Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

I. We set apart those who lack any supernatural habit and are not yet converted to God, from others who are otherwise disposed. The reason for this distinction will appear from the treatise itself. The question is not whether grace is necessary, but what sort of grace is necessary. Some think that the immediate illumination of the intellect alone suffices, because (as they suppose) a deliberate act of the will can immediately follow upon the knowledge of the intellect (cf. Suarez De Gratia L. III. c. 7). But the assertion is certain (says Suarez ibid.) and in it all modern writers agree, for it is the manifest doctrine of Augustine that exciting grace is infused not only into the intellect, but also into the will, before deliberate consent. In this demonstration there is no need that the testimonies which we shall bring speak determinately of those men alone: but it is enough that they certainly include them, wherefore it will be necessary that, after the testimonies of Tradition have been recited, we show that they certainly hold good in the case of men of this sort.

II. Therefore first it is established that the grace of God necessary for acting salutarily is an interior grace. For this is established from the appellations by which it is frequently distinguished (which we have already set forth above, cf. Th. VIII. and the historical Synopsis n. 111.); for it is called the infusion of the Spirit, the diffusion of charity in our hearts through the Holy Spirit, the operation of God in our hearts and in free will itself, and the like, which signify an immediate inrush of God, or an immediate operation of God. from the fact that, besides the external grace of the law and of doctrine and of the examples of Christ, certainly admitted by the Pelagians, the Fathers professed another, by which the will and action would be helped; but this other cannot be anything but immediately interior. Whence Augustine Cont. duas epistt. pelagg. I. I. c. 19. «You however think that man is so helped by the grace of God in good work, that in the exciting (the excitation supplying strength) of his will to the good work itself, you believe that it works nothing.» «And when he had refuted this with the example of Paul, he concludes: «The will is therefore drawn in marvelous ways to will, by Him who knows how to work inwardly in the very hearts of men, not that men, which cannot be, should believe unwillingly, but that from unwilling they should become willing.»» And hence in the Synod of Diospolis was proscribed the doctrine of Caelestius, that the grace of God and help are not given for individual acts, but are in free will, or in the law and doctrine.

III. Moreover, this necessary grace, interior or immediate, is twofold: namely, immediate illumination and immediate inspiration. In this matter note carefully that each grace consists of a twofold element: namely, an elevation of the faculty, by which the faculty is made capable of producing supernatural acts, and a vital act of a certain knowledge and volition, by which (if this element be considered in itself, apart from the first) the will is morally bent to the free salutary act. Now indeed the necessity of the former element for both faculties, and also of the latter for the intellect, is more evident, and the arguments which we are about to bring demonstrate it beyond any doubt. But the necessity of the latter element for the will is established from the doctrine of the Fathers, if, speaking of the necessary grace of the will, they exhibit it under the aspect of some vital act of the will inspired by God.

We have already dealt with this matter in the 1° chapter, where we proved the existence of this twofold grace; now the necessity of each is to be proved. The arguments will indeed have to be drawn from the same sources, which however can be set forth more distinctly.

First, therefore, we prove the necessity of immediate illumination. Indeed, immediate illumination of the mind has been asserted as necessary in the Councils. 1) In the Council of Carthage, ch. 4, we are taught that the grace by which the understanding of the commandments is revealed and opened to us is a gift of God together with charity, by which it is granted to us that we may do them. Moreover, the grace by which the understanding of the commandments is revealed and opened — which is that grace which Pelagius conceded was to be sought by prayers — is a grace immediately affecting the intellect, as we have already demonstrated elsewhere. But the formula by which knowledge of this sort is said to be a gift of God signifies that this knowledge is not in the power of nature, but is conferred on us by God; and because the understanding of the commandments is necessary for fulfilling them, therefore by that formula is signified the necessity of this gift of God, which is so exhibited that it is an opening of the understanding, that is, an immediate grace of the intellect.

2. In the Second Council of Orange, ch. 7, we are taught that the illumination of the Holy Spirit is necessary that we may be able to consent to the evangelical preaching, as is expedient. But this illumination is wholly distinguished from the preaching of the Gospel; for on account of the former we consent to the latter, and it is supposed that the former can be lacking, although the latter be had. Nor can it be another grace equally external; because if evangelical preaching does not suffice, by the same reason neither will another external grace illuminating the intellect suffice; it is therefore a grace of immediate interior illumination. Whence this is proved by the Council from the words of Paul: that our sufficiency of thinking is from God, by which words we said (Th. VII.) that some immediately subjective help is signified.

3. In the Council of Trent, Sess. VI, capp. 5. 6., we are taught that the beginning of justification in adults is to be taken from the prevenient grace of God, which is the grace exciting and aiding men to their own conversion, which grace is called the illumination of the Holy Spirit, by which God touches the heart of man; men however, excited and aided by this divine grace, conceiving faith from hearing, are freely moved toward God, etc. Thus here a twofold grace is manifestly distinguished: the illumination of the Holy Spirit by which the heart is touched by God, and faith, which is received from hearing and therefore the preaching of faith; but that illumination, whether you regard its distinction from the preaching of faith, or whether you regard the formula by which it is described — God touching the heart of man through the illumination of the Holy Spirit (which is the same as that by which the African Fathers signified interior immediate grace in the letters to Zosimus, as Caelestinus reports, c. 8. Auctorr. Sedis Apost.) — that illumination, I say, is interior and immediate. Now indeed in these chapters the Tridentine Fathers hand down that which is necessary for justification: whence it is said that the beginning of justification is to be taken. Therefore.

4. The same grace was asserted as necessary by Caelestinus and confirmed by the authority of Zosimus. For he says, c. 9. «That God so works in the hearts of men and in free will itself, that a holy thought, a pious counsel, and every movement of a good will is from God; because through Him we can do some good, without whom we can do nothing. For to this profession the same doctor (Zosimus) trained us, who, when he spoke to the bishops of the whole world about the help of divine grace: what time, he said, intervenes in which we do not need His help? In all acts therefore, causes, thoughts, movements, the helper and protector is to be prayed to.» It is therefore a question of necessary grace, of grace necessary also for any holy thought whatsoever. Moreover, this grace is so described that God is said so to work in the hearts of men that a holy thought is from God; but the heart, whence thought comes, is not the will alone, but also the intellect: but the operation of God in hearts, which is the same as that by which He works in free will itself, is an immediate operation. Therefore.

5. That the Fathers asserted the same doctrine is clear from the testimonies which we gave in Th. VII., from which it is also established that this doctrine is contained in the Scriptures. Now indeed from these testimonies it is clear 1) that the grace of illumination consists of a twofold element, namely both of some thought, in which the illumination of the mind is situated, excited by God, and of the elevation of the faculty; because it is the illumination of the Holy Spirit, who through it gives the power of thinking which is not in nature. And indeed both graces are certainly required. The elevation of the faculty is required, because grace is given that the mind may be able to think supernaturally, to assent to the preaching, to believe, etc.: some actual knowledge excited by God is required, because the elevation of the faculty alone does not suffice. For even an elevated faculty can still act naturally, since the powers of pure nature remain, and if it be determined by an object in a natural way (as always happens) it is prone to act only according to natural powers. It is necessary therefore that the exercise of the supernatural powers be determined by divine power, or that the intellect be moved to some thought by the Holy Spirit. But if the things which the Fathers assert in general hold good in general for all, they certainly hold good for those who are not yet converted to God and lack any supernatural habit. For the only reason for doubting whether that necessity of grace as regards both elements holds for all would be this: because those already converted to God can be determined from a pious preceding thought to another, and those having a habit, say of faith, already have the mind elevated to the supernatural order. But these things are lacking in those who are not yet converted to God and as yet obtain no supernatural habit: therefore.

IV. Now the necessity of immediate inspiration is to be proved. It is proved thus. 1) In the Pelagian controversy the question concerned the grace of the will (cf. Synop. hist. q. ult.), which is distinct from the grace of knowledge and greater than it (Conc. Carth. c. 4. Aug. de Gratia Christi c. 26., and de Gratia et lib. arb. c. 19). Thus the Fathers contended against the Pelagians that another grace was necessary besides the grace of knowledge admitted or conceded by the Pelagians. But 1) the Pelagians conceded interior knowledge, that is, immediate illumination, as we proved in the Synopsis. 2) Making abstraction of this hypothesis, if the Fathers, speaking of the necessary help of the will, had thought that the help of immediate illumination alone sufficed, by which the will is mediately inspired, they would not have opposed it to the grace of knowledge, since it too would formally be a grace of knowledge, but they would only have opposed it to external grace, as having this as its own property, that it is interior. Nor from that head could they have opposed it to the grace of knowledge, because it is a help of the will; for immediate illumination itself is a certain help of the will: for it is given for this reason, and for this reason alone it is given, that the will may be able to act. Nor again from that head could they have set up that opposition, because mediate inspiration is subjectively in the will; for this is not a new help, but a necessary effect of the help of knowledge.

And in very truth 2) in can. 4. of the Council of Carthage there occurs explicit mention both of eternal grace (the divine commandments), and of immediate illumination (by which the understanding of the commandments is opened), and of the grace of immediate inspiration (namely, of charity, which builds up and ensures that knowledge cannot puff up); and against those who admitted only the grace of illumination it is defined that the grace of charity is also necessary and that both are a gift of God, charity and knowledge. now indeed, if the grace of the will is nothing other than the grace of illumination, which extends itself also to exciting the will, since this excitation arises of its own accord and naturally from the illumination of the mind, it is natural to ask: how are those who are said to admit the grace of illumination said to deny the grace of the will, and why, besides that grace, is another demanded? At most it could be required that the Pelagians confess this also to be an effect of the same grace in the will. But the Pelagians could not deny this effect, which necessarily arises from that cause, nor did they in fact deny it — indeed they confessed it; for Pelagius taught that by the grace of knowledge the will is aroused by God in astonishment. Cf. in the historical Synopsis IV.B.

But in this canon there is distinguished not another effect of the same grace in the individual, but a twofold grace: knowledge and charity, without which knowledge can puff up. Therefore, on the hypothesis of the sufficiency of mediate inspiration, that canon has no sufficient reason of itself: but; therefore.

3. That grace of the will was asserted by the Fathers which would supply strength to free will, through which it could do something not only more easily but simply, and without which it could do nothing. But this prerogative cannot belong to mediate inspiration alone. For since the latter is formally in the intellect alone and is formally only knowledge, and does not move the will except morally, it leaves the will formally in its own powers: wherefore that grace can indeed be the reason why the will can do something more easily from that special moral motion, but not why it can simply do something, which without that grace it could in no way do: but; therefore. This argument discloses the intrinsic reason for the necessity of this grace.

Now indeed from this argument it is clear that the grace of the will, which is necessary, certainly comprises the elevation of the faculty. That the other element also — which is indeed a vital act by which the will itself is immediately excited — belongs to the grace of the will is proved thus. This grace, whose necessity is defended by the Fathers, is called inspiration: moreover, this appellation signifies a certain motion impressed on the soul, that is, the excitation of some act. But an act of this sort is either a deliberate act or an indeliberate one. Since a deliberate act also can be a grace (Th. X.), the inspiration of a deliberate act can likewise be a grace of the will for another subsequent deliberate act. But inspiration is also a prevenient grace, by which namely the will is prepared; for such is the grace of the will whose necessity Augustine defends, which preparation of the will the Pelagians denied (cf. cont. duas epistt. pelagg. L. IV. c. 6. L. II. c. 5), so that consequently this inspiration is to be called necessary for any act whatsoever. Among prevenient graces, moreover, there is also the purely prevenient, which cannot be situated in a deliberate act. If therefore inspiration is the motion of the will to any act whatsoever, not every inspiration will be the motion of a deliberate act, but also of an indeliberate one in the will; and therefore in general the grace of the will will comprise its motion to some act, whether indeliberate or deliberate, which has been prevented by some indeliberate one.

Indeed it is the doctrine of Augustine that God, by the inspiration of an indeliberate act of the will, besides interior illumination, prepares the will. De Spiritu et litera c. 3. «We say that the human will is so divinely helped to the doing of justice, that besides doctrine... it receives the Holy Spirit, by whom there is made in its soul the delight and love of the supreme Good.» Which he then explains thus: «When that which is to be done has begun not to be hidden (but according to Augustine it begins not to be hidden through the interior illumination of the Holy Spirit, cf. his words in Th. VII. IV.), unless it also delights and is loved, it is not done, it is not undertaken, it is not lived well.» Cf. Suarez de Gratia L. III. c. 7.

We conclude therefore that the grace proper to the will, which is necessary for acting, comprises both elements: both the elevation of the faculty and the excitation of a vital act. Now indeed, that we may reason once more in the same way: if these things are true in general, they must certainly be true as regards those who are not yet converted to the faith and lack every supernatural habit. For the same reason occurs which was adduced above in the preceding part, nor is there need to renew the argument. The Thesis is therefore proved.

V. Nevertheless, against the doctrine of two distinct helps some things can be objected. For you will say 1) in the Council of Orange, ch. 6, this formula is used: through the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit; and in ch. 4: through the infusion and operation of the Holy Spirit: but infusion does not seem to signify something else distinct from inspiration or operation. Therefore, although the names are diverse, the thing can be the same: whence it seems that both illumination and inspiration can be said to be the same grace.

I answer 1) that we do not derive the distinction of these graces from the diverse names only, but from the diverse things which we have proved to be represented by these names. Wherefore, although we concede the first part of the consequence, we nevertheless deny the other. Moreover, that we may declare those formulae of the Council of Orange, we note that the operation of which there is speech in cn. 4. is determined from the context to signify the inspiration of the will: for to prove it these testimonies are adduced; the will is prepared by the Lord, and God works in us the willing. We have therefore infusion and inspiration placed together. Now indeed nothing hinders the infusion of the Spirit from being taken for illumination itself, so that the same things are exhibited through these two formulae: infusion and inspiration, and illumination and inspiration. For the infusion of the Spirit, which is made through actual grace, is in itself transient. Moreover, if only the operations excited in us by the Holy Spirit are considered and compared with each other, the first transient operation which the Spirit excites in us is illumination; wherefore through it the infusion of the Spirit is formally obtained, which is already presupposed by the other operation, that is, by inspiration, whence through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit He is not properly infused, but is already infused. Since therefore it is proper to illumination that through it the Spirit is transiently infused into us, that is, works in us exciting the soul to the first act, illumination can be signified by the name of infusion. If these things hold, infusion really signifies something distinct from inspiration.

You will say again that in the Council of Trent, Sess. VI, cap. 5., the same thing which is called illumination is presently called inspiration: «so that, God touching the heart of man through the illumination of the Holy Spirit, man himself does not do nothing at all, receiving that inspiration;» therefore illumination and inspiration are the same thing.

I answer. Inspiration is signified not only by the word 'illumination', but also by the other words, 'God touching the heart of man', in indirect speech; for since the heart is not only the intellect but chiefly the will, when the touching of the heart is spoken of, there is signified not only the illumination, which precedes the movement of the heart, but also the inspiration, which begets that movement; wherefore illumination is not that by which the will is formally touched, but that by which it is touched dispositively.

Moreover, Augustine himself more than once signified the immediate grace of the will, which he certainly taught, by the single name of light, and not undeservedly; since light not only illuminates but also warms, whence it can be transferred to signify metaphorically the grace proper to the will. Let him be heard, De Natura et gratia c. 26: «Just as, for example, one who is lame is therefore healed by a wound, so that, the past evil being healed, his future walk may be directed; so our heavenly Physician heals our evils not only to this end, that they may no longer be, but that for the rest we may be able to walk uprightly: which indeed even we who are healthy will not be able to do unless He helps... For just as the eye of the body, even when most fully healthy, cannot see unless aided by the brightness of light; so man, even when most perfectly justified, cannot live rightly unless divinely aided by the eternal light of justice. God therefore heals, not only that He may blot out what we have sinned, but that He may also grant that we do not sin.»

VI. You will object against the asserted necessity of interior immediate grace the doctrine of the Scriptures, by which the Word of God preached through its ministers is commended. For it is called the Word in which one is saved: Actuum XI, 14. The word of reconciliation: 2. Cor. V, 18. The word not of men, but truly the Word of God: 1. Thessal. II, 13. The word which works in those who believe: ibid. The power of God unto salvation: Rom. I, 16. The word of life: Act. V, 20, by which we are begotten in Christ: 1. Cor. IV, 15; and those who announce the Word are said to beget and to have children: ibid. Therefore they are sent that they may open the eyes of men and thus men be converted from darkness to light and from the power of Satan to God, that they may receive remission of sins and a lot among the saints through faith, which is in Christ: Act. XXVI, 18. Now indeed formulae of speech of this sort signify a certain efficacy proper to the Word of God, which is immediately connected with salutary acts, so that on account of the Word of God itself heard there is excited in the soul a supernatural illumination and inspiration, almost in the way the Sacraments effect grace in us. Moreover, if the matter stands thus, there is no longer need of illumination and inspiration which are immediately from God.

Against the necessity of immediate illumination, however, Augustine seems to be, who in I. I. ad Simplicianum q. 2. n. 2. says: «But man begins to perceive grace from the time he begins to believe in God, moved to faith either by an internal or by an external admonition.» Whence presently, concerning Cornelius, he adds: that he «would in no way have believed unless he had been called either by secret admonitions through visions of the mind or of the Spirit, or by more manifest ones through the senses of the body.» Cf. also de Spir. et lit. c. 34.

I answer 1) The formulae adduced from the Scriptures certainly do not admit that interpretation which some of the Protestants would wish to impose, and which seems to be excluded by the objection itself: namely, that the illumination and inspiration of the mind are contained in acts which are naturally excited from the Gospel heard; for this is the heresy which the Fathers reprobated in the Pelagians, who reduced the help of God to the law and to doctrine.

I answer 2) The argument of the adversaries, even granted (which indeed we do not concede) all those things which they contend, proves nothing against the thesis. For that efficacy which in the objection is attributed to the Word heard for exciting supernatural acts in us either does not exceed the limits of a mere condition, or has some reason of causality properly so called. If the first, therefore an immediate interior operation of God is required. If the second, that efficacy cannot be physical, since not even such efficacy belongs to the Sacraments, but at most in the word heard it will be moral, insofar as, namely, from divine institution the preaching of the Word of God moves God to infuse into the soul of the hearer supernatural illuminations and inspirations. But in this hypothesis there is again demanded an illumination and inspiration which are immediately from God; therefore.

3. But if it be asked whether the preached Word is only a condition, or also a cause of the supernatural act, we reply this. Since the preached Word of God is something sounding outwardly and sensible, it is related in the manner of efficacy for moving the intellect just like other natural utterances. But, that preaching being posited, God is present, who inwardly gives the increase, illuminating and inspiring. Wherefore the interior act, viewed ontologically, is an effect of God; but the preaching of the Word is related both as a condition that the supernatural act may exist, and it is also a determining cause why the act is such objectively: such, namely, an apprehension, such a love, etc., since the divine immediate illumination is not of itself revelation (Th. VII.). This, moreover, and nothing more, is demanded by those formulae taken from Scripture which are adduced in the objection. For of a moral causality, placed in a certain dignity of the preached Word derived to it from the Word of God, which would move God infallibly to infuse actual graces — of this causality, I say, to be asserted we do not see a sufficient reason in those testimonies of Scripture and the like. Concerning which testimonies and formulae, by which the efficacy of the preached Word is expressed, two things are to be noted. First, that Scripture is wont to ascribe the effect which depends on several causes to one cause, the other causes not being mentioned. Second, that Scripture, frequently commending the efficacy of the Word, does not consider it separately, but together with those things which from the law of God are connected with it, that is, with the interior graces by which the preached Word itself, as it were, paves the way.

Finally, it will not be beside the point to note that that efficacy which is ascribed to the preached Word is to be attributed also to the other extrinsic means, which are able to excite pious thoughts and pious affections, and on the existence of which God bestows actual grace. That efficacy is to be attributed, I say, to those means at least analogically, that is, insofar as they represent the preached Word of God more or less and more or less equal it.

As for the testimonies of Augustine, comparing those things which were adduced from him in Thesis VII. and having examined the Catholic doctrine on the necessity of immediate illumination, from which Augustine certainly did not depart, indeed which he himself professed in Canon 4. of the Council of Carthage, whose author he himself was, or which he certainly approved, it must be answered that Augustine does not deny in the testimonies adduced the necessity of immediate illumination. Therefore the terms which are opposed in this disjunction, internal or external admonition, are not immediate interior illumination and mediate interior illumination, but immediate illumination with a preceding extrinsic ministry — which illumination is called an extrinsic admonition — and immediate illumination without extrinsic ministry, through an internal excitation either of phantasms or of ideas recalled into memory, or through a simple revelation, which can be.