Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

Although in the Pelagian question concerning the necessity of grace Augustine handed down these things, namely 1) that the opinion of Pelagius concerning the power of free will would be tolerable, if the question were about unimpaired nature; 2) that there is this difference between the unimpaired first parents and fallen men, that the former had in the powers of free will the ability to persevere if they wished, while the latter obtain this power only by grace; 3) that the first man did not need grace in order to receive good; nevertheless these things do not oppose the necessity of graces, which the same Augustine vindicated for every unimpaired nature.

I. That these things may be understood, the manner of conceiving human nature which Augustine used must first be recalled. For he represented human nature to himself such as it was immediately established by God, so that those things which accompanied its origin and, by the institution of the author, were always to be in it belong to human nature and are, as it were, natural to it. For in a nature which is propagated by generation, the first individual, which has its existence from the author of nature, is the type and form of the rest. This concept of human nature is not a strictly philosophical concept, but a historical one; for it apprehends man as he was in fact placed by God; and it is theological; for it is drawn from revelation. To human nature conceived in this way, besides those things which are essential, belong those gifts — unowed indeed, but conferred on it from its origin, so that they would always be in it and would be propagated with nature through natural propagation itself — namely, the grace of adoption, immunity from concupiscence and ignorance, and consequently the power of operating justly and meritoriously for eternal life. A nature of this sort is sound nature; for it labors under no vice, is wounded by no injury, and has everything that can be demanded in it, so that it can rightly live the life owed to it, namely the divine life. Wherefore a man so disposed does not need any grace, whether habitual or actual, which would heal him; for healing grace presupposes an infirmity which has gone before. Nevertheless, a man so constituted needs the grace of God exciting and aiding the faculties in salutary works; for nature, however perfect, does not exclude the divine motion to action, and that this determinate motion is required we have already seen in Th. XXVIII.

Fallen nature, if it is compared with that which according to the institution it ought to be, is a deficient nature, and it is denied by Augustine to be truly and properly nature, Retract. I. I. c. 10; for such is that nature which was established by God. Certainly this nature lacks the grace of adoption; ignorance and concupiscence are in it; the possibility of doing salutary good is lacking; it is a wounded nature, ailing, in need of a physician.

Therefore man, such as he is now born, needs healing grace from the infirmity of sin and from the vice of concupiscence and ignorance, and he needs aiding grace for salutary works. Of this twofold grace, or twofold office of grace, Augustine expressly makes mention in De Natur. et grat. c. 59, reproving Pelagius because he «was unwilling to say anything about the fact that nature itself is either healed by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord, because it is corrupted, or is aided, because it does not suffice for itself.»

The same must be said of free will, which lacks that freedom which is called freedom from sin and from concupiscence; it consequently lacks the powers or the ability of doing salutary works.

The grace of the Redeemer heals from sin habitually, but from concupiscence actually; for it does not take it away, but continually supplies the powers by which we can always resist it, rein it in, and overcome it, and it confers the power of doing salutary works, or, as the ancients said, it confers the possibility of good.

Healing grace, inasmuch as it recalls man (although not yet completely; for the complete restoration will be through the merits of Christ in the resurrection) to that state from which Adam fell, is itself simply supernatural, just as the state of the first man was supernatural. For the health which an infirm man acquires comes down to this, that he acquires the prior perfection which he lost, not merely some part of it and that the more imperfect. Therefore he who holds that the first man was constituted in the supernatural order and fell from it through sin and is restored to that order through healing grace, by this very fact that he calls the grace healing, signifies a grace of the supernatural order.

And in truth that it is proper to the grace which is called healing to free from sin and therefore to restore the adoption of sons and so to recall to the supernatural order, Augustine bears witness in De Nat. et grat. cc. 3. et 4: «Nature, he says, of man was at first created blameless and without any vice; but this nature of man, by which each one is born from Adam, already needs a physician, because it is not sound... But this grace of Christ, without which neither infants nor those of mature age can be saved, is not rendered for merits, but is given freely, on account of which it is also named grace. Being justified, he says, freely through his blood.»

II. But the Pelagians, considering nature such as it is now born, affirmed of it that it is sound and robust, that the possibility of good is in it, and that it needs no grace of God besides the very possibility of good, which, since it is intrinsic to nature and has been conferred by God the creator, can be called the grace of God.

It is manifest that if the Pelagians had affirmed this of nature such as it was established by God from the beginning, they would have spoken truly, with this one exception, namely that that nature still needed aiding grace for salutary works, which the Pelagians, by denying, erred. But this is in fact what Augustine teaches when he seems to permit the opinion of Pelagius for the state of unimpaired nature; he concedes indeed that the opinion of Pelagius would be true if the question were about unimpaired nature; but he does not concede it simply, but with an added exception, and that the one which we have indicated.

III. Certainly 1) that it is not to be conceded simply, but that some exception is to be applied, he indicates sufficiently when he says in De Natura et grat. c. 49: «He (Pelagius) does not say that whether we will or whether we will not, we do not sin: without doubt we do sin, if we will: but he asserts that, whether we will or not, we have the possibility of not sinning, which he says is implanted in nature. But of a man with sound feet it can be said tolerably: whether he will or not, he has the possibility of walking; but of one with broken feet, even if he wills, he does not have it. The nature of which he speaks is corrupted.» And c. 51: «Therefore he attributes the possibility of not sinning to the grace of God, because God is the author of that nature, to which he says the possibility of not sinning is inseparably implanted... If that man who wrote this book were speaking of that nature of man which was at first created blameless and sound, this saying would be accepted somehow: although to have the inseparable possibility, that is, as I may say, the unlosable, that nature ought not to be called one which could be corrupted and need a physician...» to seek." He who says that some opinion is only tolerable and acceptable somehow signifies that it is not true in every respect, and therefore that some exception must be applied so that it is nothing but true. For who calls an opinion affirming e.g. the existence of God tolerable or acceptable somehow? 2) And in truth Augustine adds that exception of which we have spoken, in the same book, c. 48: »If he were speaking of the whole and sound nature of man, which we do not now have, not even then would he rightly say that our not sinning is only ours, although sinning would be ours: for even then there would be the help of God, and as it were a light for sound eyes, by which being helped they see, it would present itself to those willing." That is, just as eyes, although whole and sound in themselves, nevertheless need an external help, such as light — not that they may be eyes, but that they may see in act; so even whole and sound nature would need the help of God, which would present itself to it from without, and it would need it in order not to sin, that is, to operate salutarily. From which it is clear that the sole reason at least why Augustine did not wholly approve the doctrine of Pelagius even for the state of whole nature is not the one which Jansenius hands down, namely because Pelagius wanted that faculty of good to be unlosable, which Augustine rightly reproves in the second of the cited testimonies.

Therefore, since this is the sense of that saying of Augustine which is objected to us in the first place, it is clear that there is nothing in it which opposes the doctrine handed down in Th. XXIV. et XXVIII.

IV. From these things it is also clear what is to be replied to the second proposition of Augustine objected to us from the beginning, which is to be seen in the book De Corrept. et grat. c. 12. Namely, omitting now the more subtle and more exquisite investigation of Augustine's doctrine concerning the difference between the help of man standing and the help of fallen man, about which there will be a more suitable place for treating in what follows: let it suffice for now to reply 1) that the powers of the free will of unimpaired man, of which Augustine speaks, are not only the essential powers placed in the indifferent activity of choosing, but are also powers superadded gratuitously, arising from the supernatural grace and charity with which man was furnished and from immunity from concupiscence and ignorance, on account of which it came about that in him there was the power of doing salutary good. 2) That when powers of this sort are named, the actual helps, which are owed to man constituted in the supernatural state — just as light is owed to the eye, as we have heard from Augustine — are not excluded, but indeed implicitly included; and just as ibid. he says in De Corrept. et grat. c. 12: »the will of the first man was strong and sound (esset), having the power of free will, although with the help of God not failing, without which it could not persevere, if it wished.«

V. Indeed, that we may proceed to the third saying of Augustine objected from the beginning, not unlike this one, he says in De Corrept. et grat. c. 11 of the first man: »to receive good, he did not need grace, because he had not yet lost it.« The good which he had not yet lost was the grace of holiness; it was the soundness and the power of free will for doing salutary good: this is the good which to receive he did not need grace. But the good merits which he would from time to time have acquired or ought to acquire through acts were not among those goods which he had received from the beginning; whence it cannot be said that what Augustine says — that the first man did not need grace — looks to these. And indeed let the words be read which follow immediately: »but that he might remain in it (the good which he had received), he needed the help of grace, without which he could not at all do it, and he had received the ability, if he wished: but he did not have the willing which he could; for if he had had it, he would have persevered.«

The help of grace, which, besides what he had received, he needed, cannot be anything but actual grace: therefore. That Augustine vindicated the necessity of actual grace for unimpaired man can also, if need be, be demonstrated by these things, besides the testimonies cited here and above and the words of Canon 19 of Syn. Arausic. II., which are taken from his epist. CLXXX, c. 11. In De Genes. ad lit. L. XI. c. 4 he says of the first man that »he had in nature the ability and in his power the will not to consent to the one persuading, with him however helping who resists the proud, but gives grace to the humble.« Ibid. L. VIII, cc. 10. 11. 12. On those words of Genesis II, 15, posuit eum in paradiso ut operaretur et custodiret illum, he says: »There is another sense in these words, which I think not undeservedly to be preferred, that God would work man himself and keep him. For as man works the earth, not that he makes it to be earth, but that it be cultivated and fruitful, so God much more works man himself, whom he himself created that he be man, that he be just... And through this the same God, who creates man that he be man, himself works man and keeps him, that he be also good and blessed. Wherefore by that locution...« man is said to work the earth, which was already earth, that it be adorned and fertile; by that locution God is said to work man, who was already man, that he be pious and wise... For man is not such a thing that, once made, with him who made him forsaking him, he could do anything well as it were from himself; but his whole good action is to turn to him by whom he was made, and from him to be always made just, pious, wise, and blessed... Let him therefore work man good and keep him, who is unchangeably good: we ought always to be made by him and always to be perfected... for we are his workmanship not only to this end that we be men, but to this end also that we be good. For when the Apostle had said: with fear and trembling work out your own salvation, lest they think it to be attributed to themselves, as if they themselves made themselves just and good, he immediately subjoined: for God it is who works in you. Therefore the Lord God took man, whom he made, and placed him in paradise to work him, h. e. to work in him and to keep him." And in Oper. imperfect. I. V. n. 57 he denies that Adam had from himself a good will; because otherwise what is written would be false: the will is prepared by the Lord. Moreover, from these things taken together you have the necessity, in that state of integrity also, of divine help for doing well and persevering in good and for retaining salvation, that is, the grace of adoption; of the help by which God works in us the willing, by which we ought always to be made by him and always to be perfected, which Adam needed in order to remain in the good he had received; of the help which aids those willing, just as light aids sound eyes; but this is actual grace; therefore.

Wherefore when Augustine attributes the power of doing well to his free will, but attributes man's inherence to grace, he does not exclude grace, and actual grace, from sound man — since according to Augustine man's free will was therefore such because it rejoiced not only in the freedom of indifference, but because through the gift of grace it was immune from concupiscence and, relying on the power of operating salutarily, with the help of God never failing: but he excludes the special grace which is given to the unworthy, the healing grace, the mercy of the Redeemer; so that therefore, a comparison as it were being instituted between the gifts conferred on standing nature and fallen nature, these latter, before those, are called grace by a certain proper right. Cf. Tract. de Deo Creante. p. 362. seq.

VI. Therefore it is not lawful to doubt that Augustine proved the necessity of actual grace in the state of integrity. Nevertheless, the question can be of what sort the necessary help was was, nor is the opinion of the theologians one. Bellarminus (De Grat. primi hominis c. 7) thinks that, besides habitual grace and the general concurrence of God in the supernatural order, the first man needed no other interior special motion of God or exciting grace. Becanus (De Angelis c. 2. q. 5) agrees with him. Tricassinus (De Praedestinatione parte 2a sect. 3a paragr. 10. punct. 3) thinks that only the grace of illumination was necessary. Stephanus Dechamps (De Haeresi ianseniana L. III. Disp. 3. cc. 15. 16. seqq.), having distinguished the first good volition from the other consequent good volitions, contends that for the first there was need of the grace of inspiration, but for the others by no means, but that the grace of illumination was sufficient. These theologians indeed, and those who agree with them, hold for certain that their opinion is the opinion of Augustine, and as such they defend it.

But from the cited testimonies it sufficiently appears that at least the interior grace of illumination was admitted by Augustine. The question, however, can be about the grace of the will, that is, of inspiration. And indeed if it be asked indefinitely whether Augustine judged the grace proper to the will to be necessary for Adam also, this cannot be denied by him who remembers that the same Augustine asserted the same grace necessary for the angels, as is evident from his testimony recited in Th. XXIV. pag. 173. seq. But the most learned Stephanus Dechamps contends that those things which are said there by Augustine hold only for the first act, not indeed for the following ones, for which he says Augustine required only the grace of illumination in the angels and in the first man. Nevertheless, if the matter be weighed more deeply, it will easily appear that the reason is not sufficient for this exclusive opinion. Certainly let the testimony cited in the preceding page from L. VIII. De Genesi ad lit. be recalled. There, concerning the help of God in sanctifying the first man, he asserts that which he affirms of the rest of men in the state of fall, and indiscriminately he teaches the same of all at once; he affirms namely that God worked man, just as man works the earth, that man was God's workmanship not only that he might be man, but also that he might be good, that man is made by God just, pious, wise, blessed not only the first time, but always; for this reason, that we ought always to be made by him and always to be perfected, and that the saying of the Apostle looks to this: God is he who works in us, which consequently looks equally to Adam and to the rest of men. But these things said of the rest of men signify, according to Augustine, that operation of God by which he is the author even of the good will through the immediate grace of inspiration. Since therefore Augustine teaches that the first man ought to have been always made and always perfected by God, and therefore God always worked in him, just as in us, according to the words of the Apostle; it remains that the grace of the will was necessary to Adam as continuous, Augustine being the author. Nor should you say that Augustine, not without reason, in reciting the testimony of the Apostle omitted what the Apostle adds, namely to will and to perfect, lest of course this special operation of God be referred also to the first man; for 1) this interpretation is excluded by the preceding words, in which, of any man whatever, the first not excepted, he says that «we ought always to be made by him (God) and always to be perfected», 2) the more probable reason of this omission seems to be sought from this, that in that place he had undertaken to demonstrate that God works man, and that thus the words of Genesis can be taken: The Lord God took man, and placed him in paradise, to work him. For since in this locution the subject of the divine operation is man himself, not that which God does in man, from the cited testimony of the Apostle he thought that only that should be recited which would agree more with that manner of speaking: God is he who works in you, which taken by itself can be just the same as, God is he who works you, which was to be proved by Augustine. But how God works in man Augustine teaches both by the preceding words and by this very testimony of Paul cited, whose most certain sense he presupposes.

VII. And in truth, on what theological foundation does this distinction between beginning and persevering rest, that for the former actual grace of the will is necessary, for the latter by no means necessary? They say that actual grace of the will is required for beginning, because the will naturally elicits the act of charity before it is informed by sanctifying grace; therefore, habitual grace not yet existing, actual grace is necessary for the will that it may elicit the supernatural act. But habitual grace adorning the soul, and the habits of the virtues which follow upon it, can by themselves sufficiently accomplish this without the support of actual grace. But, setting aside that false hypothesis of sanctifying grace not conferred from the beginning (de Deo Creante Th. L.), we cannot concede the rest either. For besides what has already been said, if habitual grace existing in the soul were sufficient without the special help of actual grace for eliciting salutary acts as is fitting, it would follow that for the regenerated, clothed with sanctifying grace, actual grace would no longer be necessary: but we have already shown that this is abhorrent to the doctrine of the Fathers and false. Therefore also the habitual grace of Adam could not accomplish that.

You will say that an actual help is required in us on account of the vice of concupiscence, which was lacking to Adam. I answer that this is asserted gratuitously, if it be taken exclusively; for the vice of concupiscence is not the adequate reason of the necessity of grace, but besides it the supernaturality of the act is the principal one; which reason held also in Adam.

VIII. Hither, however, the reasons of the theologians who think otherwise return. They say namely that actual grace, at least of the will, was not necessary 1) indeed because the disorder of the powers was absent from Adam, on account of which that grace seems to be required by the Fathers; 2) Augustine, speaking of the grace of the state of innocence necessary for persevering, names only the grace of illumination; 3) nor does he ever use those names by which he signifies the grace proper to the will, of which sort are delight, sweetness, etc.; 4) the same Augustine says that the proper help of Adam is the help in which man remains, De Corrept. et grat. c. 11; moreover this manner of speaking signifies some habitual grace, not actual; he says it is a help which was left in the free will of man, and a help through which he could, not one by which it came about that he willed: ibid.; therefore it is not a grace preceding and exciting the will.

To the we have already warned that grace is moreover required on account of the supernaturality of the act, and that this requirement is taught by the Fathers.

To the and 3. we say that, if the testimonies cited in this appendix from Augustine are weighed, it is simply to be denied that Augustine, when he speaks of the grace necessary to Adam for operating, makes mention only of illumination and never uses those names by which he is accustomed to signify the grace proper to the will: for he calls even the charity of God poured out in the hearts, and he speaks expressly of the operation of God by which he works the willing, by which we ought always to be perfected; with which formulas Augustine is accustomed to indicate the grace proper to the will. But it matters little that he does not so frequently employ those appellations which he is accustomed to use when he speaks of the grace of fallen nature, namely of delight, of sweetness, and the like: for he did not so frequently dispute about the grace of the first man; and besides, perhaps another reason was at hand, namely that the grace of Adam's will was not a grace fighting against concupiscence, but only aiding to operate salutarily. Moreover, the opinion of Augustine in c. 48. De Natura et gratia already cited, which compares the grace of Adam to a light offering itself to sound eyes, does not look to this, that the grace of Adam be taught to have been only a light, that is, an illumination of the mind; for in the same book c. 26. he compares also the grace of a man healed from infirmity to a light (v. pag. 205). In that place, however, c. 48. that comparison looks to this, that it show that even for one most perfectly sound grace is necessary, just as light is necessary for the most sound eye. Wherefore also the grace of the healed man is called light (l. c.).

To the fourth. We note a) that these testimonies which are objected have been taken from the most difficult place among all the works of the holy Doctor, from which place the Jansenists seek, undeservedly indeed, the patronage of their heresy; but among the Catholic doctors, although they demonstrate more than enough that the Jansenist interpretation is inept, nevertheless when it is a question of defining the true sense which was present to Augustine's mind when he wrote those things, scarcely two are to be found who have not lent their talent to others, who agree in the same opinion. Wherefore we seem to ourselves to be able to use this exception: since the necessity of both immediate graces even for the state of innocence has been demonstrated by theological arguments drawn from the analogy of faith and from authority, the same Augustine himself not excepted, who elsewhere clearly teaches the opinion which we defend; it is not equally required that we abandon this opinion on account of certain testimonies whose legitimate interpretation is not certain and explored even among the adversaries themselves.

b) Moreover, having rejected the declaration of this place to Chapter IV of this treatise, we note here only two things with Livino de Meyer in his work De Mente Augustini circa gratiam praedestinationis c. 1). 1) that there St. Augustine does not speak of the grace conferred on Adam for any good work whatever, but of the grace conferred on him for persevering, which is to be weighed accurately; for these two differ very greatly: nor to compare the grace given to Adam for persevering with the grace which in fallen nature is necessary for all, that they may act well, but with the grace which is given to the persevering, by which they persevere. But we are disputing about the grace necessary to Adam for any good work whatever, which was certainly conferred on him when he performed good acts; for it is not lawful to think that he did not elicit any acts of the love of God before he sinned. y) Furthermore, that we may now in some way satisfy the testimonies objected in the 4th place, we reply to the first that what Bellarminus objects — first, that it proves too much, if it be taken wholly of habitual grace alone; for the actual grace of illumination, which without any doubt Augustine asserts for Adam, would be excluded. Wherefore, secondly, even if those words be taken of habitual grace, this alone could be concluded, that mention is not made there of actual grace: which is something entirely different from Augustine's having never signified it. That, however, is itself also false; for he has these words in n. 32: «That (Adam) might receive good, he did not need grace, because he had not yet lost it: but that he might remain in it, he needed the help of grace, without which he could not at all do it, and he had received the ability, if he wished.» Therefore the help of grace is distinguished from the good received and in which he was to remain. But this is the habitual gift; therefore that help is something other than the habitual gift.

To the second and third. The help by which it comes about that someone wills to persevere is either the very formal will of persevering, which is itself grace, or it is a grace effecting perseverance — not indeed by an antecedent necessity, but infallibly bringing it about — or it is a certain special sweet delight in the good, by which man is drawn, freely indeed yet certainly, to willing to persevere; but by the negation of some one of these, the actual help of the will is not excluded in general, but only some special one for a certain end: whence it does not follow that the actual helps of the will were lacking to Adam. Likewise, the help left in man's free will, if this formula be considered by itself (for what Augustine means by it in that place we shall declare in Th. XLVI.), is not only an illumination of the mind, but the very inspiration of the will itself, which does not compel the will; wherefore by it Adam could have persevered if he had wished, and therefore by it he did not persevere, because he was unwilling to persevere.