Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

I. It is certain that, on account of the infirmity of nature, it is very difficult for man, and morally impossible, to overcome all grave temptations and always to keep the law of God, if he is left to the sole powers of his nature (Th. LX.); moreover, this moral impossibility entails the moral necessity of some supernatural help. And let it suffice now to have dealt with these historical questions of the Pelagian heresy, lest the synopsis, drawn out too long, accuse its title of shameless mendacity. Other things, distinguished in their proper places, when we treat of Pelagian impeccability and of the errors of the Massilians, we shall give more opportunely. And because the knowledge of the doctrine of Augustine and the explanation of the formulas which he frequently uses also pertain to the history of the dogma, these we shall try to hand down in cap. IV, when we impugn the heretical doctrines. superadded to nature. This help, taken universally, can be considered both in the order of pure nature and in the order of elevated nature. In the order of pure nature, although taken generically it could be said to be owed to nature, lest the attainment of the end be morally impossible for it, nevertheless considered in the individual, insofar as it is conferred on these or those persons rather than on that one, it would have the character of a gratuitous favor, that is, of grace. In the order of elevated nature, however, if that help is connected with that order and conduces to the end of the same order, and so is itself found within the order of elevation, it will have to be called gratuitous under this respect, just as the order of elevation itself. But if nature is elevated, which by sin fell from the former state of elevation, and so adoption is restored to it, as to one positively unworthy, together with the other goods accompanying it, then again for a special reason a help of this kind, which looks to these gifts, will have to be called grace.

But now it is established that the Fathers, and especially Augustine, frequently demonstrate the necessity of actual help from that difficulty and moral impotence which is said to have arisen chiefly from the vice of nature, which is concupiscence: and they proclaim the necessity of that help which is able to lead men to the kingdom of heaven. It is manifest, therefore, that at least a moral necessity of actual grace is proclaimed by the Fathers, nor is there any difficulty in this matter. But the question is whether, besides this, another greater necessity, which is called physical, has been affirmed against the heretics by the Fathers. We now enter upon this question.

II. For the necessity of grace or of help for acting can be conceived in many ways. Moral necessity is the necessity of help for being able easily or more easily, not for being able simply, arising, namely, from the difficulty of the act, not from pure impossibility. Hypothetical necessity is a necessity determined by some accidental hypothesis, which, if it is absent, there is in nature no necessity of that help which is said to be necessary. This necessity is also called consequent: for some necessity is called consequent for this reason, because it supposes and follows some accidental hypothesis. On the contrary, physical necessity of help is the necessity of help for being able simply, supposing an impotence, not a mere difficulty. Absolute necessity is a necessity which holds before any hypothesis whatever, or in any hypothesis that occurs. Hence it is an antecedent, not a consequent, necessity.

But the absolute necessity of some means for a certain end, if the end is not necessary to nature of itself, does indeed suppose the contingent hypothesis of this end; but, this being posited, it holds before any hypothesis whatever, or in whatever hypothesis the subject which is ordained to the end is constituted.

Therefore the physical and absolute necessity of help for acting salutarily, for the attainment of the supernatural end, is a necessity essentially bound up with nature, which by itself alone is physically impotent for acting: a necessity independent of any hypothesis, whether of sin, or of innocence, or of integrity, or of concupiscence. Moreover, of this kind is the necessity which the Fathers vindicated for that grace by which we are helped to act. We do not say that it is only this, and not also, under a certain respect, the moral necessity of which we have already spoken: but we defend that the Fathers certainly taught this physical and absolute necessity of grace against the Pelagians.

Before we demonstrate this, note 1°, what pertains to the matter to be demonstrated: that the necessity cannot be asserted of that help which is natural of itself, namely, the congruent thought exciting the will to a good act. For although without this thought, which actually obtains assent (whence it is called congruent), the act would never come to be, it is nevertheless false that it cannot come to be without it; for a sufficient power of assenting is present without that special thought. Moreover, where there is a sufficient power of acting well, another superadded help cannot be physically and absolutely necessary. Note 2°, what pertains to the method of demonstration. Namely, some doctrine can be confirmed by the testimonies of the Fathers either insofar as it is proposed by them in express and frequent words, or insofar as it is most certainly contained in those things which they teach. Since the Catholic intellect admits of progress, and the manner of expounding the same truths of the Faith has not always been the same: no Catholic ought to be struck by any difficulty, if, in order that the ancient tradition of some dogma be demonstrated, testimonies are not produced which affirm it in the same verbal formulas which the Catholic intellect has afterwards been accustomed to use. Let us come, therefore, to the proof of the thesis.

III. The proof of the thesis can be proposed in this way. If the Fathers 1) while conceding that human nature can do some morally good thing, deny to that same nature, without grace, even with suitable gratuitous moral helps applied, any possibility of salutary good, not merely for doing it more easily, but for doing it simply, whether for beginning or for perfecting it, if 2) they teach that grace was necessary even for the whole and sound man in order to act: if3) they affirm the same necessity also with regard to the Angels: if4) they teach that grace is necessary for any salutary action, even the least, to which no special difficulty can attach from concupiscence or any other vice of nature: if5) they compare salutary works with miracles, and under that respect in which miracles are above the power of nature: if6) they teach that the grace necessary for acting salutarily is such that it confers on man holiness and justice, restoring him to that perfection and that power of acting which he received from the beginning: if, I say, the Fathers hand down these things, they teach the same thing, that the necessity of actual grace for acting salutarily is physical and absolute: but these things they in fact hand down; therefore. The major and the minor are to be proved separately. The major is proved, which is conditional, and its consequence is to be proved. And so as to the first: for an impotence to be physical in nature with respect to something, it is required that nature not be able to do that thing intrinsically, even with the greatest difficulty, and that even extrinsically, namely, with suitable helps applied, which can be conferred gratuitously and by which the intellect is persuaded and the will is morally moved, it again not be able to do it; for when nature is so disposed, it labors not under moral impotence alone, but under physical; for if it were moral impotence alone, this would at length come down to a difficulty, and with suitable moral helps applied, that difficulty could be overcome by nature. Therefore, if the Fathers teach that there is in nature no possibility, not merely for doing more easily, but for doing at all the salutary good, and deny that it is in it even when gratuitous moral helps are applied, they in fact teach a physical impotence and consequently a physical necessity of grace, by which alone they say that possibility is conferred.

Likewise, if nature can do some morally good work, there is in it by this very fact a physical power of all the works of the same order as those which it can do: wherefore, if, that possibility of an honest work having been conceded to nature, any possibility of a salutary work is then denied to it, this must be said to be above the order of those things which nature can do; which are natural moral works; therefore the salutary work is above the order of natural works: but this is the same as saying that it is above the physical powers of nature. Therefore.

As to the second: If grace was necessary for the whole and sound man, such as Adam was created, in order that he could act salutarily at all: this surely is a physical and absolute necessity. For, given nature not merely complete in its own order, but also praeternaturally perfected, so that there would be no proneness to evil, no difficulty to good, no necessity of grace could arise except from nature itself, insofar as nature is finite and created; but this is a physical and absolute necessity.

As to the third: If grace is asserted to have been necessary also for the Angels, who are of a more perfect nature than the human, in whom there is no tinder of animal concupiscence by which they might be inclined to evil, in order that they could act salutarily at all, the reason for this necessity cannot be anything other than the physical and absolute impotence of created nature. And indeed, since the Fathers did not recognize certain degrees of perfection of the angelic nature, which nature is nevertheless more perfect in its kind than the other diverse possible natures, they could not have asserted that grace is necessary for the Angels too in order to act salutarily, unless they had thought that for any created nature, by the very fact that it is a created nature, grace is necessary. But this is a physical and absolute necessity. And if the necessity of grace for the Angels is physical and absolute, it will have to be said to be so also, and much more so, for man. Therefore.

As to the fourth: Likewise the necessity is physical and absolute, if grace is necessary for any salutary action, even the least, to which there is no special difficulty from concupiscence or any other vice of nature; for if it were only a moral impotence, something in that order could be done; if it were an impotence consequent upon concupiscence and some other vice of nature, those things could be done in which they offer no obstacle at all. Therefore.

As to the fifth: A divine operation not owed to nature is necessary with a physical and absolute necessity for working miracles; therefore divine grace also, necessary with the same necessity for salutary works, if these are to be compared with miracles.

As to the sixth: If the Fathers teach that grace is necessary for acquiring justice and holiness, for exercising actual justice, whether to be attained or to be conserved, and that justice and holiness which are supernatural, the necessity of grace is physical and absolute. holiness, which Adam lost; they surely do not derive the necessity of grace only from the difficulty that arises from the vice of concupiscence, but from the dignity and perfection of the work to be exercised through grace. Therefore they do not teach only some moral hypothetical necessity, which would at length arise from the vice of concupiscence, but they teach a physical, absolute necessity. For the justice and holiness of which Scripture and the Fathers speak is, according to them (as we here suppose from the Tract. De Ordine supernaturali, even independently of this special argument of the necessity of grace), above the physical powers and the exigency of any creature whatsoever.

Now the individual minors of the argument set forth above are proved. 1) That the Fathers conceded to nature the power for some moral work is clear from Ih. XX. et XXI. That they denied to it every possibility of the salutary work, not merely for doing it more easily, but for doing it simply, whether for beginning or for perfecting it, is clear from the condemnation of the Pelagian heresy, against which the Fathers always urged that saying, both separately and in the Councils, which Augustine states (cont. duas epistt. pelagg. I. II. c. 8.) «The Lord, in order to answer the future Pelagius, did not say: without me you can do with difficulty, but said: without me you can do nothing. And in order to answer even those future ones (who seemed to think that the perfection of the work alone was to be attributed to grace), in that same evangelical sentence He did not say: without me you can perfect nothing, but do.... For when the Lord said: without me you can do nothing, He comprehended the beginning and the end in this one word.» Likewise, that the Fathers denied to nature alone every possibility of salutary good is clear from can. 7 of Conc. Araus. II: «If anyone affirms that by the vigor of nature he can think as is expedient or choose, etc., some good which pertains to the salvation of eternal life, without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit ... he is deceived by a heretical spirit.» But that the same Fathers denied to nature, even aided by suitable and gratuitous moral helps, this possibility of good, is evident again from the condemnation of Pelagius, who admitted these helps, «by which the eyes of the heart are opened, by which we are illuminated by the multiform and ineffable gift of heavenly grace, by which the will, astonished, is aroused to the desire of God, by which everything that is good is persuaded» (De Gratia Christi cc. VII. X.), and yet the sufficiency of nature aided even by these supports is denied by Augustine (ibid.), and was denied by all who held Pelagius, confessing these helps, because he confessed these alone, to be a heretic. Therefore.

2. Augustine teaches the second in Enchirid. c. 106: «Just as it is in a man's power to die when he wills, but for keeping life the will does not suffice, if the helps, whether of foods or of any protections whatever, are lacking: so man in Paradise was capable by his will of killing himself by abandoning justice: but in order that the life of justice might be held by him, willing was not enough, unless He who had made him helped.» Cf. De Genes. ad lit. L. XI. c. 4. De Corrept. et Grat. c. II. epist. CLXXXV. c. 11. et De Genes. ad lit. L. VIII, cc. 10. 11. 12. The same is the opinion of Gelasius, Rom. Pontif., writing against the Pelagians: «If in the first men themselves, while they trusted, to be sure, in their own happiness, and yet, receiving the grace of God in vain — not praying, which indeed they are reported never to have done, nor giving thanks for what they had received, nor suppliantly imploring that those gifts might remain inviolate — they could not remain unharmed: how much more after the ruin of the transgression ... can they not stand without the divine gift (the discussion is about those who are already just, and therefore about the necessity of a help that is not habitual, but actual), without which not even the whole could have persisted.» The same is confirmed by the authority of the Fathers of the Synod of Arausic. II, who approved this canon. 19m «Human nature, even if it remained in that integrity in which it was created, would in no way preserve itself, its Creator not helping. Whence, since without grace it could not keep what it received, how, without the grace of God, will it be able to repair what it lost?»

Furthermore, let it be weighed that by these and many similar testimonies the necessity of grace for integral nature is handed down in the same formulas by which it is asserted for fallen nature, and that, a comparison being made, the same is affirmed of both states, namely, that man cannot act well without helping grace. Therefore not mere difficulty, but simple impotence inhered in integral nature for acting salutarily without grace, just as is affirmed of fallen man.

3. Augustine again teaches the third in De Civit. Dei L. XII, c. 9: «Who had made that (good will in the Angels) except Him who created them with a good will, that is, with chaste love, by which they would cleave to Him, at once both forming their nature and bestowing grace?... It must therefore be confessed with due praise...» of the Creator, that it pertains not to holy men alone, but can be said even of the holy Angels that the charity of God has been poured out in them through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to them.» Furthermore, to this testimony of the Apostle Augustine appeals six hundred times, in order to demonstrate the necessity of the grace of God, the grace of inspiration, without which nature is wholly impotent for good. This is also the doctrine of s. Anselm, De Casu diaboli c. 1: «It is sufficiently clear that it applies no less to the Angels than to man (the testimony of the Apostle: what have you that you have not received?). It is established, therefore, that that Angel who stood in the truth, just as he therefore persevered because he had perseverance, so he therefore had perseverance because he received it, and he therefore received it because God gave it.» But the same observation is to be made concerning this point of doctrine as concerning the preceding one.

4. The fourth is gathered from these testimonies of Augustine, De Corrept. et Grat. c. 2: «The grace of God through I. Ch. D. N. is to be understood, by which alone men are freed from evil, and without which they do absolutely no good, whether in willing and loving or in acting — not only so that, with it showing, they know what is to be done, but also so that, with it supplying, they do with love what they know.» Of Caelestinus, in Auctorr. Sedis Apost. c. 9: «Thus God works in the hearts of men, and in free will itself, so that holy thought, pious counsel, and every movement of a good will are from God, because through Him we can do some good, without whom we can do nothing.» Conc. Arausic. II, c. 7: «If anyone affirms that by the vigor of nature he can think as is expedient or choose... some good which pertains to the salvation of eternal life, without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who gives to all sweetness in consenting to and believing the truth, he is deceived by a heretical spirit.» Here every salutary operation is withdrawn from the power of nature, none is excepted, not even the lightest and easiest; for what is easier than some thought? but no pious thought at all, and therefore not even that which precedes the determination of the will, can be in us from the vigor of nature. Therefore.

5. The fifth is established from the doctrine of Augustine, De Spir. et lit. c. 1. ad Marcellinum: «It seems absurd to you that something should be said to be able to be done of which an example is lacking, since, as I believe, you do not doubt that it never happened that a camel passed through the eye of a needle, and yet He also said that this is possible for God; read also the twelve thousand legions of Angels could have fought for Christ, lest He suffer, and yet it was not done... Whence we ought not therefore deny that it can come to be that a man be without sin, because there is none among men, except Him who is not only man but also by nature God, in whom we could show this to be perfect. Here perhaps you may answer that those things which I have recalled were not done, and could have been done, are divine works; but that a man be without sin pertains to the work of man himself.... and therefore it is not to be believed that no one has been, or is, or will be in this life who fulfilled this work, if it can be fulfilled by man. But you ought to think that, although to do this pertains to man, this also is a divine gift, and therefore not to doubt that it is a divine work. For it is God who works in us, says the Apostle, both to will and to perfect.» And in c. J. he adds: «I wish, if I can, to show that what the Apostle said: the letter kills, but the spirit gives life, was said not of figurative locutions, although that too may be fittingly understood, but rather of the law openly forbidding what is evil. When I shall have shown this, it will certainly appear more manifestly that to live well is a divine gift, not only because God gave to man free will, without which one lives neither well nor badly, nor only because He gave a precept, by which He teaches how one ought to live; but because through the Holy Spirit He pours out charity in the hearts of those whom He foreknew in order to predestine, predestined in order to call, called in order to justify. But when this shall have appeared, you will see, as I think, that it is said in vain that those things alone are possible without example which are works of God, as we recalled concerning the passage of the camel through the eye of a needle, and whatever other things are impossible among us, but easy with God; and therefore that justice is not to be reckoned among these, because it ought to pertain not to the work of God but of man: whose perfection, if it is possible in this life, there is no reason why it should be believed to be without example. That this therefore is said in vain will sufficiently shine forth, when it has become clear that human justice itself is to be attributed to the operation of God, although it is not done without the will of man.» With this absolute demonstration, he concludes in c. 35.: It seemed absurd to you that a thing which can be done should be without an example. Hence arose the question of this book, and for this reason it pertained to us to show that something can be done, although an example is lacking. Hence from the Gospel and the Law we set forth certain things at the beginning of this discourse, as about the passage of the camel through the eye of a needle.... To these can be added also the case of that mountain, which faith would transfer into the sea, which nevertheless we neither read nor heard was anywhere done.... But because it can be said that those works are divine, while to live justly pertains to our works, I undertook to show that this too is a divine work, and I did this in this book, perhaps more verbosely than is enough; but against the enemies of the grace of God I seem even to have said too little, and nothing delights me to say so much as where His Scripture most supports me and it is brought about that he who glories, glories in the Lord, and that in all things we give thanks to the Lord our God, having our heart on high, whence from the Father of lights every best gift and every perfect gift is. For if on that account it is not the work of God, because it is done by us, or because we act while He gives, neither is that the work of God, that a mountain be transferred into the sea, because the Lord said that it could be done by the faith of men, and attributed this to their own work.... Behold how perfect justice is without example among men, and yet is not impossible. It would, however, be so great, if nothing of those things which pertain to justice were hidden, and they so delighted the mind, that that delight would overcome whatever other pleasure or pain impedes; that this is not so pertains not to impossibility, but to the judgment of God. For who does not know that it is not in a man's power what he knows, nor does it follow that what has been known as to be sought should be sought, unless it delights as much as it ought to be loved? But this belongs to the health of the soul."

It is evident that that is called a divine work which is above the power and exigency of nature, which can be done by God alone: that among these divine works there is also to be numbered, in Augustine's judgment, the perfection of justice, that is, justice excluding any sin whatever, even one improperly so called; and it is to be numbered among divine works in such a way that this is in no way hindered by the fact that justice is done by us, or because our cooperation is required.

Augustine adds nothing by which he might in some degree temper this comparison of perfect justice with divine works or miracles, and signify that he is using it improperly, but he affirms that parity absolutely, although this parity is the subject of the disputation of the whole book, which surely ought to have been determined accurately. Moreover, if perfect justice is a divine work, justice itself is to be called, without qualification, a divine work; indeed Augustine's proof comes back to this, namely, that perfect justice is a divine work because to live well is a divine work; but to live well is a divine work because the charity of God is poured out in our hearts, on which justice depends of itself. God therefore can, by a poured-out charity which delights as much as it ought, bestow also perfect justice: but by His just judgment this gift is not conferred at present.

6. Finally we wish to prove from a certain appellation given to grace, of which someone could abuse to prove the opposite. Thus it is the teaching of Augustine and of the other Fathers that the grace by which we are helped to operate as we ought is a medicinal and healing grace: for human nature was weakened and vitiated through the sin of the first parent, whereas it was whole and sound in the first man before sin. But grace healing from the infirmity contracted through guilt is a grace restoring to that health or that perfection in which man previously was, who was created just and holy. And in truth, according to the Fathers, the health which grace restores is not only that which cures the wound of concupiscence, but that which restores justice and holiness both formally and efficiently, by which we are made just, holy, and sons of God. Therefore when healing grace is spoken of, the perfection of that state is regarded, from which nature departed through the sin of the first parent, which perfection is not only of integrity, but also of holiness. For that reason, healing actual grace is a grace conferring powers not only for conquering or bridling concupiscence, which grace in itself is necessary with only moral necessity, and which in itself does not exceed the natural order; but it is a grace conferring powers for exercising actual justice and holiness and for either acquiring or conserving and promoting habitual justice. Therefore.

The major is proved, the minor is proved; it follows, therefore, that the Fathers asserted a physical, absolute necessity of actual grace.

Note. The proofs of the thesis are drawn principally from Augustine, and there is none of those six chapters which Augustine did not assert. It is evident, therefore, that Augustine acknowledged and proved the supernatural dignity of the salutary act. For he asserted the necessity of grace either only on account of the difficulty arising from concupiscence, or chiefly on account of the supernaturality of the act: but not the former, because that is not a physical and antecedent necessity: therefore.

IV. Against this physical and absolute necessity of interior immediate grace asserted by the Fathers, the rationalists argue ineptly. For they say that the character of an intelligent nature requires that it be moved objectively, but that subjectively it moves itself; for in this it differs from natures lacking reason, which are moved subjectively. Especially since subjective motion is repugnant to freedom, which ought to be the principle determining the act. Furthermore, if the immediate operation of God is necessary in order that one act well, whenever one does not act well, as when one sins, the cause of this will have to be sought in God, who denied grace, whence God would be had as the author of sins. Again, this doctrine of necessary immediate grace fosters the dreams of the mystics and teaches that each one's private sense is to be preferred to the public magisterium and to common opinions. Finally, it is a doctrine which we are unable to attain by reason; for it is not permitted to comprehend how God moves our faculties immediately.

To the first. It is indeed the nature of intelligent beings to be moved objectively; but they cannot be moved subjectively in such a way that a deliberate act is immediately excited or determined, which would not by that very fact be free: but they can be moved subjectively in such a way that indeliberate acts are excited in them, which are necessary and according to which they agree with non-intelligent beings, which can be moved subjectively. Moreover, when an intelligent being is to be elevated to an order exceeding the limits of its nature, it is fitting that it be subjectively affected and moved.

To the second. If God did not operate inwardly through His grace except in such a way as to determine the good act, and this operation of God were necessary in order that any good act come to be, what is objected could be conceded: but if God operates in such a way that He leaves the exercise of freedom intact and it is in man's power to follow or not to follow God calling, what is opposed must be denied.

To the third. We deny 1) the supposition. For they suppose that the immediate illuminations are true revelations, by which we are taught apart from the extrinsic magisterium. But we have shown this to be false. Moreover, 2) neither are those true revelations which foster the dreams of the mystics, but presumptuous and imaginary ones. revelations, and the spirit of pride, which deceives perverse men, fosters the same dreams.

To the fourth. Although reason cannot attain the immediate operation of God in our faculties, this is surely not a sufficient reason for denying it or doubting it; since it is proved most certainly by infallible authority. Moreover, from those things which were said in chapter 1 it is clear that a sufficiently clear concept of this matter can be formed in the mind.

V. You will object against the proof of the thesis. 1) The grace for which the Fathers disputed against the Pelagians is the grace which heals the wound of concupiscence; it is the grace which the first man did not need; August., De nat. et grat., c. 64: «But now the question concerns human nature, which is vitiated; the question concerns also the grace of God, by which it is healed through the physician Christ, which it would not need if it were sound, which is defended by him (Pelagius) as sound, or as sufficient to itself through the freedom of the will, able not to sin.» But the grace by which concupiscence, which is a vice of nature, is healed, which Adam did not need, is not a grace which is required with physical and absolute necessity: therefore.

I answer. That the grace about which the Fathers disputed is the grace by which the wound of concupiscence is healed and at the same time that from which concupiscence proceeded, i.e., sin, with man restored to the friendship of God and to the supernatural order — I concede; that it is a grace which only heals concupiscence — I deny. Wherefore Augustine in the same book, c. 59, says that human nature through the grace of Jesus Christ «is either healed because it is vitiated, or is helped because it does not suffice for itself.»

Again, Adam before sin did not need that grace which the Fathers defended against the Pelagians, i.e., he did not need that grace insofar as it is a fighting grace, a grace healing the infirmity of nature, insofar as it is the grace of the Redeemer — I concede; he did not need that grace insofar as it is illumination and inspiration, the existing principle of the supernatural salutary work, the grace of elevation — I deny.

That this response is fair ought to be manifest to those who consider that Augustine teaches that grace was necessary for Adam standing and for the Angels, teaches that the health which is restored through the grace of Christ looks to this, that the justice and holiness lost through sin be restored, teaches the impotence of nature for any salutary work, even the least, teaches namely that it is impossible without the grace of God to produce any good salutary work, teaches the physical and absolute impotence of nature for salutary works. These things cannot be composed with those which are objected by the adversaries, except through the response brought forward.

Of course, before sin there was in man a power of operating salutarily without difficulty, a power coalescing from sanctifying grace, the integrity of nature, and actual grace — which actual grace indeed was suited to that state, granted liberally, not mercifully, not healing, but following upon health.

But after sin was committed, to that easy power of operating salutarily succeeded a physical and absolute impotence of operating salutarily, on account of the loss of grace, and a moral impotence of operating rightly, on account of the concupiscence that had arisen. But this moral impotence is both a certain sign of the former impotence, because it is a certain sign of the loss of grace, and it is a part of the total impotence which followed sin in man. Indeed, the physical impotence of operating salutarily and the moral impotence of operating rightly are not, in man considered historically in the state of fall, the grace of God being set aside, two separable impotences, but together they necessarily constitute one total impotence: for the one could not exist without the other. Wherefore it can be said that concupiscence considered historically comprises also the defect of the physical and absolute power of operating salutarily, which power is to be recovered through grace mercifully granted to unworthy nature, and medicinal. Hence the grace healing concupiscence, necessary against concupiscence, is the grace by which not only some difficulty of the good arising from the inclination of nature to evil is overcome, or by which nature, which is vitiated through sin, is healed and restored to its pristine state, to which it had been elevated, by which consequently the physical and absolute power of operating salutarily is conferred. Moreover, cf. the Appendix at the end of this chapter.

And note that Jansenius admits that Augustine taught the physical and absolute necessity of grace for this state, but wills that Augustine taught that necessity not on account of the excellence (supernatural dignity) of the act, but for overcoming concupiscence. But in order that Jansenius might defend this, he was forced to assert that both concupiscence and grace have a power necessarily determining the will; for in this hypothesis, if namely the will is necessarily and antecedently determined by concupiscence to evil, grace is necessary to it with physical and absolute necessity, the grace by which the will is withheld from evil and bent to the good. But this opinion is not only false, but absurd, as we shall see in its own place. But with that opinion rejected, in order that the doctrine of Augustine on the physical and absolute necessity of grace may be understood, nothing remains except that we say that Augustine asserted that necessity on account of the excellence of the act: for the free will under concupiscence cannot suffer anything but moral impotence.

They insist, however. According to Augustine, the grace which we ask for is that by which a great will is made in us (De gratia et lib. arb., c. 17), through which we will as much as suffices that we may do by willing (ibid., c. 16), through which a man who willed and could not, can, provided he fully wills (Serm. 158), through which we will something the more vehemently the more ardently it delights us (De pecc. mer. et rem., Bk. II, 17), through which what did not delight becomes sweet (ibid., c. 19). But these things are well understood if grace is a delight which opposes concupiscence and conquers it; but if grace looks to this — that, a precision being made from concupiscence, it confer the power of operating salutarily — it cannot be understood to what end such a comparison of grace with concupiscence looks, namely that it be a sweetness, a delight, and a delight greater, more vehement, more ardent. For if grace confers simply the ability to operate salutarily, even when concupiscence does not exist, neither is it necessary that it be a delight, nor is that excess of delight over concupiscence required.

I answer that in grace a twofold power is to be distinguished, physical and moral (chap. I, art. 2). But physical power belongs both to the grace which is not followed by the consent of the will and is called sufficient, and to the grace which is joined with the act and is called efficacious. Moreover, the difference of each grace is not in the physical power, which is the same in both and cannot be different, but in the moral power, yet not necessarily in first act, but in second act; for the will acts because it freely delights it to act, which free delight indeed takes its origin from a preceding indeliberate delight. Hence one who, speaking of grace, considers it under that aspect by which it is efficacious and obtains consent, is inclined to view it chiefly from the side of the moral power, by which the will is so attracted that it freely chooses that which grace persuades. Moreover, Augustine disputing in general with the Pelagians speaks of efficacious grace: for the question was by the power of what the good acts which are done come to be: the discussion therefore concerned that grace by which they come to be; this, moreover, is efficacious.

You will object, 2. There can be a physical and absolute necessity even of some gift natural in itself, as in a sick man the necessity of some help for walking: so in nature vitiated through concupiscence there can be a physical and absolute necessity of medicinal grace.

I answer. The necessity of help for a sick man is not absolute for the nature of the sick man, but hypothetical, namely with the infirmity posited, apart from which there is no necessity of help. But grace is said to be necessary to nature not only as infirm, but also as sound: whence the reason is not the same.

VI. Therefore if you ask the reason why the necessity of actual grace is such, it is clear that this depends on the fact that the grace which is required must be proper to that order to which nature has been elevated. But since this order is above the physical powers of nature, which accordingly, for bringing forth the works of this order, labors of itself with physical impotence; therefore it demands by physical necessity itself the help by which it may be assisted in bringing forth such works. Which indeed will be more fully declared in the following thesis.