Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

I. We say that in this doctrine of the Fathers, explained in the preceding thesis, is contained that grace is required on account of the entitative supernaturality of the act, which exceeds the physical power of nature. In order that this may be made clear, it is necessary to treat somewhat more fully of the supernaturality of the salutary act, which we presupposed in chapter 1° when treating of the nature of grace. Accordingly, these two things are to be established beforehand. Namely, it is certain 1) that the grace of adoption, by which we are named and are sons of God, and heavenly beatitude are absolutely supernatural and simply exceed the physical powers of nature: this is clear from what was discussed in the preceding Tract. de Deo Creante. It is certain 2) that the operations and acts of man, by which he disposes himself to the attainment of salvation, are proportioned to the dignity of the adopted son of God and to the excellence of the end, and therefore are found in the same order in which adoption and the end are found.

For actions of this kind are such as it behooves, as it is expedient for true piety, for preserving the grace of justification, for eternal life (cf. the doctrine of the Fathers in Th. XXI. n. 1a). These things being posited, if it be asked: A) why salutary acts are supernatural? it is answered: so that they may be proportioned to the supernatural life which the just live, and to the end to which all men ought to prepare themselves. But if it be asked B) in what their supernaturality is to be located: we answer that the generic reason (which of course holds for all acts) consists in this, that they are intrinsically, i.e., by their entity, supernatural, and are consequently above the physical powers of nature, and need, in order to be done, a special help of God unowed to nature, and are by their perfection proportioned to the dignity of divine adoption and to the dignity of the end. This, indeed, as far as possible, must be declared more fully.

Since it is agreed by all that salutary acts are supernatural, when this word is taken in a most confused notion, namely as it signifies acts that could not exist in pure nature — acts proportioned, in whatever way, to the attainment of the supernatural end; the question nevertheless is in what the supernatural character is determinately to be located. Let us premise the diverse opinions of certain authors.

II. There is therefore the 1st opinion: that the salutary act is supernatural because it is accepted by God as meritorious of eternal happiness, so that in itself it is indeed natural, but from this acceptance it receives the extrinsic denomination of a supernatural act. But this opinion cannot be received. For if it is so, the grace of God would not be required as the efficient principle of the salutary work, as an intrinsic principle in the one operating, since the work would not be elicited except by the powers of nature: but the grace of God is demanded as the efficient and intrinsic principle of the work, and it is denied that nature and the vigor of nature can produce these acts. Therefore. Moreover, Pelagius too, according to his heresy, could admit this free acceptance by God of a natural work: for when he said that adults merit by acts of nature the grace of adoption and the kingdom of heaven, he did not exclude that free acceptance of God, since he posited those things to be gifts which nature could lack; nor did he need to exclude that free acceptance of God; because even with it posited, if only it be posited, it is always true that man does not need intrinsic help by which powers are supplied to him: in which matter the heresy of Pelagius consists.

The 2nd opinion holds that salutary acts are indeed intrinsically supernatural in their becoming (in fieri), but not in their having been made (in facto esse); just as sight restored by a miracle is supernatural — which, as to the substance of the matter, is natural, but whose mode of acquisition is supernatural. But if it is so, the salutary act can be done equally perfectly even naturally; for this is proper to those things which are supernatural only as to mode, that they can also be done equally perfectly by nature; but the Catholic doctrine is that salutary acts can in no way be done by the powers of nature.

The 3rd opinion maintains that the salutary act is supernatural on account of some accidental, and therefore separable, mode inhering in the act, for instance a mode of greater intensity, duration, facility, which mode exceeds the powers of nature and depends on grace.

But, leaving aside the question of this theory of inhering modes, which is not philosophical, and leaving aside that the opinion demanding grace only for the facility of the act is plainly Pelagian: we note that these modes of intensity, duration and the like are not necessary in order that the act be salutary, but it is such per se even without any determinate degree of them; therefore grace would not be necessary per se in order that the act be salutary, as the Catholic definition teaches, but only per accidens: which comes back to a certain error of the Pelagians.

Again, that inhering mode is either entirely from grace alone, or from grace together with free will: if from grace alone, free will contributing nothing; 1) this mode can here avail nothing for salvation, because it is not done freely; 2) it is truly not a mode of the act, but a certain reality existing along with the act, because the mode of an act ought to proceed from the agent itself, from which comes the exercise of the faculty or act. But if the mode is from grace and free will together, since the act as to substance is natural, the mode too, proceeding from the one eliciting the moral act and proceeding from the same action (I say the same action; because if the action is diverse, that which is called a mode will not in reality be a mode of the act, but another act), and inhering in a natural subject, cannot be anything but natural, and to that extent can be said to exceed the powers of nature, insofar as that mode of acting is morally impossible to nature alone. But the salutary act is impossible to nature alone not morally only, but physically. Therefore.

The 4th opinion posits that the act is indeed natural as to substance, but is supernatural on account of the character of merit which is in it, and that this character of merit is borrowed from grace; so that by grace there is elicited indeed an intrinsically natural act, such as could also be elicited by nature alone, but because it is elicited from grace and is a special work of God, it obtains the character of merit for eternal life. But neither is this opinion sufficient. For 1) the Catholic doctrine is that grace is required in order that the act be able to become worthy of eternal life — not only that it be able to be done easily, but that it be able to be done at all — and consequently that by grace powers are added in order that the act be done; but the addition of powers looks to this, that the very substance of the act be done, not only that some extrinsic denomination be added to it, of which sort is this character of merit, which accrues to the act — no differently than to one that would be posited in pure nature — as natural from the fact that it is done with God as agent. 2) If the act can be done by nature equally perfect as to all its reality, it is asked why this act posited by nature is not accepted by God? For whether it be done from grace or not, when in itself it is an equally perfect act, there seems to be no reason why God should reject the one and accept the other.

But the opinion teaching that natural acts acquire the character of the supernatural from sanctifying grace, by which the operating subject is adorned, 1) does not hold for those acts which are done by sinners, 2) nor does it suffice for the acts of the just, since, as we shall teach, actual grace is required also for them, 3) nor do these two things sufficiently cohere: that the subject is in the supernatural order, and that its operation, which it produces, as such, is natural (Cf. Suarez. I. II. de Necessitate Gratiae cc. 4. seq.).

III. Therefore it remains that we say that the good act, as it behooves for salvation, enjoys that perfection which is intrinsically supernatural, i.e., intrinsically more excellent than that perfection which can be acquired for acts by the powers of nature; and therefore that the mode of perfection which is signified by the words sicut oportet is an intrinsic mode of the act, by which its essence is constituted; and that for this reason, on account of that perfection which is proper to an intrinsically supernatural act, grace is required in order that it may be done by us.

An act of this kind is wont to be called supernatural as to substance. In which matter, lest an equivocation creep in, take the words of Suarez C. c. 4. «If the substance of the act be taken for the genus, it is clear that supernatural acts are not supernatural in substance, but rather agree with natural acts, namely in the genus of knowledge or assent or love or hope or in some other similar genus. For if they did not have this agreement, they could not be acts elicited by our powers, because powers cannot be elevated beyond their objects, at least the most universal ones. With the substance of the act taken in this way, these acts will be called supernatural as to mode, insofar as the specific difference is said to modify the genus. But that the act as to substance is commonly wont to be taken for the act considered according to the general character of assent or love about such an object, Molina notes in Concordia q. 14. a. 13. Disp. XV.». Here, however, we do not speak in this sense, but we call those acts supernatural as to substance in which the genus of knowledge or love is essentially contracted by a difference of a higher order, that is, which pertains to a certain grade of things surpassing the natural order, and therefore elevates the acts themselves to it. Whence it comes about that they can be elicited neither by our powers, nor by angelic powers, nor perhaps (that ‘perhaps’ could have been omitted) by any creatable intellect through natural powers. But then such an act is wholly supernatural as to substance, that is, as to its entity; because the specific difference elevates the genus of knowledge or love to the supernatural order, and so the whole entity is supernatural; because in reality there is no actual distinction between genus and difference, and an indivisible entity cannot be in diverse orders, natural and supernatural.

IV. Now indeed it is certain that such supernaturality is possible. For if there were any difficulty, it would be this: that the act which is called supernatural is posited vitally by nature; for it is the intellect that believes, e.g., and the will that loves; but if it is posited vitally by nature, then it is exercised by the powers of nature; for nature and its power are the same thing: but that which is posited by the powers of nature, how can it be conceived as intrinsically, as to its entity, supernatural? But we concede that nature by its powers contributes to the production of every act, even the supernatural one, for every one of these acts must be vital; but it can contribute in two ways, namely either by natural powers only, or by elevated powers, i.e., powers which belong to it according to obediential potency and which are made ready for acting by a special operation of God unowed to it. When nature elicits acts in this second way, since they are acts of an elevated faculty existing in the supernatural order, they can borrow from it the same perfection, or obtain an intrinsic perfection greater than that which purely natural powers can confer; and therefore be intrinsically supernatural. For the intrinsically supernatural is not that to which nature contributes nothing, but that to which nature by itself alone, without the elevating help of God, cannot contribute.

Moreover, we have already proved in Tract. de Deo Creante Th. XXXVI, n. IV. the possibility of supernatural acts — a demonstration which, if you please, compare. According to it we indeed disputed Ib. iVI., when we excluded non-vital qualities from the census of actual graces. Furthermore, if the state of adoptive filiation, by which we are made partakers of the divine nature, is intrinsically supernatural (cf. Tract. cit. Th. XXXVII); since it is a certain state of life and operation, it is fitting that the acts also proportioned to it be intrinsically supernatural. Cf. Ripalda op. cit. disp. XLIV. Sect. 3.

And indeed that salutary acts are really intrinsically supernatural is proved from that necessity of grace which the Fathers assert, and to which we have seen that no other hypothesis about the nature of supernaturality gives satisfaction. From this demonstration it is clear that all salutary acts whatsoever are intrinsically supernatural: for the doctrine of the Fathers on the necessity of grace extends equally to all pious acts. Although, however, among the Fathers this appellation ‘intrinsically supernatural’ does not occur formally applied to acts, it occurs nevertheless equivalently, as is clear from the demonstration.

V. But if salutary acts are intrinsically supernatural, and therefore their entitative perfection is greater, why are not all salutary acts discerned, and indeed with certainty, from purely natural ones? Perhaps it could first be answered, according to a certain opinion (cf. Ripalda Disp. XX), that they are not discerned for this reason: because all good acts which are done in this order of providence, at least by the faithful, are supernatural; wherefore the term of comparison is lacking, i.e., a natural good act, with which we could compare the pious salutary acts. But this response in reality does not satisfy; for even with that granted, evil acts always remain, from which natural good acts do not differ as to entitative perfection, and with which, therefore, by reason of this perfection, salutary acts could be compared — between which, nevertheless, and those, no difference is discerned according to entitative perfection. Therefore, setting aside this opinion of Ripalda, which is not certain (cf. what is to be said in the Parergon at the end of Cap. II.), and which here served only to render the solution of the question obstructed, in order that we may settle the question according to the natures of things, we judge that these things are to be established.

1 1) It must be admitted that a natural act can be borne upon the same material and formal object upon which the supernatural act is borne. This is a sufficiently common opinion (cf. Molina in Concordia in q. XIV. a. 13. Disp. VII. XIV: Meyer Histor. de Auxiliis L. V. c. 6: Ripalda Disp. XLV. Sect. 1. 5. 6.). Indeed, we have already seen, with St. Thomas leading the way (Th. XX.), that man can naturally love God above all things on account of His goodness, which is the formal motive of charity; but if he can do this, why will the natural faculty not be able to be exercised about the material and formal objects of the other virtues, in which surely there is no greater difficulty? And in truth, when a herald of the Gospel has proposed and declared the mysteries of faith to unbelieving men and has confirmed his preaching by an evident miracle, it is denied only irrationally that it is in the natural power of reason then to believe those things to God testifying, whose testimony is made certain through a miracle. For if we can believe a man, why can we not believe God, whose authority is certain to reason, and whose revelation is also known with the help of reason on account of the miracle?

Suarez indeed denies this, contending that the supernaturality of the act of Faith proceeds from its formal motive, De Fide D. III. S. 3. But this doctrine of Suarez is interwoven with his opinion about the analysis of the act of Faith, which opinion is special and seems scarcely intelligible to not a few. Wherefore Lugo, unmoved by his arguments, thought otherwise: De virtute Fidei D. 1. S. 5. n. 65. «it is answered that the supernaturality of Faith does not proceed from the motive which it has; for about the same motive a natural act can perhaps turn: the supernaturality therefore proceeds from the nature of the assent itself, which in its entity» has proportion with the supernatural end”: and this very thing is what we defend. Cf. the same D. IX. S. 1ª. But what Suarez affirms about the faith of a heretic — and can equally be transferred to that faith of a Gentile man which we just proposed by way of example — namely, that the heretic does not resolve his faith into the authority of God, as the Catholic does, but into his own private persuasion, does not seem sufficiently aptly said. For the difference between either act (besides the fact that the faith of the Catholic is supernatural, that of the heretic natural) turns on that which is a condition for the act of Faith, not its formal object; the Catholic, namely, leans upon the authority of the Church manifesting divine revelation, the heretic upon his own private judgment interpreting the written word of God or the monuments of Tradition; whence it comes about that the faith of the Catholic is per se infallible, for always, under the magisterium of the Church, it attains that which is truly revealed by God and that alone; the faith of the heretic, on the contrary, is fallible, no differently than the judgment on which it leans. But, given this judgment, the assent of the heretic is borne upon something apprehended under this formal character, that it is revealed by God. Lugo indeed teaches that in the present order supernatural acts, even of the moral virtues, differ in some way on the part of the motive from natural acts, because by them the object is attained insofar as it falls under revelation and pleases God, ibid. D. IX. S. I. But I ask: does not, with revelation proposed externally, the same object with that mode first naturally come to be apprehended by the intellect? and after this apprehension, can there not follow a natural act of the will upon that same thing which is known to please God? Lugo himself does not deny this, who speaks of what is wont commonly to be done by those who lack revelation. Finally, that we may also bring forward the doctrine of the Church for our opinion: this is the reason why ecclesiastical definitions do not simply deny that we can believe, hope, love, etc. without grace, but deny that we can do this as it behooves, as it is expedient for salvation: by which limitation it is presupposed that we can, e.g., believe God: and who believes God unless moved by the formal motive of God revealing? Cf. the things said in Th. XXII. Nevertheless 2) it must be held that a natural act cannot be borne upon the same object of the supernatural act according to the same intrinsic perfection. The reason is that the supernatural act, by the very fact that it is such, since it is above the powers of nature, is intrinsically more perfect: for the more perfect is the principle of action, the more perfect is the action II. q. CXIV. a. 2. ad 2. The judgment of this matter is gathered, e.g., from the act of supernatural faith, of which sort is the faith of the Catholic, which is firmer and more efficacious; the same can be seen in the act of charity, which is borne upon God, beloved with the love of friendship, and to be united to man by an immediate union — which love is proper to the adopted son of God admitted to the participation of those goods which are proper to God. This mode is the intrinsic perfection of charity; but the natural love of God above all things lacks that perfection intrinsically. Nevertheless, upon all those things which are contained in the object of charity, with external revelation presupposed, the will can be borne even naturally; and although this act is intrinsically more imperfect, nevertheless the same perfection can be simulated by the effort of nature. Did not the heresies too have their martyrs? These things being posited, behold the solution of the proposed difficulty. Since we do not see our acts in themselves, and the intrinsic or entitative perfection of the act and of its very mode does not fall under the internal sense, but we discern our acts from the general mode of tending toward something (for instance, of knowing, of willing) and distinguish them from their objects; but upon the same objects, when they are sufficiently proposed externally, both a natural and a supernatural act can be borne; hence it comes about that we lack a criterion for discerning in the concrete natural acts from supernatural ones.

VI. But, you will say, if a natural act can attain the same formal objects which are attained by supernatural ones, it is natural to ask 1) why God does not accept natural acts too, which according to the moral dignity that depends on freedom can be equal to supernatural ones? 2. How can the judgment of the Church about the supernatural holiness of some man be certain?

I answer to the first. God does not accept those acts, not because that is repugnant, or because God could not, if He willed; but because God wills that the acts by which we tend to the end be in the same order in which the end is, which is intrinsically supernatural, and consequently wills that their principle be His grace. But what is said about moral dignity must be distinguished In Hie q. CXIV. a. 3. a meritorious work, according as it proceeds from free will and according as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit. If the work be regarded in the first way and in reality have only that mode. the work is not meritorious of the supernatural good on account of the greatest inequality. «If, however (the holy Doctor continues ibid.), we speak of a meritorious work according as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit (and therefore is supernatural), so it is meritorious of eternal life de condigno (worthily, by condign merit; he speaks of the works of the just). For the value of merit is weighed according to the power of the Holy Spirit moving us to eternal life. The price of the work is also weighed according to the dignity of grace, by which man, made a partaker of the divine nature, is adopted as a son, to whom the inheritance is owed from the very right of adoption.»

Hence the condemned 13th proposition of Baius: «The good works done by the sons of adoption do not receive the character of merit from the fact that they are done through the Spirit of adoption inhabiting the hearts of the sons of God, but only from the fact that they are conformable to the law, and that obedience to the law is rendered through them.»

To the second it must be said that, since the end is supernatural, and supernatural works are required for it, and these cannot be had without grace; it must be held that the grace of God is always at hand for the faithful, so that their works can be as it behooves, and that consequently all their good acts — at least those which are ruled by faith — are supernatural.

VII. That we may return to the demonstration itself of the thesis: there will not be lacking those who say: some natural help, e.g., a suitable thought, is truly the grace of God; it is moreover absolutely necessary for acting rightly: therefore the sayings of the Fathers, when they proclaim the necessity of grace, can be taken of this help, not of some supernatural help for supernatural acts. We have already forestalled this difficulty at the beginning of the preceding thesis: but that it may be completely demolished.

I answer. a) That which is done through helps of this kind can also be done naturally through other helps which lack the effect; whence there is in nature a physical power for those acts which would be done through those helps; which power, however, is denied to nature with respect to those acts which are done through grace.

b) This help is such that without it no natural good is ever done; but the grace which the Fathers defend is such that without it some natural good can be done and is done. Hence also the condemned 29th proposition of Baius: «Not only are those thieves and robbers who deny that Christ is the way and the door of truth and of life; but also whoever teaches that men can ascend from elsewhere than through Him into the way of justice, i.e., into some justice, or that man can resist any temptation without the help of His grace, so that he is not led into it, or is not overcome by it.”

c) Pelagius would not have recoiled from this natural help; rather he seems to have been content with those graces of knowledge conferred by God, which Pelagius admitted, by which the possibility of nature was helped to operate more easily. But those graces indeed do not suffice. See Vasquez in 1. 2. q. CIX. Disp. 189. c. 16.

VIII. You will say again: physical power or impotence is spoken of with respect to the ontological perfection of the effect: but the supernatural perfection which belongs to the act is a moral perfection; therefore either the impotence of nature is not physical, or the supernaturality of the act does not cohere with it.

I answer. Just as the perfection of the act of the vision of God, and of the charity consequent upon it, is an ontological perfection, so also the perfection of the salutary acts, which dispose to those acts, is ontological. Whence, to the argument, the major being granted: that the supernatural perfection is a moral perfection, i.e., of dignity and of proportion with the end to be attained, I concede; that it is a perfection consisting only in conformity with the law, I deny. This is established also from certain condemned propositions of Baius, 61. 62. 31., by the condemnation of which is established the distinction between the conformity of the work with the law and its goodness or rightness from the object and all circumstances, and a certain mode of works, i.e., a meritorious mode, from the fact that they are from a living member of Christ through the Spirit of charity. Cf. the doctrine of Thomas recited a little before.