Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

I. There are those who judge that no morally good act is in reality performed which is not at the same time supernatural. Many disagree. We have thought it opportune to report their disputations here, so that nothing may be lacking of those things which pertain to this question concerning the necessity of grace.

It is evident that if every good act, by whomever it is done, must be supernatural, then an absolute and physical necessity of grace for any morally good act whatsoever must be affirmed, and in the present order one may say universally: nothing at all good can be done without the grace of God.

II. Now the opinion is that which Ripalda upholds, De Ente Supern., Disp. SX.: «as often as, he says in Sect. 2., a man does what has been given to him, in order to produce a natural act of virtue, God is already antecedently present with the help of an intrinsically supernatural grace, so that he either brings forth that act—intrinsically natural, extrinsically supernatural and consequently salutary—or, together with the intrinsically natural act, elicits also another act of the same virtue, intrinsically supernatural, about the same formal object, which is common to both the natural and the supernatural act: and thus no morally good effort of nature exists which is not preceded by some purely supernatural grace.» From this he infers (Sect. 3.): «in my opinion it is absolutely true that for any good moral work, or for any act of moral virtue, the theological help of grace—about which the Councils and the Fathers of the Church have disputed against the enemies of grace—is necessary per se for the rational nature elevated to the supernatural end.»

This distinguished theologian therefore holds that in the present order of providence no act is done morally well which is not supernatural, and therefore from prevenient and helping grace. This opinion must be distinguished from the particular manner in which he explains it, which manner can be false without the opinion itself being false on that account. Behold, then, the arguments by which this opinion can be proved or commended.

III. a) The present order, in which human nature is placed, is supernatural; for every man is destined to a supernatural end, and sanctifying grace must be present in all. Hence, because every moral operation of man must be ordered to the end and must be such that through it man disposes himself to the attainment of his end—for this is the reason why he acts—since man's end in the present order is nothing other than supernatural, God requires of man those acts which are proportioned to this end. But only intrinsically supernatural acts are proportioned to this end; therefore God, in instituting this order of providence, requires acts of this kind and no others from every man, and requires them always; because every moral act must be suited to the attainment of the end, whether proximately or remotely. But God cannot require this unless he likewise supplies what is necessary and what can be effected by him alone, namely the elevation of the faculty and the opportune supernatural illumination and inspiration, by which the will is prevented and prepared for the act befitting the end; therefore.

All of Scripture, which speaks so frequently of moral acts, speaks as if in reality no act were good unless supernatural. For it teaches in general that God demands of men nothing but the observance of the law (if you will enter into life, keep the commandments): but it teaches that this cannot be performed without the help of God, that this must be continually implored, and that therefore every exercise of virtue is a gift of God, who enlightens every man, who equips men for every good, who works all things in all, even to will and to accomplish. To be sure, the Scriptures speak of salutary acts, but it is also true that the Scriptures never indicate other honest acts which are not salutary. For every honest act is some observance of the law: and this observance is set forth both as conducive to eternal life and as dependent on the help of God. Moreover, this silence of Scripture finds an adequate explanation in the hypothesis which we defend. And this is what Theologians commonly say: that Scripture considers man in the historical order, which is supernatural, and therefore calls good only those acts of his which lead to that end; for this is fully satisfactory if in reality there is no good act which is not supernatural, but it does not seem to be satisfactory if there are also naturally honest acts, for these too would really pertain to the historical order of the present providence, which would demand from man morally good acts, whether supernatural or even merely natural.It cannot be denied that with the ministry of creatures, that is, with the external calling by which men are of themselves stirred to naturally good acts, interior supernatural graces are frequently connected by the law of God: therefore it is probable that this holds also in all callings universally by which a man is naturally stirred to a good act; therefore there is probably no good act which is not placed supernaturally.

c) It cannot be denied that with the ministry of creatures, that is, with the external calling by which men are of themselves stirred to naturally good acts, interior supernatural graces are frequently connected by the law of God: therefore it is probable that this holds also in all callings universally by which a man is naturally stirred to a good act; therefore there is probably no good act which is not placed supernaturally. Proof of the antecedent. External callings are not only the preaching of the Word of God, but also the instruction and examples of others, the reading of books, the contemplation of creatures, and those things which stir us to the apprehension of the beauty of virtue, of the obligation of acting well, and things of this kind, which of themselves are able to stir only to natural acts. Moreover, that interior supernatural graces are joined to this ministry of creatures is proved from the words of the Apostle, Acts XIV, 14 ff. We are mortals, men like you, announcing to you that you turn from these vain things to the living God, who made heaven and earth and the sea and all things that are in them. Who in past generations allowed all nations to walk in their own ways. And yet he did not leave himself without testimony, doing good from heaven, giving rains and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness. Now Paul in this discourse indicates a twofold testimony by which God is manifested to men: first, that of the Apostles themselves announcing to men the living God and creator; second, that of the creatures themselves, by which, as Paul teaches in Rom. I. 18. seg., the invisible things of God are made manifest. Moreover, this composition of a twofold testimony made here by Paul indicates that both testimonies look to the same end, although in a different way. But the testimony of the Apostles looks to this, that men be converted to God; therefore the testimony of creatures too finally looks to the same end. But conversion to God is a salutary and supernatural act, for which grace is required; therefore supernatural graces were joined with the ministry of creatures. And indeed, that the testimony of creatures looks to stirring up salutary acts will be clear even to one considering that Paul by those words made a certain correction of the preceding words; for when he had said that God in past generations allowed all nations to walk in their own ways, he adds: although he did not leave himself without testimony, doing good from heaven, giving rains and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness. he left it. Therefore this testimony was of such a kind that the nations, enlightened by it, could, if they had willed, not walk in their own ways, i. e. sins, and therefore could act salutarily, namely be converted to the Lord, as the Apostle says in the preceding verses: since therefore this salutary operation is supernatural and stands in need of grace, it must be said that with the ministry of creatures, by which men are called extrinsically, interior supernatural graces are connected. The same can be shown from Paul, Rom. I, 19. seg., who teaches that the nations could know God and be stirred to his worship from creatures, so that they are inexcusable because, having known God, they did not glorify him. Therefore if they are inexcusable, they could glorify God, and they are justly punished because they did not render to God that glory which he himself demands. But in the present order God demands only that glory and rewards it, which is rendered to him through supernatural acts; this glory, therefore, the nations could render: they could, indeed, because of that external revelation; therefore with that external revelation there was connected, and is understood by Paul to be connected, an interior grace by which supernatural acts would be possible. Therefore.

d) The same is proved from the doctrine of Augustine, Lib. LXXXIII. Q n. o: »Since no one can even will unless admonished and called, whether intrinsically, where no man sees, or extrinsically through sounding speech or through some visible signs, it comes about that God works in us even the willing itself... Was it hidden, then, from Pharaoh how much good those lands had obtained through the coming of Joseph? The knowledge of that deed, therefore, was his calling, so that, treating the people of Israel mercifully, he would not be ungrateful... But this calling, which works whether in individual men or in peoples and in the human race itself through the opportunities of the times, is of a high and profound ordering.« External calling through sounding speech, through visible signs, through knowledge of a deed that has happened, is a calling by which God works even the willing: but with this phrase Augustine designates grace properly so called; therefore with the external calling this grace is connected, by which God works the willing.

The same, on Psalm CII, n. 16: What is so long-suffering, what so abundant in mercy? Sin is committed and life is granted; sins increase, life is prolonged: he is blasphemed daily, and he makes his sun rise over the good and the evil. He calls on every side to knowledge, calls on every side to penance, calls by the benefits of creatures, calls by granting time for living, calls through the reader, calls through the preacher, calls through the mercy of consolation.» With him agrees the Author of De Vocat. omnium Gentium, bk. II, c. 8: «Let us return to the consideration of the differences by which the works and gifts of divine grace have been varied. Why by his most secret will he willed that in all times, over all generations or over all men, there should be unequal measures of his gifts. For he helped in one way those whom it befitted to come to know him through the testimonies of heaven and earth; in another way those whom he provided for not only with the service of the elements but also with the teaching of the law, the oracles of the Prophets, the signs of miracles, and the cooperation of Angels; and much more in another way did he declare his mercy to all men when the Son of God was made the son of man.» It is clear from the whole context that the discourse is about salutary and gratuitous knowledge. Moreover, this knowledge is obtained through the testimonies of heaven and earth. But this cannot happen unless interior supernatural grace supervenes; therefore.

Prosper also agrees, adv. Collat. c. 7: «As if the power of God drew to the Son only those whom he had rebuked by voice, or crushed by punishment, or terrified with fear; but moved nothing of his power in the minds of those who ran to the promises of their Redeemer with eager hope and avid desire. But the truth says: No one comes to the Father, unless the Father who sent me draws him. If, therefore, no one comes unless drawn: all who come in whatever way are drawn. The contemplation of the elements and of the most ordered beauty of all things that are in them draws, therefore, to God. For his invisible things are seen, being understood, from the creation of the world through the things that are made. The relaters of deeds draw; narrating the praises of the Lord and his powers and his wonders which he has done, they inflame the soul of the hearer; fear draws... etc.» Orosius, in his Apology (Gallandi IX.), teaches the same.

It is established, therefore, that with the ministry of creatures, that is, with the external calling, interior graces are connected by the law of God, not only with the ministry of preaching the Word of God but also with the other ministries which we have recalled above and which are sufficiently indicated in the testimonies adduced. As regards the ministry of preaching the Word, we have already spoken specifically in Thesis XXVII, to which this testimony of the author of De Vocat. omn. gentium, bk. I, c. 18, can be added; explaining the words: I will give my laws in their understanding and in their heart I will write them, he says: «Which indeed he does daily, while he inserts his will into the hearts of those called, and with the pen of the Holy Spirit whatever the devil, envying, falsified on the pages of the soul, the truth, pitying, rewrites. When, therefore, the word of God is brought in through the ministry of preachers to the ears of the flesh, the operation of divine power is mingled with the sound of the human voice, and he who stirred the office of the Evangelizer also strengthened the affection of the hearer.» For the interior supernatural calling connected with the reading of books, that passage too is adduced, Iac. XVI, 29. seq.; for when the rich man, buried in hell, had asked Abraham to send Lazarus into his house, who might testify to his brothers of the place of torments, Abraham answered: they have Moses and the prophets, let them hear them... if they do not hear Moses and the prophets, neither will they believe if someone rises from the dead. From this it is gathered that the reading of Scripture is, by divine institution, that by which men are taught and led to do that by which they may be able to escape the eternal fire; but this cannot happen without interior supernatural illumination and inspiration: therefore.

e) It is established, moreover—which indeed can already be gathered from the preceding—it is established, I say, that unbelieving nations are prevented and helped by supernatural grace to act honestly; but if an unbeliever acts by the help of supernatural grace when he acts well morally, there is no longer any certain reason why it should be denied; rather, it is probable that every good act is done supernaturally; therefore. The major is proved by the authority of Jerome, epist. ad Cyprianum CXL. n. 5: «Man from the beginning of his condition has God as helper, and since it is of his grace that he was created, of his mercy that he subsists and lives, he can do nothing good without him, who so granted free will that he would not deny his grace throughout all works.» These words are indeed most universal and embrace all men, whether faithful or unfaithful. Then it is proved by the authority of Augustine, De Grat. Christi cc. 23. 24: «Is it then the case that, in order that one may come to the help of God, one runs to God without the help of God?... What greater thing, or what such thing, could grace itself bestow on man, if without it he could already be made one spirit with God merely from the freedom of the will? But I would wish that this man would say whether that Assyrian king, whose bed the holy woman Esther execrated,... had already run to the Lord... whether he had delivered himself wholly to God... I think that whoever has thought these things about that king, such as he then was, is not deluded but mad. And yet God converted and turned his indignation into gentleness. But who does not see that it is much greater to convert and turn indignation from the contrary into gentleness, than to decline a heart preoccupied by neither affection, but standing in the middle between both, into something? Let them read, then, and understand, let them contemplate and confess that not by law and doctrine sounding from without, but by an interior and hidden, wonderful and ineffable power, God works in the hearts of men not only true revelations but also good wills. Let Pelagius, therefore, now cease to deceive himself and others by disputing against the grace of God. In Ahasuerus, therefore, a man still an unbeliever (at least as Augustine holds for certain), God worked a good will through that grace which Augustine defends against the Pelagians, i. e. through grace properly so called, or supernatural.

Likewise, epist. CXLIV, n. 2, he has this about the chastity of Polemo: «Xenocrates, as you write and as we recall from those letters, by disputing about the fruit of temperance, suddenly converted Polemo—not only a drunkard but even then drunk—to different morals. Although, therefore, as you have prudently and truthfully understood, he was not acquired for God, but only freed from the dominion of lust, nevertheless I would not attribute even that very thing which was made better in him to a human work, namely the divine... For what more proud or more ungrateful thing can human foolishness think, if it has believed that, while God makes a man beautiful in flesh, he is made chaste in soul by a man? This is written in the book of Christian Wisdom (VIII, 21.): When I knew, he says, that no one can be continent unless God gives it, and this very thing was of Wisdom, to know whose gift this was. Polemo, therefore, if, made continent from a man of lust, he had so known whose gift this was, that, having cast away the superstitions of the Gentiles, he would piously worship him, he would have become not only continent but also truly wise and salutarily religious, which would have availed him not only for the honesty of the present life but also for the immortality of the future.» Moreover, this manner of speaking and arguing of Augustine is that which he himself employs for defending grace against the Pelagians. Therefore.

But what Augustine asserts about these two is not

why it should be limited to them alone, since the same reason holds for all good acts, and Augustine's arguments, if they prove anything, prove generally about all. Augustine therefore judged that unbelievers too are prevented and helped by grace to act rightly. Chrysostom also agrees, hom. 7 in Ioann.: «He enlightens every man coming into this world: he enlightens, indeed, as much as is in him. But if some, of their own accord, with the eyes of the mind shut, have been unwilling to direct the gaze of their sight upon the rays of this light, they have not remained in darkness from the nature of the light, but from their own malice... Grace is poured out upon all: it does not except or disdain Jew, Greek, barbarian, Scythian, free man, slave, man, woman, old man, young man. It is the same for all, it shows itself readily to all, it calls all with equal honor. But let those who neglect to enjoy its gift impute this blindness of theirs to themselves; for since it is given to all, lies open to all, and is forbidden to no one, certain lost and wicked men refuse to enter solely because of their own malice.» To this point the testimonies adduced in the preceding argument also contribute, inasmuch as from them it is gathered that with the external calling an interior supernatural calling is joined; for the external calling is common to all men, whether faithful or unfaithful.

The minor of this proposed argument is proved. For if there were any reason why it should be denied that every honest act is supernatural, this would be chiefly the following: namely, that many honest acts also take place in those who lack sanctifying grace and faith; for in the faithful and the just, what difficulty is there in admitting all acts to be salutary or supernatural? but that this reason does not hold, the Fathers teach by the cited testimonies; therefore:

J) The sixth argument can be gathered from the common sense of the faithful, that is, of the Church; which argument is thus proposed by Ripalda, l. c., sect. 18: «Finally, our opinion is proved from the common conception of the faithful, by which they believe that any good moral work, of whatever virtue it be, done by a just man is meritorious of grace and glory, and done by a sinner is impetratory and preparatory for the soul to grace and the remission of sin; although they commend no distinction by which such a work is distinguished from a merely natural one. And in order that they may venerate a man as holy and just—indeed, in order that the Church may number him among the saints—it suffices to have known (so far as the examination of moral virtues is concerned) that through the whole course of his life he was devoted to the offices of temperance, mercy, humility, penance, religion, and the other virtues, even though those offices are indifferent to natural and supernatural virtues. But this common conception of the faithful cannot be true unless it is true that the help of grace, which renders that work salutary and supernatural, precedes every exercise of virtue.That you may fully grasp the force of this argument, consider that even in the just themselves, while natural power remains, the possibility of also acting rightly naturally remains: why, then, are many acts—say of temperance, justice, etc.—which of themselves could be purely natural, accepted as salutary and therefore supernatural, although the intention of the one acting and the manner in which he acts are for the most part unknown?

Again, this doctrine is reprobated by the Church in the Quesnellian propositions, whereby it is affirmed that no graces are given except through faith, that faith is the first grace and the source of all the others, that outside the Church no grace is granted. Cf. proposs. 26. 27. 29. Likewise, by Alexander VIII. there was proscribed a proposition conceived in these words: «Pagans, Jews, heretics, and others of this kind receive no influence at all from Jesus Christ, and so from this you will rightly infer that in them there is a naked and unarmed will without every sufficient grace.» It is false, therefore, that the will of men who are outside the Church — pagans, Jews, and the like — is unarmed, destitute of every sufficient grace; some graces, therefore, are conferred upon them existing in that state of paganism, Judaism, etc., by which they may work good and be disposed toward faith; but if grace is conferred for some works, why not for all good works? Therefore.

You will say that to pagans that grace is conferred by which faith is inspired. I answer that if it is so, since the inspiration of faith presupposes preaching — for the faith toward which grace moves is faith from hearing — you will have to say that all pagans who have heard nothing of the Gospel have been, are, and will be destitute of every sufficient grace, which does not seem consonant enough with the condemnation of these propositions. For then it will be true that to very many pagans every sufficient grace has always been denied, which nevertheless seems to be denied by the proscription of these propositions.

1. Ripalda confirms this opinion by the authority of many theologians, who, although «they do not express those motions of grace, even the continual ones given to the gentiles, as intrinsically supernatural; nevertheless they teach that these helps are theological grace, added to the powers of nature, conferred from the merits of Christ, required by the Fathers against the Pelagians, of the same condition as those graces which are provided to the faithful for works positively conducing to salvation. But once we posit (the same author continues) that intrinsically supernatural helps are given, and that the grace contended for in the Pelagian dispute is none other than intrinsically supernatural grace, it is more probable and more consequent to assert that those helps are supernatural which, according to the common doctrine of the theologians, are provided to all men, even the gentiles.» Cf. Sect. 19. and 20.

IV. On the contrary, Cardinal Lugo (De Virtute Fidei divinae Disp. XII. sect. 2.) judges it harsh to concede that good supernatural acts arise before proper faith (i.e., taken strictly, resting on positive divine revelation) from the natural knowledge of God from creatures or of moral uprightness; but that this, taken absolutely and with that universality (with which it is taken by Ripalda), is false. And Suarez (in the posthumous work De vera intelligentia auxilii efficacis c. 11.) says «that this hypothesis, just as it is not impossible, so it is not necessary nor fundamental in the Scriptures or in any other grave authority, and seems to be against experience.»

Indeed 1) if this is granted, it must also be granted that before faith some congruous merit of the same is possible and frequently had; for a good supernatural act is meritorious; but, Lugo says ibidem, it is the common opinion of almost all theologians, who teach that before faith no merit of faith itself is given, and in this sense that faith is the beginning and foundation of our justification. And indeed this seems to be entirely in accord with the mind of Augustine, who always reduces the first grace to that help which is given for believing, and because it is not given from merits, therefore he says that the first grace is not from merits. De Praedest. SS. c. 7. «Therefore the Apostle teaches that a man is justified by faith, not by works, because faith itself is first given, whence the rest are obtained, which are properly called works, in which one lives justly.» And L. I. ad Simplic. q. II. n. 7: «Unless the mercy of God should precede by calling, no one can even believe, so that from this he may begin to be justified and receive the faculty of doing well." And epist. 194. ad Sixtum n. 9. «They can indeed say that the remission of sins is a grace which is given with no preceding merits; for what good merits can sinners have? But neither is the remission of sins itself without some merit, if faith obtains it; for the merit of that faith is not nothing, by which faith he was saying: God, be merciful to me a sinner, and he went down justified by the merit of faithful humility; since whoever humbles himself will be exalted. It remains, therefore, that we attribute faith itself, whence all justice takes its beginning... not to the human will, which these men extol, nor to any preceding merits; since whatever merits there are begin from it." The Fathers of Conc. Arausic. II. teach the same, c. ult. «This too we salutarily profess and believe: that in every good work it is not we who begin and afterwards are helped by the mercy of God, but He Himself, with no preceding good merits, first inspires in us both faith and love of Himself, so that we may salutarily seek the sacraments of baptism and after baptism, with His help, may be able to fulfill those things that are pleasing to Him."

In the words of Augustine from the letter to Sixtus one may weigh this: that although he concedes merits before the remission of sins, he nevertheless denies the same before faith; but merits before the remission of sins cannot be other than merits of congruity; therefore Augustine denies even these merits, and hence absolutely all merits, before faith.

2. The grace of which the Fathers speak, i.e., supernatural grace, is a grace not common to all men, but proper to Christians. «Concerning grace (say the exiled African bishops in Sardinia in their synodal letter) no one thinks worthily, whoever thinks that it is given to all; since it is not only not useful to all, but there are still found some peoples to whom the preaching of faith has not reached.»

3. If every good act is supernatural, it does not appear why someone could not be justified and saved without faith. For an unbeliever can certainly, especially aided by supernatural grace, know God from creatures and apprehend His goodness; moreover, this objectively natural knowledge is enough to determine the love of God above all things, which is physically possible to nature, but with supernatural grace helping is certainly also morally possible. But supernatural love of God above all things justifies. You would therefore have an unbeliever justified without faith. Nor will you say, as Ripalda says (who concedes and defends this as at least probable), that that man is justified through some faith, even if it be faith taken in a broad sense: inasmuch as the assent given to truths about God known from creatures, and given because of a certain illumination and interior inspiration of God, is an assent given to God manifesting and testifying through creatures and speaking within. That indeed cannot be said; for a) that assent, determined objectively by creatures, is a necessary assent because of evidence: but according to the unanimous doctrine of the Fathers justifying faith is free; b) the sufficiency of that broadly taken faith has been reprobated by the Apostolic See in the proscription of proposition 23. among those condemned by Innocent XI: «Faith broadly so called from the testimony of creatures with a similar motive suffices for justification.» Ripalda, however, defended that opinion as probable, before a sentence was passed on it by the Apostolic See.

V. But the patrons of the former opinion answer the first argument with two things. Namely, 1) when the Fathers deny that works which are good are done before justifying faith, they are speaking of the works in which one lives justly, of the works to which the crown of justice is owed; which do not comprise the genus of salutary works, but constitute a species, and a nobler one. The reason for this response is clear from the very testimonies adduced; for the works in which one lives justly are works which are done by a just man, i.e., by those sanctified through the grace of adoption; likewise, the faculty of doing well, which follows justification, is the faculty of operating meritoriously with condignity. Consequently, the merit which is excluded before justifying faith is merit properly so called, which can simply be called merit. Just as the Council of Trent, Sess. VI., teaches that justification is conferred gratuitously, although it likewise teaches that salutary acts of faith, hope, fear, and the like precede, to which the character of merit of congruity belongs.

Furthermore, they answer 2) the same first argument thus: by the name of faith, which is called by the Fathers the first grace of all and without which, on the same authorities, nothing can be done, and which therefore excludes every preceding merit, even of congruity, is meant any pious thought divinely sent. This they urge, first,

From the comparison instituted between these terms, faith and charity, employed by the Fathers. For just as the term charity, although strictly it signifies love, and the love of God, which is the act of the theological virtue, is nevertheless not infrequently used by the Fathers in a certain broader sense for signifying any pious affection and any pious motion or inspiration of the will; so the name faith, although strictly it signifies the act of the first theological virtue, could nevertheless have been employed by the Fathers for signifying any pious thought or any pious illumination of the intellect. To this conjecture no small force of proof will accrue, if one weighs that the same grace which in the canons of the Synods, in the letters of the Pontiffs, and in the works of the Fathers against the Pelagians and Massilians is set forth in this locution, so that it is called the charity which is diffused in the hearts of men and the faith which is given from heaven, is likewise expressed by these formulas, so that it is a holy affection of the will and a pious thought. Just as, therefore, someone would wrongly contend that whenever the name charity occurs in Augustine, charity properly so called, theological, is to be understood, so no less futile are those who want the appellation of faith always to be taken in the stricter sense. Nor did reasons fail the Fathers for honoring with the name of faith any pious thought divinely sent. For a) any beginning of a thing can receive an appellation from the term toward which it tends; moreover, any pious supernatural thought tends at last toward faith properly so called. b) The character of faith befits analogically any pious thought divinely sent. For it is the character of faith to be a locution of God and a supernatural doctrine by which we are taught from heaven; but this too can be asserted of a pious thought divinely sent. Thus Bernard, Serm. XXXI. in Cantica: «There are certain words of the Word, the Spouse, to us: our meditations upon Him and His glory, elegance, majesty... Let us know for certain that the Spouse is present and speaks to us, so that we may not grow weary in labors, delighted by the discourses. You therefore, when you feel such things turning in your mind, should not think it your own thought, but recognize Him speaking, who says through the prophet: I who speak justice.» And Augustine, De Praedest. SS. c. 8. «Very far removed from the senses is this school, in which the Father is heard and teaches, so that one may come to the Son; there too is the Son; because He is His Word, through which He thus teaches, nor does He do this with the ear of the flesh, but of the heart.»

Finally, c) it seems it cannot be denied that by the name of faith the Fathers time and again understood any pious thought divinely sent. For, to show the necessity of the grace of prevenient illumination, they not rarely appeal to that testimony of the Apostle: all that is not from faith is sin. Thus Augustine, Cont. duas epistt. pelagiann. I. I. c. 3: «Nor can a man will anything good unless he is helped by Him who cannot will evil, i.e., the grace of God through I. C. D. N. For all that is not from faith is sin. And through this a good will, which withdraws itself from sin, is faithful.» Where you see that the proof is empty, unless by faith the grace of illumination is signified.

Moreover, they say, since the proofs adduced in the preceding demonstration sufficiently show that the Fathers were persuaded that supernatural grace is conferred upon the gentiles too in the state of unbelief; lest the Fathers be thought to speak contradictions, it is necessary that we understand the testimonies objected by the adversaries according to the sense which we have explained.

To the second they answer that the grace which is not common to all is not any supernatural grace whatever, but a certain special grace, i.e., efficacious grace immediately leading to faith. For the adversaries cannot deny that sufficient graces are conferred by God upon the gentiles too before faith, by which they could have been led to faith and to which they themselves resist. These things, for the most part, Ripalda replies in the work De fide divina, Disp. XVII., to Cardinal Lugo, in order to defend his opinion from his attack, denying likewise that the opinion which the Cardinal calls common is in reality such.

To the third it can be answered that the consequence (which, however, Ripalda here permits — before that time, however, in which that proposition was proscribed by Innocent XI: afterwards, however, in Sect. 17. he concedes simply that faith strictly taken is required) is not necessary. For it can happen that by the positive law of God, for attaining justification not any supernatural knowledge whatever suffices, but a supernatural knowledge is required also on the part of the object, a knowledge which is faith properly so called of the revealed truths. With that requirement posited, it does not follow that no salutary act precedes faith, but it follows that the preceding salutary acts are ordered to this, that they induce faith, that they are certain beginnings of faith, and that without faith properly so called and perfect they are useless for attaining justification proximately and for eternal life.

VI. For our part, the opinion of Ripalda taken according to its fullest universality cannot persuade us, because of the arguments adduced to the contrary, especially the third. If, however, it is restricted to the faithful alone: since no arguments stand in the way, and for this hypothesis the reasons of Ripalda have the greatest force, we judge it to be true. Nor, furthermore, do we deny that gratuitous natural helps are always available to the gentiles, which are extrinsically supernatural, given from the merit of Christ; with these posited, the force of the arguments c. d. e. g. and also a. and b. can be broken. Cf. Th. II.