Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

Domenico Palmieri

Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

Domenico Palmieri (1829–1909)

First published 1885

Dominicus Palmieri, S.J.'s Tractatus de gratia divina actuali (Gulpen, 1885) is a systematic Roman-school treatise on actual grace. After defining grace and its divisions, Palmieri examines its effects, necessity for fallen humanity, gratuitous character, efficacy, distribution, and relation to predestination, engaging Augustine, the Fathers, councils, Jansenism, and the scholastic disputes over physical predetermination. The sixty-two-thesis format exemplifies late nineteenth-century neo-scholastic dogmatic method: historical authorities are gathered into tightly argued theological conclusions. Schola presents the Latin work from the 1885 edition.


Prolegomenon I: Prolegomenon. De notione et partitionibus praecipuis gratiae divinae

Thesis I: Gratia, prout dicitur de bono aliquo alteri collato, definitur: beneficium ex benevolentia collatum citra exigentiam eius, cui confertur: ad quam definitionem redit illa communis Scholasticorum: donum gratis datum.

Thesis II: Gratia creata tum in donum naturale tum in donum supernaturale dispesci potest: supernaturale tamen donum potiore iure et magis proprie gratia dicitur; ita ut ea dona in ipsa ratione gratiae specifice differant.

Thesis III: Ratione habita tum status sive integritatis sive lapsus creaturae rationalis, tum principii meritori, quod proprium est alterius status, gratia supernaturalis distinguitur in gratiam Dei et gratiam Christi.

Thesis IV: Gratia supernaturalis alia est externa, alia interna.

Thesis V: Rursus gratia supernaturalis dividi debet in gratiam gratis datam, et gratiam gratum facientem, quae potior est illâ.

Thesis VI: Gratia gratum faciens alia est in habitu sita et permanens, alia actualis et transiens.

Caput I: De Gratiae actualis natura

Articulus I: De iis, quibus gratiae actualis ratio competit

Thesis I: Ad gratias actuales spectant mentis illustrationes tum quae tantum ab extrinseco excitantur in nobis, tum potissimum quas operatur quoque immediate Spiritus in mente nostra.

Thesis II: Ad gratiam actualem spectant quoque inspirationes voluntatis tum mediatae tum immediatae atque inspirationes immediatae inter gratias actuales enumeratas principem obtinent locum.

Thesis III: Gratiae actuales illustrationis et inspirationis continentur certe actibus vitalibus intellectus et voluntatis.

Thesis IV: Actus vitales, quibus continetur gratia actualis illustrationis et inspirationis, quae principium est deliberati actus et operis boni, sunt primo quidem actus indeliberati utriusque facultatis tum vero etiam actus deliberati.

Thesis V: Ex quo corollarii instar consequitur inter auxilia, quibus voluntas adiuvatur, aliqua exsistere, quae sint per se efficacia.

Thesis VI: Ratio gratiae actualis extendi potest etiam ad actus indeliberatos sensus et appetitus sensitivi.

Thesis VII: Ratio gratiae actualis ad universam quoque providentiam externam tum positivam tum negativam, qua ad opera salutaria et ad beatitudinem homines promoventur, extendi debet. 1.

Articulus II: De viribus quas gratia actualis confert

Thesis I: Gratia actualis confert vires morales voluntati ad honeste agendum.

Thesis II: Tenendum est actualem gratiam nedum morales, sed physicas quoque vires addere facultatibus nostris ad actus salutares eliciendos.

Thesis III: Non demonstratur inter gratias actuales recensendas esse qualitates quasdam reales, non vitales et suapte natura fluentes, quae principium intrinsecum sint actus vitalis indeliberati supernaturalis: tenere autem licet quod actualis gratia absolvatur tum actibus vitalibus tum divina operatione elevante facultatem et cum ea producente actus supernaturales.

Articulus III: De generali habitudine gratiae ad voluntatem

Thesis I: Constat ita addi per gratiam formaliter vires tum physicas tum morales voluntati, ut ex voluntate et gratia unum constituatur principium actus deliberati salutaris, quod est nempe voluntas elevata, illustrata, inspirata.

Thesis II: Gratia actualis interior multipliciter dividitur, nempe in excitantem seu vocantem et adiuvantem, in operantem et cooperantem, in praevenientem et subsequentem, in antecedentem et concomitantem.

Caput II: De Gratia actuali necessaria hominibus lapsis

Articulus I: De potestate naturae ad actus ordinis naturalis

Thesis I: In ipsa natura intellectus humani positum est, ut per solas naturae vires sit ei impossibile cognoscere veritates sibi naturales omnes simul collective sumptas.

Thesis II: Liberum quoque arbitrium gaudet naturaliter potestate physica semper honeste agendi servandique legem naturalem; quamvis ad idem praestandum impotentia quadam morali laboret.

Thesis III: Merito proscripta est doctrina, quae statuit omne, quod agit peccator, peccatum esse et omnia opera infidelium esse peccata liberumque arbitrium sine gratiae Dei adiutorio non nisi ad peccandum valere.

Articulus II: Quid natura humana per se sola non possit

Thesis I: Certum est, quoties in monumentis Ecclesiasticis doctrinam revelatam proponentibus legimus credendum esse quod bonum aliquod esse non possit in nobis vel actus aliquis fieri a nobis non possit citra auxilium gratiae, id de bonis et actibus salutaribus intelligendum esse.

Thesis II: Cum testificatione catholica satis constet citra gratiam nihil boni et salutaris in hominibus esse posse, speciatim affirmamus gratiae quoque deberi fidem saluturam eisdemque pium quodvis initium spiritumque precum.

Thesis III: Necessitas gratiae actualis ad agendum sicut oportet asserta a Patribus contra pelagianos, est necessitas non solum moralis, sed physica et absoluta.

Thesis IV: Ex qua doctrina Patrum consequitur actus salutares esse intrinsece h. e. entitate sua supernaturales.

Thesis V: Eamdem doctrinam necessitatis gratiae, quae saeculo V. a Patribus contra pelagianos propugnata est, iam Patres praecedentium saeculorum in Oriente et Occidente continenter tradiderant. 1.

This indeed must be certain for a Catholic, who knows that a doctrine preached and defined by the Church in any age can only be ancient. But, setting this extrinsic argument aside, the thesis is proved by proper arguments. And 1) it is evident immediately from the testimony of the Fathers of the fifth century, who testify that the Pelagian doctrine is new and that the Catholic doctrine was received from the preceding Fathers. Indeed, Augustine in De gratia et libero arbitrio, c. 4, says: «Such is the Pelagian heresy, not ancient, but arisen not long before our time.» And in Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum, Bk. IV, c. 8: «Let those be admonished who think that these men (the Pelagians) have something to say, how, before the new empty talk of these men, Catholic bishops followed the divine utterances in these matters, and let them know that by us the right and anciently founded Catholic faith is defended against the recent presumption and perniciousness of the Pelagian heretics.» Celestine in his epistle to the bishops of Gaul says: «Let novelty cease, if such is the case, to assail antiquity; let unrest cease to disturb the peace of the Churches.»

It is established 2) that the common sense of the faithful in the fifth century abhorred the doctrine of Pelagius; but this could not have come to pass unless the flock of Christ had been so instructed by the preceding pastors. Augustine in turn testifies to this in Serm. XXVI, c. 7: «We are often compelled to dispute with you against the new heresy that attempts to rise up... Those disputing against grace in favor of free will caused offense to pious and catholic ears. They began to be dreaded, they began to be avoided as certain ruin, it began to be said of them that they were disputing against grace.» Vincent of Lérins testifies the same in Common., c. 34: «Who ever, before that profane Pelagius, presumed so great a power of free will as not to think the grace of God necessary to assist it in good things through each single act?» The matter was therefore most thoroughly known to all before and after Pelagius.

There exist 3) direct testimonies of the preceding Fathers, of which it suffices to recite some from each side of the Church, the Western and the Eastern. From the Western Church. Clement of Rome in epist. 1 to Corinthians, n. 32, teaches that «all attained glory and increase not by themselves or by the power of their own works, but by the will of God», and in like manner that we obtain justice not by our own power or wisdom, nor by good works done by us with a pure heart, but through faith, by which God sanctified all from the beginning»; and accordingly in n. 38 he forbids the chaste man to be puffed up with pride, since he knows that it is another who bestows continence. Irenaeus, Bk. III, adv. haeres., c. 20, n. 3, says «Paul, announcing the infirmity of man, says: For I know that good does not dwell in my flesh, signifying that the good of our salvation is not from us but from God.»

»The Lord taught that no one can know God unless God teaches, that is, without God, God is not known.»Bk. IV, c. 6, n. 4. And in the same book III, c. 17, n. 2: «The Lord promised to send the Paraclete, who would fit us for God. For just as from dry wheat one mass cannot be made without moisture, nor one bread, so neither could we, being many, become one in Christ Jesus without the water which is from heaven. And just as dry ground, if it does not receive moisture, does not bear fruit, so also we, being at first dry wood, would never bear fruit unto life without the supernal voluntary rain.»

Tertullian, De Anima, c. 21: «A bad tree will not give good fruits if it is not grafted, and a good one will give bad ones if it is not cultivated. And the stones will become sons of Abraham if they are formed into the faith of Abraham. And the offspring of vipers will produce the fruit of penance if they spit out the poisons of malice. This will be the power of divine grace, more powerful indeed than nature, having in us the free power of the will lying subject to it.»

Cyprian (to whom Augustine appeals more than once, as in bk. IV contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum, c. 9) in the Epistle to Donatus: «You yourself know (the wonderful effects of baptism in me), and I do not proclaim them; boasting in one's own praises is an odious thing: although whatever is not ascribed to the power of man, but is proclaimed of the gift of God, can be not a boast but a grateful thing: so that not to sin has begun to be of faith, what before was sin, was of human error. Of God, I say, of God is all that we are able; from there we live, from there we prevail, from there, having received and conceived vigor while still placed here, we foreknow the signs of future things.»

And in bk. III of the Testimoniorum ad Quirinum he teaches that «one must glory in nothing, since nothing is ours.» Which he also proves by testimonies of Scripture: «What do you have that you have not received? etc. No one can receive anything unless it has been given to him from heaven.»

Arnobius the African, Contra Gentes, bk. II, c. 33: «You place the salvation of your souls in yourselves and trust that you are made gods by your own inward effort. But we promise ourselves nothing from our weakness, looking upon our nature as having no strength and as being overcome by its own affections in every contest of things. You, when once released from the knots of your members you have departed, think that wings will be at hand for you, by which you may proceed to heaven and fly to the stars; we dread so great audacity, nor do we think it to be placed in our own power to seek things above.»

Hilary in Psal. 118, v. 1: «The justifications are many...» and diverse, to be observed in the several kinds of duties; for the keeping of which, unless we are directed by the Lord, we shall always be weak through our nature. We must therefore be aided by his grace and directed, so that we may attain the order of the prescribed justifications ... Nor will anyone be able to attain the eternity of that blessed life by his own merit, unless he is borne forward by the mercies of him who is the Father of mercies. And in Psalm 123, n. 2: «What place of glorying is left to us who remember that all things are from God? If the mercy of God is not needed in all things, let us also claim all things for ourselves, as if they were from ourselves.» Ambrose (of whom Augustine relates several testimonies together with Cyprian in the cited book) in his commentary on Luke, Bk. II, n. 84, says «You see assuredly that everywhere the power of the Lord cooperates with human endeavors, so that no one can build without the Lord, no one can guard without the Lord, no one can begin anything without the Lord.» And in the exposition of the prophet Isaiah (cf. August. in the work now cited, c. 11) he teaches that, because human care without divine aid is weak for healing, it requires God as helper, and that to pray to God is a spiritual grace; for no one says Lord Jesus except in the Holy Spirit. And in the book De fuga seculi, c. 1: «Who is so blessed that he always ascends in his heart? But who can do this without the help of God? in no way indeed» and c. 3: «The law was able to stop the mouth of all, it was not able to convert the mind» and c. 7: «The law condemns the deed, it does not take away malice.»

From the Eastern Church. Ignatius to the Smyrnaeans, c. 1: «I glorify Jesus Christ God, who has made you so wise.» But how? gather it from what follows: c. 11: «according to the will (of God) I have been made worthy, not according to my own conscience, but through the grace of God, which I ask to be granted to me entirely, so that through your prayers I may attain God.» And in the epistle to Polycarp, n. 7: «That you devote yourselves to God is both the work of God and yours.» Justin in the Dialogue with Trypho, n. 102, citing the words of the Psalm: You are my God, depart not from me, teaches that we are taught by this prayer «that all ought to hope in God, who created all things, and to seek from him salvation and help.» Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech. XIII, n. 8, teaches that the act of faith is a gift of God and to be sought by prayers: «God, entreated by your prayers, will grant to believe both to us who speak the words and to you who hear.» Basil in Psalm 33, v. 3, teaches that «salvation consists not in the power or wisdom of man, but in the grace of God» and in the homily on humility, n. 3, says: «nothing is left to you, O man, of which you can glory; whose glorying and hope is placed in this, that you mortify all your own things and seek the future life in Christ, whose firstfruits we, having them, now live in these things wholly in the grace and gift of God. And it is God who works in us both to will and to accomplish for his good will.» Nazianzen, Orat. XXXVII, al. 31a, n. 31: «When you hear that: It is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy, I judge that the same must be thought by you. For since there are some who, on account of right deeds, are so lifted up in their minds that they ascribe all of it to themselves and attribute nothing to the Creator and author of their wisdom and supplier of all goods, Paul teaches them by these words that right willing itself also stands in need of divine help; nay, to speak more rightly, the will itself also and the choice of those things which are right and joined with duty is a certain divine benefit, flowing from the kindness of God. For it is necessary both that this be in our power and that we be saved through God. Therefore he says not of him who wills, that is, not of him who wills alone nor of him who runs alone, but also of God who shows mercy. Thus since a certain willing itself is from God, with the best right he assigned all to God.» Chrysostom, homil. XII on 1 Cor. IV, nn. 1, 2: «You have nothing of your own, but received from God. Why then do you carry yourself as having what you do not have?… You have received not this or that, but all things that you have. For these right deeds are not yours, but of the grace of God. Even if you speak of faith, it exists from the calling; and if you speak of the remission of sins… from there you received all things. What then, he says, do you have that you have not received? But you acted rightly of yourself: you cannot say this, but you received. And on that account do you exalt yourself and please yourself? For that very reason you ought to be kept within the bounds of modesty. For what has been given is not yours, but his who gave. For if you received, you received from him.» The same, hom. VIII on 1 Tim. III, teaches that all evil things come to pass by our will alone; but all good things from our will and his assistance.

II. Now if these testimonies are compared, it is indeed evident that there is lacking the more distinct manner of proposing the dogma, which is proper to the state of controversy; which defect accordingly also finds a place in the peaceful tradition of other dogmas: as regards the sum of the matter, although the tradition be less distinct, it is clear that the same heads of doctrine which were defended in the fifth century had been handed down from antiquity. For it is evident that the Fathers taught that Christian justice cannot be acquired by the powers implanted in nature, that grace is necessary, and that it is an interior grace of illumination and inspiration, by which God works the very willing itself and bestows faith itself, grace without which the law, or external grace, does not suffice, grace which begins good works in us and works them together with us, so that the works are gifts of God, while evils are only ours, that grace must be obtained by prayers, that all our good is from God, and that in nothing are we to glory, because nothing is ours. But this is the very doctrine of Augustine and of the others in the fifth century. Therefore.

Thesis VI: Gratia porro necessaria ad salutariter agendum iis, qui necdum sunt conversi ad Deum et quovis habitu supernaturali carent, est gratia duplex interior immediata, nempe illustrationis mentis et inspirationis voluntatis.

Thesis VII: Ut tandem de necessitate gratiae actualis pro iustis quoque disseramus, primum advertendum est quod cum gratia praeveniens dicitur necessaria ad omnes actus salutares, non eo ipso dicitur quod ad singulos actus nova gratia praeveniens sit necessaria.

Thesis VIII: Praestituto Tridentinae Synodi Sess.

Appendix I: De sententia Augustini circa necessitatem gratiae actualis in statu integritatis

Parergon I: De quadam sententia Ripalda

Caput III: De Gratiae actualis gratuitate et de praeparatione ad gratiam

Thesis I: Distincto merito operis condigno et congruo, docemus nullum esse posse in natura meritum, quo gratia comparetur atque utrumque pariter meritum naturae condignum et congruum a Patribus fuisse reiectum. 1.

Thesis II: Negandum est quoque naturam viribus suis posse sibi positivam dispositionem ad gratiam comparare.

Thesis III: Neque precibus naturae adseri potest vis impetratoria gratiae, ratione saltem habita huius, in quo versamur, providentiae ordinis.

Thesis IV: Calumnia est plurimos graecos Patres et nominatim Chrysostomum primas partes in ordine salutis tribuisse naturae et idcirco gratiam merito cuidam naturae congruo rependi affirmasse. 1.

Thesis V: Etsi illius theologici effati: *Facienti quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam*; interpretatio, quae statuit facientem quod in se est viribus naturae, se disponere negativa dispositione ad gratiam, permitti possit tanquam non derogans dignitati gratiae; attamen animadvertendum^[15.

Thesis VI: Gratuitas gratiae optime componitur cum impetrutione et meritis ope praecedentis gratiae comparatis.

Thesis VII: Formalis perseverantia, licet sit per gratiam, quae ex divina ordinatione ipsis debetur, in potestate omnium iustorum; est tamen adhuc donum Dei, distinctum a donis tum iustificationis tum illius potestatis divinitus collatae, ideoque donum speciale atque est donum iustis gratuitum; quod tamen iustus potest suppliciter emereri.

Caput IV: De Gratiae actualis efficacia

Articulus I: Synopsis historica controversiae Patres inter et Massilienses

Thesis I: Massilienses negarint ad salutare fidei initium necessariam esse gratiam interiorem immediatam praevenientem.

Thesis II: Gratia, quam Massilienses ad cetera opera necessariam fussi sunt, si in se spectetur prout est auxilium ad operandum, est illa eadem gratia, quam Augustinus contra pelagianos defendit.

Articulus II: Controversia circa gratiae efficaciam

Controversia cum haereticis

Thesis I: Haeretica est sententia, quae statuit ita voluntatem humanam per gratiam Dei antecedenter moveri, ut libertate indifferentiae sub eadem gratia sit destituta.

Thesis II: Sententia Iansenii: gratiam Dei ita esse efficacem, ut inter ipsam et libertatem exsistat habitus line quidem delectationis inde liberatae praevenientis victricis, inde autem voluntatis victae et ad unum insuperabiliter determinatae, qua parte statuit gratiam necessitatem inferentem, haeretica est nec a praecedente differt; quatenus vero gratiam, quae necessitatem infert, in delectatione collocat, falsa est.

Thesis III: Haeretica est haec divinae gratiae notio, quam Quesnellus systema Iansenii emendaturus tradidit, ut sit nempe ipsa omnipotens Dei voluntas vel operatio manus sive voluntatis Dei omnipotentis.

Thesis IV: Inepte vero ad plures Scripturarum locutiones provocant haeretici, ut suam haeresim tueantur.

Thesis V: Perperam ex iis, quae pelagiani ac massilienses contra Augustini doctrinam obiciebant atque ex difficultate, quam ipse Augustinus se experiri fatebatur in conciliando utroque dogmate libertatis et gratiae, colligunt haeretici sententiam, quam ipsi defendunt, esse ipsam Augustini doctrinam.

Thesis VI: Neque proficiunt magis afferentes doctrinam Augustini, qua traditur et explicatur sive gratiam operari ipsum velle, facere ut velimus, dare bonam voluntatem, dare omnia merita, totum esse gratiae, sive gratiam esse, quae nos discernit et opus bonum non esse volentis aut currentis, sed miserentis Dei, sive gratiam esse omnipotentissimam, efficacissimam, insuperabilem, indeclinabilem et a nullo duro corde respui.

Thesis VII: Inscite quoque Jansenius abutitur Augustini doctrina in Expositione Epistolae ad Galatas: quod amplius nos delectat, secundum id operemur necesse est atque appellatione victricis facta gratiae, ut evincat a maiori delectatione voluntatis consensum necessario extorqueri.

Thesis VIII: Falsa est doctrina, quam Iansenius asserit, enarrans distinctionem ab Augustino (*De Correp. et Grat.* cc. 10. 11. 12.) traditam duplicis adiutorii, nempe adiutorii sine quo non et adiutorii quo; falsaque est pariter interpretatio ab eodem Iansenio adlibita in Augustini locis.

Thesis IX: Gratia omnis potestatem tribuens operandi est vere sufficiens ad id propter quod datur, sive operatio consequatur sive non.

Thesis X: Ut gratiae pure sufficientis doctrina catholica impugnetur, frustra obiicitur 1) quod Augustinus aliam gratiam non agnoverit nisi efficacem sive praeter hanc non agnoverit nisi naturalem possibilitatem pelagianam, quod docuerit gratiam Dei nullo duro corde respui negaveritque gratiam Dei omnibus dari; 2) quod idem censuerit frequenter gratiam deesse, qua tentationes superari ac praecepta servari possint.

Controversia inter scholasticos

Thesis I: Sunt qui putant gratiam efficacem, per quam Deus praestat ut velimus, esse motionem Dei in voluntate receptam eamque praeviam prioritate saltem naturae ad actum secundum, quae ex ipsa sua natura sit efficax ita, ut eam necessario necessitate consequentiae sequatur voluntatis consensus atque ita necessario sequatur, ut quamvis voluntas libere vere agat, attamen contradictionem implicet ea gratia praeparari voluntatem eandemque voluntatem ei gratiae non consentire.

Thesis II: Omissa, quia non amplius necessaria, responsione ad argumenta quae ex testimoniis Scripturarum petuntur, ad Augustinum quod spectat, cui praecipue vel unice ex Patribus innituntur Thomistae, docemus Augustinum eam tradere notionem gratiae, quae theoriam gratiae physice praedeterminantis prorsus excludat.

Thesis III: Ex principio philosophico, cui sententia gratiae praedeterminantis innititur, petito ex dignitate causae primae, necessario consequitur Deum praedeterminare ad entitatem actus mali, quod nequit admitti.

Thesis IV: Alterum principium philosophicum, cui doctrina gratiae praedeterminantis innititur: nempe voluntatem, utpote facultatem indifferentem, indigere determinatione accepta ab alio, si eo intelligatur sensu, quo in hac quaestione adhiberi solet, infert libertatis interemptionem et est idcirco prorsus falsum.

Thesis V: Immerito tandem Thomistae obiiciunt nobis doctrinam s.

Thesis VI: lisdem pene omnibus argumentis hactenus allatis reiiciendum censemus quoque systema illud circa gratiam, quod Augustinianum audit. 1.

Thesis VII: Suppositis principiis fidei in hac materia: gratiam nempe interiorem praevenire et adiuvare nostram voluntatem, omnium actuum salutarium principium esse gratiam Dei, gratiam Dei vere sufficientem dari, liberum arbitrium integrum manere sub gratia gratiamque Dei abiicere posse seu Dei gratiae resistere: ita doctrinam catholicam hanc explicandam censemus.

Thesis VIII: Infallibilis proinde connexio futura gratiae, si haec datur, cum bono opere non est adaequate petenda ex efficacia virtutis gratiae et ex divina omnipotentia, sed ea supposita, formaliter petenda est ex divina praescientia, quae noscit quid sub qualibet gratia actura sit voluntas creata, si ea gratia ipsi donetur.

Thesis IX: Quum non modo bene agendi facultas, sed ipse bonus actus et consensus voluntatis a gratia pendeant, si fiat, quippe qui est a voluntate non per se sed per gratiam praeparata ut fiat; pronum est colligere, eum, qui bene operatur, nihil habere quod non acceperit Deumque esse qui illum discernit.

Thesis X: Talis autem explicatio doctrinae catholicae idoneis fundamentis innititur.

Caput V: De distributione gratiarum

Thesis I: Nulla Dei praecepta hominibus iustis volentibus et conantibus secundum praesentes, quas habent, vires, sunt impossibilia: praesto quoque illis est semper gratia necessaria, qua possibilia fiant.

Thesis II: Nemo est in hac vita adeo obstinatus in malo, ut quavis gratia sufficiente ad resipiscendum et salutem consequendam sit destitutus.

Thesis III: Nullis hominibus adultis vel infidelibus media opportuna aut gratiae sufficientes negantur, quibus ad agnitionem valeant venire veritatis salutemque tandem obtinere.

Thesis IV: Quemadmodum Deus nemini neget auxilia sufficientia ad salutem assequendam, non eadem tamen est quoad singulos distributio gratiarum.

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