Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

It must further be held that for the just, too, actual grace, prevenient and helping, both of illumination and of inspiration, is necessary for all their salutary acts; although not in exactly the same way as for those who are destitute of supernatural habits.

I. What we put in the first place depends on those things which we taught in Th. X. Namely, when there exists a series of salutary acts, of which the later is determined by the earlier, that which precedes has the character of prevenient grace for the one that follows, and all depend immediately or mediately on purely prevenient grace, which was conferred at the beginning of the series. We call new grace in that series that grace which, consisting in the inspiration of an indeliberate act, would excite and prepare the will independently of preceding free acts. Now, although prevenient grace is said to be necessary for all acts, it is not by that very fact said that new prevenient grace is necessary for each individual act even of a man who is not just; for the former can be given without the latter. For in a continued series of salutary acts, of which the preceding determines the following, each of the subsequent acts comes to be from the grace of God preventing and preparing the will, and yet no new prevenient grace intervenes. Nor does any necessity of it appear; for it is not required as elevating, since by the prior act the faculty has been elevated, and that elevation can remain when the prior act is continued with the later one and determines it. Nor is it required as exciting the will to act, because the will existing in a deliberate act is sufficiently excited formally to the other acts which are connected with it. Taken in this sense, the opinion of Bellarmine can be defended, De Grat. et lib. arb. l. VI, c. 15.Sent. 13.) namely, that the just man does not ordinarily stand in need of new exciting grace, which is also suggested by the last canon of the Second Council of Orange. Therefore, when in the Thesis we defend the necessity of grace, even prevenient, for all and each of the acts of the just, it will have to be taken with the aforesaid limitation.

II. In disputing about the necessity of grace, Suarez, l. c., c. 8, sets up several hypotheses regarding the state of a man already excited, which with a moderate change we can propose thus: 1) that an unbelieving man has not yet consented to any grace of God calling him, 2) that he has consented to some, 3) that he has the habit of faith and of hope, 4) that he is just and has all the supernatural habits. We distinguish the second hypothesis from the following one, because since the first grace is not faith, a man can be prepared by several graces to obtain it—as if by an interior calling he is called to hear the preaching, then to investigate the truth, then to pray, so that at length he may believe. The same Suarez recounts several opinions in this question, ibid., which you may, please, consult; the difference of these opinions depends also on this, that not all put the same meaning under the names of exciting or prevenient and helping grace. Cf. Th. XVIII.

It can therefore be asked whether in each of these hypotheses actual grace is necessary for all good acts, and which grace; and the question is chiefly about the grace immediate to the will, and that one prevenient. For that the will is helped by grace when it acts, no one doubts. It is manifest, however, that if we have demonstrated that for the just themselves, with regard to all salutary acts, grace is necessary not only as helping but also as prevenient, of illumination and of inspiration, the same will have been demonstrated with regard to the others as well. It will therefore be enough for us to demonstrate this explicitly and of set purpose.

III. The demonstration briefly comes down to this. a) If actual grace—the same of which there is speech in Tradition—is asserted to be necessary indiscriminately for all, for all acts, with no distinction made of the states of men or of the condition of the acts, but with regard had only to the salutary act; it must be said that that grace, which, with no one dissenting, is necessary for some persons for some acts, is equally necessary for the just for all acts: but; therefore. Or b) if in Tradition grace is asserted to be necessary for the just in such a way that that which is said to be necessary for them for acting is that same grace which is affirmed to be necessary for others who are not just and who are called to faith, and which is said to be the grace of illumination and of inspiration, preparing and helping; the same is to be held as wholly necessary for the just as well: but; therefore.

If it is explicitly asserted by express testimonies that give assurance that for the just, for all salutary acts, grace prevenient and helping, of illumination and of inspiration, is necessary; that grace certainly must be said to be necessary for them: but; therefore.

d) If it is demonstrated by theological reason that for the just, too, both graces are necessary in both ways; there will be no reason why this should be denied: but; therefore.

The minors of these arguments must be proved. And first let this always be kept before one's eyes: that the Fathers in their writings and decrees of the Pelagian age always preached and defended the same grace—namely, the grace which the Pelagians denied, i.e., the grace of the will, the grace by which the will is called, excited, and prepared to will, and is helped when the will wills and works, as Augustine most frequently explains; just as the African Bishops also explain it to Zosimus (cf. c. 8. Auctorr. Apost. Sedis), and the Fathers of the Second Council of Orange, c. 4.

Now, as regards the minors of the first and second argument, which differ only in form, it has been affirmed that grace is necessary for all acts. Thus indeed the Roman Pontiff Zosimus, in the dogmatic epistle by which he proscribed the Pelagian dogmas throughout the whole world, and to which all catholic bishops subscribed: »what time, he says, intervenes in which we do not need his help? In all acts, therefore, causes, thoughts, motions, the helper and protector is to be prayed to."

Likewise, that grace is necessary for all has been preached, and to this all the decrees published in that age look. Auctorr. c. 6. Hence they prove the necessity of grace not from the special state of men but from the dignity of the salutary act. For this is why they assert that there is no vigor in nature (Council of Orange, c. 7) for doing any good that pertains to the salvation of eternal life, for acting as one ought for salvation, for the good works of piety (cf. Th. XXII.).

And hence it is that, with no distinction of men being made, they assert in general that the grace of God is given for individual acts (Council of Diospolis), so that without grace we can have, think, say, or do nothing of true and holy piety (the African Fathers to Zosimus, in Prosper, adv. Coll., c. 5): of which testimonies, in the first there is speech about the just as well, in the other directly about the just. And from this it came about that, to prove the necessity of grace for the first conversion, they brought forward those words of the Apostle Philipp. II, 13: It is God who works in us to will and to accomplish (Council of Orange, c. 4), which of themselves refer directly to those already converted. Therefore.

As for the minor of the third argument, it is evidently proved by these testimonies; for, first, it is clear in those things which have just been recited from Zosimus and the African Fathers that the speech is directly about Christians, that is, those converted to God, whom the Fathers certainly did not suppose to be all sinners—indeed they are to be presumed just. In the same way Augustine speaks, De Grat. et lib. arb., c. 17: «Without him either working that we may will, or cooperating when we will, we avail nothing for the good works of piety.» There you see that both graces, prevenient and helping, are said to be necessary for pious works without qualification. The same, De nat. et grat., c. 20: «The heavenly physician heals our evils not only to this end, that they already be not, but that we may be able to walk rightly for the rest, which indeed even the healthy will not be able to do except with him helping.» Which he declares in this way: «Just as the eye of the body, even when most fully healthy, cannot see unless it is helped by the brightness of light, so also a man, even when most perfectly justified, cannot live rightly unless he is divinely helped by the eternal light of justice.» Weigh that the light precedes vision and is necessary for each individual act of seeing. Cf. also what we gave in the preceding Thesis, n. IV, from the doctrine of Augustine. Among the Auctorr. Apost. Sedis brought forward by Celestine, this is brought forward in c. 8 from the African Fathers: «The will is prepared by the Lord, and that they may do something good, he himself touches the hearts of his faithful with paternal inspirations. For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are the sons of God, so that we may not feel our own free choice to be lacking, and in each and every good motion of the human will we may not doubt that his help prevails (by which, namely, the will is prepared and helped by the Lord).» Second Council of Orange, c. 9 (although here, rather than a canon, it is held by the learned as a certain sentence excerpted from the Fathers, in confirmation of the preceding canons, just as also many others follow; it is nevertheless a sentence which the Fathers of Orange make their own and to which they subscribe): «as often as we do good, God operates in us and with us (you have prevenient and helping grace) that we may work.» And en. 10: «The help of God is always to be implored even by the reborn and the holy, that they may be able to arrive at a good end or persevere in good work.» Council of Trent, Sess. VI, ep. 16: «Christ Jesus himself, as head into the members and as vine into the branches, continually infuses virtue into the justified themselves, which virtue always precedes, accompanies, and follows their good works.» In these testimonies you have mention of grace not only helping but also prevenient. Moreover, if you apply the observation made above—namely, that the grace which the Fathers defended was the grace of the will besides the grace of interior knowledge (cf. at the same time the historical synopsis of the Pelagian heresy given above), i.e., both graces were asserted to be necessary; it will have been abundantly demonstrated that, from the mind of Tradition, for the just too, for all their acts (cf. the first part of this Thesis), the grace of illumination and of inspiration is necessary, both prevenient and helping.

IV. There remains the demonstration to be set forth from the artificial theological argument. And indeed that 1° some prevenient actual grace is necessary for the just man too is demonstrated even by the intrinsic argument. For, as Ripalda argues,q. sect. 3 every salutary act elicited even from the influx of the habits necessarily presupposes a preceding knowledge and also affection (see what was said in Thesis XIV), and both supernatural, about the object toward which the will is freely affected: but that knowledge and affection is actual grace; therefore. The minor is evident from what was said in Ch. I. The major, as regards what it says that knowledge must precede, is evident: as regards the affection born of knowledge, it depends on what was said in Th. XIV: as regards what we add—namely, that this kind of knowledge which precedes (let the same be said of affection, if it is judged to be necessary per se for every act) is supernatural—it is clear 1) because the knowledge and affection by which the will is disposed to the act, and which are certain beginnings of the act itself, must be in the same order in which the act is: 2) because it is the doctrine of the Fathers that the will is prepared by acts of this kind; but the Fathers acknowledge no acts by which the will is prepared that are not simply grace, above the powers of nature, i.e., supernatural; therefore. Thus exciting grace is necessary.

But that 2° a divine excitation purely prevenient (cf. 1. p. Th.), actual even in the will, is necessary for the just man equipped with the habits by which nature and the faculties are elevated, can be demonstrated by this reason. For by sanctifying grace and the infused habits nature is indeed elevated, the faculties are elevated, and there is conferred on them the potency to the supernatural act, that is, the efficiency of operative power: whence that divine operation by which we said the faculties are transiently elevated (Th. XVI) is no longer necessary. But the faculties even thus elevated, when objects are proposed from without, can exercise themselves about them naturally, even if the objects are supernatural; because those objects, once they have been proposed, the force of nature can in some way attain. Nor does it matter that the faculty is elevated, and that a necessary faculty, such as the intellect and also the will as regards indeliberate acts, acts as much as it can; for this principle is to be taken thus: that a faculty acts as much as it can according to what the circumstances in which it is engaged and the object which it attains require; besides, this principle has been gathered from the analysis of those faculties which can act in only one specific way. But the elevated faculties can act both supernaturally and also naturally, because nature does not cease, whence they can also sin, which is a purely natural action; 2) the objects by which they are struck can be attained also by a natural operation, and attained in such a way that the faculty is exercised naturally as much as it can about them. Therefore, even in an elevated faculty there is not yet a sufficient reason why it should attain the objects supernaturally rather than naturally, or why it should elicit supernatural acts rather than natural ones. Nor can this be determined through freedom; for the exercise of freedom already presupposes indeliberate supernatural acts, and it belongs to freedom indeed to determine the existence of the act with regard to this or that, but not to determine the state in which it acts, whether natural or supernatural; for this pertains to God. Therefore, even granted the elevation of nature and of the faculty, the proximate principle of the supernatural work still remains to be completed, that is, there is still required on the part of God a determination that the faculty act supernaturally rather than naturally. But this determination must precede the act; hence it cannot be a simple concurrence, which of itself accompanies the act. It is necessary, therefore, that God by his operation excite in the intellect and in the will vital supernatural acts. Thus the grace of illumination and of inspiration is necessary for the just as well. It is not indeed any longer necessary for them that the faculty be elevated; with regard to this, the infused habit is already sufficient; but it is necessary for determining the supernatural exercise of the faculties. This prevenient grace certainly governs the consenting will; for what else is helping grace than prevenient grace joined with its effect? cf. Th. XVIII.

From what has been said you have why we said that grace is not necessary for the just in exactly the same way as for those who lack the supernatural habits. What is said of the just, however, must also be said of those who are equipped with some habits, as regards the acts of their habits. In one lacking the habit, the operation of God is required that excites vital acts and at the same time elevates the faculty; in one having the habit, this latter office is not necessary.

You see, therefore, that the necessity of grace for the just is not drawn only from the infirmity of nature, which remains even in the justified. From it indeed arises a moral necessity of some help (cf. Thomas, 1. II. q. 109. a. 9.); but the necessity of supernatural grace must be drawn from the supernatural dignity of the act. And indeed the Fathers, who defend the physical and absolute necessity of grace, speak indiscriminately of the just and of sinners, and assert the same grace necessary for both in the same way. There is therefore no reason why for the just the necessity of grace should be sought only from the vice of concupiscence. For even to overcome the temptations arising thence, to resist concupiscence not in any way whatsoever but salutarily, grace properly so called, supernatural, is required.

BRIEF HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS ON PELAGIAN IMPECCABILITY AND APATHY.

I. Augustine, as often as he deliberately enumerates the errors of the Pelagian heresy, also makes mention of impeccability, τῆς ἀναμαρτησίας: De haeresibus, n. 88. «They even go so far as to say that the life of the just in this world has no sin at all, and that from these the Church of Christ is perfected in this mortality, so that it is altogether without spot and wrinkle: as if the Church of Christ were not that which cries to God throughout the whole world, forgive us our debts.» And Against Julian, Bk. III, c. 1, he testifies that they say «that a man in this life can have no sin, so that what the whole Church says in the Lord's Prayer, forgive us our debts, is not necessary for him.» And Against the Two Epistles of the Pelagians, Bk. III, c. 8, he says that the Pelagians are pressed by the testimonies of truth, lest they say «that in a mortal man, however holy and well-doing, there is so great a justice that even after the laver of regeneration, until he ends this life, the remission of sins is not necessary for him.» Jerome, who was among the first to assail the Pelagians in his writings, refuted this error above all in three dialogues.

This error differs from the error of Jovinian. For, as Augustine testifies, De haeresibus, n. 82, Jovinian denied that a man could sin after receiving the laver of regeneration. Pelagius, however, taught that a man could, if he willed, be entirely without any sin. Cf. however Garnerius, Op. cit., p. 1, Diss. VII, c. 6, § 3.

II. The character of this Pelagian error is manifested to us by Jerome and Augustine. For the former, in the letter to Ctesiphon, says: «What other greater rashness can there be, than to claim for oneself the likeness of God—I will not say equality—and to embrace in a brief sentence the poisons of all heretics, which flowed from the font of the philosophers, and especially of Pythagoras and of Zeno, the prince of the Stoics? For they assert that those things which in Greek are πάθη, and which we can call perturbations..., can be rooted out of the minds, and that no fiber and root of vices remains at all in man, by meditation and assiduous exercise of the virtues.»¹ Augustine, Against Julian, Bk. II, c. 8: «Hence you wish man to be perfected—and would that it were by the gift of God and not by the free, or rather servile, choice of his own will... How much better we hear Ambrose in the book On the Flight from the World saying: what is worse, the allurement of earthly desires frequently creeps in.» and the obscuring of vanities occupies the mind, so that what you strive to avoid, that you think and turn over in your mind, which is difficult for a man to guard against, but impossible to put off... For our heart and our thoughts are not in our power, which, suddenly rushing in, confound the mind and the soul and draw them elsewhere than you had proposed. If you do not suffer these things, forgive us; we do not believe you, but rather in these words of St. Ambrose we recognize a certain mirror—and this, if we profit—of the common human infirmity. But even if we believed you and said: pray for us, that we too may not suffer these things, we find you so elated and savoring lofty things, that you would answer us not only that you do not suffer these things, but also that it is in man's power not to suffer them, and that there is no reason why the help of God should be sought for this.» Moreover, from these words of Jerome and Augustine it is clear that the Pelagians asserted not only that man has the power of always resisting concupiscence, but also of restraining all the first motions of concupiscence and of preventing them from arising, or of rooting them out from the depths and plucking out every fiber and root of the vices. This latter is proper to apathy, that is, to the absence of perturbations; but this apathy was either the same as, or certainly a part of, that impeccability which the Pelagians defended. Indeed, the Pelagians expressed this power in this formula: that a man can be without sin. Whence Jerome, in the cited place, after he has proved that it cannot come about that a man is free of perturbations, concludes: «How then can this stand which is said, that a man can be without sin, if he wills?» And Augustine, when he recounts the errors of Pelagius, embraces this certain error of his in the same formula: that a man can be without sin. The amplitude of which is indicated by the same Augustine, Contr. duas epistt. pelagg., Bk. IV, c. 11, in these words: «the Pelagians say that there are or have been just men in this life who have lived without any sin, to such an extent that the future life, which is to be hoped for as a reward, could not be more advanced and more perfect.»

II. Nor should it be a matter of wonder that the Pelagians embraced this portent of error; for they exalted too much the powers of human nature and were too much imbued with the false doctrines of the philosophers, who claimed this power for nature. Augustine indeed sets forth this argument of Caelestius in de Gestis Pelagii c. 18: «He placed the testimony of the Apostle Peter: that we are partakers of the divine nature. And he is said to make a syllogism: since if the soul cannot be without sin, then God also is subject to sin, whose part, i.e. the soul, is liable to sin:which is nothing other than to interpret Scripture in accordance with the opinion of the Stoics. And ibid. c. 35: «In the eleventh chapter of the book, which does not indeed bear the title of its author, but which is reported to be Caelestius's, I myself read this set down in these words — How, he says, has anyone taken up a share in that thing, from whose state and power he is defined to be a stranger? — Therefore the brethren, who had objected these things, understood him in this way, as though he had said that the soul and God are of the same nature and that the soul is a part of God: for they had accepted it in this way, that he thought it to be of the same state and power with God.»

IV. This impeccability, or the state of this impeccability, was called the perfection of justice. This is most frequent in Augustine. De Natura et Gratia c. 62: «To do justice, therefore, is to fight in the true worship of God with an internal conflict against the internal evil of concupiscence; but to perfect it is to have no adversary at all.» And in the book de Perfectione iustitiae c. 11: «It is not the doing of good that is not at hand, but the perfecting of it. For in that he does not consent, he does good, and in that he hates his concupiscence, he does good... but to perfect the good is not at hand to him, which will then be the case, when that concupiscence which dwells in his members will be no more.» And in the same place he thus answers Caelestius in c. 3: «If God did not will man to be without sin, he would not send his Son without sin, who healed men from sins. This is done in believers and those making progress, by the renewal of the inner man from day to day, until perfect justice is made, like full health... Then, therefore, will justice be full, when health is full; then will health be full, when charity is full.» Moreover in ep. CLXVII. c. 5 he says: «Then we are perfect in charity, when nothing remains of infirmity.» For, as he says in the book de Perfect. iustitiae c. 8: «While there is still something of carnal concupiscence, which is restrained even by continence, God is not loved in every way with the whole soul. For the flesh does not covet without the soul; although the flesh is said to covet, because the soul covets carnally. Then will he be just without any sin at all, when there will be no law in his members repugnant to the law of his mind; but he will love God wholly with his whole heart, whole soul, whole mind, which is the first and greatest commandment.»

V. This doctrine of Pelagius was reprobated by the Fathers on a twofold account:namely, that he asserted that the perfection of justice can be obtained by the powers of nature, without the grace of God; for this was the sense of that formula: that man can be without sin, if he wills, i.e. that this is placed in his will alone; although he would afterwards add, to avert ill-will: not without the grace of God; which grace, however, he placed in free will. Read Epist. Hieronymi ad Ctesiph. and Dialogue 1 cont. pelagg. Then indeed, that Pelagius taught the very fact or possibility of the perfection of justice in this mortal life. About this second point Augustine was less concerned at the beginning of the dispute, and although even then the negative opinion was more approved by him; nevertheless, provided it were conceded that perfection can be had not otherwise than through the grace of God, he judged that one ought not to fight very much with the heretics about this matter, but rather that the question should be held among Catholics, namely whether the perfection of justice can be obtained only in the other life, or also in this life, and is sometimes obtained. Cf. De Spiritu et litera c. 2. De Nat. et Grat. c. 42 and c. 60. But after the Carthaginian canons were published, of which the sixth, seventh and eighth contain the condemnation of this error, he absolutely attacked this error together with the rest and numbered it among the heresies. Thus in Lib. IV. Contra duas epist. Pelagianorum c. 10 he says: «Let us now see that third point, which (no less than the preceding ones, i.e. the denial of original sin and of the necessity of grace) makes every member of Christ and his whole body shudder in those men, because they contend that there are or have been just men in this life having no sin at all. By which presumption they most openly contradict the Lord's Prayer, in which all the members of Christ cry out with a truthful heart and daily voices: forgive us our debts.»

VI. In order to rout this error, Jerome in his dialogues against the Pelagians, and Augustine in almost all his works against the same men, draw their argument also (I do not say only, but this too) from the indeliberate and necessary motions of concupiscence, «which ought not to be restrained, but not to exist at all,» as Augustine says in De Perfect. iustitiae c. 8. For, as he again says in Retract. L. I. c. 15: «The perfection of good is that not even the concupiscence of sin itself be in man, to which indeed, when one lives well, the will does not consent; nevertheless he does not perfect the good, because the concupiscence, to which the will is repugnant, is still within.» They draw likewise from the ignorance by which we generally labor, also of positive law, concerning those things which are to be done or omitted by us so that we may live justly; likewise from those things which we commit through ignorance: for these in reality are opposed to that perfection of justice about which the question was. To these same ignorant things the appellation of sin was also given, both because in reality they are effects of original sin, and because they were called by the name of sin by the Pelagians too, who, teaching that that perfection is possible which would tear out all the perturbations and the roots of the vices, said that man can be without sin. But nothing is more frequent with Jerome and Augustine than to draw the argument against this Pelagian dogma from Rom. c. VII, 15. seqq.

VII. Now, with the state of the controversy between the Fathers and the Pelagians thus understood, as is fitting, many things will be most clear and subject to no difficulty, which through the Jansenist fraud have seemed to some almost unintelligible and absurd. Surely it is understood 1) that it was truly said by Augustine that there are certain necessary sins, namely those which cannot be avoided, and which hinder us from being perfect — sins, that is, placed in the indeliberate motions of concupiscence, in those things which are done through ignorance, and in ignorance itself; for these stand in the way of the perfection of justice and have a certain character of sin. In this sense Augustine said in de Perfect. iustitiae c. 6: ›Sin is when either the charity which ought to be is not, or it is less than it ought to be, whether this can be avoided by the will or not; because if it can, the present will does this; if it cannot, a past will did it." And ibid. c. 8, concerning concupiscence, he says »that it ought not to be restrained, but not to exist at all, nor will it be in that perfection of justice, where there will be no sin at all." From this doctrine of Augustine it does not follow that men sin with formal sin even in those things which they do necessarily; for it is not sin properly so called, but sin improperly so called and material, that is urged by Augustine against Pelagian impeccability.

It is understood 2) how Augustine truly said that there are certain precepts of God impossible for us in this life. For in order that Augustine might exclude the Pelagian dogma, when it was objected to him that it is a precept that we love God with our whole heart, with our whole soul, with our whole mind, with all our strength, and that we not covet; for in these precepts the perfection of justice is contained, and the exclusion of every motion of concupiscence, and that what God commands us is certainly possible; Augustine judged that two kinds of precepts are to be distinguished, namely the precept of doing justice and the precept of perfecting justice. He conceded that these precepts: You shall love the Lord with your whole heart etc. and you shall not covet contain the precept of perfecting justice, but he denied that those precepts, taken in their whole amplitude, are to be fulfilled in this life, and he asserted that grace is given that they be fulfilled, and that they are to be fulfilled in the other life: but that they are now proposed to us so that we may know whither we must strive, so that now, by loving God, although still imperfectly, and by resisting concupiscence, we may merit at last to arrive at that state in which we love God with our whole heart, with our whole soul etc., no concupiscence existing in us. De Perfect. iustitiae c. 8: «It is not asked whether it is a precept, which is very manifest; but this very thing, which is agreed to be a precept, whether it can be fulfilled in this body of death, where the flesh lusts against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh, so that we do not the things which we will... As long, therefore, as we walk by faith, being absent from the Lord... this is our justice in this very pilgrimage, that we now tend by the rectitude and perfection of the course itself toward that perfection and fullness of justice, where in the sight of its beauty charity will already be full and perfect, chastening our body and bringing it into subjection etc.» Cf. the testimony adduced above from the book de Perfect. iust. c. 8, where he denies that God is loved with the whole soul while concupiscence still exists. Then de Nat. et Grat. c. 62: «It is one thing not to have sin, another not to obey its desires. It is one thing to fulfill what is commanded: you shall not covet; and another, by a certain effort of abstinence, at least to do that which is likewise written: do not go after your concupiscences. To do justice, therefore, is to fight in the true worship of God with an internal conflict against the internal evil of concupiscence; but to perfect it is to have no adversary at all. For he who fights is still in danger and is sometimes struck, even if he is not laid low: but he who has no adversary rejoices in full peace. And he himself is most truly said to be without sin in whom no sin dwells, not he who, through abstinence from evil work, says: I now do not that thing, but the sin that dwells in me...» The same is the opinion of Jerome in Dialogue 1.

Therefore, according to Augustine, the perfection which God requires of us in this stadium of mortality is the perfection of the course, which is to do justice; it is not the perfection of peace or of rest, which is to perfect justice. One may say that, in Augustine's opinion, we are thus commanded to love God with our whole heart etc. and not to covet (with the tinder of concupiscence also extinguished), just as we are commanded to save our soul, which salvation, however, is obtained not in this but in the other life. And just as by that precept we are now obliged only to those things by which salvation can be procured, so by that precept of the love of God we are now obliged only to doing justice, so that we may be able to attain the perfection of justice, which we certainly ought to attain. Whence perfect justice is said to be received not as something to be cast in the mandate, but as something to be received in the reward. Contr. duas epistt. pelagg. L. IV, c. 10. It can happen that Augustine's interpretation of the precepts: you shall love the Lord with your whole heart etc. and you shall not covet, is not approved by many: but this now matters nothing. Nevertheless the doctrine which Augustine hands down through this interpretation is most true. Moreover, with that interpretation established and posited, Augustine most truly said that certain precepts are now impossible and that the grace by which they are fulfilled is now lacking; for these are those precepts which show that perfection is not to be exercised in this life, but to be attained in the other life — attained, however, not through acts which are of the same perfection as those which will be in the other life, but through more imperfect acts. So that by those precepts we are now obliged not to the having of that perfection, but to tending toward it. Whence the lack of this perfection in this life is not imputed to man, nor does man sin in any way by not now fulfilling the precepts of perfecting justice. Tract. XLI in Ioann. n. 12: «To will, he says, is at hand to me, but to perfect the good is not. Did he say: it is not at hand to me to do good? If he had said this, there would be no hope. He does not say: it is not at hand to me to do, but it is not at hand to me to perfect. For what is the perfection of good, unless the consumption and end of evil? And what is the consumption of evil, unless what the law says: you shall not covet? Altogether not to covet is the perfection of good, because it is the consumption of evil. That man was saying this: to perfect the good is not at hand to me; because he could not bring it about that he would not covet: he did only so much as to rein in concupiscence, not to consent to concupiscence, and not to offer the members of concupiscence for its service. To perfect, therefore, he says, the good is not at hand to me; I cannot fulfill what is said: you shall not covet. What need, then, is there that you fulfill? Do not go after your concupiscences. Do this in the meantime, as long as illicit concupiscences are in your flesh. Remain in the servitude of God, in the freedom of Christ; with your mind serve the law of your God; do not give yourself to your concupiscences."

Note that the difference between doing justice and perfecting justice is as it were specific, since the former is contained in battle, the latter in peace; but in the very perfection of justice there can be infinite degrees, which, however, differ only accidentally. Augustine, however, considering the essential or specific difference, distinguishes only two ways of fulfilling the law, namely either by doing or by perfecting justice.

It follows from what has been said, first, that Luther and Calvin err, who gather from the doctrine of Augustine that the just man sins formally in every work, for the reason that it is impossible for him to observe these two precepts: you shall love the Lord your God with your whole soul, and you shall not covet. For the precept about the perfection of justice is entirely different from that which commands the action of justice; for while the latter has a single object, the former has a double object: one mediate or ultimate, which is the extinction of all concupiscence; the other immediate and proximate, which is the care and endeavor of diminishing the forces of concupiscence through the exercise of virtue. And this is what is to be observed by us now.

It follows, secondly, that Jansenius errs, who attributes to the action of justice what St. Augustine affirms about the perfection of justice, so as to conclude from this that certain precepts are impossible for man in this state, and in relation to the powers which he has: whereas the holy Doctor and the Fathers speak not of the action of justice, but of the perfection, and teach that this is not so commanded that we should now carry it out, but that we should only tend to it through the action of justice.

It is understood, thirdly, why Jerome and Augustine called every ignorance in any matter which pertains to duty, whether of natural or positive law, a sin, and said that those sin who act from ignorance, even invincible. For whatever is of this kind is a defect, is a misery which cannot be composed with perfect justice. Wherefore, since the Pelagians were compelled to confess that ignorance is at times invincible, in order to defend their dogma about the possibility of the perfection of justice, they denied that a work done from invincible ignorance is any evil, even materially, as we say; nay, they wanted it to be good and to agree with the most perfect justice no less than works done from knowledge of the law. August. cont. Iulianum L. II. c. 19: «Proceed to the rest and weave things vainer than the vain... since you say — that from this it should be understood that perfect ignorance is to be called justice, because God said to Abimelech, who was about to lie with Sarah, not knowing that she was another man's wife: and I knew that you did this in a clean heart. And therefore the state of those who are born is not harmed by the will of those who beget; because even if it were evil, you say, yet it would in no way reach their knowledge. — Why, then, do you not name them just, if perfect ignorance is to be called by the name of justice? For nothing is more perfect than the ignorance of little ones; let nothing, therefore, be called more just either. Where is what you thought should be asserted above — that little ones are born neither just nor unjust, which they will be by their own acts, but only that infancy is rich with the dowry of innocence?... Are you going to say that virtue is not justice? How, then, is the infant not yet full of virtue, but capable, when he is full of ignorance, which you say is justice, unless you deny that virtue is justice?» And it was the opinion of Caelestius, reported and condemned in the Council of Diospolis: that forgetfulness and ignorance are not subject to sin; because they do not happen according to the will, but according to necessity. Therefore the Fathers, in order to show the vanity of that perfection of justice which the heretics promised to men, showed that ignorance and the things which are done from ignorance are sins, namely those which are opposed to the perfection of justice. Augustine De Spir. et lit. c. 35: «Behold how perfect justice is without example among men, and yet it is not impossible. For it would be done, if so great a will were applied as suffices for so great a thing. And it would be so great, if none of those things which pertain to justice were hidden from us, and if it so delighted the mind that the delight would overcome whatever other pleasure or pain impeded.» Jerome cont. Pelag. Dialogue 1: «Now I must traverse the testimonies of the Scriptures very widely, to teach that error and ignorance are sin.» And he brings into the midst the ignorance of Jacob, who did not know what had been done to Joseph, the ignorance of Samuel, who did not know which of the sons of Jesse was to be anointed king, and things of this sort. Augustine likewise De Peccat. merit. et remiss. L. I. c. 23: «Is there no evil of ignorance and therefore nothing to be purged? And what does that voice do: do not remember the sins of my youth and my ignorances?» And he brings forward as an example the ignorance of little ones. Jerome *Dialog. II. cont. pelag.*Give me (says the Pelagian) a testimony of the New Testament, where error and ignorance and the impossibility of a mandate are held in crime. The Catholic answers: «I will bring forward one, to which certainly you will not be able to contradict.» Moreover he adduces Rom. VII, 15. seq. and subjoins: hear the Apostle preaching most openly: for I do not know what I do, for I do not do what I will, but I do what I hate. But if I do what I do not will, I consent to the law, that it is good. Now, however, it is no longer I who do that, but the sin that dwells in me.»

Hence these Fathers in this controversy never distinguished, as Jansenius wishes to distinguish, between ignorance of natural law and ignorance of positive law; nay, they are wont to argue more frequently from ignorance of positive law; and certainly any ignorance whatever of those things which pertain to our duties, whatever it may be, is opposed to the perfection of justice.

Therefore the sin from which invincible ignorance does not excuse is a sin opposed to the perfection of justice, not a sin opposed to the action of justice, from which invincible ignorance, according to Augustine, certainly excuses, or rather does not prevent that justice from being and producing its effects. (Cf. Iacobum Merlini S. I. Vera Clavis operum s. Augustini, parte 2ª.)

VIII. We said under n° V that the Fathers, against Pelagian impeccability, drew their argument also from the indeliberate and necessary motions of concupiscence. It is asked whether they were content with that alone, namely whether, according to the Fathers, the perfection of justice is therefore impossible in this life, because it is impossible to prevent all the indeliberate motions of concupiscence, so that they concede that man, with the grace of God, can rein in all the motions of concupiscence or resist them, but because he cannot prevent them, he therefore falls short of the perfection of justice: or whether, besides, the Fathers deny that man in this life, except by some special privilege, can resist all the motions of concupiscence in such a way that he never sins, even venially. It must be answered that it is the doctrine of the Fathers that the perfection of justice is impossible in this life, not only because the indeliberate motions of concupiscence exist, but also because to motions of this kind the will of man sometimes consents, at least lightly.

Surely the Fathers of the Council of Carthage, in canons 6. 7. 8., by which the Pelagian ἀναμαρτησία is proscribed, speak of sins which need remission, on account of which we truly say in the Lord's Prayer forgive us our debts: but nothing is remitted by God except what has been admitted voluntarily and freely; therefore the discourse was about sins which are contained also in the deliberate motions of concupiscence.

And in truth, when Augustine objects the indeliberate motions of concupiscence, he frequently also looks to the deliberate motions which follow upon them, and he supposes as certain that those deliberate motions sometimes follow. It is clear from the testimony cited above from the book de Natura et Gratia c. 62: «For he who fights, he says, is still in danger and is sometimes struck, even if he is not laid low; but he who has no adversary rejoices in full peace.» Moreover Augustine in Lib. II. De peccatorum meritis et remissione (which is the first work written by him against the Pelagians, in the year 412) treats this question expressly, namely he attacks Pelagian impeccability. Further, in c. 6 he proposes or distinguishes four questions; for he says «one question is whether (man in this life) can be (without sin); another, whether he is; another, if he is not, when he can be, why he is not; another, whether he who has never at all had any sin — not only whether anyone is, but also whether he could at some time have been or can be.» Now, with it conceded in answer to the first question that he can be through the grace of God; to the second he answers in c. 7: «If it is asked whether he is, I do not believe that he is.» But asking in the third question why he is not, he answers that which sufficiently signifies that Augustine considers also the more or less deliberate consents which follow upon concupiscence, and on account of them teaches that man cannot be without sin. For he says in c. 17: «I could easily answer, because men are unwilling; but if it is asked of me why they are unwilling, we go on at length. Nevertheless I will also say this briefly, without prejudice to a more diligent inquiry. Men are unwilling to do what is just, either because it is hidden whether it is just, or because it does not delight. For we will each thing the more vehemently, the more certainly we know how good it is, and we are delighted by it the more ardently. Ignorance, therefore, and infirmity are vices which impede the will, that it be not moved to do a good work or to abstain from an evil work." Augustine therefore distinguishes two things, i.e. the more ardent delights of concupiscence and the will following upon them, which either does not will the good or wills the evil. Moreover this will is a free will; and indeed in that will is placed by Augustine that sin about which it was asked why man cannot be without sin; for the delights of concupiscence are adduced as the reason of existing sin; sin, therefore, is some effect of them, which effect is indicated to be that will.

Moreover Augustine De Perfect. inst. c. 21 concludes his disputation thus: «Whoever says that after receiving the remission of sins any man has lived or lives so justly in this flesh that he has no sin at all, contradicts the Apostle John, who says: If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us. For he does not say: we have had, but we have. But if anyone asserts (let these things be noted) that this is said of that sin (namely concupiscence) which dwells in our mortal flesh according to the vice that was contracted by the will of the first man sinning, to whose desires the Apostle Paul commands us not to obey; and that he does not sin who, to that same sin, although dwelling in the flesh, consents to no evil work at all, either of deed or of word or of thought, although the concupiscence itself is moved, which received the name of sin in another way, because to consent to it is to sin, and it is moved in us against our will: he indeed distinguishes these things subtly, but let him see what is to be made of the Lord's Prayer, where we say: forgive us our debts — which, unless I am mistaken, we would not need to say, if we never consented a little to the desires of that same sin, even in a slip of the tongue or in a delightful thought; but we would only have to say, lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil. Nor would the Apostle James say: in many things we all offend. For one does not offend, unless when great concupiscence, by seeking or avoiding against the reason of justice, persuades, whether deceiving or prevailing, that something be done or said or thought which ought not.» The opinion of Augustine, therefore, was that men are at times led by concupiscence into some illicit consents or into some venial sins, and that this is proved from the words of the Lord's Prayer. The same, therefore, is to be understood when, after the publication of the Carthaginian canons, he absolutely affirms that the words of the Lord's Prayer are opposed to the Pelagian opinion, as in book IV cont. duas epistt. pelagg., which we gave under n. V. Most clearly cont. Iulianum L. II. c. 10: «Laboring in this war, as long as human life upon earth is a temptation, we are not therefore without sin, because this which is called sin in that way (namely, as he had said a little above, because it has been made from the guilt of the first man, and by rebelling strives to draw us to sin) works in the members, fighting against the law of the mind, even in those not consenting to it for illicit things; for as far as concerns us, we would always be without sin, until this evil were healed, if we never consented to it for evil: but in those things in which we are conquered by that rebelling one, although not lethally, yet venially, in these we contract a debt, whence we daily say: forgive us our debts.»

Jerome is to be thought to have held the same, who in dialogue II against the Pelagians, in order to prove that no man is ἀναμάρτητον, enumerates several sins of the just, which have the true character of guilt; and in the epistle to Ctesiphon, at the end, teaches that the just are said to be just in the Scriptures not because they lack every vice, but because they are commended by the greater part of the virtues. But the vice which, existing in the just, is the reason why all the virtues are not in them, cannot be only that which is naturally and necessarily in us; for that would exclude either no virtue or all virtues equally, since it is opposed to all: it is, therefore, something existing in us freely.

IX. Therefore, although the Fathers, in order to refute the Pelagians and to refute their ἀναμαρτησίαν, also brought into the midst the indeliberate motions of concupiscence, which certainly are opposed to the perfection of justice which the Pelagians claimed as possible for themselves, they nevertheless also added this: that these indeliberate motions at times drag just men into certain sins which are truly and properly sins, and that no man's life is passed in this mortal flesh without some sin which would need remission. But this doctrine of the Fathers, which embraces all the just in general, does not exclude some special privilege which God may wish to confer gratuitously upon someone. Augustine expressly signifies this exception, disputing with the Pelagians about this same matter, i.e. about the perfection of justice, in the book de Natura et Gratia c. 36: «Except, therefore, the holy Virgin Mary, concerning whom, for the honor of the Lord, I wish no question at all to be had when sins are treated: for from this we know that more grace was conferred upon her for overcoming sin in every part, who merited to conceive and bring forth him whom it is certain had no sin.» Cf. the treatise De Immaculato Virginis conceptu.