Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

I. We say that the doctrine of the Catholic tradition concerning the necessity of grace, which the Church defends against heretics, regards salutary goods, i.e. either salvation itself, both begun in justification and completed in beatitude, or the works by which we are disposed to attain both. Indeed no one of the Fathers has denied that any natural good is a gift of God; but we now speak of those gifts which, in the Pelagian controversy, were called simply grace by the Fathers, when they proposed revealed doctrine. Now indeed 1) there is nothing in the whole of tradition that compels us to accept another interpretation, so that all natural goods and acts too must be numbered among those which divine tradition teaches to be owed to the grace of God. And in point of fact 2) the Fathers, when they teach that the grace of God is necessary for acting, clearly signify that they are speaking of acts which pertain to salvation. This indeed is clear either from the very nature of the acts which they mention, of which sort are believing, preparing oneself for justification, etc., or it is clear from the express words by which this is stated. Thus Fulgentius, De incarnatione et grat. c. 21: «There is no one who can naturally will any good that pertains to eternal life»; and in Conc. Araus. II, c. 7: «If anyone, through the vigour of nature, can think any good that pertains to the salvation of eternal life, as is expedient» etc. Trident. Sess. VI, cn. 1: «If anyone shall have said that man can believe, hope, love or do penance, as is fitting, so that the grace of justification may be conferred upon him, without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit and his help, let him be anathema.» Surely the Fathers frequently add this express limitation — that it pertains to piety, to salvation, as is fitting for salvation — to those acts for which they require the grace of God, or when they speak of the grace of Christians: August. de Gratia Christi c. 27. De Praedest. SS. c. 2. Cont. duas epistt. Pelagg. c. 5. Patres Africani in epist. ad Innocentium. Conc. Arausic. cc. 6. 7. Trident. Sess. VI. cn. 3. The Fathers, therefore, speak of salutary acts. But the Baianists are inept, who by formulas of this kind — as is expedient, as is fitting — wish to signify that perfection of the act which is owed to it in order that it be honest, namely that it be done from the love of God; for they say that this motive of love is required in order that the act be simply honest (cf. propp. Quesnelli 41–58.). But besides the fact that the signification of this formula has been sufficiently determined by the Fathers, who expressly add for justification, for salvation, for eternal life, for the salvation of eternal life; if the formula as is fitting looked to this, that the act be done from love, then love itself would never be numbered among these acts: but love itself is numbered among them: therefore. Furthermore, some thought of a good must precede the love of God; it therefore cannot be required to be from the love of God: but grace is required, so that any thought of a good that pertains to salvation be in us as is expedient; therefore that formula does not signify the motive of the love of God. Nor does that formula, that the act be as is fitting, signify only this, namely that the act be meritorious, in whatever way at all and of whatever good at all it be meritorious — which would be just the same as saying that the act be morally good: but some quality of the act is signified which is required in order that the act be meritorious of salvation (which quality is supernatural) or dispose to it, lacking which quality the act could nevertheless be morally good and meritorious of a natural reward. Certainly, besides the fact that it is the doctrine of the Fathers and of the Church (Th. praec.) that morally good acts, and therefore acts meritorious of some reward, can be done without grace: the Fathers themselves expressly teach what that is on account of which it is necessary that the act be done by grace, i.e. piety, eternal life, justification. And let these things be said concerning the force of this formula, the understanding of which will be necessary for us when we treat of the supernaturality of the salutary act. Now, as far as the present thesis is concerned, we gather that the Fathers, upholding the necessity of grace, spoke of acts which are meritorious of salvation or dispose to it, i.e. of salutary acts.

II. The same also 3) Augustine, in the name not only of his own but of all Catholics fighting for grace against the Pelagians, most expressly professes in the same passage weighed above, from Bk. IV Cont. Iulian. c. 3. n. 33: »Or certainly, since at least you concede that the works of unbelievers, which seem to you to be their good works, do not nonetheless lead them to everlasting salvation and the kingdom; know that we (namely all Catholics) say that that good of men, that good will, that good work cannot be conferred on anyone without the grace of God, through which alone a man can arrive at the eternal gift and kingdom of God.« Thus Peter the Deacon to the Bishops of Africa in Sardinia (Oper. August. Tom. ult. App. p. 1771. Migne): »Without this grace a man can indeed think and desire human things, but he cannot think or will or desire divine things.«

III. Nor 4) did the Fathers in the Council of Carthage, en. 5, interpret otherwise the words of Christ, Ioan. 5: Sine me nihil potestis facere; for they say: »the Lord was speaking of the fruits of the commandments (the fruit of the commandments is the merit of eternal life); where he did not say, sine me difficilius potestis facere, but said sine me nihil potestis facere.« And again Augustine explains the words of Paul, 2. Cor. III, 5: Non sumus sufficientes cogitare aliquid a nobis, quasi ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est thus: »What therefore pertains to religion and piety, of which the Apostle was speaking, we are not fit to think anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God.«

To which 5) the suffrage of the Schools also accedes: for, as s. Bonaventura witnesses, in 2m D. XXVIII, a. 2. q. 3: »Therefore they say…

that man can neither think nor will any good without the help of divine grace, because they speak of the good according as it is ordered to attaining beatitude.»

IV. Finally 6) it is confirmed and placed in open light by the proscription of the three propositions of Baius, by which propositions it is rejected, and by the proscription of which the threefold distinction established by the Scholastics is defended and proved, namely 1st of a twofold love, natural and gratuitous (prop. 31), then 2nd of a twofold way of fulfilling the divine commandments, namely as regards the substance of the work and as regards the meritorious mode (prop. 61.), and 3rd of a twofold goodness of the work, namely goodness merely moral and goodness meritorious of the kingdom of heaven (prop. 62). For that threefold distinction had this in view, that acts elicited by the powers of nature be distinguished from salutary ones and that we be taught that the grace of God pertains and is required for these, not for those. it is confirmed and placed in open light by the proscription of the three propositions of Baius, by which propositions it is rejected, and by the proscription of which the threefold distinction established by the Scholastics is defended and proved, namely 1st of a twofold love, natural and gratuitous (prop. 31), then 2nd of a twofold way of fulfilling the divine commandments, namely as regards the substance of the work and as regards the meritorious mode (prop. 61.), and 3rd of a twofold goodness of the work, namely goodness merely moral and goodness meritorious of the kingdom of heaven (prop. 62). For that threefold distinction had this in view, that acts elicited by the powers of nature be distinguished from salutary ones and that we be taught that the grace of God pertains and is required for these, not for those. Moreover, the Apostolic See, establishing and defending this distinction, teaches 1) that not all morally honest works are by that very fact salutary: 2) that grace is not required for any morally honest work whatever, since morally honest acts can be done even by the powers of nature; and therefore 3) that when the Church defends that grace is required for performing a good work as is fitting, it is speaking of a certain kind of acts, namely of salutary acts.

This doctrine of the Church, which so manifestly shows itself in the proscription of the propositions of Baius and of Quesnellus too (cf. 2. 38. 39.40. 41.), must be carefully attended to: for since it cannot happen that the doctrine of the Church of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries be different from the doctrine of the fifth century — rather, the doctrine of the Church, always remaining indeed the same, is more clearly explained with the progress of time — it will follow that the distinction between natural and supernatural acts, so manifestly asserted by the Scholastics of the middle ages and afterwards solemnly approved by the Apostolic See, is found also in the doctrine of the ancient Fathers, although not always expressed so clearly, as regards the substance of the matter.

V. What then is it that occurs in Hieronymus in Dialogue 1º adv. Pelag. mn. 3 and 4, where those are reproved «who take away God's help in each single thing we do?» For the Pelagian argues thus: «If in each single thing we do we must use God's help; then shall we not be able, unless God helps, also to trim the pen for writing, and to rub the trimmed pen with pumice and fit the hand to the letters, to be silent, to speak, to sit, to stand, to walk, to run, to eat, to fast, to weep, to laugh, and other things of this kind?» But the Catholic answers: «In my judgment it is clear that we cannot.» By these things, moreover, not the necessity of prevenient and helping grace, but the natural concurrence of God seems to be proved, nor is there speech about some kind of acts, but about any whatever. I answer 1) that this argument is proper to Hieronymus, who wrote the dialogues shortly after the heresy arose: but to what the common opinion of Catholics looked, Augustinus taught us by the testimony cited under n. 3. I answer 2) that the aim of Hieronymus in these dialogues is not directly the attack on the error concerning the necessity of grace, but another, namely impeccability. I answer 3) that what Hieronymus asserts in the cited passage is both true and can avail to prove that it is not in man's power to keep himself immune from any (even the least) sin, if he wills (namely if he wills by the powers of nature alone), as the Pelagians contended.

VI. Therefore from all these things it manifestly appears what those goods are for which the Fathers proclaimed grace — i.e. the divine help, gratuitous and unowed to nature — to be necessary. As for the Scriptures, it must be noted that, since natural goods too are gifts of God and we can do nothing according to nature without the help of God, and this is a truth of the greatest moment, it ought not to be a wonder that this doctrine too is preached by the Scriptures. But when the Scriptures preach that grace of which the Fathers speak and commend its necessity, they themselves look to the same goods which the Fathers looked to. This can easily appear from the very collation of the principal testimonies of Scripture. In which matter, note that we do not deny that many testimonies of Scripture, especially if taken by themselves, signify also natural goods and the natural help of God; but we affirm that those testimonies which signify the necessity of grace — of that grace, I say, which the Church defends against the Pelagians — refer directly to salutary goods and works and on their account vindicate the necessity of grace. But if you ask which these testimonies are, we answer in general that we understand those which have been used by the Fathers in the Pelagian controversy.

VII. But what we assert can be proved 1) from the very interpretation of the Fathers, who, employing them, spoke of salutary goods, as we have seen. Then 2) as regards many, it can be made known from their very matter, namely when they speak of faith, of justification, of eternal salvation or things of this sort. 3) As regards certain others, which seem more universal, the same will be clear once the analysis of them, at least of the principal ones, has been undertaken. Therefore a) what Christ says, Ioann. XV, 5: quia sine me nihil potestis facere, looks to this, that it give the reason of what he had said before: ego sum vitis, vos palmites, qui manet in me et ego in eo, hic fert fructum multum. Namely, that we may bear fruit, Christ teaches that we must adhere to him as branches to the vine, because without him we can do nothing, i.e. if we do not adhere to him as to the vine, we can bring forth no fruit: moreover the fruit which is drawn out from the vine, Christ, is a salutary fruit; for Christ is the vine in the salutary order, whose branches are not men but Christians.

b) The words of Paul, 1 Cor. XV, 10: Gratia Dei sum id quod sum et gratia eius in me vacua non fuit, sed abundantius illis omnibus laboravi, non ego autem, sed gratia Dei mecum, the context teaches, are to be understood of the grace of conversion to faith and of the Apostleship.

c) The words of the same Paul, 2 Cor. III, 5: Non quod sufficientes simus cogitare aliquid a nobis, quasi ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est, are referred to those thoughts which look to salvation, i.e. to the supernatural order of procuring salvation. For when the Apostle had said earlier that he is not like many, adulterating the Word of God, but speaks from sincerity, as from God and before God and in Christ, he subjoins that the testimony of this matter, namely of his sincere ministry, is the Corinthians themselves, in whom the ministry of his preaching was efficacious unto salvation, that this testimony is known to all and is the testimony of Christ, who, cooperating with the preaching of Paul, bore witness that his ministry is sincere; then he concludes that he has confidence or persuasion that his ministry is such, before God through Christ. But to give the reason or explain why he has this confidence not in himself, but through Christ before God, he subjoins: non quod sufficientes simus cogitare aliquid a nobis, quasi ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est, who also made us fit ministers of the new testament. Therefore the thoughts for which sufficiency is suggested by God look to the ministry of salvation, to be promoted in others, and therefore to the salutary order. Cf. the words of Augustinus cited above under n. 4.

d) Likewise the words of Paul, Philipp. II, 13: Deus est qui operatur in vobis velle et perficere, are set forth as the reason of the preceding: cum metu et tremore vestram salutem operamini; the discourse, therefore, is about a salutary will and accomplishment.

e) Likewise the words of Iacobi I, 17: Omne datum optimum et omne donum perfectum desursum est, descendens a Patre luminum, set forth the salutary and supernatural gifts, which are κατ᾽ ἐξοχὴν best and perfect; whence this reason of this saying is given: voluntarie enim genuit nos verbo veritatis, by which words spiritual regeneration is signified.

The words of I Cor. IV, 7: Quis te discernit? quid autem habes quod non accepisti? can by themselves, and even with account taken of the context (cf. A. Lapide in h. l.), be taken also of natural gifts, of which sort are wisdom, eloquence. But they can also — certainly with the context itself permitting — be taken of supernatural gifts or charisms and salutary goods; they are indeed most universal. «Nihil ex te habes, sed a Deo accepisti... Non enim haec recte facta tua sunt, sed ex Dei gratia proveniunt. Si fidem dixeris, ex vocatione illa venit; si remissionem peccatorum, si charismata, si doctrinae verbum, si virtutes, omnia inde accepisti. Quid ergo habes quod non accepisti?» (Chrysost. in h. l. hom. XII in I Cor.). Moreover, according to this second, truest sense as regards salutary goods, this testimony is always urged by the Fathers against the Pelagians (cf. August. de Praedest. SS. c. 5, and De Corrept. et Gratia c. 7, and most especially the Fathers of Conc. Arausicanum II, c. 6).

Finally, if account be taken of the character of this book, which is the divine Scripture, it will easily appear that man's good is not exhibited by it simply except what pertains to union with God and eternal beatitude. For Scripture regards man not philosophically only, but theologically, and considers man not as he could be of himself, but as God, creating him from the beginning, willed him to be, and as he restored him through Christ. Scripture itself, indeed, was given to us for this end, that we be helped to attain salvation.

VIII. You will say that grace is demanded by the Fathers so that we may be able to resist the stimuli of concupiscence, and that therefore it is asserted that man without grace is of himself impotent to bridle concupiscence. Therefore, not only for the salutary or supernatural act, but for the simply honest act itself, grace is required according to the Fathers.

I answer 1) that by the Fathers there is not affirmed a physical impotence to bridle concupiscence, but a moral one, for which some help of God is required. 2) But that the Fathers require the help of grace properly so called, acquired by the merits of the Redeemer, comes from this, that the Fathers speak of that resistance to concupiscence and victory over temptations which avails unto salvation. This, moreover, is clear from what has been proved so far. But if it be asked why the Fathers make no mention of some help of purely natural Providence, which would be necessary so that facility be had at least for a naturally honest act, this came about either because the Fathers were not solicitous about purely natural acts, since about them strictly there was no question, and they more or less numbered them among sins, as we have seen; or it came about because that opinion sat in their minds which Ripalda defends, de Ente Supern. D. XX.

Cf. Livinum de Meyer Hist. Contr. De Auxilis I. V., cc. 22. 23. 36.