation whose title is: Observationes in testimonia Doctorum Scholasticorum, per duodecimum seculo ineunte ad hanc usque aetatem de gratia pro conditione corruptae naturae disputarunt). But from the testimonies which we shall cite, this too will be sufficiently established. Hence, for them, a man without grace is frequently a man not yet justified, namely, destitute of habitual sanctifying grace. And in very truth, not a few old Scholastics say that the first parents were created in their natural endowments and so disposed themselves to grace; but they do not exclude actual graces. Thus, e.g., St. Bonaventure in II. D. 29. a. 1. q. 2. teaches that the first man had the natural goods prior in time to the gratuitous ones, and brings forward among other reasons this one, because «God, according to the common law, requires some disposition and preparation on our part in order that He may infuse grace into someone... and therefore grace was not concreated with man, but was deferred until man, by an act and use of reason, would in some way dispose himself to receive it, so that thus that saying of Augustine would be verified in the first man; He who created you without you does not justify you without you.» By which words, indeed, some positive disposition is signified. But the same Doctor, ibid. D. XXVIII. a. 2. q. 1., teaches both that one who has the use of free will is hardly ever or never found without grace freely given,¹ and that without it man cannot dispose himself to sanctifying grace; namely, that the exciting grace and the first disposition which is toward sanctifying grace is a thought, and that this is not without the gift of grace freely given; which grace holds, as it were, a middle place between sanctifying grace and natural freedom. That grace freely given, however, is required for this reason, because sanctifying grace is something divine and existing above free will. Now, in order that these things may be reconciled, one must say that man created in natural endowments and operating in natural endowments, or according to natural powers, is a man lacking sanctifying grace, but not lacking any actual grace. Therefore, if some testimonies of the Scholastics say that a man without grace, existing in natural endowments or in purely natural endowments, prepares himself for grace, they can be conveniently taken of a man lacking indeed justifying grace, but not lacking actual graces, unless the context of the whole opinion required that, which indeed seems to take place in very few cases.

From this observation and from that one it follows in turn, namely, that in that formula of the Scholastics — man prepares himself for grace from natural endowments — one must distinguish both the principle by which man acts and that which man does; and that that formula can legitimately yield this sense, namely, that man operating those things which are of themselves natural and, according to the very light of reason, right and knowable, and not yet operating those things which are also objectively supernatural, prepares himself for grace. But with this interpretation applied, the act that is also objectively supernatural is indeed excluded, but the act that is at least subjectively supernatural is not excluded, inasmuch as it is done with the help of grace. That formulas of this kind can be so taken among the Scholastics will be evident both from the preceding observation and especially from what follows.

VII. And indeed 2) A detailed explanation of the sense of this saying — that God does not deny grace to one who does what is in himself — exists among the older theologians themselves, who can and ought to be regarded as interpreters of the common opinion. To the thirteenth century can deservedly be referred the author of that compendium of theological truth which was assigned to Albert the Great or to Thomas. He, however, says in Bk. V, ch. 2: «Man is inaccessible if he does not receive sanctifying grace; because grace freely given (gratis data) is always at hand to arouse and admonish free will, whose part it is to consent to this admonition, and this is to do what is in oneself: which done, a man can prepare himself for sanctifying grace.» Marsilius of Inghen, in the fourteenth century, has these things in II, q. 18, a. 3. Having first handed down the definition of merit of congruity (that someone merits de congruo when, from the quality of the deed done, a reward is not owed to him but only from the liberality of the giver, with the quality and liberality of the giver himself attended to and the quality of the work that the worker does weighed), and with no mention made of a negative disposition, he lays down, among others, these conclusions. Third conclusion: «Just as in the state of fallen nature a man cannot merit the first grace de condigno, so neither can he merit it de congruo from purely natural things.» Fourth conclusion: «Although no one can merit the first grace after the fall from purely natural things even de congruo, still anyone can merit it de congruo through the special helps of God freely given to him.» He concludes the article thus: «And in this the opinions of my masters seem to me to agree.»

For those who say that a sinner can merit the first grace de congruo from purely natural things understand the conclusion already laid down, namely that he can merit it from those things, when he has been prevented by the special help of God. But those who say the contrary understand the third conclusion, namely that he cannot merit it from purely natural things that are not specially helped by God.And in article IV, answering the objection which he had proposed to himself in article I in these words: «Seventh: because for merit of grace de congruo either it suffices that a man do what is in himself, and if so, since a man can do this from natural things, it is clear that he can merit the first grace de congruo from them; or something beyond the common natural powers is required, and if so, then those to be damned, who die in continued mortal sin, seem to be unjustly damned:» he says, to the seventh point, that it must be said «that for merit of grace de congruo in the state of fallen nature it does not suffice that a man do everything that is in his purely natural powers, but something beyond all natural powers is required, namely faith.» Whence he explains those words of Scripture: «Turn to me and I will turn to you», thus: «It can be explained more clearly, that the Lord's meaning is: turn to me by serving my interior preveniences, by which I call you from the state of guilt, and I will turn to you by the infusion of grace.» But those who said that a man can merit grace de congruo from purely natural things were the ones who wanted the axiom: «God does not deny grace to one who does what is in himself», to hold also for the acquisition of the first grace; but what their interpretation would be, we have heard from Marsilius.

To the fifteenth century belongs John Gerson, who among his Moral Rules says: «To no one doing what is in himself — that is, using well the gifts of God already had — is God lacking in the things necessary for salvation.» In his sermon on the Holy Spirit, moreover, he says: «The Sacred Scriptures constrain the soul itself, that it dispose itself, that it do what is in itself, in the aforesaid and similar ways — by praying, weeping, groaning, or that it work something toward the reception of the Holy Spirit. For the Apostle hands down that we are God's co-workers, and certainly if the will contributed absolutely nothing, whence would there be merit? It must plainly be admitted: it contributes by a spontaneous consent obedient to the premotion of the Holy Spirit; but that it so contribute and obey, this already is not from itself without grace, inasmuch as it has been prevented by grace and salutarily drawn by him.»

Toward the beginning of the sixteenth century flourished John Driedo: he indeed, in Tractate 5, On the Captivity and Redemption of the Human Race, argues thus: «that we say a man does as much as is in himself can be understood in three ways. In one way indeed, to do as much as is in oneself is to do as much as nature itself can do of itself, that is, from its own powers alone implanted by the author of nature, not peculiarly drawn by God the Father... And one doing what is in himself in this way neither merits grace nor prepares himself for acquiring grace, because the will is prepared by the Lord for having grace. Secondly, to do as much as is in oneself is, for the time and place, to do as much as nature without the gift of habitual grace can do from its rational powers peculiarly drawn by God the Father toward the beginnings of faith. And to one doing as much as is in himself in this way, God bestows the beginning of faith, from which he may also be able to pray, invoke, seek, implore the mercy of God. And this is already the first drawing of the rational soul, which is to be posited not as a general influx of God... but is a peculiar and gratuitous drawing... Thirdly, to do as much as is in oneself is to do as much as nature, aided by faith given from above, can do for the remission of sin or for obtaining the perseverance of grace; and thus God gives grace to one doing as much as is in himself: but in this way no one can do as much as is in himself without the help of habitual grace... And in these two latter ways did the interpreters of sacred theology understand the saying, who teach that God illumines and gives grace to those who do as much as is in themselves.»

VIII. And indeed 3) The greater and more excellent part of the theologians received that saying in no other way, as Driedo testifies. That we may bring forward only the testimonies of the greatest, let these be had. St. Thomas, I. II. q. CIX. a. 6, asks whether a man can prepare himself for grace by himself without the exterior help of grace (which namely is from an extrinsic principle, which is God), and among the objections for the affirmative side he proposes that axiom, because if a man does what is in himself, God does not deny him grace. Now he solves the question by teaching that, in order that a man be prepared to work meritoriously for the attainment of beatitude, habitual grace is necessary; but that he be prepared for habitual grace itself, some gratuitous help of God interiorly moving the soul or inspiring a good purpose must be presupposed..., That a man be converted to God — this cannot be unless God converts him. This, however, is to prepare oneself for grace, namely, to be converted to God...

A man cannot prepare himself to receive the light of grace except through the gratuitous help of God interiorly moving.To the objection, moreover, he responds, «that a man can do nothing unless he is moved by God, according to that saying of John: Without me you can do nothing. And therefore when a man is said to do what is in himself, this is said to be in the man's power according as he is moved by God (i.e., as he said above: according as a good purpose is inspired in him by God through gratuitous help).» «And in q. CXII. a. 3, whether grace is necessarily given to one preparing himself for grace, or doing what is in himself; he responds that, if the preparation be considered insofar as it is from free will alone, there is no necessity of the attainment of grace, because the gift of grace exceeds every preparation of human power. But if the preparation be considered insofar as it is from God moving, then it has a necessity of infallibility with respect to that to which it is ordained by God.» Whence the words of the Gloss adduced in the first objection: God receives him who flees to him, otherwise there would be iniquity in him, he so explains, that «if the gloss be referred to the movement of free will before grace (habitual), it speaks according as the very flight of man to God is through a divine motion, which it is just should not fail.» Moreover, if St. Thomas had thought that that axiom is also to be taken of a man doing what is in himself by the powers of nature, he would not have denied that there is any necessity of the attainment of grace, namely a necessity of infallibility, given the preparation from free will, but he would have indicated that actual grace infallibly follows. The same holy Doctor had taught this in the QQ. disputatis. De Verit. q. 24. a. 15 and in II. D. 28. q. 1. a. 4.

St. Bonaventure, in II. D. 28. a. 2. q. 1, asks whether free will destitute of grace given can sufficiently dispose itself for sanctifying grace: he argues, moreover, for the affirmative side that he who does what is in himself sufficiently disposes himself for grace. He responds, however, that «it is impossible that free will destitute of all grace dispose itself for sanctifying grace:» «because free will never rises up either to know grace or to ask for it unless it is in some way stirred from on high and is led through the help of grace freely given.» To the argument, however, he responds thus: «it must be said that to do what is in oneself can be understood in two ways. In one way positively, because one does something ordained to grace» (namely, something that has an order to sanctifying grace, i.e., something supernatural by the excitation of God), and does as much as he can, and in this way the aforesaid saying has truth. In the other way it can be understood privatively, so that one is said to do what is in oneself because one does what one can, although it is not ordained to the reception of grace (i.e., only something natural), and in this way free will destitute of grace can do what is in itself, and thus the aforesaid saying does not have truth." Therefore the aforesaid saying does not hold for that man who does what is in himself, destitute of grace freely given.

You will say that St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure do not properly treat our question — which is whether God does not deny actual graces to one doing what is in himself by the powers of nature — but another, namely whether habitual grace is not denied to him. I answer that this very thing is an argument that those Doctors did not understand that saying of one doing what is in himself by the powers of nature, to whom actual grace is not denied; for if they never have this special question, how do you prove that they thought that actual graces are not denied to those who do what is in themselves through the powers of nature? Moreover, if they had been of that opinion — that actual grace is not denied to one doing what is in himself by the powers of nature — even if they instituted the question about habitual grace, they would have warned that one doing what is in himself by the powers of nature is disposed to it remotely; because he is disposed, albeit negatively but infallibly, to actual graces, by which he is afterwards positively disposed to habitual grace. But those Doctors either simply affirm that a man does as much as is in himself toward attaining grace insofar as he is moved by God; or they simply deny that that axiom has truth, if a man acts only according to the powers of nature.

The author of the ancient compendium of theological truth, already cited, in I. V. c. 3, having distinguished the general help of God from the special help, which is the grace of grace freely given and the gift by which a man prepares himself to receive the gift of the Holy Spirit, adds that »it is the part of this grace to recall free will from evil and to excite it to good; without which no one does sufficiently what is in himself, so as to prepare himself for salvation.

Aegidius Romanus, in II. d. 28. q. 1. a. 3; »Because grace is something supernatural, it is never infused into the soul unless the supernatural agent, which is God, moves and impels the soul to the reception of grace. This impulse, moreover, and this divine motion toward grace are the compunctions and good thoughts which God sends into the sinner not converted, that he may be converted to him, and which he sends into the converted, that he may be converted more to him. Therefore, to the infusion of grace there first precedes the divine calling, or the sending of divine thoughts; afterwards follows the conversion of free will to God, and afterwards the infusion of grace. It is clear, therefore, how without grace we cannot sufficiently prepare ourselves for grace. Unless perhaps someone should say that it is in our power to do what is in us, and if we do what is in us, God will infuse grace into us. But as is clear through what has already been said, unless the divine calling and the sending of good thoughts by God precedes, which is a certain grace, we cannot through free will sufficiently move ourselves to grace.

Thomas of Strasbourg, in II. D. 27. a. 3. concl. 2. «One existing without grace can merit grace de congruo: because it seems fitting that the merciful Father receive with piety the prodigal and wandering son returning to the bosom of the paternal home. Whence if he did all that is in himself, even if he were a pagan, God would never fail but that he would lay open to him the truth of his faith and infuse the grace of the Holy Spirit. The manner, however, of returning, or of obtaining grace (i.e., by doing what is in oneself), although it is sufficiently expressed in the aforesaid parable, can still be said to be this: that first, through prevenient grace, God himself admonishes the sinner himself through certain spiritual impulses. For by such admonitions God stands at the door (even of a pagan) and knocks, and asks of us our conversion.»

Cajetan, I IIe. q. CIX., a. 6: «Nor does this stand in the way here, that it is commonly said that a man, by doing what is in himself, disposes himself for grace. For this is understood of the disposition and preparation not simply, but insofar as it is on his part. And again, taking disposition simply, it is understood that he does what is in himself, moved specially by God.»

Many other Scholastics could be cited for this opinion, whom you may see in Charles de Argentrée, in the cited Dissertation. Not a few are also wont to be brought forward to the contrary: but 1) if those observations be applied which we gave in this part under number

VI, it will be clear that, with very few exceptions, as regards the rest as well, the matter is left in uncertainty; and with that uncertainty existing, if, as is fitting, their doctrine be measured against the doctrine of others who have spoken clearly on this matter, scarcely any doubt will remain that the opinion of these was the common one. Moreover 2) since several, even among the principal ones, manifestly take the saying of one doing what is in himself by the powers of grace, it follows that at least it is not certain that the contrary interpretation was common.

IX. This saying, however, so frequent among theologians, had already been pre-formed by the Fathers with a pre-formation both real and verbal. The real pre-formation is contained in those sentences by which it is said that God illumines every man coming into this world, that the grace of God is offered to all, and that only those are deprived of it who refuse to receive it. Cf. the testimony of Chrysostom, pag. 261. The verbal pre-formation through equivalent words is contained in those formulas customary among the Fathers, by which it is said that it is ours to begin, God to perfect, that God is to be stirred up by us, that it is ours to ask, God's to give, that we ought to show ourselves such that God may call us — which formulas see in Thesis XXXIII.

I. Assuredly, works of this kind are works of the Holy Spirit moving or even indwelling; they are supernatural works, placed in the same order as the other gifts of grace; from their higher principle, therefore, and from their intrinsic character they have a dignity by which they are equal to the other supernatural gifts for obtaining things unowed to nature. Nor does the gratuitousness of grace suffer any loss from this; for the gratuitousness of grace consists in this, that it be rendered to no merits or impetration of nature; for grace is gratuitous insofar as it is supernatural: but it is supernatural with respect to nature, not with respect to some grace. But if grace is rendered to merits acquired with the help of that same grace, the grace itself which is rendered is utterly gratuitous to nature; because the conferral of the first grace was gratuitous to nature, from which alone the merit of the subsequent graces arose.

II. This is the doctrine that the whole of Tradition attests. For the Scriptures claim for good works (which, as is evident from the same Scriptures, are done with the help of grace) the character both of impetration and of merit with respect to grace. Matth. VII, 7. Ask, and you shall receive; seek, and you shall find; knock, and it shall be opened to you. Paul gives the reason for this matter, ad Romanos VIII, 26: For the Spirit himself asks (i.e., makes us ask) for us with unutterable groanings. But what is to be asked, or what we can obtain by praying, is clear from the Lord's Prayer, by which we beg for salvation and the means of salvation. Daniel, IV, 24. Redeem your sins with alms and your iniquities with mercies to the poor: perhaps he will forgive your offenses. To be sure, as Christ says at Matth. V, 7: Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy. Whence also Tobiae XII, 8: Prayer is good with fasting and almsgiving frees from death, and it is this that purges sins and makes one find mercy and eternal life. Likewise ad Hebraeos XIII, 16: Do not forget beneficence and communion, for by such sacrifices God is won over (χαρίζεται: he takes delight, is appeased). Then Matth. VII, 14: If you forgive men their sins, your heavenly Father will also forgive you your offenses. And Apocalyp. XXII, 11. 12: He who is just, let him be justified still, and he who is holy, let him be sanctified still; behold, I come quickly, and my reward is with me, to render to each one according to his works. Moreover, in these testimonies there is exhibited a connection of good works with the further gifts of grace, a connection that is indeed causal, insofar as good works, by reason of some excellence that is in them, are the reason why grace is conferred; but this causal connection between good works and the further gifts is a moral connection, i.e., of a certain dignity, or rather it is a connection of merit: therefore. And it must be observed that grace is connected not only with the good works of the just but also with the works of sinners; whence some character of merit is claimed for all good works, although it is different in sinners than in the just: about which difference, however, there is no need to dispute at present.

III. That this is the doctrine of the Scriptures is clear from the Fathers. The Fathers of the Second Council of Orange, c. 8, teach that a reward is owed to good works, if they are done, but that grace, which is not owed, precedes so that they are done." Indeed, the gratuitousness of grace does not require that it be rendered to no merits of any order whatsoever, but demands only this, that the merits by which it is rendered not be from nature, but that they themselves also be from grace.

Augustine most excellently sets forth this economy of graces in epist. 194. ad Sixtum n. O.: «But neither is the remission of sins itself without some merit, if faith obtains it; for the merit of that faith is not nothing, by which faith that man said: God, be merciful to me, a sinner.» He also hands down the same thing at g. 68. inter LXXXIII n. 4: «Assuredly he has mercy on whom (God) wills, and he hardens whom he wills: but this will of God cannot be unjust. For it comes from the most hidden merits; because even the sinners themselves, although on account of the general sin they have made one mass, still there is no small diversity among them. Something, therefore, precedes in sinners, by which, although they are not yet justified, they are made worthy of justification; and the same precedes in other sinners, who are worthy of hardening.» And in the same epistle to Sixtus, speaking of eternal life, n. 19, he says that grace itself is so named for no other reason than because it is given freely, nor for this reason, that it is not given to merits, but because the merits themselves, to which it is given, were also given.» Therefore the gratuitousness of grace is most excellently reconciled with merits acquired with the help of grace.

IV. Hence the Council of Trent, Sess. VI, Can. 32, defined that the works of the justified man are so much the gifts of God that they are also the merits of the justified man himself, and that through them the just man merits the increase of grace, eternal life and, if he dies in grace, the attainment of eternal life itself, and also the increase of glory.» And at Sess. XIV, cap. 4, that contrition was at all times necessary for obtaining the pardon of sins and that it prepares the soul for the remission of sins, and that that imperfect contrition which is called attrition is a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit moving, by which the penitent, aided, already prepares justice for himself, by which he is disposed to obtain the grace of God in the Sacrament of Penance. And Sess. VI, having enumerated the acts elicited through grace which must precede the justification of the adult, says in cap. 7 that justification itself follows this disposition or preparation, and in cap. 8 teaches that faith is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root of all justification. Therefore good works done from grace have both the character of merit toward grace and glory, and they dispose and prepare man for justification and prepare the way to it, and the good act which is faith is the beginning of salvation, the foundation and root of justification, and through contrition the pardon of sins is obtained. Furthermore, the power of impetration, which is attributed not to simple prayer but to an honest act, cannot be separated and really distinct from a meritorious power at least of congruity: for it is the power of obtaining some reward on account of the dignity of the work, which is merit, and those dispositions which prepare the soul for justice are positive dispositions, which consist in moral acts and therefore have the character of congruous merit (Th. XXX), and that which is the beginning, foundation and root of justification is contained in the same order with it and has the character of a certain moral cause with respect to it, i.e., the character of some merit, as the Fathers argued against the Massilians, which is certainly congruous merit. Therefore, what the same Council established at Sess. VI, cap. 8 — that man is justified freely and that none of those things which precede justification, whether faith or works, merit the grace of justification itself — must be understood in such a way that 1) justification, taken together with the dispositions that precede it and the helps conferred on account of them, is entirely gratuitous; and 2) justification, taken separately from the preceding acts, for the infusion of sanctifying grace and the remission of sins, is conferred freely, because it is conferred apart from any merit of condignity and therefore is not given out of justice.

I. Since perseverance is said in many ways (1. II. q. CIX, a. 10.), we now speak only of final perseverance in the state of grace, which eternal life follows; before which perseverance several partial perseverances can be distinguished, although not always and necessarily. The name of perseverance properly signifies an act, not the bare power of persevering; and in this signification it was employed by Augustine in the book on the Gift of Perseverance; for he says in ch. 1: «Assuredly this perseverance, of which we now treat, by which one perseveres in Christ even to the end, he is in no way to be said to have had who has not persevered to the end; rather, a faithful man of one year had it, and as much as can be thought below it, if, until he died, he lived faithfully, than one of many years, if a short time before death he fell away from the firmness of the faith.» This is formal or actual perseverance, which indeed depends on a twofold element, as it were, intrinsic and extrinsic. The intrinsic element is the preservation of the state of grace, which in adults having the use of reason is obtained through holy operations or through the due use of the graces conferred on the just man; so that the just man, from that justification at least in which he perseveres, always lives justly, that is, does not sin. The extrinsic element is death then arriving, when the man is in the state of grace. Moreover, the preservation of the state of grace, considered actively, namely when it depends on the operation of man, is called active perseverance; but the conjunction of death with the state of grace, insofar as it is referred to man, is called passive perseverance, because man is passively disposed with respect to it; for the instant of death depends on the will of God alone.

The gift of perseverance is taken both formally and causally. Formally, it is formal perseverance itself, which we have explained; causally, they are those helps, whether internal or external, by which not only the ability to persevere, but actual perseverance itself is infallibly obtained.

II. We teach first that formal perseverance is in the power of the just man, namely one furnished with the grace of God, that is, that the just man, if he wills, can through the grace of God, which is at hand for him, attain formal perseverance itself, so that the terminus of his active perseverance is at last formal perseverance itself. To demonstrate this, these two things must be proved: a) that helps sufficient for acting rightly are always at hand for the just man; b) that, these being granted, he can attain formal perseverance.

Thus «) to begin with the first point, we teach that to the justified there are always supplied helps necessary and sufficient for acting as one ought for salvation. We are not now speaking of all men in general, but of the justified; yet not in an exclusive sense, as if the necessary helps were given to the just alone, but in a precisive sense: we prescind, namely, from the rest and consider the just alone; for these alone can persevere. The discourse is about the supply of helps, which is made successively to the just man; and therefore when we say that helps are always supplied to the just man, this proposition is equivalent to this: if the just man has used the first helps well and has remained just, other helps necessary for the following time will again be supplied to him, and so on. When we say that the necessary and sufficient helps are at hand continuously, this is to be understood at least at the time when the just man must act salutarily, which he cannot do without the help of God. We are speaking, as is evident, of sufficient helps, by which a man can, if he wills, act justly; not of efficacious ones, which, namely, are, with man cooperating, joined with the effect, that is, with the salutary act. And now in this way what we proposed is demonstrated.

a) The state of the just man requires helps of this kind. For the just man is actually and formally constituted in the supernatural order, existing as an adopted son of God and heir of the kingdom of heaven, who by the law of God is bound to perform works suitable to his state and proportionate to his end, so that at last he may merit to enter into his inheritance. But, this law being granted, God must supply the just man with the means necessary and sufficient for acting as one ought; for means of this kind are not in man's power, since they are supernatural helps; therefore God really confers on all the just these helps necessary and sufficient; for what God owes by the law established by Himself, He certainly does.

β) This will of God to confer on the just helps necessary and sufficient is evident also from the doctrine of the Scriptures. Assuredly we are taught by the Scriptures 1) that the just, by the very fact that they are just, not because they are predestined, are loved by God, and are loved with an active and fruitful love, conferring, namely, the means and helps which they need; Prov. VIII, 17. 20. 21. X, 6. XII, 2. Ioan. XIV, 21. Matth. XI, 28. seg. Roman. V. 8. 9. Psalm. XXII, 4. XXVI, 1. XXXII, 18. 19. 1a. Cor. X, 13. we are taught 2) that the just are made certain that eternal life will be repaid to them, that is, as far as it is from God's part, God is prepared and wills to repay eternal life to them, unless they themselves fail themselves, Sapient. V. 16. Psal. XXXVI, 18. Marci XVI, 16. we are taught 3) that the just are not deserted by God, unless they first desert God, Psal. XXXVI, 21. 33. 39. 10. Eccli. II. 12. XXVII, 9. XXXIV, 19. Ezech. XVIII, 21—32. But these things would be wholly false, if God denied to the just the helps necessary and sufficient: therefore. And surely we are commanded to hope for beatitude and for the helps to its attainment, nor is there any time in which it is lawful to despair: therefore God is always prepared to confer helps of this kind, and if we ask for them as we ought, He certainly confers them, and we can always pray as we ought; otherwise there would be a just reason for despairing again and again. The same is handed down by the Fathers, Conc. Arausic. II. c. 25., namely that all the baptized, with Christ helping and cooperating, can fulfill those things which pertain to salvation, if they will labor faithfully. And the Trid. Syn., Sess. VI. cp. 11., teaching that God does not command impossibilities, but by commanding admonishes you both to do what you can and to ask for what you cannot, and aids you that you may be able.

y) Furthermore, the relation of Christ with the just, which is both that of a spouse loving and never hating the bride, Ephes. V, 23. seq., and that of a head uniting to himself and ruling the members of his body, Colos. I, 18., compared with I Cor. XII, 27., persuades us that the participation of the goods which are communicated by Christ to the just is continual, and that the influx which flows from Christ to the just is unceasing. But this again would be false, if God denied to His just the necessary helps: therefore. Cf. Conc. Trid. ibid.

β) Indeed, we add, for the further confirmation of the same point, that the just can merit helps of this kind, and therefore on account of the merit, and indeed the condign merit, of the just, God confers on the just those helps which are sufficient; except, however, the first one. For the first help, which is conferred on the justified man for acting, must be excluded from merit; for this the justified man cannot merit, and we are speaking of the justified man insofar as he is justified: namely, we say that the first help cannot be the object of merit existing after justification. For a help of this kind the justified man cannot merit, because it is the principle of any merit whatsoever which the justified man acquires. This help is therefore conferred on the justified man by that law which we stated in this part a) in the first argument. And because it is bound up with sanctifying grace, on account of which it is owed; just as that grace is not obtained by condign merit, but can be obtained only by congruous merit, so too that help cannot be the object of condign merit, but at most of the congruous merit which preceded justification.

Now, however, it is the common opinion of theologians that the just man merits of condignity the helps necessary and sufficient. Several prove this because the just man merits of condignity glory, and therefore also the means necessary for attaining it; which reason, however, is not approved by all. Cf. Ripalda, De Ente Supernat. Disp. 93. Suarez, however, De Gratia I. XII, c. 26, proves it by this reason. Namely, the just man can certainly merit by condign merit the increase of grace (Synod. Trid. Sess. VI. Can. 32.); but the fruits of the increase of grace are those actual helps which correspond to it and are owed on account of it; therefore the just man, by meriting the increase of grace, merits at the same time those actual helps which are connected with it. Moreover, it is certain that the just man, through the grace which he has, can so always act that he merits the increase of habitual grace, and therefore that he merits also the actual helps which correspond to it.

Ripalda denies, l. c., that the just man merits the actual helps — not indeed because the dignity sufficient for meriting is lacking to the works of the just man, but because the helps necessary and sufficient are not the object of merit, since they are already owed and destined before the prevision of any merit, as is clear from what we said in the first argument. But nothing prevents something from being owed on several different titles, just as glory is owed to adult just men both by the title of inheritance and by the title of reward. Ripalda must at least concede this, that the merits of the just are such that, if the actual helps were not owed to the just by some law, those helps which correspond to the increase of grace would certainly be owed to them on account of merit; and therefore he must concede that in the just acting well there is really a twofold title by which the helps can be claimed.

III. Now the other point must be proved: namely, that with these helps granted, the just man can attain formal perseverance. And this indeed is evident. For if the just man has these helps, he can always act justly; but acting always justly, he will arrive in the state of grace at the end of life, however far it may be prolonged; arriving in the state of grace at the end of life, the just man obtains formal perseverance, that is, he actually and formally perseveres: therefore, since through the grace of God the just man can always act holily, formal perseverance is in his power. And surely every just man can be saved, if he wills; but he cannot be saved except by persevering in grace (that is, by attaining formal perseverance): therefore he can persevere, if he wills. The consequence (says Suarez, De Gratia I. X. c. 3.) is excellent and evident per se; and each premise is most certain in faith: therefore.

IV. Now that must be proved which, when inspected at first glance, seems a paradox: namely, that formal perseverance is nevertheless a gratuitous gift. Formal perseverance is had when the just man existing in the state of grace is overtaken by death.

So that perseverance may be had, it is not enough that the just man, through grace, can persevere by always acting holily, but it is necessary that he really persevere, that is, preserve the state of grace for that instant in which he must die. Now, this formal final perseverance is a gift or benefit of God, and a gift distinct from the gift of justification and of the power of persevering, and it is a gratuitous gift. What we say is a gift distinct from the gift of justification and of the conferred power of persevering, we can call a special gift, so that by this term "special" is signified not its rarity, but its distinction from the other gifts, at least inadequately. But what we assert we demonstrate from a twofold head, yet in such a way that for adults we especially press the second, as will be declared later, so that the first is not to be taken separately from the other, although in it a certain special reason is also found.

Thus 1) perseverance depends on this, that death be conjoined with the state of grace, or that it happen in that instant in which the man is in grace. But a conjunction of this kind is a gift or benefit of God; for the man could have died in another instant, in which he either was, or would have been, in sin: b) it is a benefit distinct from the other gifts; for it was not given even to many who had sanctifying grace and the power of persevering: c) it is a gratuitous gift; because the just man, however holily he has acted and acts, in no instant acquires the right of demanding that he be snatched away by death at that time when he is in the state of grace; for the terminus of probation is placed wholly in the power and free will of God, the Lord of life and death, whose act of dominion it is to preset for each one the terminus of probation. See (says August. De Dono perseverantiae c. 17.) how far from the truth it is to deny that perseverance to the end of this life is a gift of God, since He Himself gives an end to this life, whenever He wills; and if He gives it before an imminent fall, He makes the man persevere to the end." And to prove the same thing he appeals to the words

Sap. IV. 11. He was taken away lest malice should change his understanding. (De Praedest. SS. c. 14.).

This grace, by which perseverance is given, is not an interior grace, but is an exterior providence, which fixes the end of life for that instant in which one has justice. But this gift of perseverance alone is conferred on baptized infants and on those who, after receiving justification, up to death are not capable of free acts.

But 2°. in order that in adults, whom it behooves to act holily after receiving justification, death may be conjoined with the state of grace, it is necessary that the state of grace have been preserved by them; wherefore the very preservation of the state of grace, with which death is at last conjoined, is an element of the gift of perseverance. But this preservation depends on this, that the just man has acted holily, that is, has consented to the graces received from God and has acted through them. Moreover, all the graces indeed by which men are excited to act holily are accommodated to those to whom they are given, so that they can follow the one exciting them, if they will: several, however, of these, on account of man's fault, lack their effect: others, with man cooperating, obtain their effect, and these are called efficacious and congruous in a special manner, whose effect God, when He destines them, knows to be infallibly obtained. God indeed destines these graces with the intention that a good act be produced; which indeed is common to the destination of each grace. Now these congruous graces are those which the persevering have, and on account of which they actually persevere: but these, insofar as they are such, although the just man could humbly merit several of them, God nevertheless gives gratuitously; as we are about to demonstrate here shortly. We ask, namely, of God that He Himself work the good in us, make us do it, help us, and work with us, which is to ask the conferral of those graces which God knows will be efficacious; we therefore obtain them by prayer, yet we do not merit them of condignity. The conferral, therefore, of graces which are not only sufficient but will also be infallibly efficacious is causally the conferral of the preservation of the state of grace, and therefore also of perseverance. Now the conferral of graces of this kind a) is a gift or benefit of God; for by them is given the perseverance which would not be had without them: b) it is a gift distinct from the gift of justification and of the power of persevering, which is had through sufficient graces; a special gift therefore; for these can be without that, and that adds something over and above the former: c) it is a gratuitous gift to the just; because the just man has a right only to attaining glory after life and to the means necessary for this: but these means are the sufficient graces, by which he can, if he wills, persevere; for that the graces which he has are not actually efficacious, man must impute to himself, who does not use the sufficient means. Wherefore the just man can never merit of condignity that those graces be conferred on him which have been foreseen by God to be efficacious.

Therefore from this part also, namely with a view to the helps by which the just man is aided in preserving the justice which he received, and thus in persevering, perseverance is a gift of God, distinct from the others, and a gratuitous gift. Whence Augustine, l. c. cp. 6.: «But indeed (they said, who denied that perseverance is a gift of God) each one deserts God by his own will, so that he is deservedly deserted by God. Who (answers Augustine) would deny this? but we therefore pray that we be not led into temptation, so that this may not happen. And if we are heard, assuredly it does not happen; because God does not permit it to happen. For nothing happens except what He Himself does or permits to be done. He is able, therefore, both to bend wills from evil to good, and to convert those prone to falling, and to direct the step that pleases Him.»

The efficacious graces, moreover, by which good operation and the preservation of the state of grace are obtained, are not only interior graces but also exterior ones, of which kind are the removal of occasions of sin, the restraint of temptations, occasions of acting well, counsels, holy examples, and the like (cf. Th. II.).

From these things, moreover, it is gathered that the gift of perseverance, as regards adults, is not one simple grace, but is put together from a collection of many graces, both internal and external, among which latter the principal is the death appointed for that instant in which a man attains justice.

V. Now, moreover, one may observe that, as regards adults, the deeper reason why perseverance is a distinct benefit of God is that which we adduced in the second place. For if you suppose that someone is going to live always holily (for this can come to pass if he wills it), the death, which must happen at some time, will have to find him in the state of grace; and therefore, from the fact that he is snatched away now rather than at another time, he does not obtain that special benefit of persevering, which he would certainly obtain in whatever other instant he might be called. You have an example in the most blessed Mother of God. But even then it is a special gift of perseverance; because those efficacious graces, both internal and external, by which the just man has worked holily and would work holily, are a special gift of grace. And thus this part of the thesis has been demonstrated.

VI. It is a certain opinion that the just man can obtain, that is, humbly merit, and indeed infallibly, final formal perseverance — obtain, namely, that efficacious graces not be lacking and that he be snatched away at that time when he is in the state of grace, and therefore obtain that gift which we have said to be gratuitous. This is the opinion of Augustine, which he taught in De Dono perseverantiae, c. 12: «This gift of God can be humbly merited; but once it has been given, it cannot be lost by contumacy» (he is speaking of perseverance itself formally taken). And indeed in that book Augustine proves that perseverance is a gift of God because it is to be asked of God by us; but what we are commanded to ask of God we can also certainly obtain, if we pray, as is fitting. And in truth the most universal words of Christ are: ask and you shall receive: everyone who asks, receives, which words therefore also comprehend perseverance. Therefore formal perseverance, which we are taught by the Holy Spirit to ask of God, we can certainly obtain, if we pray as we ought. Surely we can certainly obtain from God what is contained in the Lord's Prayer; but, if Augustine is to be believed, «by the very prayer which is called the Lord's, because the Lord taught it, when it is prayed by the saints, almost nothing else is understood to be asked than perseverance.» Lib. citato c. 2. To this indeed the second, third, fifth, sixth, and seventh petitions look; by which, if the just attain what they ask, they will certainly obtain perseverance.

But because the obtaining power of prayer rests on the manifest promise of God, which cannot fail; hence the obtaining of perseverance, when it is asked as it ought to be, is infallible.

VII. We have said: if it is prayed as it ought to be; for the conditions required in prayer must be observed, in order that it may obtain its effect, about which there is no need to dispute here. We shall indicate only two, which will also serve to declare the matter. Namely, first, as long as the just man lives, the petition for this gift must be continual and constant. For, as Suarez says, De Gratia I. XII. c. 38. n. 14: «The just man can be understood to merit or obtain the gift of perseverance in two ways. First, by one act or by several acts made in a certain time or up to a certain instant of life, obtaining perseverance and, as it were, confirmation in grace for the remaining time of life. Second, successively through the whole time of life, obtaining perseverance as it were by parts — for example, now obtaining efficacious help so as not to fall in the present occasion, and after that praying again and obtaining another help for keeping the precept that again occurs, and so on, always praying and never failing. I say, therefore, that the former way of meriting or obtaining perseverance is not infallible. The a posteriori argument of Medina urges this (namely, because most holy men often fall after many similar prayers, and because otherwise a just man praying thus could be secure and work out his salvation without fear and trembling, which seems to be against Paul). The a priori reason, however, is that no divine promise exists on this matter... because such infallibility cannot be gathered from the promise made to prayer. It is proved, because that promise was made under certain conditions, which not concurring, prayer does not infallibly obtain,... and one of these is perseverance» (namely, in praying). The other condition is that which Suarez teaches in the same place: «although, absolutely speaking, prayer can be obtaining even if the one praying is not in grace; nevertheless this prayer by which perseverance in grace is asked, by reason of the thing asked, which intrinsically supposes grace, requires grace in the one praying, in order that it may be obtaining, and consequently requires perseverance in grace, in order that it may be infallibly obtaining; because, in order that prayer may have due perseverance, it must endure with those moral circumstances which it also ought to have had from the beginning, in order that it be made fittingly. Hence, by the very fact that a new impediment is placed (by sinning) to the effect of the prayer, perseverance in praying fails, at least in the due manner.»

VIII. You ask whether the just man can also merit congruously this gift of perseverance? I answer that theologians are wont to use together the names of obtaining and of congruous merit in this matter, as may be seen in the cited words of Suarez; cf. also Bellarmine, De Iustificatione L. V. cap. ultimo. Moreover, Ripalda answers the question in the affirmative, De Ente supern. Disput. XCIV.

Sect. 2. because in the order of present Providence the power of obtaining is bound up with at least congruous merit, which that theologian proves from this, that the Fathers, in order to remove the natural merits of grace, deny that it is given to natural desires and petitions, because it would not be given without merit of nature, since it would be obtained by natural prayers. The Fathers therefore judge that every prayer is also meritorious. Therefore the act of praying is also meritorious. But if the act of praying is meritorious, why not also other acts, which in respect of the ratio of merit can be more excellent than prayer? And in general, as regards all the good acts of the just, Ripalda proves the same a priori — not indeed that all acts merit, but that some, namely the most excellent, can merit; because, namely, such great dignity inheres in those acts that it is able to move God to confer the gift of perseverance. This opinion is at least probable; but it must be noted with Suarez, loc. cit., that «infallibility (of the attainment of perseverance) does not belong to merit of congruity by reason of itself, so to speak (that is, from the dignity of the perfection of the work), but by reason of the obtaining, which properly corresponds to prayer alone, as such. The reason is that this infallibility is founded only on the divine promise, which is not found to have been made to the works of the just, insofar as they are meritorious of congruity, but only to prayer. Wherefore, in order that the fruit of this merit be more certain, the petition for perseverance must always be joined to it.»

Corollary. Therefore the just man can attain final perseverance not only because he can persevere through the sufficient graces owed to him; but also because, by praying as he ought, he can infallibly obtain the gift of perseverance. This, however, does not stand in the way of the doctrine handed down under n. IV.; for prayer too, and such prayer as is fitting, is a fruit of efficacious grace.

IX. As far as this question is concerned, the Council of Trent teaches four things. First, that the gift of perseverance is great, Sess. VI. cn. 16. Second, that without the special help of God the just man cannot persevere in the justice received, ibid. cn. 22. Third, that with that special help he can, ibid. cn. 22. Fourth, that no one ought to promise himself the gift of perseverance with absolute certainty, although all ought to place and repose the firmest hope in the help of God, ibid. and cp. 13. Now the first of these is easily understood. For only habitual grace persisting in us up to the end of life introduces us into the kingdom of heaven; and therefore perseverance, which includes sanctifying grace itself, is a gift more excellent by reason of the benefit than habitual grace alone, which is included in it and which, nevertheless, eternal perdition can follow. Perseverance is therefore a great gift of God; for, compared with the other preceding gifts, it is their complement, or it is the reason why we have not obtained them in vain. As to the second and the third, the question arises what that special help is. Note that it is not called a special privilege, but only a special help. It is asked, therefore, what this special help is, or wherein the specialness of this help lies. To wit, a threefold interpretation can be adduced. For either the special help is the sufficient actual graces, both external and internal, insofar as they are sufficient; or they are actual graces insofar as they are congruous and efficacious; or, finally, they are simply actual graces, comprising in a confused way both determinations, which are efficacious in those who persevere, inefficacious in those who do not persevere. But before we settle the question, we note that it is not probable that the Synod willed to comprehend among the helps mentioned in that canon 22°. the very conjunction of death with the state of grace, or the death which then occurs when a man is in the state of grace. For 1) this grace, rather than a help to persevering, is formal perseverance itself conferred, 2) about that help the Synod speaks, by which, even when it is given, it is supposed by the Synod that there can be someone who says that the just man cannot persevere, as is clear from the second part of the canon; but it was not lawful for the Tridentine Fathers to imagine that there is someone who says that a just man dying in the state of grace cannot persevere. Hence the Tridentine Fathers speak of those helps, whether external or internal, which precede formal perseverance. From the observation made it is also clear that the canon speaks of the perseverance of adult just men, not of infants.

Therefore, in the first place, it is certain that this special help is not the sufficient actual graces under this precise ratio, insofar as they remain only sufficient and are not efficacious; for neither under this ratio are these helps given by God, nor can any cause be thought up why the Synod should have regarded the help of God under this respect. There will be some, however, who judge that the special help of God is the actual graces, both extrinsic and intrinsic, congruous and efficacious, insofar as they are such; for such are in reality a special help, since it is not given to all, and by them perseverance is truly obtained. But a difficulty immediately occurs; for we are taught by that canon that without that special help the just man cannot persevere, and with it he can; but without those congruous helps the just man indeed will not persevere, yet he has a true power of persevering. And although, supposing the knowledge of God, which sees that certain helps will be inefficacious, it may be said that a man cannot persevere with those helps, just as God cannot be deceived; this, however, is an impotence consequent upon the very fact, which is certainly foreseen by God, and it comes back to saying that someone cannot persevere with those helps; because he who does not persevere cannot persevere. Now we do not judge that the Synod speaks of an impotence of this kind consequent; for who denied it, or what controversy could there be about it?

You will say that the special help is the congruous helps, which are in our power, because congruous helps can be infallibly obtained, and in this way they are in our power, like prayer. But one must pray, and pray as one ought; prayer itself, however, is also made through a congruous help. Moreover, this help is not given to all; otherwise all would pray as they ought and so would infallibly attain perseverance. The Synod, therefore, does not speak of this help; for the prior difficulty returns: for without it there is the power of praying, and so the power of obtaining perseverance, and yet it is denied that one can persevere without the special help of God.

There remains, therefore, the third interpretation; and nothing else is needed except that it be declared why these actual graces are called a special help. Namely, it is a special help because it is diverse and distinct from that by which one becomes just, that is, from sanctifying grace and the habits of the virtues. For we are taught that for persevering it is not enough to be just and equipped with sanctifying grace, but besides, other helps are required so that we may be able to persevere in the justice received through good works. These are the helps that St. Thomas demands, helps, namely, directing and protecting against the impulses of temptations, which are actual graces, I. II. q. CIX. a. 10.

The fourth thing that the Synod teaches, after those things which have so far been said in this Thesis, no longer needs explanation.

Corollary. The doctrine of this thesis is most practical. It is established that all the just can persevere if they will: it is established that all the just can infallibly attain formal perseverance; but it matters nothing that they cannot merit it of condignity, when it is certain that they can attain it infallibly, if they pray as they ought, which is most certainly in their power through the help of God. With fear and trembling, indeed, our salvation must be worked out; because it is God who works in us both to will and to accomplish, namely, because our salvation depends on the help of God, who on account of our negligence can deny us efficacious helps; but if we are not wanting to the grace of God, which is conferred on us from time to time, we ought to conceive the firmest hope that he who has begun in us a good work will himself perfect it.

X. You will object. It is the opinion of Augustine that perseverance is given to the just man by God gratuitously; but if it is in the power of the just man to persevere, the gift of perseverance is not truly gratuitous. Furthermore, these two do not seem to cohere sufficiently: that it is in the power of the just man to persevere if he wills, and yet that the gift of perseverance is gratuitous.

I answer to the first. Augustine, teaching that perseverance is a gratuitous gift, first excludes the merits of nature, by which perseverance would be rendered mediately, as will become known in the following Synopsis. Then, because although it is in the power of the just man to persevere; nevertheless that he actually perseveres is a gratuitous gift of God, who, knowing, gives those graces which he foresaw as efficacious, not those which he foresaw as inefficacious, and sets the end of life when a man is acceptable to God, who could die at another time.

To the second, we say that for persevering actively the sufficient helps are enough, which surely would not be sufficient if they were not enough. Indeed, these helps must be efficacious or joined with effect, but this conjunction depends on the very will of the recipient of the helps; whence it is in his power to persevere. Nor do we deny that the just man can merit the helps which, with his consent supervening, can be efficacious; but we deny that he can merit of condignity, or demand, that those helps be conferred on him which will certainly be efficacious, and not others, however most sufficient, and that he be overtaken by death in that instant in which he is acceptable to God. Now in these things the gift of perseverance consists, and this we have proved to be gratuitous.

XI. But if you ask why to this one are granted graces which, from middle knowledge, are foreseen as efficacious, while to another are granted graces which God foresees will lack effect through the fault, indeed, of the man; just as if you ask why God recalls this one from life when he is in the state of grace, while that just man is permitted to fall and to die before reparation; if you ask these things, I say, you touch upon the question of the gratuitous distribution of graces, in which we gladly confess that there is a mystery. Cf. ultimam Th.

The rest is to be sought in the question on predestination.