Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

VI. Since Canon 230 declares that a justified man cannot in his whole life avoid all sins, even venial ones, unless by special privilege, the Fathers' teaching on this matter against the Pelagians being also taken into account; it must be held 1°) that the just generally do not avoid all venial sins through the whole time of their life, unless the time be per accidens quite short. By the name of venial sin those sins also are to be understood which are committed with imperfect deliberation and, as they say, by surreption. It must be held 2°) that a certain antecedent impotence, albeit only moral, is in the just for always avoiding those sins. Moreover, the reason for this impotence seems to be sought from the weakness of nature or the defect of integrity. Therefore a special privilege is necessary, which is not certainly known to have been granted to anyone else besides the Immaculate Mother of God.

I. First of all, the words of the definition must be explained. It is asked, therefore, first, what comes under the name of venial sin, or how great is the extension of this name. We answer that, since this word is used by the Synod without any addition, it must be taken indefinitely and comprehend any moral act which has the character of venial sin. Now indeed a twofold venial sin is wont to be distinguished by theologians: namely, that which is venial by reason of its matter, which is light in itself, so that, even with full advertence and full deliberation present, it is venial; and that which is venial on account of the defect of full advertence and full deliberation, which indeed can happen both in a light matter and in a grave matter. Moreover, for an act to be a sin, some advertence and deliberation suffice; for on account of them the act is in the moral order and difform from the law. Cf. on this matter the moral theologians. A specimen of sins of this kind you have in Augustine, De Natura et Gratia c. 38, where he himself warns that it was not to have been cited from Scripture: «if Abel, although deservedly called just, sometimes laughed a little too immoderately, or joked in the relaxation of the mind, or saw something for concupiscence, or plucked fruits somewhat too immoderately, or was more indisposed from a somewhat larger meal, or, while he prayed, thought of something by which his intention would be called away to something else — and how often those and many similar things stole upon him. Or are they perhaps not sins, against which we are generally admonished to beware and to restrain by the apostolic precept, where it says: let not sin reign in your mortal body to obey its desires. For indeed, lest we obey these for those things which are not permitted or are less decent, we must fight with a daily and perpetual struggle.» Therefore, since those acts also which are committed with imperfect advertence and imperfect deliberation are and are called venial sins, the words of the Council must also comprehend them: namely, for that proposition to be true, it is enough that all venial sins which are done from imperfect advertence and deliberation, and which are wont to be said to be done by surreption, cannot be avoided.

It is asked, secondly, about which impossibility the discourse is, when it is said that the just man cannot. We answer that not physical impossibility is signified, but moral. The reason is that when it is said that the just man cannot avoid all sins, it is supposed that he actually sins when he does not avoid some sin, which indeed must necessarily happen if it is impossible to avoid all: he could not, however, sin, if the physical power to avoid each one whatsoever were lacking; therefore the physical power to avoid all is had; hence the discourse is not about physical impossibility. The discourse, consequently, is about a certain moral impossibility, of what sort it is we shall see afterwards.

It is asked, thirdly, what space of time is understood when 'whole life' is said. It must be noted that the Canon speaks of that time of life which runs after the first justification; for it speaks of the justified man. We say, however, 'after the first justification' (i.e., after man has been made just for the first time by the infusion of sanctifying grace, which sanctity he can again lose through lethal sins and again recover through penance); because there is no reason for limiting the words of the Council, universal in themselves: for man justified for the first time is in reality a justified man; then because the Council speaks of the whole life, which therefore is not to be narrowed to that part which runs after man has returned for the last time into the grace of God; then because the words of Canon 23 correspond to the doctrine contained in chapters 11 and 12, in which the discourse is directly about the first justification. Again it must be noted that the Council did not say 'through a long time of life,' but simply 'through the whole life.' Hence theologians ask whether through some long space of life every sin can be avoided, and they answer that it is not so certain that through some, albeit long, space of life sins cannot be avoided, just as it is certain that they cannot be avoided through the whole life: indeed some add that through some short space of life, say of one day, all sins can be avoided (see Suarez De Grat. L. IX. c. 8. n. 29).

But the matter must be declared. For if it is asked what properly has been defined, it must be said that this one thing has been defined, that the whole life cannot be spent by the just man without sin without a special privilege; and therefore he is not a heretic who would contend that a long space of life, although not the whole life, can be passed without sin. Nevertheless, if the question is raised, what aptly coheres with that definition, what can be gathered from it by reasoning, it must be said that the opinion teaching that a long space of life, say several years, can be passed without sin apart from a special privilege, is not easily composed with that same definition, or rather that that opinion is to be excluded from the sense of the definition. Surely if that opinion can be received, it will also be permissible to say that the just man who lived 60 years could have lived 30 and more years without any interruption without sin; but if he could, why will not so many others be able, whose whole life is of 30 or fewer years? for it does not appear what the prolongation of the subsequent life could contribute to this. Besides, if he can keep himself immune from sin for 30 continuous years, why will he not be able in the subsequent years? for he does not seem to experience great difficulty in the continual resistance to temptations and suggestions, which occur frequently. The matter, therefore, would seem to be without sufficient reason. Again, if this canon 23 is compared with chapter 11, it is clear that the canon comprehends those sins also which are enumerated in that chapter, which are called light and daily, into which the Council testifies that men, however holy and just, fall. The discourse, therefore, in the canon is about sins whose occasions occur daily and which, on account of the frequency of these occasions, can all be avoided only with difficulty; it is therefore alien to the mind of the Council to think of some long space of time passed without any sin, especially since it expressly teaches that the just fall into daily sins. That opinion, therefore, does not sufficiently cohere with the doctrine of the canon.

But because the just man does not always sin, the just man can, without a special privilege, pass some short time without any sin. But he would be inept who wished to define the quantity of this time. For in moral matters of this kind certain limits posited in the indivisible are not to be sought, as they can be had in natural things. This depends very much on the circumstances in which man is placed, on acquired habits, on the fervor of spirit with which he works, on the more or less copious grace by which he is helped by God. Having considered, however, those things which the Council hands down in chapter 11, it seems to be said that that time, according to the mind of the Council, cannot be anything but quite short, if it is compared with the common space of human life. Whence if it happens that someone, after justification, lives only that short space, the definition of the Council will not, per accidens, regard him, because it, using these words, 'whole life,' signified some space not too short; for when we say 'whole life,' we commonly are wont to understand some long space.

And these things suffice for the fuller understanding of the canon on this matter. But what we defend in the Thesis in the first place is a thing placed in fact: that the just generally do not abstain through the whole time of their life from any sin whatsoever, with that exception, however, added, unless the time of life be quite short. The question, therefore, is first one of fact, and of this fact, namely, that the just do not abstain from any sin whatsoever through the whole life. But whether it must also be denied that the just keep themselves immune from sin through some long space of their life will be disputed afterwards, according to those things which we have already premised.

II. Concerning this question of fact Suarez thus decides, De Gratia L. IX. c. 8. n. 18: «It must be said absolutely that just and holy men, however perfect, have not avoided all venial sins in this life. This assertion under these terms is not only true, but also theologically certain.» We add, in the enunciation of the Thesis, that little word 'generally,' by which we signify that our assertion is not hindered if that exception exists in certain persons, which coheres with the character of a special privilege. The exception which we add, unless the time of life be quite short, aims at this, that we declare that we do not include in our conclusion those whose time of life is quite short, which indeed is not the same as affirming that they do not sin in that short space of life. Therefore, that the fact stands thus is proved 1) by the analysis made of the cited canon. For it says that the just cannot avoid all sins through the whole life without a special privilege; therefore it is a special privilege or the effect of a special privilege that the just man admits no sin at all through the whole life. But a privilege, and a special one, is something departing from the common law or the common manner of living of the community; therefore to avoid all sins, which is a special privilege or the effect of a special privilege, is not something common: therefore commonly just men do not live immune from any sin. You will say that it is called a special privilege on account of the excellence of the benefit. But a privilege by itself signifies something private, rare, not common; nor does the excellence of the benefit suffice that it be called a privilege, just as adoptive filiation and the beatific vision are not called privileges, than which nothing among created benefits is more excellent: for a privilege is an exception from the law insofar as it is common or universal. This is confirmed from the words immediately following of the same canon, 'as the Church holds concerning the Blessed Virgin.' Namely, the Church holds that to the Blessed Virgin, on account of her most special dignity, special graces and special prerogatives were granted, among which this one too is numbered, as we have heard Augustine teaching at the end of the preceding Synopsis; but it is abhorrent to the Christian sense to deem common those things which were conferred on the Blessed Mother of God on account of her most special dignity; therefore 'privilege' is taken under that proper character by which it is opposed to the common.

And in truth this is the doctrine of the Fathers, who profess to have drawn it from the Scriptures. For the Fathers of the Council of Carthage teach that, not only on account of humility, but because it is true, the just ought to say that they have sin, and that he speaks falsely who has denied that he has sin. They say that the petition of the Lord's Prayer, 'forgive us our debts,' is necessary for the just, so that they say this not only for others but also for themselves. The Fathers indeed appeal to the testimonies of Scripture, James III, 2: in many things we all offendIac. III, 2., 1ª Ioan. I, 8: if we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us1 Ioan. I, 8., and to the Lord's Prayer, which is also to be recited by the just and by which they are commanded to say forgive us our debts. Similar to these are Prov. XX, 9: *who can say: my heart is clean, I am pure from sin?*Prov. XX, 9. and Eccles. VII, 21: There is no just man on earth, who does good and does not sinEccles. VII, 21.. These are universal in themselves and exhibit that truth to which indeed some exception can be made by special privilege, but which is nevertheless common in itself.

Augustine exhibits the doctrine of the Fathers both in many other places and in De Natura et Grat. c. 36, where, after he had excepted the Blessed Virgin, he says: «With this Virgin therefore excepted, if we could gather all those holy men and holy women, while they lived here, and ask them whether they were without sin, what do we think they would have answered? Whether this which that man (Pelagius) says, or what the apostle John says? I ask you, however great the excellence of sanctity in this body may have been, if they could have been asked this, would they not have cried out with one voice: If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us. Or would they answer that thing more humble, perhaps, than truer? But to this man (Pelagius) it now pleases, and rightly pleases, not to place the praise of humility in a part of falsity. And so, if they said this truly, they would have sin, which, because they humbly confessed it, the truth would be in them; if, however, they lied about this, they would none the less have sin, because the truth would not be in them.» And De Peccator. meritt. et remiss. L. II, c. 14: «Thus, therefore, all who in this life have been proclaimed by the testimonies of the Divine Scriptures in good will and in acts of justice, and all who were such after them, although not proclaimed and praised by the same testimonies, or even now are such, or will be so hereafter, are all just, all truly praiseworthy, but they are not without some sin; since by the testimonies of the Scriptures, by which we believe concerning their praises, we also believe this, that no one living is justified in the sight of God, therefore He is asked not to enter into judgment with His servants and not...» only universally for all the faithful, but also for each individual is the Lord's Prayer necessary, which He handed down to His disciples.Moreover, the Fathers then distinguished crime from sin, the former comprising grave faults, the latter any sins whatever, even light ones. August. Cont. duas epistt. pelagg. L. I. c. 14: «Many indeed baptized faithful are without crime, but without sin in this life I should say no one, however much the Pelagians, because we say these things, may swell and burst against us in their madness; not because some sin remains which is not remitted in baptism, but because, while we remain in the infirmity of this life, sins do not cease to be done daily, which are remitted daily to those who pray faithfully and work mercifully. This is the soundness of the catholic faith, which the holy Spirit everywhere sows, not the vanity of heretical depravity and the presumption of the spirit.»

III. Since the Pelagians, together with Jovinian, appealed to the testimony of 1ae Ioannis III, 9: Whoever is born of God does not commit sin; because his seed abides in him and he cannot sin; because he is born of God: the Fathers observed, first, that it cannot happen that the apostle contradicted himself; for he had said at the beginning of the epistle, c. II, 1: if we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us. Then they interpreted the words of the Apostle in such a way that he cohered with himself and with the rest of Scripture. «Charity (Augustine says, De Gratia Christi c. 21), which is a virtue, is for us from God, not from ourselves, Scripture being witness, which says: Charity is from God, and everyone who loves is born of God and has known God, because God is charity (1a. Ioann. IV, 7. 8). According to that charity the saying is better understood: he who is born of God does not sin and cannot sin. That charity, according to which he is born of God, does not act wrongly, does not think evil. When, therefore, man sins, he sins not according to charity but according to cupidity, according to which he is not born of God.»

Insofar, therefore, as one has the grace of adoption and charity, and follows its lead, he does not sin nor can he sin. Moreover, since the Apostle in v. 8 said that he who commits sin is of the devil, he subjoins in the following verse that he who is born of God does not sin, cannot sin, because the seed of God abides in him: by which surely we are taught that sin is not from God, but is the work of the devil, who sinned from the beginning, and that the divine grace, by which

we are regenerated, excludes sin by itself, and that sins are also excluded in act, if we allow ourselves to be ruled by grace. Cf. A. Lapide in h. l.

Therefore, both from the canon of the Council of Trent and from the canons of Carthage and from Scripture, with the Fathers' interpretation employed, the truth of this fact is gathered most certainly, namely, that the just generally do not avoid through the whole life all sins, even venial ones.

Furthermore, from what has been said it is also clear what must be answered to the question whether a just man lives for a long time without any sin. For this, as we have already seen in the declaration, does not cohere with the canon of the Council of Trent, does not cohere with the doctrine of chapter III of the same session; moreover, it does not cohere with the canons of the Council of Carthage, with the testimonies of Scripture and the interpretation of the Fathers, which, all of them sources of revealed doctrine, exhibit to us the frequency of those sins, which cannot be reconciled with a long span of life passed without any sin.

IV. You will ask whether what has been proved thus far in this part pertains to the faith. I answer that this fact, namely, that the just in general do not avoid all sins, even venial ones, throughout the whole time of their life, is a truth which is certainly contained in the deposit of revelation. This is clear from what has been demonstrated. The same seems to be said of the other truth: that the just in general do not avoid all venial sins over a long span of their life. For it is handed down both explicitly and implicitly together with the former. Moreover, if you ask whether the former truth is defined by the authentic magisterium and pertains to the dogmas necessarily to be believed; I answer that in the canon of the Council of Trent this definition is not contained in express words; for the discourse is about a power separated from a special privilege. If, however, the force of the meaning of the canon is considered, in it must be said to be contained also the affirmation of this fact, namely, that the just in general do not abstain through their whole life from every venial sin. For this is truly said, albeit in other words, by him who affirms that this cannot happen without a special privilege; for if it happened in general among the just, although it would happen by the help of grace, it would be false that it happened by the help of a special privilege, since the gift would be common; and therefore it would be absurd that a special privilege be required for this effect. From the fact, however, that this definition is not had in express words, Suarez calls this truth only theologically certain. But although this may be said, if only the reason of the Tridentine canon is considered; if, nevertheless, the Canons of the Council of Carthage are considered, it seems it cannot be denied that this truth is defined; for this truth is openly handed down in those canons: moreover those canons, the Apostolic See approving, obtained infallible authority in the universal Church.

V. It is of faith, defined by the cited canon of the Council of Trent, that a just man cannot, apart from a special privilege, avoid all sins, even venial ones. There inheres, therefore, in the just a certain impotence. But impotence can be distinguished as twofold: one consequent or concomitant, another antecedent. Consequent is that which has its reason in the free act itself; for he who does a thing cannot at the same time not do it, and he who does not will to do a thing cannot at the same time will to do it. Antecedent is that which is the reason, whether adequate or inadequate, of the omission of an act; insofar as something is therefore not done, because it cannot be done. Now indeed it is inept to judge that only consequent impotence is signified by the words of the canon; both because he who cannot for this reason alone is not simply said not to be able, and chiefly because to remove this impotence a special privilege would not be required, such as was granted to the Blessed Virgin; for the will, which is common to all, would suffice. And although Augustine seems frequently to assert only the fact — nay, to refer its necessary affirmation back to the knowledge of God, when he says: «But since by the divine Spirit, who much better than we knows all things of the human race, whether past or present or future, such human life was foreknown and foretold that no one living is justified in the sight of God, it happens that through ignorance or infirmity, not having exerted against it the whole forces of the will, we yield even to some unlawful things, the more and the more frequently the worse we are, the less and the more rarely the better we are»De Peccatorum meritis et remissione, L. I, c. ult.; nevertheless this is not to be taken exclusively, as if there were no antecedent reason of this matter in us. For even in this same place some such reason is indicated, namely ignorance and infirmity, and elsewhere, at least after the canons of Carthage were enacted, the holy Doctor teaches that no one here can live without sin... no one can be without sins in this land, and of this matter he indicates an intrinsic reason in man, when he says: «Insofar as we are united to our God by faith, hope, and charity and imitate him, insofar as we are able, we do not sin, but we are sons of God: insofar, however, as from the occasion of carnal infirmity, because the body is not yet dissolved by death, not yet changed by the resurrection, reprehensible and wicked movements creep in, we sin: which indeed it befits us to confess, lest with a stiff neck we merit not the healing of our weakness but the damnation of pride. Whence both are most truly written: he who is born of God does not sin, and if we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves. For the former was said from the firstfruits of the new man, the latter from the remnants of the old.Serm. CCCLI. c. 3. And certainly of this most universal and constant fact, that no just man always abstains from any sin whatsoever, some reason must exist; but this reason cannot be the sole will itself of the just. For since in individual men the wills are so diverse, the circumstances diverse, the inclinations diverse, and in reality at least several just men would will to avoid all sins, why nevertheless do all agree in this, that individuals sometimes sin? Certainly he would say nothing who placed the reason of this matter in the sole act of the will. There will be, therefore, something besides the act itself of the will. But this is either some decree of God, or the very antecedent impotence of the will; but the first is absurd: therefore the other remains. There is, therefore, an antecedent impotence. But we have already proved in the declaration that the impotence of which there is speech here is a moral impotence. Namely, the difficulty of the act, or the defect of moral power, is the reason why that perfect observance of the law is not done.

VI. How great, however, is this moral impotence? Namely, does that which is said to be impossible so behave that it happens only most rarely, or also that it never happens? It must be said with Suarez, l. c. n. 14. seq., that it is a moral impotence such that what is said to be impossible never happens. Moreover, it is said to be impossible to avoid all sins without a special privilege; therefore it never happens that some just man without a special privilege avoids all sins. «This assertion, as Suarez says, is sufficiently proved; because it is necessary that the definition of the Council have absolute truth. Because if even in one man it could happen that those two things were joined, namely, to lack a special privilege and nevertheless to guard against every venial sin through the whole life, the proposition of the Council would be simply false; for it is absolute and universal, for whose falsity it is enough that it fail in one: then chiefly because if it could happen that someone avoid all venial sins through the whole life without any special privilege, it would be an argument that many others also could morally do it and through their negligence and sloth do not do it.This impotence, which is never joined with its opposite, the same author n. 17. calls impotence simply; «whence, he says, although it may rightly be called moral, so that it does not exclude physical potency nor freedom regarding individual sins, it is nevertheless not moral in that sense that it is only in a qualified way, because the opposite happens rarely and with difficulty. For it can be moral impotence and be simply impotence, because the impediments and occasions from which it arises are such that they must be freely and morally overcome, and human powers still do not suffice, not only alone, but even aided only by the common help of grace; for although those helps suffice for individual and for several acts, they do not, however, collectively for all.» Moreover, when the necessity of repeatedly falling is spoken of, nothing else is said than this moral impotence of always guarding against any sins whatsoever; it is not some necessity from law, but just as what is impossible to be is necessary not to be, so when it is morally impossible to avoid all sins, it is morally necessary to fall sometimes.

VII. It is asked what is the reason of this sort of impotence. Certainly he does not satisfy who answers that it must be placed in the sole defect of some act, namely of a congruous thought or a congruous inclination of the will; for again the reason of this defect would have to be rendered, or the reason why the thought and inclination which is had is not congruous for the agent, who has the power of acting provided some cognition precedes: which reason must be in the very nature of the operating subject. The reason, therefore, of this impotence must be placed in something habitual: but this seems to be nothing other than what is indicated by St. Thomas in these words, Ia. IIae. q. CIX, a. 8: «Man cannot abstain from every venial sin on account of the corruption of the lower appetite of sensuality, whose movements reason can indeed repress individually, and from this they have the character of sin and of the voluntary, but not all of them; because while it strives to resist one, perhaps another arises, and also because reason cannot always be watchful to avoid (i.e., to restrain) movements of this sort.» Namely, on account of concupiscence (which must be taken broadly, inasmuch as it comprises both the concupiscible part and the irascible; for they are together the sensitive appetite, and it also comprises the indeliberate movements of the will, by which it is borne toward whatever is set before it under the aspect of some apparent good), whose movements continually anticipate reason and draw the assent of the will toward those things which are not fitting, there exists a necessity of a certain continual struggle, by which the free will is engaged in combat with concupiscence itself. Moreover, in this struggle, in order that every consent, even imperfectly deliberated, be guarded against, a most prompt free aversion of the will from all those things which natural inclination suggests as less befitting reason is necessary. But a most prompt aversion of the will, especially in sudden matters, presupposes a habit, i.e., a habitual aversion of the will from those things which natural inclination suggests; because in sudden matters we operate according to a preconceived end and according to a preexisting habit (Aristot. Eth. L. III. c. 8). Now indeed a habit of aversion of this sort, and one constant and prevailing with respect to some or several objects, could indeed be acquired through the exercise of virtue; but a prevailing habitual aversion, which has always been and always lasts and which extends itself to all things, cannot be had; because, on the contrary, there is had a habitual inclination toward those objects unbefitting to reason, which inclination is habitual concupiscence itself, which always remains. This certainly is the opinion of Augustine, who appeals to the infirmity of nature, in order to demonstrate this impossibility of guarding against any sin whatsoever, as can sufficiently be clear from the testimonies adduced in this Thesis and in the preceding Synopsis.

Therefore it cannot happen that the free will always resists, as is fitting, all the movements of the appetite by which it is allured to unlawful things.

VIII. The question, however, is how these two things are reconciled: that the just man cannot keep himself immune always from sin, and yet formally sins when he falls; for that is what is asserted: that it cannot happen that the just man at some time does not sin, namely formally. It is answered that the just man cannot avoid all sins collectively, but can avoid individual ones. This response is true, but needs a declaration. For 1) we do not say only that there is a power with respect to individual sins, if they are considered abstractly and absolutely, but also in the concrete, even on the hypothesis made that one has already avoided other sins. 2) That moral impotence therefore does not exist in the concrete with respect to individual acts; namely, for avoiding individual determined sins a moral impotence is not had; but only for avoiding all: in order, however, that there be a moral impossibility of avoiding all sins, or of always acting rightly without any stain, there must indeed be a moral necessity that some sin be committed; but it is not necessary that there be a moral necessity of some determined sin in the real series of acts; but it is enough that there be a moral necessity that some indeterminate sin be committed. For, this being posited, it is already false that all sins can be avoided. Moreover 3) this sort of necessity does not consist in this, that on account of the exercise of virtue the power of acting well should at length at some time fail, but it comes back to this, that on account of the habitual infirmity of human nature, which is prone to that which is not befitting reason, it cannot morally happen over a long time that the will always freely opposes the habitual inclination of nature, or that it does not from time to time freely yield to it. this sort of necessity does not consist in this, that on account of the exercise of virtue the power of acting well should at length at some time fail, but it comes back to this, that on account of the habitual infirmity of human nature, which is prone to that which is not befitting reason, it cannot morally happen over a long time that the will always freely opposes the habitual inclination of nature, or that it does not from time to time freely yield to it. Namely, it cannot morally happen that over a long time there does not exist some free act conformable to the habitual and spontaneous inclination of nature, especially in sudden matters, in which we act according to habit. Just as it cannot morally happen that generating nature, when generations are multiplied, does not bring forth in some nation some defective fetus; although there is no determined fetus in which it is necessary that the defect occur, and at each occurrence there could be a perfect generation. But just as this difficulty depends on the infirmity of the human species, so that of avoiding any sin whatsoever depends on the infirmity remaining in individual men, or the evil inclination of nature, which cannot morally always, over a long time, operate in a determined way repugnant and perfectly repugnant to that inclination. Because indeed 4) from this infirmity of nature it follows with moral necessity that the will from time to time freely yields to it; for it is an inclination to deliberate acts: hence the character of sin is not taken away but remains. from this infirmity of nature it follows with moral necessity that the will from time to time freely yields to it; for it is an inclination to deliberate acts: hence the character of sin is not taken away but remains.

Hence God does not command impossibilities. Certainly at each single time sufficient power is present: nor is there ever (as we have already warned) with respect to individual determined sins that greatest difficulty, namely that moral impossibility which is had with respect to all; but at each single time there is had a physical power, which although it is from time to time joined with a certain moral impotence or difficulty, great or small, can nevertheless overcome it, if man applies all the effort which he can exert. For since there is nothing that can impose necessity on the will, its active indifference always avails for willing and doing the good, and therefore he sins, if he acts badly.

Therefore if the argument is proposed in form: what is necessary is not free, what is not free is not sin; therefore either man does not sin when he falls, or there is no necessity: it is lawful to answer: what is necessary with physical necessity, that is not free — I concede. What is necessary with moral necessity — I subdistinguish: if this necessity determinately affects the act itself — let it pass; if it does not determinately affect the act itself, but only some act indeterminately, that is not free — I deny. For the rest, if the reason is asked why God does not impart a more abundant grace, it can be answered that since this is not necessary for obtaining salvation and sanctity and is of itself proper to the state of integrity, God is not bound to confer a help of this sort, and just as in pure nature this impotence would be without any fault of the creator, so the same, although diminished, remains in the order of a nature elevated but not yet perfect. Augustine, de Spir. et lit. c. 35., says that this «pertains not to impossibility, but to the judgment of God.» Suarez adds (l. c. n. 12.) that it «could have been done justly by God, either as a punishment of original sin, or for the custody of the humility of the just, or for the manifestation of his grace and justice.»

Note. What we have said about the moral impotence of the just to avoid all venial sins can also be taken of the moral impotence of men destitute of grace to observe the whole law for a long time.

IX. If through ordinary grace the just cannot morally avoid all venial sins, therefore a special grace conferred beyond the common providence is required: if the reason of this moral impossibility is habitual concupiscence, therefore a healing from this infirmity is required, which certainly would be a special privilege. Now indeed this healing can be obtained either by the restitution of habitual integrity, or by a certain continuous series of efficacious actual helps, which series with respect to effect is equivalent to a habitual gift.

Of what sort, however, this privilege is, Suarez declares, l. c. n. 11., distinguishing a threefold special help or gift of grace: one according to the law, another above the law, a third against the law. As an example of the first he sets the gift of perseverance; for it is special, but it is given according to the ordinary law. As an example of the second he adduces confirmation in grace, which neither pertains to the ordinary providence of grace nor is against any general law. An example of the third is conception without original sin, which is against the law. Moreover, in this third class of gifts the privilege properly has its place, whose office it is to derogate in some respect from the law. Suarez, however, judges that the privilege of avoiding all venial sins, both deliberate and surreptitious, through the whole life pertains to this third order, and that in this sense the Council spoke. The reason is that the general rules of Scripture are that no one lives in this life without sin, and therefore such a privilege is an exception from the rule, and in this way it is said to be against the law. Moreover, the same author warns, ibid. n. 12., that it is not necessary that it be a law of God that man sometimes sin, but it suffices that the law of God be in all things to permit this, or that it be a law of God that man receive grace in such a measure according to the established providence, from which it follows that individuals are not prevented from sometimes falling from fragility, at least venially.

The same Suarez testifies, ibid., that in his age it was the common opinion of the theologians that this privilege was granted to no one besides the Blessed Virgin. And certainly this is the opinion which is spontaneously gathered from the testimonies of Scripture and from the canons of the Council of Carthage; for from these we know that it is a universal law that no one lives without sin; moreover, an exception against so certain a universal law is not to be admitted without authority, which is almost none with respect to all the rest besides the Blessed Virgin. And this certainly is the opinion of Augustine, as can be established from his already recited testimonies. For Augustine's doctrine is that concupiscence is bound up with original sin, and with concupiscence the impossibility of avoiding all sins. Whence the privilege of immunity from any actual sin whatsoever is bound up with the privilege of immunity from the original stain and from concupiscence, which is certainly known to have been granted to the Mother of God alone.