Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

I. We say that the doctrine of the Catholic tradition concerning the necessity of grace, which the Church defends against heretics, regards salutary goods, i.e. either salvation itself, both begun in justification and completed in beatitude, or the works by which we are disposed to attain both. Indeed no one of the Fathers has denied that any natural good is a gift of God; but we now speak of those gifts which, in the Pelagian controversy, were called simply grace by the Fathers, when they proposed revealed doctrine. Now indeed 1) there is nothing in the whole of tradition that compels us to accept another interpretation, so that all natural goods and acts too must be numbered among those which divine tradition teaches to be owed to the grace of God. And in point of fact 2) the Fathers, when they teach that the grace of God is necessary for acting, clearly signify that they are speaking of acts which pertain to salvation. This indeed is clear either from the very nature of the acts which they mention, of which sort are believing, preparing oneself for justification, etc., or it is clear from the express words by which this is stated. Thus Fulgentius, De incarnatione et grat. c. 21: «There is no one who can naturally will any good that pertains to eternal life»; and in Conc. Araus. II, c. 7: «If anyone, through the vigour of nature, can think any good that pertains to the salvation of eternal life, as is expedient» etc. Trident. Sess. VI, cn. 1: «If anyone shall have said that man can believe, hope, love or do penance, as is fitting, so that the grace of justification may be conferred upon him, without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit and his help, let him be anathema.» Surely the Fathers frequently add this express limitation — that it pertains to piety, to salvation, as is fitting for salvation — to those acts for which they require the grace of God, or when they speak of the grace of Christians: August. de Gratia Christi c. 27. De Praedest. SS. c. 2. Cont. duas epistt. Pelagg. c. 5. Patres Africani in epist. ad Innocentium. Conc. Arausic. cc. 6. 7. Trident. Sess. VI. cn. 3. The Fathers, therefore, speak of salutary acts. But the Baianists are inept, who by formulas of this kind — as is expedient, as is fitting — wish to signify that perfection of the act which is owed to it in order that it be honest, namely that it be done from the love of God; for they say that this motive of love is required in order that the act be simply honest (cf. propp. Quesnelli 41–58.). But besides the fact that the signification of this formula has been sufficiently determined by the Fathers, who expressly add for justification, for salvation, for eternal life, for the salvation of eternal life; if the formula as is fitting looked to this, that the act be done from love, then love itself would never be numbered among these acts: but love itself is numbered among them: therefore. Furthermore, some thought of a good must precede the love of God; it therefore cannot be required to be from the love of God: but grace is required, so that any thought of a good that pertains to salvation be in us as is expedient; therefore that formula does not signify the motive of the love of God. Nor does that formula, that the act be as is fitting, signify only this, namely that the act be meritorious, in whatever way at all and of whatever good at all it be meritorious — which would be just the same as saying that the act be morally good: but some quality of the act is signified which is required in order that the act be meritorious of salvation (which quality is supernatural) or dispose to it, lacking which quality the act could nevertheless be morally good and meritorious of a natural reward. Certainly, besides the fact that it is the doctrine of the Fathers and of the Church (Th. praec.) that morally good acts, and therefore acts meritorious of some reward, can be done without grace: the Fathers themselves expressly teach what that is on account of which it is necessary that the act be done by grace, i.e. piety, eternal life, justification. And let these things be said concerning the force of this formula, the understanding of which will be necessary for us when we treat of the supernaturality of the salutary act. Now, as far as the present thesis is concerned, we gather that the Fathers, upholding the necessity of grace, spoke of acts which are meritorious of salvation or dispose to it, i.e. of salutary acts.

II. The same also 3) Augustine, in the name not only of his own but of all Catholics fighting for grace against the Pelagians, most expressly professes in the same passage weighed above, from Bk. IV Cont. Iulian. c. 3. n. 33: »Or certainly, since at least you concede that the works of unbelievers, which seem to you to be their good works, do not nonetheless lead them to everlasting salvation and the kingdom; know that we (namely all Catholics) say that that good of men, that good will, that good work cannot be conferred on anyone without the grace of God, through which alone a man can arrive at the eternal gift and kingdom of God.« Thus Peter the Deacon to the Bishops of Africa in Sardinia (Oper. August. Tom. ult. App. p. 1771. Migne): »Without this grace a man can indeed think and desire human things, but he cannot think or will or desire divine things.«

III. Nor 4) did the Fathers in the Council of Carthage, en. 5, interpret otherwise the words of Christ, Ioan. 5: Sine me nihil potestis facere; for they say: »the Lord was speaking of the fruits of the commandments (the fruit of the commandments is the merit of eternal life); where he did not say, sine me difficilius potestis facere, but said sine me nihil potestis facere.« And again Augustine explains the words of Paul, 2. Cor. III, 5: Non sumus sufficientes cogitare aliquid a nobis, quasi ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est thus: »What therefore pertains to religion and piety, of which the Apostle was speaking, we are not fit to think anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God.«

To which 5) the suffrage of the Schools also accedes: for, as s. Bonaventura witnesses, in 2m D. XXVIII, a. 2. q. 3: »Therefore they say…

that man can neither think nor will any good without the help of divine grace, because they speak of the good according as it is ordered to attaining beatitude.»

IV. Finally 6) it is confirmed and placed in open light by the proscription of the three propositions of Baius, by which propositions it is rejected, and by the proscription of which the threefold distinction established by the Scholastics is defended and proved, namely 1st of a twofold love, natural and gratuitous (prop. 31), then 2nd of a twofold way of fulfilling the divine commandments, namely as regards the substance of the work and as regards the meritorious mode (prop. 61.), and 3rd of a twofold goodness of the work, namely goodness merely moral and goodness meritorious of the kingdom of heaven (prop. 62). For that threefold distinction had this in view, that acts elicited by the powers of nature be distinguished from salutary ones and that we be taught that the grace of God pertains and is required for these, not for those. it is confirmed and placed in open light by the proscription of the three propositions of Baius, by which propositions it is rejected, and by the proscription of which the threefold distinction established by the Scholastics is defended and proved, namely 1st of a twofold love, natural and gratuitous (prop. 31), then 2nd of a twofold way of fulfilling the divine commandments, namely as regards the substance of the work and as regards the meritorious mode (prop. 61.), and 3rd of a twofold goodness of the work, namely goodness merely moral and goodness meritorious of the kingdom of heaven (prop. 62). For that threefold distinction had this in view, that acts elicited by the powers of nature be distinguished from salutary ones and that we be taught that the grace of God pertains and is required for these, not for those. Moreover, the Apostolic See, establishing and defending this distinction, teaches 1) that not all morally honest works are by that very fact salutary: 2) that grace is not required for any morally honest work whatever, since morally honest acts can be done even by the powers of nature; and therefore 3) that when the Church defends that grace is required for performing a good work as is fitting, it is speaking of a certain kind of acts, namely of salutary acts.

This doctrine of the Church, which so manifestly shows itself in the proscription of the propositions of Baius and of Quesnellus too (cf. 2. 38. 39.40. 41.), must be carefully attended to: for since it cannot happen that the doctrine of the Church of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries be different from the doctrine of the fifth century — rather, the doctrine of the Church, always remaining indeed the same, is more clearly explained with the progress of time — it will follow that the distinction between natural and supernatural acts, so manifestly asserted by the Scholastics of the middle ages and afterwards solemnly approved by the Apostolic See, is found also in the doctrine of the ancient Fathers, although not always expressed so clearly, as regards the substance of the matter.

V. What then is it that occurs in Hieronymus in Dialogue 1º adv. Pelag. mn. 3 and 4, where those are reproved «who take away God's help in each single thing we do?» For the Pelagian argues thus: «If in each single thing we do we must use God's help; then shall we not be able, unless God helps, also to trim the pen for writing, and to rub the trimmed pen with pumice and fit the hand to the letters, to be silent, to speak, to sit, to stand, to walk, to run, to eat, to fast, to weep, to laugh, and other things of this kind?» But the Catholic answers: «In my judgment it is clear that we cannot.» By these things, moreover, not the necessity of prevenient and helping grace, but the natural concurrence of God seems to be proved, nor is there speech about some kind of acts, but about any whatever. I answer 1) that this argument is proper to Hieronymus, who wrote the dialogues shortly after the heresy arose: but to what the common opinion of Catholics looked, Augustinus taught us by the testimony cited under n. 3. I answer 2) that the aim of Hieronymus in these dialogues is not directly the attack on the error concerning the necessity of grace, but another, namely impeccability. I answer 3) that what Hieronymus asserts in the cited passage is both true and can avail to prove that it is not in man's power to keep himself immune from any (even the least) sin, if he wills (namely if he wills by the powers of nature alone), as the Pelagians contended.

VI. Therefore from all these things it manifestly appears what those goods are for which the Fathers proclaimed grace — i.e. the divine help, gratuitous and unowed to nature — to be necessary. As for the Scriptures, it must be noted that, since natural goods too are gifts of God and we can do nothing according to nature without the help of God, and this is a truth of the greatest moment, it ought not to be a wonder that this doctrine too is preached by the Scriptures. But when the Scriptures preach that grace of which the Fathers speak and commend its necessity, they themselves look to the same goods which the Fathers looked to. This can easily appear from the very collation of the principal testimonies of Scripture. In which matter, note that we do not deny that many testimonies of Scripture, especially if taken by themselves, signify also natural goods and the natural help of God; but we affirm that those testimonies which signify the necessity of grace — of that grace, I say, which the Church defends against the Pelagians — refer directly to salutary goods and works and on their account vindicate the necessity of grace. But if you ask which these testimonies are, we answer in general that we understand those which have been used by the Fathers in the Pelagian controversy.

VII. But what we assert can be proved 1) from the very interpretation of the Fathers, who, employing them, spoke of salutary goods, as we have seen. Then 2) as regards many, it can be made known from their very matter, namely when they speak of faith, of justification, of eternal salvation or things of this sort. 3) As regards certain others, which seem more universal, the same will be clear once the analysis of them, at least of the principal ones, has been undertaken. Therefore a) what Christ says, Ioann. XV, 5: quia sine me nihil potestis facere, looks to this, that it give the reason of what he had said before: ego sum vitis, vos palmites, qui manet in me et ego in eo, hic fert fructum multum. Namely, that we may bear fruit, Christ teaches that we must adhere to him as branches to the vine, because without him we can do nothing, i.e. if we do not adhere to him as to the vine, we can bring forth no fruit: moreover the fruit which is drawn out from the vine, Christ, is a salutary fruit; for Christ is the vine in the salutary order, whose branches are not men but Christians.

b) The words of Paul, 1 Cor. XV, 10: Gratia Dei sum id quod sum et gratia eius in me vacua non fuit, sed abundantius illis omnibus laboravi, non ego autem, sed gratia Dei mecum, the context teaches, are to be understood of the grace of conversion to faith and of the Apostleship.

c) The words of the same Paul, 2 Cor. III, 5: Non quod sufficientes simus cogitare aliquid a nobis, quasi ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est, are referred to those thoughts which look to salvation, i.e. to the supernatural order of procuring salvation. For when the Apostle had said earlier that he is not like many, adulterating the Word of God, but speaks from sincerity, as from God and before God and in Christ, he subjoins that the testimony of this matter, namely of his sincere ministry, is the Corinthians themselves, in whom the ministry of his preaching was efficacious unto salvation, that this testimony is known to all and is the testimony of Christ, who, cooperating with the preaching of Paul, bore witness that his ministry is sincere; then he concludes that he has confidence or persuasion that his ministry is such, before God through Christ. But to give the reason or explain why he has this confidence not in himself, but through Christ before God, he subjoins: non quod sufficientes simus cogitare aliquid a nobis, quasi ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est, who also made us fit ministers of the new testament. Therefore the thoughts for which sufficiency is suggested by God look to the ministry of salvation, to be promoted in others, and therefore to the salutary order. Cf. the words of Augustinus cited above under n. 4.

d) Likewise the words of Paul, Philipp. II, 13: Deus est qui operatur in vobis velle et perficere, are set forth as the reason of the preceding: cum metu et tremore vestram salutem operamini; the discourse, therefore, is about a salutary will and accomplishment.

e) Likewise the words of Iacobi I, 17: Omne datum optimum et omne donum perfectum desursum est, descendens a Patre luminum, set forth the salutary and supernatural gifts, which are κατ᾽ ἐξοχὴν best and perfect; whence this reason of this saying is given: voluntarie enim genuit nos verbo veritatis, by which words spiritual regeneration is signified.

The words of I Cor. IV, 7: Quis te discernit? quid autem habes quod non accepisti? can by themselves, and even with account taken of the context (cf. A. Lapide in h. l.), be taken also of natural gifts, of which sort are wisdom, eloquence. But they can also — certainly with the context itself permitting — be taken of supernatural gifts or charisms and salutary goods; they are indeed most universal. «Nihil ex te habes, sed a Deo accepisti... Non enim haec recte facta tua sunt, sed ex Dei gratia proveniunt. Si fidem dixeris, ex vocatione illa venit; si remissionem peccatorum, si charismata, si doctrinae verbum, si virtutes, omnia inde accepisti. Quid ergo habes quod non accepisti?» (Chrysost. in h. l. hom. XII in I Cor.). Moreover, according to this second, truest sense as regards salutary goods, this testimony is always urged by the Fathers against the Pelagians (cf. August. de Praedest. SS. c. 5, and De Corrept. et Gratia c. 7, and most especially the Fathers of Conc. Arausicanum II, c. 6).

Finally, if account be taken of the character of this book, which is the divine Scripture, it will easily appear that man's good is not exhibited by it simply except what pertains to union with God and eternal beatitude. For Scripture regards man not philosophically only, but theologically, and considers man not as he could be of himself, but as God, creating him from the beginning, willed him to be, and as he restored him through Christ. Scripture itself, indeed, was given to us for this end, that we be helped to attain salvation.

VIII. You will say that grace is demanded by the Fathers so that we may be able to resist the stimuli of concupiscence, and that therefore it is asserted that man without grace is of himself impotent to bridle concupiscence. Therefore, not only for the salutary or supernatural act, but for the simply honest act itself, grace is required according to the Fathers.

I answer 1) that by the Fathers there is not affirmed a physical impotence to bridle concupiscence, but a moral one, for which some help of God is required. 2) But that the Fathers require the help of grace properly so called, acquired by the merits of the Redeemer, comes from this, that the Fathers speak of that resistance to concupiscence and victory over temptations which avails unto salvation. This, moreover, is clear from what has been proved so far. But if it be asked why the Fathers make no mention of some help of purely natural Providence, which would be necessary so that facility be had at least for a naturally honest act, this came about either because the Fathers were not solicitous about purely natural acts, since about them strictly there was no question, and they more or less numbered them among sins, as we have seen; or it came about because that opinion sat in their minds which Ripalda defends, de Ente Supern. D. XX.

Cf. Livinum de Meyer Hist. Contr. De Auxilis I. V., cc. 22. 23. 36.

I. The good and salutary that exists in men can be reduced to three heads: 1) to the end, which is beatitude consisting in the vision of God, 2) to justification, by which they are constituted the legitimate heirs of this beatitude, 3) to good works or merits, by which we are either disposed for justification or by which, being justified, we procure eternal life for ourselves. But Catholic tradition teaches that all these things are to be credited to divine grace.

Indeed, Scripture first teaches universally that all our good is a gift of God: 1 Cor. IV, 7. Who distinguisheth thee? and what hast thou that thou hast not received? Ioan. VI, 66. No one can come to me, unless it be given him by my Father. Ioan. XV, 5.

Without me you can do nothing. Rom. IX, 15. It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy. These words hold universally in themselves and signify that every salutary good is a gift of God. Then, specifically as regards justification, the Scriptures testify that it is given gratuitously, without our merits, out of mercy. Rom. III, 24. Being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus. Tit. II, 1. seq. When the goodness and kindness of God our Saviour appeared, not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, by the laver of regeneration and renovation of the Holy Spirit, whom he hath poured forth upon us abundantly through Jesus Christ our Saviour, that being justified by his grace we may be heirs according to hope of life everlasting. As regards good works or merits. Ephes. II, 8. seqq: By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves; for it is the gift of God, not of works, that no one may glory; for we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus in good works, which God hath prepared that we should walk in them. Philipp. II, 13. It is God who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish. As regards the glory of beatitude: if by grace and mercy we are constituted heirs according to hope when we are justified; if our merits, by which, being justified, we procure glory for ourselves, are from the grace of God; therefore glory itself also will be a gift of God.

The Fathers agree with the Scriptures; to exhibit their testimony, it will suffice to set forth what Caelestinus R. P. contains in the authorities of the Apostolic See, or what the Fathers defined in Synods. Thus among the authorities of the Apostolic See adduced by Caelestinus, c. 4 it is said: «That no one is good of himself, unless he who alone is good bestow on him a participation of himself.» c. 7: «That no one makes good use of free will except through Christ.» c. 8. «That all the studies and all the works and merits of the Saints are to be referred to the glory and praise of God; because no one pleases him from any other source, except from that which he himself hath given.» c. 9. «That God so works in the hearts of men and in free will itself, that holy thought, pious counsel, and every motion of a good will is from God; because through him we can do some good, without whom we can do nothing.» And Synod. Araus. can. 6: «If anyone says that mercy is conferred on us by God for our believing, willing, desiring, striving, laboring, watching, studying, petitioning, seeking, asking…» divinely, but does not confess that it is brought about in us, that we may believe, will, or be able to do all these things as we ought, by the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit... he resists the Apostle saying: what hast thou that thou hast not received? and by the grace of God I am what I am." can. 7. »If anyone affirms that by the vigor of nature he can think, as is expedient, or choose anything good which pertains to the salvation of eternal life, or consent to the salutary, that is, evangelical preaching, without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who gives to all sweetness in consenting to and believing the truth, he is deceived by a heretical spirit, not understanding the voice of God in the Gospel saying: Without me you can do nothing, and that of the Apostle: not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God." can. 9. »Whenever we do good, God works in us and with us, that we may work." can. 20; » Man does no good things which God does not bring about that man should do." can. 22: » No one has anything of his own except lying and sin."

II. That the very necessity of grace is asserted is manifest upon inspecting those very testimonies which we have adduced both in this and in the preceding thesis. For the most universal negation, that nothing good is done without grace, can have its rationale only in the necessity of that same grace; a necessity which the testimonies of the preceding thesis explicitly affirm, and which several testimonies also cited in this thesis affirm, so that without the grace of God, without the operation of God, we can do nothing, we cannot please God, no good motion of the will, no good thought is possible, and from ourselves we have nothing but lying and sin. Therefore.

These things being generally established, let us come to that which we have undertaken to defend in particular,

II. In the error of the Massilians, who flourished after the Pelagian heresy, two things can be considered, namely, what they affirmed and the reason on account of which they affirmed it. The former pertains to the present question; the latter properly to the question of predestination, in which Augustine testifies that they were in the dark, in lib. de Praedest. SS. c. 1. For, having made a distinction between faith and the other salutary works, they affirmed that faith, or at least the beginning of faith, is owed not to the grace of God but to the powers of nature, whereas the other works cannot be done without the grace of God. But they asserted this in order to give an account to themselves of why, although God wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth, yet not all believe, not all are saved.

That we may briefly declare what we set down in the former place, Hilary is a witness (Epist. CCXXVI inter Augustinianas) to Augustine that the Massilians taught that of these two: believe and thou shalt be saved, God requires one of us and bestows the other: that faith, or the power of believing, remained in nature, albeit vitiated by original sin. And in truth they so defined faith, which they said is required before the conferral of grace, that it was not necessarily faith whole and perfect, but any beginning of faith, or a pious will of converting oneself to God, sufficed. For just as a sick man, they said, cannot give health to himself, but has need to seek the physician, yet the very act of seeking the physician and the desire of health is in the power of the sick man, nor does this prevent it from being truly said: the sick man of himself can do nothing, but must be healed by the physician; so man, made sick by original sin, truly cannot recover health by himself and can exercise no works of salvation without the help of God: nevertheless he can desire health and seek the physician. By a desire of this kind man approaches God and believes in him as the healer of our souls; therefore man is positively disposed by this faith to receive the grace necessary for works. Moreover, the grace which the Massilians denied to faith of this kind was interior grace; exterior grace, however, they supposed (cf. what we shall say in the historical synopsis of this error in Cap. IV.).

This error is in reality more ancient than the Pelagian heresy spread abroad in the West; for the same Augustine was imbued with it when he wrote the exposition of certain propositions from the Epistle to the Romans, which he wrote before he took up the Episcopate, while still a priest, around the year 394.

The remaining points concerning the opinion of the Massilians, and those things which Jansenius, perverting everything, invented in order to establish his heresy, will be discussed in another place.

IV. Now indeed, setting aside that chapter of doctrine which properly pertains to the question of predestination, the first point, which we have briefly expounded, is easily rejected. Namely, the testimonies of Scripture brought forward by Augustine in the book de Praedestinatione SS. and by the Fathers of the Second Council of Orange are more than enough to demonstrate the Catholic thesis against the Massilians. Those testimonies can be distributed into a threefold series. The first is of those from which the Catholic thesis is necessarily gathered; the second is of those by which the same Catholic thesis is immediately asserted; the third is of those by which, by an argument even ad hominem, the opinion of the Massilians is convicted of falsity. To the first series these pertain.

1. Cor. IV, 7. For who distinguisheth thee? and what hast thou that thou hast not received? and if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received?

2. Cor. III. 5. Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God.

Gal. II, 21. If justice be by the law, then Christ died in vain.

In these testimonies the following are most evidently contained.

1. That there is nothing pious and salutary in man which is not a gratuitous gift of God,

2. that in the order of salvation it is not man who distinguishes himself from another man, but that it is God who distinguishes one from another,

3. that since, if justice were from the law given extrinsically, it could also be from nature, hence Christ would have died in vain, if man were able to procure salvation for himself by the powers of nature,

4. that every good thought and every good motion of the will is not from nature, but from grace.

But these things clash most evidently with the opinion of the Massilians. For the Massilians teach that faith, or the beginning of faith, and the desire of salvation are salutary acts, acts, namely, which by reason of their merit determine God to confer the health and the grace necessary for all good works. But they will that faith, or the beginning of faith, or the desire of salvation, be from ourselves through the powers of nature, and that grace follows the merits of nature and is repaid to them. Therefore not every salutary good is a gratuitous gift of God; indeed, none in reality is a gratuitous gift of God; since the graces that follow faith are owed to the merit of faith, and what is owed is not grace; therefore we are sufficient to think something pious and salutary from ourselves; therefore the faithful man himself distinguishes himself from the unbeliever; therefore justice is from nature, and since the merits of nature are equal for obtaining grace, Christ died in vain.

To the second class these testimonies are referred.

Ioan. VI, 44. No one can come to me, unless the Father, who sent me, has drawn him.

Philipp. I, 29. It has been granted to you for Christ, not only to believe in him, but also to suffer for him.

Ephes. II, 8. By grace you are saved through faith, and this is not from yourselves; for it is the gift of God, not from works, so that no one may glory.1 Cor. VII, 25. Having obtained mercy from the Lord, to be faithful. Now in these testimonies we are expressly taught that faith is a gratuitous gift of God, and not only progress in faith, but simply faith itself, and therefore also its beginning and every positive disposition toward it, or merit. Indeed, if natural merit precedes, faith itself is no longer grace; for if it is from works, it is no longer grace, as the Apostle says Rom. XI, 6.

To the third class is referred by Augustine in lib. de Praedest. SS. the testimony Ioan. VI, 27. 29. Work not for the food that perishes, but for that which endures unto life everlasting... What shall we do, that we may work the works of God?... This is the work of God, that you believe in him whom He has sent. From which Augustine thus argues ibid. c. 7: «But perhaps they will say: the Apostle distinguishes faith from works, but says that grace is not from works; he does not, however, say that it is not from faith. So it truly is; but Jesus Himself says that faith itself too is the work of God, and commands that we work it. Thus, then, the Apostle distinguishes faith from works, just as in the two kingdoms of the Hebrews Judas is distinguished from Israel, although Judas himself is Israel!» Clearly, both with Christ testifying and from the very nature of the matter, it is evident that faith is a work, no less than the other works; if, therefore, grace is not from works, but works are from grace, then neither will grace be from faith preceding it, but faith from grace.

The doctrine of the Scriptures against the Massilians was vindicated by Augustine in the book de Praedest. SS., by Prosper in his work adv. Collatorem, and by others in their works; and by Celestine, Roman Pontiff, through the authorities of the Apostolic See that were produced, which he therefore collected and sent into Gaul, so that a certain norm of the Catholic doctrine might be had and novelty might cease to attack antiquity; from which authorities, as from ecclesiastical rules and documents taken from divine authority, Celestine says it is gathered «that we profess God as the author of all good affections and works and of all studies and of all virtues, by which from the beginning of faith one tends to God, so that we do not doubt that all man's merits are preceded by His grace, through whom it comes about that we both begin to will and to do something good.» Cf. Conc. Arausicanum II., several canons of which, bearing on this matter, we have already recited elsewhere, which indeed

The Council, approved by the authority of the Apostolic See, at length settled the question and restored peace among Catholics.

V. Furthermore, from what has been demonstrated it is evident that prayer itself, by which we obtain from God salutary graces — namely, that prayer which God promised He would hear — is a gift of God and proceeds from prevenient grace. For that prayer is in reality a pious and salutary work; it is the beginning of faith and of salvation; but whatever is of this kind must be believed to be an effect of grace in us. And in truth the Massilians attributed to nature the pious desire by which one turns to the physician of souls and the petition for health; but this was reprobated in them by the Fathers: therefore.

And indeed Augustine, Cont. duas epistolas pelagg. L. IV, c. 11., adduces and proves the words of Ambrose from the Expositione Isaiae: «And to pray to God, he says, is a spiritual grace. For no one says Lord Jesus except in the Holy Spirit.» (2. Cor. XII, 3). And the same Augustine, de Dono Perseverantiae c. 23: «Who would truly groan, desiring to receive what he asks of the Lord, if he thinks he takes it from himself and not from Him? Especially since, we know not what we should pray for as we ought, says the Apostle, but the Spirit Himself intercedes for us with unspeakable groanings. What is the Spirit Himself intercedes except He makes us intercede? For He is the one of whom he says in another place (Gal. III, 6.): God sent the Spirit of His Son into our hearts, crying, Abba, Father. And here, what is crying except making us cry, by that trope by which we call a day joyful, which makes men joyful? Which he manifests elsewhere, where he says (Rom. VIII, 15): For you have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear, but you have received the Spirit of adoption of sons, in whom we cry, Abba, Father. There he says crying; here, however, in whom we cry, manifestly opening how he had said crying, that is, as I have already explained, making us cry. Where we understand that even this very thing is a gift of God, that we cry to God with a true heart and spiritually. Let them attend, therefore, how they are deceived (the Massilians) who think that it is in us, not given to us, to ask, to seek, to knock, and who say that this is what it is for grace to be preceded by our merit, and that that follows — when we receive by asking and find by seeking, and it is opened to those who knock — nor do they will to understand that even this is of the divine gift, that we pray, i.e., ask, seek, knock.»

Hence against the same Conc. Araus. II. decreed in c. 3: «If anyone shall say that the grace of God is given according to our merits, let him be anathema.» Whoever says that the grace of God can be conferred through human invocation, but not that grace itself brings it about that it is invoked by us, contradicts the prophet Isaiah, or the Apostle saying the same: «I was found by those who did not seek me; I appeared openly to those who did not ask for me» (Isaiae LXV, 1. Rom. X, 20.) and can. 6: «If anyone says that without the grace of God... mercy is conferred divinely upon us asking, seeking, knocking, but does not confess that it is brought about in us by the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit that we are able to do all these things, as we ought... he resists the Apostle saying: what have you that you have not received?»

VI. Lest some difficulty arise from the reason by which we said the Massilians were moved: it is evident that they could have noticed that some sufficient grace is at hand for all men, and that by it the wills of all are prepared and prevented; but that it is left in the power of free will to cooperate with that grace or to resist, and hence it happens that not all believe, while those who do believe, believe through the grace of God.

BRIEF HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS OF THE PELAGIAN ERRORS CONCERNING GRACE.

Since in what follows we shall have need of historical knowledge of the Pelagian heresy — namely, what the Pelagians erred about, and what the Church defended against them — we have judged it worthwhile to subjoin here a brief synopsis of this controversy.

Augustine exhibits the sum of the Pelagian heresy in the book de Haeresibus, which book was written by him near the end of his life, after the Pelagian heresy had been conquered and prostrated by his many works. Now it reads thus in n. 88: «The Pelagians' heresy is at this time the most recent of all, having arisen from Pelagius, a monk. Him as master Caelestius so followed that their followers are even called Caelestians. These are so hostile to the grace of God — by which we are predestined unto the adoption of sons through Jesus Christ unto Himself, and by which we are delivered from the power of darkness, so that we believe in Him and are transferred into His kingdom, on account of which He says: No one comes to the Father, unless it has been given to him by my Father — and by which charity is poured forth in our hearts, so that faith works through love, that they believe that man can, without this grace, do all the divine commandments; whereas, if this were true, the Lord would seem to have said in vain: Without me you can do nothing. Finally, Pelagius, rebuked by the brethren for having attributed nothing to the grace of God for the doing of His commandments, yielded to their correction only to this extent, that he did not put it before free will, but with unfaithful cunning placed it after, saying that it is given to men for this, that what they are commanded to do through free will they may be able to fulfill more easily through grace. For by saying more easily, he wanted it to be believed that men could, even if with more difficulty, nevertheless do the divine commands without divine grace. But that grace of God, without which we can do nothing good, they say to be nothing but free will, which, without any preceding merits of its own, our nature received from Him; and that He helps only to this extent, through His law and doctrine, that we may learn what we ought to do and what we ought to hope for, but not to this, that through the gift of His Spirit we do what we have learned to be done. And by this they confess that knowledge is given to us divinely, by which ignorance is driven out; but they deny that charity is given, by which one lives piously; so that, since knowledge, which without charity puffs up, is a gift of God, charity itself, which edifies so that knowledge may not puff up, is not a gift of God. They also destroy the prayers which the Church makes, whether for unbelievers and those resisting the doctrine of God, that they may be converted to God, or for the faithful, that faith may be increased in them and they may persevere in it. For they contend that men have these not by receiving them from Him, but from themselves, saying that the grace of God, by which we are freed from impiety, is given according to our merits. And this indeed Pelagius, fearing to be condemned in the Palestinian episcopal judgment, was compelled to condemn; but in his later writings he is found teaching it. Thus far Augustine on the heresy of Pelagius concerning the necessity of grace. Let it be allowed to us to dwell a little on this description of the Pelagian heresy, which Augustine, most expert in it, has left us — not indeed that we may settle with some solemn critical apparatus the historical questions pertaining to that heresy, but that, having reviewed the principal questions which are commonly agitated on this matter, we may briefly and clearly show what is to be held in each one.

I. And first, since Pelagius stood forth as a proud praiser and defender of nature and of free will, the question spontaneously occurs what kind of Naturalism it was that he championed — whether it was similar to that which many modern enemies of revelation maintain. Indeed, Pelagius departs from those modern rationalists who, content with a single nature, do not admit a personal God distinct from it. But neither did Pelagius introduce a pure Naturalism, such as can be conceived together with the profession of an existing God. For Pelagius confessed a certain more excellent order of goods gratuitously instituted by God for men in the state of pure nature — namely, the adoption of sons — and admitted many other gratuitous gifts. These things will be manifest from what will be said shortly. Moreover, since the principal twofold power of rational man is both that of knowing the true and that of acting rightly, Pelagius was not solicitous to proclaim and enlarge the former power of nature, but clung entirely to exalting and amplifying the power of free will for acting rightly, so that he altogether willed that whatever good and perfect thing can be obtained in the exercise of all virtues, even those which Catholics call supernatural, man's free will is able by itself, with the sole forces of its own nature, to procure for itself — although he afterwards conceded that divine assistance contributes to this, so that men attain it more easily. For Pelagius had formed in his mind such a concept of free will, that he believed its natural and inborn ἐνέργειαν extends as far as its indifference extends, if the conditions suitable for action are present; and he judged that free will is taken away if, for doing something honestly and perfectly in any order whatsoever, the help of God is necessary and man's nature alone does not suffice. Wherefore the Naturalism of Pelagius is principally located in this: he preached, namely, that it is possible by the sole forces of nature for man to obtain the most absolute state of moral perfection, ἀπάθειαν καὶ ἀναμαρτησίαν.¹ And although, as we have said, Pelagius conceded that not a few goods are gratuitous — which, namely, God could have freely not destined for man — he nevertheless contended that, as to at least several of them and the principal ones, such as are adoption and the kingdom of heaven, given the destination of the same freely made by God, man, using free will, could merit them for himself by his own acts (August. De Praed. SS. cc. 18. 19). Now if you weigh what Pelagius preached about the power of free will and will to draw by a right conclusion what follows from it, you are forced to confess that such is the Naturalism of free will introduced by Pelagius, that the supernatural state becomes impossible for him; for no greater power can be conferred upon it than that which is said to inhere in it naturally, and no greater perfection than that which is affirmed to be due to it (cf. Tract. de Deo Creant. Th. XXXVI.). Besides, even from what Pelagius taught directly and explicitly it followed that the Incarnation and Death of Christ were useless, and hence the foundation of the whole Christian Religion was overthrown (epist. 178 of Augustine to Hilarius, and 180 to Paulinus, and epist. 5 of the African Bishops to Innocentius). For if the nature of the will can do all things: therefore Christ died in vain — especially since even the propagation of original sin was denied by him. This indeed was the reason why, as soon as the doctrine of Pelagius burst into the open, Christian ears shuddered at it; and although it was defended by ingenious and subtle men, and was not always refuted by all in its individual parts with valid arguments, nevertheless within the space of a few years it was routed and destroyed. For it was evident how repugnant to the whole of revelation was that doctrine which, exalting the powers of free will, excluded the entire economy of Christ.

Nevertheless, although Pelagius so exalted the powers of free will, he always conceded, however, that the remission of sins is a gratuitous grace: on which matter see n. IV. C. and V. below.

II. From these things, however, another special question spontaneously emerges: whether the Pelagians admitted habitual grace. There are on this matter diverse opinions of learned men. Jansenus I. V. De haeresi pelagiana c. 22. sqq., Natalis Alexander Hist. Eccl. sec. V. c. 3. §. 7., and others contend that Pelagius admitted habitual grace divinely infused, although Natalis and other Catholic theologians concede that the Pelagian profession of habitual grace did not adequately agree with the Catholic profession. They are moved by these arguments: a) the Pelagians certainly admitted the grace of the remission of sins, and that as gratuitous. Augustine, De Grat. et lib. arb. c. 6.: «When the Pelagians say that this alone is grace not according to our merits, by which sins are remitted to a man, but that that which is given at the end — that is, eternal life — is repaid to our preceding merits, it must be answered to them, etc.» But the remission of sins is effected through the infusion of sanctifying grace. Nor should you say that the Pelagians distinguished these two things and conceded indeed the remission of sins, but denied interior habitual sanctification; for this division, says Jansenius, is never charged against them by Augustine, but he reprehends them on another head — namely, that they indeed willed that a help be conferred by God by which men might be healed from past sins, but not a help by which they might be assisted to avoid future ones. b) All the attributes which belong to habitual grace and are asserted of it by Catholics were attributed to it by the Pelagians. For they attributed to it to blot out crimes, to cleanse, to heal, to bring salvation, to renew; to make men better by renewing; to be regeneration, justice, justification, sanctification, adoption of sons; that through it men are incorporated into Christ, anointed with the Holy Spirit, man is reconciled to God, man is made a temple of God. But with these things the essential concept of habitual grace is completed.

On the contrary, Garnerius (in Marium Mercatorem parte I. Dissert. VII. c. 5.) judges that the Pelagians in words indeed conceded to the Catholics in the profession of this grace which is called habitual, but that in reality they embraced that opinion which the later heretics afterwards adopted — namely, that men are formally justified either by the sole imputation of the justice of Christ or by the sole remission of sins, to the exclusion of grace and charity, which is diffused in their hearts through the Holy Spirit; or also, that the grace by which we are justified is only a favor of God. Many other theologians agree with Garnerius. They demonstrate their own opinion by this argument: that although the Pelagians conceded that men become members of Christ through baptism, that we receive the remission of sins through the death of Christ, that men are justified by the obedience of Christ, that sins are freely remitted and the Spirit is given, they nevertheless denied that charity is diffused in our hearts in justification, and hence that the interior man is renewed. Moreover, what precedes without the last point savors entirely of the doctrine of the later heretics.

This opinion is approved by us. For it must be judged to have happened not without reason, that Augustine always reduced this kind of Pelagian grace — by which we are cleansed, by which we are renewed, by which we are restored — to the sole grace of the remission of sins, which of itself denotes a negative effect in the soul, not a positive one, such as is interior sanctification. By way of example, let the same Augustine be heard, De Grat. Christi c. 37. and 38., reporting and explaining the words of Pelagius. In the former chapter he says: «Likewise in the same work (the letter to the holy virgin Demetrias) in another place: but if even without God, he says (Pelagius), men show what they have been made by God: see what Christians can do, whose nature has been restored for the better through Christ, and who are also helped by the assistance of divine grace. Nature restored for the better he wants to be understood as the remission of sins, which he sufficiently demonstrated in another place in this very book, where he says: Even those who have been hardened in some way by a long habit of sinning can be restored through penance. But the assistance of divine grace he can place here also in the revelation of doctrine.» In the other chapter, however, he says: «Likewise elsewhere in the same epistle: for if even before the Law, he says, as we have said, and much before the advent of our Lord and Savior, certain men are reported to have lived justly and holily: how much more must we believe that we can do this after the illumination of His coming — we who, restored through the grace of Christ and reborn into a better man, have been expiated and cleansed by His blood, and, spurred by His example to the perfection of justice, ought to be better than those who were before the Law? See how here too, in other words indeed, but nevertheless he placed the assistance of grace in the remission of sins and in the example of Christ.» Moreover, the reason why Augustine always expressed the formal effect of this grace, when he declared it, through the remission of sins seems to be this: that Augustine judged that the Pelagians in reality posited nothing real in the soul through that grace. And indeed 2) all those appellations which are given to grace, or the effects which are attributed to the same grace, such as the adoption of sons, can be taken for some external favor, just as they are also taken by the Protestants: and that could be done by wily men wishing to hide in whatever way, such as the Pelagians certainly are known to have been. 3) Nor is it certain what Lansenius asserts, that Augustine never charged the Pelagians... except that they separated the remission of sins from interior sanctifying grace; for in order for this to be certain, these two things would have to be certain: a) that Augustine always understood the testimony of Paul — the charity of God is diffused in our hearts, etc. — of actual charity; b) that Augustine judged that habitual charity can, by the ordinary law, be separated from sanctifying grace, so that the latter can be without the former; for if these are not certain, since Augustine always reprehends the Pelagians for opposing that testimony — if Augustine takes it of habitual charity as well, Augustine will have to be said to charge the Pelagians also with the denial of this charity; but if Augustine judged that habitual charity cannot be had without sanctifying grace, and vice versa, then, in charging the Pelagians with the denial of habitual charity, he will have to be said to have virtually charged also the denial of sanctifying grace, since both cohere with one another by a mutual and necessary bond. But those two things which we have said are certainly not certain; rather, the opposite is more certain: cf. n. seg. Wherefore, finally, 4) since it is certain that the Pelagians denied habitual charity — for they denied any intrinsic, immediate help of the will, superadded to nature, which is diffused in our hearts through the Holy Spirit — it cannot be conceived how they truly admitted interior sanctifying grace, which, according to the nature of the thing and according to the Catholic understanding, coheres with charity by an individual bond.

III. Now it is easy to take a step to another question — namely, about which grace the dispute properly was between Catholics and Pelagians: about actual or about habitual. The common answer is: the question was per se and distinctly about actual grace. But it must be noted that in that age habitual grace was not represented by those formulas by which it would be distinguished from habitual charity; rather, it was frequently signified by the name of charity diffused in our hearts, by which we are interiorly renewed and transferred from death to life. Wherefore the same properties which belong to sanctifying grace were asserted of charity, such as are interior renewal, the blotting out of sins, adoption, and meritorious power for eternal life. Moreover, charity was regarded by the Fathers not only as it is inherent, but also as it is active — namely, the principle of salutary work and the reason of merit — whether they willed the principle of acting in the justified to be the very habit of charity, or another actual grace besides it, which was also called the inspiration of charity; so that therefore frequently both graces were represented under one name, namely charity, which justifies and is the principle of actual life. Since, therefore, grace is frequently signified by the Fathers under the name of charity, when it is asked whether they disputed about habitual or about actual grace, it is properly asked whether — although we grant that they spoke of charity habitually sanctifying — they nevertheless regarded it (when of course they spoke of the just) as it is simply informing, or as it is active and the principle of good work. For if they regarded it in this latter way, they must be said to have disputed about actual grace — namely, about that which is the divine assistance for acting, by which God works with us, which is the principle of good work. These things being posited, in order to demonstrate that the question in that age was per se and distinctly about actual grace, it will suffice to bring proofs both from those things which the Pelagians maintained and most constantly reprehended in Catholics, and from those things which are contained in the decrees of the Councils and of the Apostolic See, by which the heresy was condemned: for that grace which is asserted in these decrees is certainly that which the Church defended against the Pelagians.

But a) Pelagius, as we have already seen, so declared his opinion that, having distinguished these three — possibility, will (namely volition, i.e., the act of willing) and action — he conceded the first to God, and denied that the other two need divine assistance. And this was the complaint of the Pelagians, which Augustine reports, epist. CXCIV. ad Sixtum: «Free will is taken away, if we do not have even the good will itself without the help of God»; and Jerome reports, epist. ad Ctesiphontem: «If I do nothing without the help of God... in vain did He give the power of choice, which I cannot fulfill, unless He Himself has helped me; for the will which needs the aid of another is destroyed.» Nay, even this other complaint, which Augustine reports in Cont. duas epistt. pelagg. L. II. c. 5: «For thus they thought it should be objected to us: under the name of grace, they say, they (the Catholics) so assert fate, that they say that, unless God inspires in an unwilling and reluctant man the desire of good — and that itself imperfect — he can neither decline from evil nor seize upon good.»

b) If the decrees of the Councils and the authorities of the Apostolic See are considered, which Celestine exhibits in his letter to

If the Gauls and those things are compared together, it is clear that in them actual grace is treated of expressly, most clearly and most constantly, which is marked by the following characters. Namely, «1°» there is exhibited that grace which is a help for not committing sins, by which the understanding of the commandments is revealed and opened to us, and it is granted to us that we be able to do what we have known, without which we cannot fulfill the divine commandments (Conc. Cartag. cc. 3. 4. 5.); «2°» there is asserted that grace which raises up free will, which men obtain daily, that they may be good, which is necessary for the baptized for overcoming the snares of the devil, for conquering the concupiscences of the flesh, for persevering, without which no one uses free will well, by which those who are led are led by the instinct of God, by which the will is prepared by the Lord, by which the hearts of the faithful are touched, that they may do something good, by which God works in free will, so that holy thought, holy counsel, and every movement of a good will be from God, through which we can do something good, without which we can do nothing, which is necessary for all acts, causes, thoughts, movements, from which are the beginnings of a good will and the growths of praiseworthy endeavors and perseverance even to the end, by which faith is given to the unbelieving, idolaters are freed from the errors of their impiety, to the fallen the remedies of penance are conferred, from which are all good affections, all good works, all endeavors, all virtues, which precedes all human merits, by which it comes about that we begin both to will and to do something good, by which God acts in us so that we both will and do what he himself wills. (Auctor. Sed. Apost. cc. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 11. 13); «3°» that grace is vindicated by which it comes about that we invoke God, that we will to be cleansed from sin, from which is the beginning of Faith, and the very pious affection of belief by which we arrive at regeneration, by which our will is corrected from unbelief to faith, from impiety to piety, by which it comes about that we believe, will, labor, desire, strive, watch, study, ask as we ought, through which we can think something good and consent to the evangelical preaching, by which God works all our goods in us and with us, which is always necessary for the reborn and the holy, by which the mercy of God is going before us, which is the charity of God poured out in hearts, from which is Christian fortitude, which precedes good works that they may be done, which was necessary also to Adam while intact, which grants to man that he do good, through which men willingly serve the divine will (Conc. Araus. II. cann. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 9. 10. 14. 15. 17. 18, 19. 20. 23. 25): γ) that grace is asserted which is contained in the illuminations of the mind and the inspirations of the will (Auctt. Sed. Apost. Capp. 8. 11. Conc. Araus. II. Cann. 4. 6. 7). e) Finally that grace is defended which is proved by these testimonies: Without me you can do nothing; We are not sufficient to think etc. It is God who works in us to will. The will is prepared by the Lord. What have you that you have not received? (in the cited places passim).

Now the doctrine of Pelagius and his arguments a) tend to this, that they directly impugn actual grace; for the grace of the will (namely of volition) and of action is formally actual grace. Nor can it be devised what freedom has to fear from habitual grace, and how anyone could conceive that fate is introduced by it. Moreover γ) all the characters which are attributed by the Fathers to that grace which they championed against the Pelagians, especially if they are taken together, exhibit not habitual, but actual grace. For a) many good works can be done without sanctifying grace, as the acts of the penitent before justification; therefore the grace which is required for every good work, every pious thought, and every movement of a good will, is not habitual grace; β) the just do not need, nor did Adam need, new sanctifying grace; y) the grace from which are the beginnings of a good will precedes justification; d) the grace by which God works in us is the grace which is given for works; e) no one would say that illuminations and inspirations are habitual grace; ζ) in almost all those testimonies by which grace is proved from Scripture, actual grace is signified; and η) grace is always represented in those decrees as operative, helping free will in itself impotent for acting, and it is always regarded to this end, that the power of free will which Pelagius had asserted should be profligated. Therefore.

The same thing can again be proved from what Augustine says when he defines the state of the question between Pelagius and the Church. De Gratia Christi c. 47: «As far as it pertains to that question about divine grace and free will, attend to these three things, which he distinguished most openly: posse, velle and esse, that is, possibility, will, and action. If therefore he has agreed with us not only as to possibility in man, even if he neither wills nor acts…» well, but the will itself and the action as well, that is, that we will well and act well, which are not in man except when he wills well and acts well: if, as I said, he has agreed that the will itself and the action are also divinely helped, so that without that help we neither will nor do anything good, and that this is the grace of God through I. C. D. N., in which he makes us just by his own, not our, justice, so that it may be the true justice which is ours from him; nothing, as far as I judge, of controversy about the help of grace will remain between us.» The question therefore, and that alone, was about the grace by which the will and the action are helped, by which it comes about that we will and act; this, however, is actual grace.

We said moreover that the question was per se and distinctly about actual grace; for about this there was disputed extensively, always, directly, and most clearly on both sides. For Pelagius directly impugned this grace by his heresy concerning the necessity and gratuitousness of grace. We do not deny, however, that per accidens, in this respect, both by reason of the other head of doctrine which Pelagius also denied, namely original sin, and by reason of this same doctrine of actual grace itself, and confusedly, that is, insofar as it was contained virtually in the doctrine of actual grace, there was disputed also, or that speech fell upon, habitual grace. And indeed since Pelagius also denied original sin and denied that nature was vitiated, it was necessary to establish against him the necessity of the grace which is conferred by baptism, which is habitual grace; but this per se did not look to that question of the necessity of grace which Pelagius, the proud praiser of free will, denied, but rather to the question of original sin. Moreover, sometimes actual grace, which is given to sinners, tends to this, that it leads us to attain formal justification through habitual grace; but that which is given to the just tends to this, that it preserve the just in holiness and continually promote them in it; but the Fathers, disputing with the Pelagians, regarded chiefly that grace which is operative and attains its own term; hence not infrequently the Fathers join actual grace with its term, and attribute to it those appellations which most aptly suit habitual grace. Of this sort are: grace is the charity poured out in our hearts; through grace nature is renewed and restored to the pristine state of innocence; by its help the soul is healed; men are advanced to the adoption of the children of God; the grace of God by which we are Christians; which formulas, although taken in a causal sense, may suit actual grace as well, if however they are understood with the attainment of the effect, they so suit actual grace as to embrace also sanctifying grace. For the rest, those characters of grace which we enumerated above can suit only actual grace. But what Augustine says, De Natura et Gratia c. 4: «This grace of Christ, without which neither infants nor those of mature age can be saved, is not rendered for merits, but is given freely», does not prove that the grace about which Augustine disputed with the Pelagians per se and distinctly, in the question of the necessity and gratuitousness of grace, is that grace which is common equally to infants and to adults, and therefore habitual grace; but it proves only that in that question there repeatedly had place a mention also of the grace which is conferred on infants, both on account of the kindred dogma of original sin, and in order that, by the example adduced from the justification of infants, the gratuitousness of actual grace, which is not less grace or less unowed than that, might be placed in the most evident light. Thus Augustine, Cont. duas epistt. pelagg. L. II. c. 6: «Why has not the baptism, which is given to infants, reminded you what you ought to think about grace. For these are your words: we confess that baptism is necessary for all ages, and that grace also helps each one's good purpose, but does not instill the zeal of virtue into one who is unwilling; because there is no acceptance of persons with God. In all these words of yours, what you said about grace I for the present pass over; render an account of baptism: why you say that it is necessary for all ages; tell why it is necessary for little ones: assuredly because it confers on them some good, and that same something is neither small nor mediocre, but great... tell us then: those little ones who, baptized in Christ, have departed from the body, by what preceding merits did they receive this so sublime gift?... Why is this good sometimes denied to the children of the pious and granted to the children of the impious? etc.»

These things having been demonstrated, it is clear what grace Augustine says was denied by Pelagius in the prior part of the historical description of that same heresy which we related from the beginning: for it is evident that it is actual grace. For 1) in the historical description, Augustine must be said to make mention of that grace certainly about which the question properly was between the Pelagians and the Catholics; but this was, as we have seen, actual grace. 2) The grace of which Augustine speaks is indeed that by which we are adopted and transferred into the kingdom of God, delivered from the power of darkness, but it is nevertheless that from which is the beginning of this adoption, by which we come to the Father; and this is properly actual grace. Indeed Augustine says in epist. CXCIV ad Sixtum: «They can indeed say that the remission of sins is the grace which is given without any preceding merits. For what good merit can sinners possess? But not even the remission of sins itself is without some merit, if faith obtains it. For neither is the merit of faith nothing, by which faith that man said (Luc. XVIII, 13): God be propitious to me, a sinner, and went down justified by the merit of faithful humility, since he who humbles himself will be exalted. It remains therefore that we attribute faith itself, whence all justice takes its beginning... not to human free will, which those men extol, nor to any preceding merits; since from it begin whatever good merits there are: but let us confess that it is the gratuitous gift of God, if we think of true grace, that is, grace without merits.» Since therefore Augustine understands the words of Christ: No one comes to the Father etc. of the faith by which we begin to approach God (Cont. duas epistt. pelagg. L. I. c. 3. «Let them also read what the Lord says: No one can come to me, unless the Father, who sent me, has drawn him. Where, lest anyone think that coming to me is said to mean something other than believing in me, a little after, when he was speaking of his body and blood etc.» Cf. et De Gratia Christi c. XIV.) and says that the remission of sins, and therefore formal justification itself, is gratuitous, because the grace of faith, by which the remission is obtained, is given freely, and in this exposition of the Pelagian heresy he speaks of that grace which the Pelagians denied to be gratuitous and which the words of Christ exhibit: No one comes to the Father etc.; it follows that Augustine here speaks of that grace by which the beginning of justification and faith is brought about; this, moreover, is actual grace. 3) Moreover, the grace of which Augustine speaks there is that by which the divine commandments are done; this, however, is actual grace. 4) The words which follow, denique Pelagius etc., are connected with the preceding ones; for they refer to a certain correction of an error which Augustine described in the preceding words. The object of the discourse therefore is the same, that is, the negation of grace, simple indeed in the prior part of Augustine's discourse, a little softened in the one that follows; moreover in this latter the discourse is about the grace for doing the divine commandments, which according to the Catholics is necessary for being able to do them, but according to Pelagius is given for being able more easily; but this is actual grace. Therefore.

IV. There follows the second question, namely what grace Augustine here (Denique etc.) says was conceded by Pelagius: or did Pelagius admit some actual graces, and which, and to what extent necessary?

We answer. A) Besides the inborn possibility of good, which is the very power and nature of free will, with which is connected the power of knowing the natural law, which consequently is the grace of creation, the Pelagians professed several helps of this possibility, which namely would complete this possibility in first act. And first indeed the help of the positive law given extrinsically by God to men; then the help of the doctrine contained in the Scriptures and the magisterium of the Church; then especially the examples of Christ, which they called grace properly so called. These things are already sufficiently manifest from what has been recited above elsewhere.

Faith also pertains to the grace of the law, because, as Pelagius says in epist. ad Rom. c. 10: «In this time no one fulfills the law without Christ; because it is also of the law that he himself be believed.» Moreover, it must be noted that since this grace of law and doctrine tends to this, that it illumine the mind, and is, as Augustine puts it, the grace of knowledge, it is to be considered together with that knowledge, or illumination of the mind, which is excited in the mind by the law and doctrine proposed extrinsically.

B) We have already warned in Th. VIII, p. 2 that we judge that Pelagius conceded also the help of immediate illumination; although not as necessary, and perhaps to humor his adversaries in some way, lest he should seem to repudiate every interior help. So Petavius judged and defended in the book de Pelagiana et Semipelag. Haeresi cc. 8 et 9, and Livinus Meyer de Pelagg. et Semipelagg. erroribus c. 5. We are moved by these testimonies of Pelagius. Augustine (De Gratia Christi. c. 7.) relates certain words of Pelagius from his Lib. III, De lib. arbit. thus: «As though about to explain (Pelagius) what grace he means, he went on and added = Which we confess to be not, as you think, in the law only, but in the help of God. For God helps us through his doctrine and revelation, while he opens the eyes of our heart, while he shows us future things lest we be occupied with present ones, while he lays open the snares of the devil, while he illumines us with the multiform and ineffable gift of heavenly grace." Then (c. 41. of his same book) Augustine says that «they believe no help of grace, by which the possibility of nature is helped, except in the law and doctrine, so that they think even the prayers themselves, as he most openly affirms in his writings, are to be used for nothing else, except that doctrine be opened to us even by divine revelation, not that the mind of man be helped to accomplish even with love that which it has learned ought to be done." Whence Augustine subjoins: «The very help, by which he asserts the natural possibility to be helped, he places in the law and doctrine, which he confesses is revealed to us even by the Holy Spirit: on which account he concedes that we must also pray." Now from these things it is clear that Pelagius admitted another help besides the law and doctrine, namely the help by which doctrine and law are opened to us even by divine revelation. Indeed this revelation of the Holy Spirit is not itself the external grace of the divine law and doctrine proposed; for that it is another grace is shown a) by that particle etiam: is shown b) by what is subjoined, namely that prayers are to be used by us to obtain it; but we cannot pray that the law and external revelation be given to us, which are already immutably given and are had by us. The same occurs in epist. CLXXXVIII. 3 where August., reviewing the errors of Pelagius about grace, says that he judges that we are so created by God that beyond the fact that he reveals knowledge to us, he helps us in nothing: cf. ibid. nn. 12. 13. And again from the same work of Pelagius Augustine ibid. c. 9 brings forward these words: «(God) works in us the willing of what is good, the willing of what is holy, while he inflames us, given over to earthly desires and, after the manner of dumb animals, loving only present things, with the greatness of future glory and the promise of rewards, while by the revelation of wisdom he arouses the stunned will into the desire of God, while he persuades to us all that is good": what is this arousal of the stunned will and this persuasion through the revelation of wisdom but some interior operation of God in the mind?

Likewise in the book De Gratia Christi c. 23, these words of Pelagius from his Book I. De Lib. arbitrio are related by Augustine: «he who uses well that freedom of the will so delivers himself wholly to God and mortifies all his own will, that he can say with the Apostle: I live, now not I, but Christ lives in meGal. 2:20 and places his heart in the hand of God, that he himself may incline it whither he will.Cf. Prov. 21:1 That so great a help, that God himself incline our heart whither he will, we then, on the authority of Pelagius, as Augustine subjoins, merit, when without any help, only by the freedom of the will, we run to the Lord, desire to be ruled by him, hang our will from his will, and, by adhering to him continually, are made one spirit with him.Cf. 1 Cor. 6:17 But, as Petavius rightly argues l. c. c. IX, 8, »neither can we deliver ourselves to God or hang from his will, without the knowledge of him, which is had through the law and the Scriptures; and since that inclination of the heart made by God is a later and different kind of grace (as being the fruit of merit), it cannot be the same as the former, but is far more excellent than it.«

Likewise in cp. 22 of the same book de Gratia Christi Augustine relates the words of Pelagius from his letter to Demetrias: »For there, having interposed the testimony of the apostle James, in which he says: be subject to God, but resist the Devil and he will flee from youIac. 4:7, he subjoins and says: — He shows how we must resist the Devil, if indeed we are subject to God and, by doing his will, merit divine grace, so that with the help of the Holy Spirit we may more easily resist the wicked spirit.« Here again a certain grace is distinguished which is the effect of the merit of the works which have been done from the knowledge of the law; it is therefore another, more excellent grace. But since that certainly is not the grace of the will, it remains that it is that grace of which we have heard Pelagius speak also elsewhere, namely the interior illumination of the mind.

Finally weigh the words of Augustine in the description of the heresy recited: denique etc. Namely, the brethren reproached Pelagius because he attributed nothing to the grace of God for doing his commandments: but he who is reproached in this manner is supposed indeed to admit the knowledge of the commandments of God, yet to deny the necessity of some help, assuredly distinct from that simple knowledge. Now Pelagius, to humor those brethren in part, professed the help which was demanded, although only for doing them more easily: but which help shall we judge that to have been? the law and doctrine proposed externally? that would be ridiculous. The least that one may conjecture is the interior illumination, of which we have heard Pelagius speak elsewhere.

Finally it is certain that Augustine proved the necessity of a double interior help, of illumination and of inspiration, and it is equally certain that he himself, in the Pelagian controversy, was indeed solicitous in extorting from the Pelagians the profession of the help of the will, that he disputed about it most distinctly and most constantly, and, it having been received, testified that the question was finished: but about the help of knowledge he never disputed deliberately, and spoke of it only in passing. But what is the reason of this diverse method, unless that Augustine knew that this latter was not denied by Pelagius?

Those who think otherwise warn that Augustine reduces the Pelagian grace to law and doctrine, and this is their principal argument. But one may note 1) that this formula by itself alone is ambiguous and can signify both the law and doctrine proposed only extrinsically, and the same manifested also by an interior operation; for even regarded in this way it is nothing but law and doctrine. The determination of the sense of this Augustinian expression must therefore be sought from elsewhere. One may note 2) that Augustine does not oppose Pelagian grace to interior grace in general, but specifically to the interior grace of the will: in this opposition, however, the interior grace of the intellect can also come under law and doctrine (cf. De Gratia Christi c. 7. in fine). Indeed 3) Augustine says De Gratia Christi c. 10: «To doctrine pertains also that wisdom is revealed; to doctrine pertains when all that is good is persuaded.» The same he clearly shows by the words cited p. 141.

You will say that that which the Pelagians called grace properly so called are the examples of Christ, which are exterior grace: moreover, if they had admitted the grace of interior illumination, they would have called this properly grace. I answer: that grace comprises also the interior illumination, by which the understanding of the examples of Christ is opened, just as to the other exterior graces of law and doctrine there corresponds the interior opening of the understanding of them: wherefore in this regard there is no difference between those graces. But a comparison can be instituted between the grace of the examples of Christ and the other graces of law and doctrine in respect of itself, and thus it can be said that it is properly grace; because it is the grace proper to the Gospel.

You will say again that Augustine, the testimony of Pelagius in the book De Gratia Christi c. 23., which we have already described, having been related, after he has refuted the doctrine contained therein, showing that God precedes with his grace the evil wills of men, concludes thus: «Let them read therefore and understand, let them contemplate and confess, that not by the law and doctrine sounding from without, but by an internal and hidden, wonderful and ineffable power, God works in the hearts of men not only true revelations, but also good wills.» Therefore the whole Pelagian grace, and that grace by which God inclines the heart of man whither he will, returns to the law and doctrine sounding from without, to which is opposed the power of God working in the hearts of men true revelations and good wills.

I answer that in this very testimony there is that by which the adversaries are refuted. And so we note that in those words: non solum veras revelationes (not only true revelations), that phrase: non solum etc. (not only, etc.) is wont to be used also when that which is subjoined is both defended by the one who speaks and admitted also by the adversary with whom he contends: so that the sense in this place is this: not only true revelations, which the Pelagians also concede, but also good wills, which the Catholics defend. Why then is Pelagian grace exhibited only as law and doctrine sounding from without? I answer that these things are not said exclusively, having regard to the whole context; yet mention is made from the beginning only of the law and doctrine sounding from without, because this was chiefly the grace of which the Pelagians spoke, which they conceded as necessary too, at least on the hypothesis that God wills to rule the wills of men by some positive law; for then there is need that it be manifested at least extrinsically, and thus we heard a little before Pelagius confessing faith or revelation as necessary. But the grace of interior illumination they conceded indeed, but in no way as necessary, and they seem rather to have conceded it lest they should seem to deny any interior help.

Moreover weigh this, that since the testimonies of Pelagius recited by us in this question have been taken from his work on free will chiefly, and also from the letter to Demetrias, and Pelagius wrote the letter in the year 413, the work in 416, and began to disseminate his heresy at the beginning of the 5th century, the opinion of those can easily be proved, who, to settle the disagreement of the critics, say that Pelagius admitted at first only the external graces, but then, toward the end, conceded also the interior grace of illumination. Cf. Antoine De Gratia c. 1. a. 1.

C) Besides these graces, which can be reduced to efficient causes, the Pelagians maintained that others are to be reduced to formal causes. Namely first the remission of sins, about which Augustine De Gestis Pelagii c. 35: «After the old heresies, even now a heresy has been brought in, not by bishops or priests or any clerics whatsoever, but by certain men as it were monks, which, as though defending free will, would dispute against the grace of God ..., and would deny the help of God in our acts, saying: that human nature, which was created with free will, can suffice for us not to sin and to fulfill justice, and that this is the grace of God; because we are so created that we can do this by the will, and that what help of his law and commandments he gave, and that he forgives past sins to those converted to him: that in these alone is the grace of God to be reckoned, not in the help of our individual acts.» Cf. et can. 3. Conc. Carthag. Then moreover the Pelagians professed the adoption into the children of God. Thus Caelestius in the little book which he offered at Rome to Zosimus: «But we confess that infants ought to be baptized for the remission of sins, according to the rule of the universal Church and according to the sentence of the Gospel, because the Lord decreed that the kingdom of heaven cannot be conferred except on the baptized, which, because the powers of nature do not have it, must be conferred through the bounty of grace.» And Julian (in the work of Augustine cont. eumdem L. III, c. 3.) «The grace of baptism is not to be changed according to causes, because it dispenses its own gifts according to the capacity of those who approach. And therefore Christ, who is the redeemer of his own work, increases benefits around his image with continual bounty, and those whom he had made good by creating, he makes better by renewing and adopting.»

Now of these graces, they thought the grace of adoption necessary for all, not indeed that men might be happy in any way in the other life, but that they might obtain the kingdom of heaven. The grace of the remission of sins they judged necessary for adult sinners, for they taught that little ones are immune from sin. But the other graces given as a help to possibility they denied to be necessary, but they wished only that they be conferred, that free will might the more easily keep the divine commandments. «The very way of salvation (which we find through the law, doctrine, and the examples of Christ) can be found even by nature alone, but more easily if grace helps», they said, with Augustine as witness, De Grat. Christi. c. 41. Which again is evident from the doctrine of Pelagius, which Augustine relates De Pecc. Origin. c. 20 in these words: «Let us not therefore, like Pelagius and his disciples, divide the times, saying: first just men lived from nature, then under the law, thirdly under grace. From nature, namely, from Adam for so long an age, when the law had not yet been given. For then, they say, the creator was known under the guidance of reason, and how one ought to live was carried written not by the law of the letter but of nature. But with morals corrupted, when nature, already discolored, began not to suffice, the law was added to it, by which, like the Moon, it might be restored to its former splendor, the rust having been rubbed off. But after the excessive habit of sinning prevailed, for the healing of which the law availed too little, Christ came, and as to a most desperate disease, not through disciples, but through himself, the physician himself came to the aid.» From which distribution of the three ages it is clear that the Pelagians judged that men could have been holy through nature alone, not only apart from the grace of Christ, but also without the written law, and that some in fact were holy. Whence the necessity of the law and of Christ, arising from contracted vices and the excessive habit of sinning, is only moral, that the difficulty may be overcome. What is said of the law, that is to be affirmed much more of immediate illumination; for they absolutely teach that nature suffices by itself.

But faith in Christ, after his coming, they thought necessary, as is evident from the words of Pelagius in epist. ad Ephesios c. 6: «When now men will not be able to be saved otherwise, unless they are saved by the faith of Christ.»

V. The question is more difficult: whether the Pelagians willed that any grace at all be gratuitous or not. In the first place this was their capital dogma, the most wicked and most subtle germ of their other errors, as Prosper says in the epistle to Rufinus, namely, that the grace of God is given according to the merits of men. This error indeed the Pelagian heresy professed from its very beginning, as is clear from the things that were objected to Pelagius in the Synod of Diospolis in the year 415; although, as Garnerius notes, the reprobation of this error is not found in the canons of the Council of Carthage, nor in the synodal letters of the earlier Council of Carthage and of Milevis to Innocent, nor in his rescripts. But it is permissible to consider that this dogma, that the grace of God is given according to our merits, coheres with the other dogma concerning the possibility of nature to live piously and justly, that is, with the denial of the necessity of grace. Indeed, these two — the grace of God is given according to the merits of men, and the grace of God is not necessary — are partial formulas of one adequate dogma, which as a whole is partly signified and partly co-signified by each one. For the Pelagians did not deny that there is some grace, since they saw that many benefits are God's, which God could of himself have denied to nature; and they counted the free creation itself of nature and the conferral of free will among the principal graces. But since they had established among themselves that free will was so constituted by God as to be sufficient to itself for every exercise of virtue and for attaining all perfection, and consequently for meriting whatever it is right to correspond to virtue, hence 1) they denied that, besides the grace of the creation of nature itself, another grace was necessary for free will in order to live holily, and2) they affirmed that nature could by merits from itself, as it were, procure for itself the other benefits or graces of God. Whence this head of doctrine, that the grace of God is given according to our merits, was a consequence of the other, which had been established beforehand, namely, that nature is by itself sufficient for living holily. Conversely, this other too followed from that former one, which had been posited antecedently. For if the grace of God is given according to the merits of man, merits therefore precede, which can be only from nature, and for that reason nature is by itself powerful for working justly. The Pelagians, namely, denied at the same time both the necessity and the gratuitousness of grace. It is, moreover, evident by itself that if the gratuitousness of grace is denied, the necessity of grace insofar as it is such is also denied: for what is rendered as a debt is not grace. And conversely, if the necessity of grace is denied, because nature is by itself powerful for meriting, the gratuitousness of the gifts that are afterwards superadded to nature is also denied.

It is not permitted to conjecture which of these two was first explicitly devised by them; it is certain that they taught both and confirmed both with their own arguments, and it is equally certain that the question of the gratuitousness of grace was agitated especially after the heresy was proscribed by Zosimus in the year 418, and that the gratuitousness of grace was defended deliberately by Augustine in his last works. But just as the Pelagians denied the necessity of grace, lest freedom should seem to be denied or harmed, so too they taught that the grace of God is given according to merits, lest God should be deemed unjust and an acceptor of persons.

Although, however, the Pelagians denied the gratuitousness of grace in general, teaching that the grace of God is given according to merits, yet it must not be thought that they willed that absolutely all graces be repaid to merits and that none be conferred freely. Surely, how could they have conceived that the grace of the law and of external doctrine, of the examples of Christ, is given to us according to merits, since those graces preceded even the merits of each one of us, and in general the law and doctrine is known, at least in part, before anyone actually merits. Especially since, according to the Pelagian doctrine of the distribution of the three ages, which we gave above, the law was given and Christ came because morals had been corrupted and the excessive habit of sinning had prevailed; in the human race, therefore, bad merits, not good ones, had preceded. But it does not appear how the good works of subsequent men could have merited these graces for themselves; therefore the Pelagians are to be said to have acknowledged these graces, although not necessary to nature, as gratuitous nevertheless. But the grace of interior and immediate illumination, by which the understanding of the commandments is opened, by which the Spirit reveals the law, the doctrine, and the examples of Christ; the grace of adoption, by which God turns himself to men and receives them among his sons and friends; the grace of eternal life, that is, of the kingdom of heaven — these certainly are the graces which the Pelagians willed to be given to adults according to merits (for to infants it was impossible). «It has been understood (says Prosper, epist. ad Rufinum, c. 2) and most salutarily perceived that they confess only this much about grace, that it is a certain mistress to free will and shows itself through exhortations, through the law, through doctrine, through the contemplation of creatures, through miracles and through terrors at its indication, by which each one, according to the motion of his own will, if he has sought, may find, if he has asked, may receive, if he has knocked, may enter. Because, namely, the calling of grace itself does this first of all with regard to us, that it admonishes the choice of our faculty, and grace is nothing other than the law, than the prophet, than the teacher, to whom, with regard to all men through the whole world, the care is common and general, so that those who will may believe, and those who have believed may receive justification by the merit of faith and of good will, and thus grace is bestowed according to the merit of men, and in this way grace is not grace.» Augustine reports these words of Pelagius in De Grat. Christi, c. 31: «We say that this power of free will is in all men generally, in Christians, Jews, and Gentiles; in all, free will is equal through nature, but in Christians alone it is helped by grace. Those are therefore to be judged and condemned, because, although they have free will, through which they could come to faith and merit the grace of God, they use badly the liberty granted. These, however, are to be rewarded, who, using free will well, merit the grace of the Lord and keep his commandments."

The question, however, is about the grace of the remission of sins. Garnerius (in Marium Mercatorem, p. 1. D. VII. c. 5. § 3) contends that Pelagius was always of that opinion, that it is given freely, indeed also the rest of his followers, if you except Caelestius; and there is a clear testimony of Augustine in De Grat. et lib. arbit., c. 6: «When the Pelagians say that this is the only grace that is not according to our merits, by which sins are forgiven to a man, but that the one which is given at the end, that is, eternal life, is rendered to preceding merits: it is to be answered, etc.» But Petavius (l. c., c. 3) doubts whether Pelagius was always of that opinion, and certainly he does not see how this doctrine coheres with the rest of the doctrine of Pelagius. For he himself teaches that justification is merited by faith, but that faith is acquired by the merits of nature. And although the things which we have just given from Augustine are affirmed by him in a book written in the year 424, nevertheless in the book de Gestis Palaestinensibus, written in the year 417, and in the epist. ad Paulinum Nolanum, written in 418, Augustine affirms that it was objected to Pelagius in the Synod of Diospolis that he taught: that pardon is given to the penitent not according to the grace and mercy of God, but according to the merit and labor of those who through penance have been made worthy of mercy.

What then? Either Pelagius changed his opinion in this matter — which, however, would be a wonder, since it was never noticed by Augustine — or it must be said with Garnerius that this was the special opinion of Caelestius, which was objected to Pelagius only on account of the fellowship of both in the heresy. Certainly Pelagius denied that he taught this, nor does Augustine reproach in him any vice of dissimulation in this regard. But how Pelagius was able to reconcile the gratuitous remission of sins with the rest of his doctrine, you will understand without difficulty if you weigh that, however excellent the dignity of nature may be and great its power of acting, and however huge those things may be which the creature is said to be able to bring to God for satisfaction, nevertheless the acceptance of satisfaction is always free on the part of God offended by his creature, just as it also had place in Christ. But God, according to Pelagius, accepts the natural merits of faith, and thus remission is obtained through faith, which is a work of nature, condign even, if you will, in first act; but it is obtained by God freely accepting this sort of merit of faith. Moreover, this very opinion of Caelestius was what was objected to Pelagius in the Synod of Diospolis.

VI. It is asked whether the Pelagians were constant concerning the necessity of grace, always affirming what they had taught from the beginning, or whether they in some way afterwards changed their opinion. The authority of Augustine persuades that the Pelagians deflected in the course of time somewhat from the opinion which they had previously conceived, and wished to concede something to the Catholics. Thus Augustine, Serm. CLVI. c. 12, which he delivered around the year 417, in which the heresy was condemned by Innocent: «Yet know that you so do good that the Spirit is the ruler and helper, who, if he is lacking, you can do nothing good at all. For indeed those who were constrained began at last to say something, confessing grace (and we bless God because they have at last said even this; for by drawing near they will be able to make progress and to arrive at that which is truly right). Now, therefore, they say that the grace of God is a helper for doing the commandments more easily. For these are their words. For this, they say, God gave his grace to men, that what they are commanded to do through free will, they may be able to fulfill more easily through grace.» But what is that grace which Pelagius afterwards conceded to be given by God for doing the commandments more easily, of which also the Fathers of Carthage speak? It seems to be the illumination of the mind, even the interior one, which we have shown to have been admitted by Pelagius, of which there is speech also in these words of Augustine, De Gratia Christi, c. 40: «In which words it is certainly manifest that he wills us to be helped in such a way by the grace of the Holy Spirit, not because without it, even through the mere possibility of nature, we cannot resist the tempter, but that we may resist more easily. Which help, however, of whatever kind and however small, it is credible that he places in that which seems to us to be knowledge, the Spirit revealing through doctrine, which we cannot have, or can have only with difficulty, through nature.» Namely, it seems that from the beginning Pelagius admitted only that grace which is placed in free will itself and in the natural possibility of good and in the natural law, which, as he said, suffice in the state of nature, and that he afterwards added graces, not indeed necessary but for working more easily: the law and doctrine and also the interior and immediate illumination, by which the understanding of the law would be opened; and so the grace given for fulfilling the law more easily is the grace of doctrine, which is manifested to us through the Gospel and the examples of Christ, and especially, unless we are mistaken, it is the grace of interior and immediate illumination, by which the understanding of the doctrine of Christ is opened to us by the Spirit, which grace Pelagius, as we have said, at length admitted. (IV.)

VII. Moreover, that we may say in this place whatever pertains to the historical question of the gratuitousness of grace denied by the Pelagians, we judge that these things are to be noted. 1) After the Tractoria of Zosimus in the year 418, the Pelagians contended especially for this, that the grace of God is given according to our merits, that is, they agitated the question of grace principally under the aspect of gratuitousness. This is clear from the disputations of the Fathers after that time, who impugn that head of doctrine more frequently. The testimony of Augustine is also usually adduced from the book De Grat. et lib. arbit., which was written in the year 426 or 427: but there perhaps only the method of disputing of the Pelagians is indicated. Thus in c. 14 he says: «But when they have been convicted — not defenders, but inflators and precipitators of free will, because neither the knowledge of the divine law nor nature nor the sole remission of sins is that grace which is given through Jesus Christ Our Lord; .... they turn to this, that they may try in whatever way to show that the grace of God is given according to our merits. For they say: even if it is not given according to the merits of good works, because through it we work well, yet it is given according to the merits of the will; because a good will, they say, precedes the one praying, which was preceded by the will of the one believing, so that according to these merits the grace of God who hears may follow.» 2) For denying the gratuitousness of grace, the Pelagians, when they were pressed with the diverse lot of little children, also answered that which was afterwards adopted by the Massilians, namely, that some are chosen, others left, because God foresaw their future works (namely, those that would have been future). Augustine testifies this in epist. ad Sixtum CXCIV., written in the year 418, n. 25. 3) Although the Pelagians, as we shall soon say, never approved the interior grace of the will, nevertheless, since they taught that the grace of God is given according to merits, they seem to have spoken so generally as to have comprised any interior grace whatsoever, whether that which they actually confessed or that which the Catholics proved to be admissible: this is what the Pelagians seem to have specifically intended, to deny the gratuitousness of grace, lest fate should be introduced, lest acceptance of persons should be said to be with God, and therefore their assertion seems to have been not only absolute with respect to those graces which they themselves professed, but also hypothetical with respect to the grace defended by the Catholics; namely, their assertion was equivalent to this: whatever grace is to be admitted, even if a grace proper to the will itself is to be admitted, it is nevertheless given according to merits. These things persuade us of this: a) the testimony of Augustine just cited, from which the Pelagians seem to be especially solicitous about this matter, that grace be said to be given according to the merits of a good will, even if through it we work well.The usage of disputing of the Fathers, who reproach the Pelagians for teaching that the grace of God is given according to our merits, with no distinction of graces having been made, and even when they treat of the grace properly so called of the will. August. Cont. duas epistt. pelagg. L. I. c. 3. (year 420 or a little later) «Lest perhaps they say that (men) were helped to this, that they might have the power to become sons of God: but that they might merit to receive this, they first received with free will, helped by no grace: this indeed is the intention by which they strive to destroy grace, that they may contend that it is given according to our merits; lest perhaps, therefore, they so divide this evangelical sentence, that they place the merit in what was said: as many as received him, and then that the grace in what follows, he gave them the power to become sons of God, etc., is not given freely, but rendered to this merit.» And a little after: «No one, therefore, can have a just will, unless with no preceding merits he has received the true, that is, the gratuitous, grace from above. This the proud and haughty do not will, neither purging defenders, but extolling precipitators of free will. Who are indignant at us saying these things for no other reason, except that they disdain to glory in the Lord.» persuades a certain observation of Augustine on a certain opinion of the Pelagians, which is of this sort (L. I. of the same work, c. 8). «They (the Pelagians) thought this should not be objected to us, that we say God inspires into a man, even unwilling and reluctant, not the desire of any good whatsoever, but even of the imperfect itself. Perhaps, therefore, they themselves at least in that way preserve a place for grace, so that they think a man can have without it the desire, namely, of imperfect good; but of perfect good not more easily through it, but not at all except through it» that they absolutely could not. But even so they say that the grace of God is given according to our merits, which Pelagius in the East, fearing to be condemned by the ecclesiastical acts, condemned.» «Now indeed this hypothesis, which Augustine makes — that the Pelagians attributed to nature the desire only of the imperfect, so that in this way they might defend the grace of God as given according to merits, but attributed to nature no possibility of perfect good — is an argument that it did not seem repugnant to Augustine that the Pelagians, in order to defend the grace of God as given according to merits, should contend at least this alone, that the possibility of imperfect good is in nature. But this repugnance could have seemed to Augustine to be lacking on a twofold account. Either because he knew that they then actually taught that grace is necessary for perfecting the good, or because he saw that, for defending the thesis which the Pelagians then propounded, it was enough if they said that nature suffices for beginning the good. But the first is false: the other, however, comes to this: the thesis which the Pelagians defended, namely, that the grace of God is given according to merits, sufficiently stands by itself according to them, if at least the beginning of good is from nature, even if afterwards for perfecting the good a grace also of the will is required; which was afterwards the opinion of the Massilians. Moreover, this is just as much as to say that the Pelagians then so defended the grace of God as given according to merits, that they contended this alone, that the grace of God, whatever it at length may be, is not gratuitous: and therefore that they spoke not only absolutely of their own grace, but also hypothetically of the grace of the Catholics.

VIII. There follows the most important question: whether the Pelagians ever confessed the interior immediate grace of the will, and indeed whether even before the condemnation of the heresy, or at least after the heresy was proscribed by Zosimus. Likewise, what grace helping the will the Fathers demanded the profession of from the Pelagians, so that they might count them among the Catholics. This second question concerns us more closely, who must declare and defend the catholic dogma according to the norm of the Fathers. And so the answer to the first question is: the Pelagians conceded neither before nor after the condemnation of the heresy the interior grace of the will, namely, that grace which would affect the will too, adding strength to it for working.

A) And indeed with regard to that age which preceded the Tractoria of Zosimus in the year 418, this becomes evident from the most certain monuments.

It suffices to adduce these. a) The books De libero arbitrio were written by Pelagius in the year 416; moreover, that in those books Pelagius professed no interior grace of the will supplying strength, but only the grace of the law and of doctrine or of knowledge, Augustine is witness in the book De Gratia Christi, by which he refuted those books of Pelagius. β) The bishops of Africa, Aurelius and three others with Augustine, in letters given to Innocent I at the end of the year 416, who, writing back to them in the year 417, first condemned the heresy, have these words (epist. CLXXVII. among the Augustinian letters): «For whether (Pelagius) has said that grace is free will, or that grace is the remission of sins, or that grace is the precept of the law, he says none of those things which pertain, through the subministration of the power of the Holy Spirit, to overcoming concupiscences and temptations.» γ) At the same time Augustine, writing to Hilary, his brother and fellow priest, epist. CLXXVIII., says: «A certain new heresy, hostile to the grace of Christ, strives to arise against the Church of Christ, but it is not yet evidently separated from the Church, namely, of men who dare to attribute so much power to human weakness, that they contend that this alone pertains to the grace of God: that we were created with free will and the possibility of not sinning, and that we received from God the commandments which were to be fulfilled by us; but that for keeping and fulfilling the same commandments we need no divine help. But that the remission of sins is necessary for us, because the things which were badly done by us in the past we cannot make undone. But for avoiding future sins and overcoming all temptations by virtue, without any further help of the grace of God, they will the human will to suffice by natural possibility.» δ) Innocent testifies the same in the letters given to the Fathers of the Council of Carthage and of the Council of Milevis and to the five bishops. ε) The same is proved from canons 3. and 5. of the Council of Carthage held in the year 418, in which those are condemned who teach that the grace of God avails only for the remission of sins, but deny that it avails as a help by which sins may not be committed hereafter, who, having conceded the grace of the knowledge of the law, deny the grace by which it is granted to us that we love and are able to do what we have known to be done. ζ) Finally Zosimus in his Tractoria condemned this error of the Pelagians. For Prosper testifies, adversus Collatorem, n. 57, that «the African

councils, to the decrees of which Pope Zosimus of blessed memory annexed the strength of his own sentence and armed the right hands of all the bishops with the sword of Peter for the beheading of the impious." Moreover, the African Fathers proscribed this error especially. Whence also Celestine, explaining certain words of the Tractoria of Zosimus, established a sentence contrary to this error and proves it by the authority of the same Zosimus, c. 9, among the Auctorr. of the Apostolic See. »That God so works in the hearts of men and in free will itself, that a holy thought, a pious counsel, and every motion of a good will is from God, because through him we can do something good, without whom we can do nothing. For to this profession the same doctor instructed us, who, when he spoke to the bishops of the whole world about the help of divine grace, said: what time, then, intervenes in which we do not need his aid? in all acts, therefore, causes, thoughts, motions, the helper and protector is to be prayed to. For it is proud that human nature should presume anything for itself."

But there are those who think the contrary and, in confirmation of their opinion, adduce these 1) words of Pelagius, which Augustine reports in the book De Grat. Christi, c. 10, and which are taken from the works of Pelagius written before the Tractoria of Zosimus: »How, he says, will that saying of the Apostle stand: For God it is who works in us both to will and to accomplish? He works in us to will what is good, to will what is holy, while, as we are given over to earthly desires and, after the manner of dumb animals, loving only present things, he sets us aflame with the greatness of future glory and the promise of rewards; while by the revelation of wisdom he rouses the stupefied will into desire of God; while he persuades to us everything that is good." But this is the interior grace of the will. 2) In the same book Augustine, c. 29, reciting the words of Pelagius from the first book, De libero arbitrio: »That what men are commanded to do through free will, he says, they may be able to fulfill more easily through grace:" Augustine adds: »Take away 'more easily,' and the sense is not only full, but even sound, if it is said thus: that what men are commanded to do through free will, they may be able to fulfill through grace." Moreover, the sense would not be sound, if that grace were not one of inspiration; therefore Pelagius admitted that grace, and in this alone did he err, that he contended that it is given not for being able, but only for being able more easily. 9) With Augustine as witness, in the same work De Gratia

Christi, cc. 2. 7. 10., Pelagius conceded that the possibility of good is a gift of the grace of God and that it is completed by a supernatural help; but that possibility of good is interior, and the help by which it is completed is a help of the will.

But to the first Augustine in the same book De Gratia Christi testifies that in no work of Pelagius which he himself has read did he ever see him profess the interior grace of the will. In c. 30 he says: «That grace by which we are justified, that is, by which the charity of God is diffused in our hearts through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us, in the writings of Pelagius and Caelestius, whatever I have been able to read, I have nowhere found them confessing as it is to be confessed.» Therefore it cannot be that in those words of Pelagius reported by Augustine is contained the grace of charity diffused in hearts, which is the grace of inspiration properly so called. And certainly, to those words of Pelagius Augustine immediately subjoins this commentary, c. 10: «What is more manifest than that he says that the grace by which God works in us to will what is good is nothing other than the law and doctrine?... But we will that he at some time confess that grace, by which the greatness of future glory is not only promised, but also believed and hoped, and wisdom is not only revealed, but also loved, and everything that is good is not only urged, but also prevails.» Namely, that Augustine testifies ibid. c. 41 concerning the books of Pelagius De lib. arb.: «whatever he seems to say for grace, by which we are helped to decline from evil and to do good, he so says it that he in no way departs from the ambiguity of words, which he can so explain to his disciples that they believe no help of grace, by which the possibility of nature is helped, except in the law and doctrine, so that he thinks that the prayers themselves, as he most manifestly affirms in his writings, are to be employed for nothing else, except that doctrine may be opened to us even by divine revelation... For he does not depart at all from that his most manifest dogma, where he established those three: possibility, will, action, and says that possibility alone is always helped by divine assistance, but thinks that the will and action need no help of God.» — the grace, namely, of interior illumination Pelagius expressed in those words, as is clear from Augustine's own interpretation.

To the second again, since those words of Pelagius are taken from the first book De libero arbitrio and in them Augustine testifies that the grace proper to the will is denied by Pelagius, it is evident that they cannot the words of Pelagius be turned to the sense intended by the objectors. Hence there the speech of Augustine is not about the nature of grace, but about its necessity: moreover, if the question is made only about the necessity of grace, it is certain that the words of Pelagius, with the little word 'more easily' removed, exhibit a most sound sense. But if you ask again of what sort the necessary grace is, it will be answered that this was already defined by Augustine in the preceding pages, and therefore he now only supposes it.

To the third, moreover, we say that there is in reality no difficulty there. For the possibility of good is indeed grace according to Pelagius, but it is the very grace of creation: but the help by which the possibility is helped he placed in the law and doctrine, that is, in knowledge, not however in charity and the subministration of the power of the Holy Spirit.

B) It must likewise be certain that the Pelagians persisted in the same opinion after the heresy condemned by Innocent and Zosimus, and did not will to profess an interior help of the will conferring strength upon it. Certainly 1) in the profession of faith which Julian and the other Pelagian bishops offered to the Apostolic See after the Tractoria of Zosimus, to which they refused to subscribe, they speak no otherwise than they had spoken before, and make no mention of that grace which they had previously denied. For thus they say: «We say that the commandments of the divine law are possible on account of the justice of God, and we confess that they can universally be fulfilled through the grace of Christ, which is always the helper and companion of all good acts, and through the free will of man, which itself too is a gift of God. Which grace of God, however, we so receive, that it does not follow the unwilling nor forsake the obedient.» Which words indeed are so ambiguous that they can conveniently be explained even of the mere grace of knowledge. Whence 2) concerning Julian, who seems then to have been the prince of the Pelagian faction, Marius Mercator has these things in the Subnotationes on the writings of Julian: «These and similar (Pelagian chapters) pleased also Julian and his other fellow soldiers, which, when they had been known and detected and had been condemned with the aforesaid persons (Pelagius and Caelestius) by ecclesiastical authority, were also defended by the same Julian with a multitude of books: and it pleased that he be counted third in the condemnation with Pelagius and Caelestius.» If he defended the doctrine of Pelagius and Caelestius, which had been condemned by ecclesiastical authority, he did not therefore temper that opinion. And in very truth 3) Julian himself, in the first book of the eight to Florus, which he wrote around the year 421, so opens his opinion, as Augustine reports in Oper. imperf. L. I. n. 94: «We confess the grace of Christ to be manifold. Its first gift is that we were made from nothing; the second, that we excel those living by sense, even as the sentient excel by reason, which was impressed on the soul, so that it might be called the image of the creator, to whose dignity the liberty granted to the will equally looks. Thus grace sent the law as a help; it pertained to its office that it should arouse by manifold teachings and foster by its invitation the light of reason, which the examples of depravity and the habit of vices were dulling. To the fullness of this grace, that is, of the divine benevolence, which gave cause to things, it looked that the Word should be made flesh and dwell in us. This grace, therefore, which in baptism not only pardons sins, but together with this benefit of indulgence also advances and adopts and consecrates; this, I say, grace changes the merit of the guilty, it does not create free will, which we receive at the time when we are created; but we use it when we attain the power of discretion between good and evil. To a good will, therefore, we do not deny that innumerable kinds of divine help are present; but in such a way that neither through the kinds of help is the destroyed liberty of the will fabricated, nor, with it excluded, is it ever thought that any necessity of good or evil presses upon anyone (behold the arguments of the Pelagians against the necessity of the grace of the will; therefore this is not asserted here): but all help cooperates with free choice.» Here, moreover, was the place to enumerate the interior grace of the will among the others, if Julian had approved it; but it is passed over in silence; therefore it was not then counted among the graces by the Pelagians. Wherefore 4) Augustine, who had read both the two letters of the Pelagians written after the Tractoria of Zosimus and the eight books of Julian to Florus, does not hand down that they taught anything except what Pelagius had also taught at first. For thus he says in Contra duas epistt. pelagg. L. IV, c. 5: «Nowhere do these enemies of grace plot more hidden snares for attacking the same grace more vehemently, than where they praise the law, which is without doubt to be praised. For they will the law to be understood as grace in diverse modes of speech and variety of words in all their disputations, namely, that we may have from the Lord God the help of knowledge, by which we may know those things which are to be done purely, not the inspiration of love, that we may do the known things with holy love, which is properly grace.» in the Opere imperf., in which he responds to the books of Julian, he says L. III, n. 14: «But when it is asked of you what those helps of the grace of God are, you declare those which you have commemorated above: that God helps by commanding, blessing, sanctifying, coercing, provoking, illuminating; all of which are done even through men, even through the Scriptures... Not, however, is he who plants anything, nor he who waters, but God who gives the increase: this, moreover, is the increase, that each one obeys the precepts of God, which does not happen, when it truly happens, except by charity... This charity no one gives but God; for charity is from God. This you do not will to name among the helps of grace which you commemorate, lest you concede that this very thing, that we obey God, is of his grace. For you think that in this way the choice of the will is taken away.»The same finally is clear from the testimony of Augustine from the book De haeresibus related at the beginning of this disputation, from those words: «that grace of God, without which we can do nothing good» etc., in which Augustine testifies that the Pelagians reduce the grace of God to the law and doctrine, that they confess that knowledge indeed is given, but deny that charity is given.

Nor do the arguments which are adduced on the contrary effect anything. For they say 1) that just as before the condemnation of the heresy the question for the Fathers was about the nature of grace, and they vindicated its necessity, so after the condemnation of the heresy, leaving that question aside, the Fathers turned to defending the gratuitousness of grace; which is an argument that the Pelagians in the first question gave their hands as conquered and consented to the Catholics. Which indeed can also be proved by the testimony of Augustine, who says that the Pelagians, convicted that the grace of God is not only knowledge or nature or the remission of sins, turned to this, to show that the grace of God is given according to merits. De Grat. et lib. arb. c. 14, in the place cited above.

But a) it is false that the Fathers did not agitate even after the condemnation of the heresy the question of the nature of grace and its necessity. b) Even if Augustine says that the Pelagians were convicted, he does not say that they also confessed. Whence c) that the Fathers vindicated especially after the Tractoria of Zosimus the gratuitousness of grace did not come from this, that the Pelagians consented with the Catholics in the other question, but both from this — that the Pelagians, routed on that side, lest they should seem wholly conquered, renewed the war in that part which had previously been treated with lesser cares, and contended that the grace of God is given according to merits — and from this — that, with the prior question sufficiently discussed and settled, the Fathers had no further need to dwell on it. Hence it is that Augustine, who in the cited place De Gratia et lib. arb. c. 14 says, as they object to us, that the Pelagians were convicted and so turned to impugning the gratuitousness of grace, in the same book c. 11 says the same: «What is it, then, that the most vain and most perverse Pelagians say that the law is the grace of God, by which we are helped not to sin? What is it, wretches, that they say, who without any doubt contradict so great an Apostle (Gal. II, 16)!» Still, therefore, the Pelagians persisted in the error about the nature of grace necessary for the work.

They say Augustine, in the book De dono perseverantiae, and therefore in his last age, reduces to only three heads the doctrine which the Church would defend against the Pelagians, among which heads that one about the nature and necessity of grace does not appear. c. 2: «There are three things, as you know, which the catholic Church especially defends against them; of which one is that the grace of God is not given according to our merits... the second is, that no one lives in this corruptible body in whatever greatness of justice without sins of whatever kind; the third is, that man is born liable to the sin of the first parent.» Therefore, they say, about that former head there was no longer any controversy with the Pelagians.: the testimony of Augustine is affirmative, not exclusive; β) that Augustine enumerates, not all things, but those which the Church at that time especially defended against the Pelagians: γ) that the interpretation of the testimony of Augustine is to be required according to the other testimonies which we adduced from the Opere cont. epistt. pelag., from the Opere imperfecto, and from the book De haeresibus.

They say at least it must be conceded that the Pelagians, although they persisted in denying the necessity of the interior grace which would confer strength on the will for beginning, nevertheless conceded the necessity of the same grace for perfecting. Which they think to prove by the testimony adduced from c. 8 of L. II. cont. duas epistt. pelag., which we exhibited above under num. VII.: but that Augustine did not will by those words to teach what the Pelagians absolutely thought about the nature of grace and its necessity is evident from those things which he hands down about the same Pelagians in other works written even in his last age, from which we have already cited testimonies; from which it is clear that the Pelagians never willed to acknowledge the interior grace of the will. To which testimonies this also can be added, from Op. imper. L. II. n. 198: «Now break out into the open, enemies of the cross of Christ... Say openly: we can be justified by nature, we can be justified by the law; Christ died in vain. But fearing the Christian multitude, you substitute the Pelagian word, and to those asking you why Christ died, if nature or the law effects the just, you answer: that this very thing might be done more easily: as if it could be done, although more difficultly, yet nevertheless either through nature or through the law. Christ, answer, conquer, convince, cry out: without me you can do nothing; let those be silent who cry: although more difficultly, yet we can do something without you.» Still, therefore, the Pelagians persisted in the opinion of the sufficiency of nature for doing justice, which comprises not only the beginning, but also the perfection, and of the help of the law, of doctrine and of the examples of Christ, which grace, however, would be offered only for doing it more easily. Moreover, with this doctrine cannot be composed the opinion asserting that for perfecting justice the interior grace of the will is necessary.

To this also belongs what Augustine says about the distinction between the Pelagians and the Massilians. De Praed. SS. c. 1. «These our brethren have arrived, for whom your pious charity is solicitous, at believing with the Church of Christ that the human race is born subject to the sin of the first man, and that no one is freed from that evil except through the justice of the second man. They have arrived also at confessing that the wills of men are prevented by the grace of God, and at agreeing that no one can suffice for himself either for beginning or for perfecting any good work. Holding fast, therefore, to these things, to which they have arrived, they are distinguished very much from the error of the Pelagians.» Therefore the error of the Pelagians was: that anyone suffices for himself for beginning and perfecting.

IX. It remains for us to see what that grace is, the profession of which the Fathers demanded of the Pelagians. It is a question of the greatest moment, and one to be treated accurately. For certain learned men, in order to defend their own systems, imagine that the grace which was denied by the Pelagians and defended by the Fathers is that which they themselves have devised, and they would wish it, so fortified by the authority of the Fathers, to impose it upon others as a revealed dogma. Let these things, therefore, be held.

1. The necessary help of God, of which the Fathers spoke, Palm. De Grat. tion is that which is commonly called the general concurrence of God, which is necessary for all the actions of every secondary cause. Proof. The general concurrence of God is related by reason of nature to all acts considered physically, whether good or bad; but the Fathers indicated a help of this kind, which would be a gift superadded to nature and which would not be except for good, insofar as a power to good, not to evil, was conferred. For to this belongs what we have already noted. Th. VIII. n. VI.

Furthermore, the help of which the Fathers spoke was asserted by them to be necessary for salutary acts, for acting as one ought; but the general concurrence of God is necessary also for natural acts; therefore the help which the Fathers claimed is some special help, distinct from the general concurrence.

Again, the help defended by the Fathers is a help by which the faculty for acting is prevented, prepared, and excited: but the general concurrence is only cooperating.

Likewise, the help championed by the Fathers is a help altogether gratuitous; it is a help which the Pelagians contended to be given according to merits: but the general concurrence is owed to created nature, nor may it be merited, since the first merit necessarily precedes it. Therefore.

That, however, does not prevent the Fathers from sometimes bringing forward also that head of doctrine which comes back to the general concurrence of God, in order to blunt the pride of the Pelagians and to demonstrate the necessity of divine help for acting well and the impotence of nature, which the Pelagians so greatly extolled, as Jerome seems to do in the first Dialogue against the Pelagians, who, if you consider only the words which Jerome reports, seem to deny even the general concurrence. But this special manner of arguing, employed at times by some Father, is not to be confused with that doctrine which the whole Church, together with all the Fathers, asserted against the Pelagians (cf. Th. XXII. n. I).

Note also that the general concurrence is distinct from that gratuitous natural help by which God excites the mind to suitable thoughts, of which we spoke in Thesis II. But because a gratuitous help of this kind has a place in both orders, the natural and the supernatural, it does not follow that, if the Fathers speak of that help, they are discoursing about the natural help.

2. The help of God, the profession of which the Fathers demanded of the Pelagians, is an internal help, a help of the will suggesting to it powers for willing and operating; yet without the Fathers contending that a certain definite mode is to be believed, by which the will is aided by a help of this kind, whether by predetermining it or, much less, by imposing necessity upon it. Proof. The Pelagians admitted all external graces; yet with these the Fathers were not content; therefore some internal, immediate help was asserted by the Fathers. But the immediate help, besides the illumination of the mind, which the Fathers openly testified, was chiefly the help of the will, which would heal it and add powers to it for operating as one ought. That this was demanded by the Fathers sufficiently appears from several authorities already cited. Moreover, we say only this, that it was demanded by the Fathers, without their being solicitous about, or proposing for belief, some mode by which divine grace operates in us. They knew, to be sure, that some mode is present; for what thing is there without some mode? But the question then was not what that mode might be: nor did the Fathers propose to the Pelagians that some determinate mode was to be believed. Certainly, the Carthaginian Fathers in the letter to Innocent (which is CLXXV inter Augustinianas) and the Milevitan Fathers to the same pontiff in their letter (CLXXVI inter Augustin.) reprobate this in Pelagius and Caelestius: that they leave no place for the grace of God by which we are Christians, by which the very choice of our will truly becomes free; that they place the grace of God in this, that He instituted such a nature, which could by its own will fulfill the law of God, whether naturally written in the heart or given in letters; but they are unwilling to acknowledge that grace by which, against the evil of sin and for working justice, God is our helper, which the Apostle preaches, saying: for I take delight in the law of God according to the inner man, but I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind and captivating me under the law of sin, which is in my members. Wretched man that I am, who will deliver me from the body of this death? The grace of God through I. Ch. D. N. Likewise, the five African Bishops to the same Innocent (letter CLXXVII inter Augustin.) reprove this in Pelagius: that whether he says grace

of God be free will, or grace be the remission of sins, or grace be the precept of the law, he says none of those things which pertain, through the ministration of the Holy Spirit, to overcoming concupiscences and temptations; and they demand that Pelagius «confess most openly that grace which Christian doctrine proclaims to be proper to Christians, which is not nature, but by which nature is saved, which fosters nature not by doctrine sounding in the ears or by some visible assistance, like a planter and waterer, so to speak, from without, but by the ministration of the Spirit and hidden mercy, as He does who gives the increase, God.»

Likewise, the Synods both of Carthage and of Orange, in defining what is to be believed about the assistance of the grace of God, establish these things: that by the grace of God it is granted to us to love and to be able to do what we have known to be done, and that not only may we fulfill the law more easily, but that we may be able to fulfill it at all; that it is by the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, not by the vigor of nature, that we are able to do all things as we ought; that by the same inspiration of the Holy Spirit our will is corrected from unbelief to faith, from impiety to piety; that God operates in us and with us, so that we operate — men so willing to do what they do — that nevertheless the will is prepared by the grace of God to will, and, willing and acting, is aided.

Likewise, in the authorities of the Apostolic See collected by Caelestinus, we are taught that no one uses free will well except through Christ; that no one pleases God from any other source except from that which He Himself has given; that God operates in the hearts of men and in free will itself, so that every motion of a good will is from God, so that He is the author of all good affections and works.

Moreover, from all these things it is clear what the Fathers reprobated in the heretics, what they demanded to be believed; that, moreover, is the assistance of the will; but concerning the mode by which it aids, and that mode which some invent, absolutely nothing.

The same thing is evidently established from Augustine. Cont. duas epistt. pelagg. L IV, c. 6. he says: «What does it profit them, that in the praise of free will itself they say that grace aids each one's good purpose? This would be accepted without scruple as spoken catholicly, if they did not place merit in the good purpose, to which merit the reward would already be rendered according to debt, not according to grace, but understood and confessed that even the good purpose itself, which grace aids as a consequence, could not have been in man, if grace did not precede.» And de Gratia Christi c. 17. «As far as pertains to that question of divine grace and assistance, attend to those three things which he most openly distinguished: posse, velle and esse — that is, possibility, will, action. If, therefore, he agrees with us, not only the possibility in man, even if he neither wills nor acts well, but also the will and the action themselves, that is, that we will and act well, which are not in man except when he wills well and acts well; if, as I said, he agrees that the will and the action themselves are divinely aided, and so aided that without that assistance we neither will nor do anything good, and that this is the grace of God through I. Ch. D. N., in which He made us just by His own, not our, justice, so that it may be the true justice which is ours from Him; nothing, as I judge, of controversy about the assistance of the grace of God remains between us.» What is clearer than these words? This one thing was demanded, that they confess the assistance by which the will and the action are aided: but concerning the mode nothing is said. The Fathers, therefore, did not propose that a certain definite mode, by which grace operates in us, was to be believed, although they certainly knew that some mode exists; but about this they were not solicitous, and it was enough for them if it were believed that the very act of the will, the very good action, is from God aiding.

Hence it is that Augustine most frequently reproaches the Pelagians, because they are unwilling to confess that the charity of God is diffused in our hearts; but if they confess it, he affirms that they are truly corrected: «This grace of God (he says, de Gratia Christi c. 26.), manifest in the divine eloquence, let even Pelagius manifestly confess, and let him not cover with most shameless shame that he has so long thought the contrary, but let him disclose it with salubrious sorrow, so that the holy Church may not be disturbed by his perverse obstinacy but may rejoice in his truthful correction. Let him distinguish knowledge and love, as they are to be distinguished; because knowledge puffs up, charity builds up, and then knowledge does not puff up, when charity builds up. And since both are a gift of God, but one is lesser, the other greater, let him not so extol our justice above the praise of our Justifier, as to attribute to divine assistance the lesser of the two, and to usurp for the human will the greater. And if he agrees that we receive charity by the grace of God, let him not think as though any good merits of ours preceded.»

The same thing is finally brought about by the attention given to the controversy with the Massilians. For it is established (as we will show in its place, c. IV. art. 1.) that the Fathers and the Massilians agreed with one another as to the character of the grace which is necessary for good works, and that the Fathers demanded this one thing, that the Massilians confess the same grace to be necessary also for the beginning of faith. Now indeed, with Jansenius himself admitting it, the Massilians did not admit any predetermining grace: but the Fathers so defined the grace, the profession of which they required, that it is that by which our will is prevented and prepared, and by which it is aided in acting. Cf. what we will discuss in its place about the Error of the Massilians.

It is clear, therefore, that Augustine demanded that one thing which is most certain and catholic: namely, that the will is interiorly prepared and aided by the ministration of the power of the Holy Spirit, which all Catholic theologians both confess and demonstrate; but that the other things, which pertain to the mode, were foreign to the controversy which was then held with the Pelagians.

But this is not the same as saying that Augustine did not speak of the mode by which God acts efficaciously in the will, so that salutary acts come to be; certainly Augustine spoke not rarely also of this matter, and we will see it in its place: but we only deny that, between Augustine fighting for the Catholic dogma and the heretics, there was a question about the mode by which grace exerts its powers in the soul, so that a salutary action results, or that Augustine ever demanded of the heretics that they profess a certain definite mode by which God's operation is efficacious in the will.

X. Augustine briefly touched upon the history of the condemnation of the Pelagian heresy, epist. CXV. ad Valentinum, n. 2. «That which was written to Pope Innocent, Bishop of the city of Rome, from the Council of the province of Carthage and from the Council of Numidia (behold, a double provincial Council, the Carthaginian and the Milevitan, which sent only synodal letters to Rome without drawing up canons), and somewhat more carefully by five Bishops, and what he himself replied to those three (behold, the first condemnation of the heresy by the authority of the Roman Pontiff Innocent, by which Augustine said that the cause was finished): likewise, that which was written to Pope Zosimus from the African council (it was a sufficiently prolix synodal letter, by which the errors of Pelagius and Caelestius were censured) and his rescript sent to all the bishops of the whole world «A council having been held at Carthage (says Prosper in the Chronicle, an. 418.), synodal decrees of two hundred and fourteen bishops were carried to Pope Zosimus, upon the approval of which the Pelagian heresy was condemned throughout the whole world: namely, through that letter of Zosimus, which Marius Mercator calls the Tractoria, by which, as the same Prosper says adv. Coll. c. 21., Pope Zosimus armed the right hands of all the bishops with the sword of Peter for the cutting off of the error; and what, in a later plenary Council of all Africa, we briefly established against that same error (behold, eight or nine Carthaginian canons against the Pelagian heresy, which were a brief recapitulation of those things which had been prescribed in the synodal letter sent to Zosimus by the preceding Council and approved by Zosimus), all these things we also read at present with them and sent to you through them.» Cf. Fratres Ballerini Operum S. Leonis Tom. III. Observationes in Dissertationem 13am Quesnelli cap. 1. §. 2. sqq.; and ibid. de antiquis Collectionibus Canonum. Part. II. c. III. §. 10. Cf. the cited works of Petavius and Garnerius and Livinus Meyer.

I. It is certain that, on account of the infirmity of nature, it is very difficult for man, and morally impossible, to overcome all grave temptations and always to keep the law of God, if he is left to the sole powers of his nature (Th. LX.); moreover, this moral impossibility entails the moral necessity of some supernatural help. And let it suffice now to have dealt with these historical questions of the Pelagian heresy, lest the synopsis, drawn out too long, accuse its title of shameless mendacity. Other things, distinguished in their proper places, when we treat of Pelagian impeccability and of the errors of the Massilians, we shall give more opportunely. And because the knowledge of the doctrine of Augustine and the explanation of the formulas which he frequently uses also pertain to the history of the dogma, these we shall try to hand down in cap. IV, when we impugn the heretical doctrines. superadded to nature. This help, taken universally, can be considered both in the order of pure nature and in the order of elevated nature. In the order of pure nature, although taken generically it could be said to be owed to nature, lest the attainment of the end be morally impossible for it, nevertheless considered in the individual, insofar as it is conferred on these or those persons rather than on that one, it would have the character of a gratuitous favor, that is, of grace. In the order of elevated nature, however, if that help is connected with that order and conduces to the end of the same order, and so is itself found within the order of elevation, it will have to be called gratuitous under this respect, just as the order of elevation itself. But if nature is elevated, which by sin fell from the former state of elevation, and so adoption is restored to it, as to one positively unworthy, together with the other goods accompanying it, then again for a special reason a help of this kind, which looks to these gifts, will have to be called grace.

But now it is established that the Fathers, and especially Augustine, frequently demonstrate the necessity of actual help from that difficulty and moral impotence which is said to have arisen chiefly from the vice of nature, which is concupiscence: and they proclaim the necessity of that help which is able to lead men to the kingdom of heaven. It is manifest, therefore, that at least a moral necessity of actual grace is proclaimed by the Fathers, nor is there any difficulty in this matter. But the question is whether, besides this, another greater necessity, which is called physical, has been affirmed against the heretics by the Fathers. We now enter upon this question.

II. For the necessity of grace or of help for acting can be conceived in many ways. Moral necessity is the necessity of help for being able easily or more easily, not for being able simply, arising, namely, from the difficulty of the act, not from pure impossibility. Hypothetical necessity is a necessity determined by some accidental hypothesis, which, if it is absent, there is in nature no necessity of that help which is said to be necessary. This necessity is also called consequent: for some necessity is called consequent for this reason, because it supposes and follows some accidental hypothesis. On the contrary, physical necessity of help is the necessity of help for being able simply, supposing an impotence, not a mere difficulty. Absolute necessity is a necessity which holds before any hypothesis whatever, or in any hypothesis that occurs. Hence it is an antecedent, not a consequent, necessity.

But the absolute necessity of some means for a certain end, if the end is not necessary to nature of itself, does indeed suppose the contingent hypothesis of this end; but, this being posited, it holds before any hypothesis whatever, or in whatever hypothesis the subject which is ordained to the end is constituted.

Therefore the physical and absolute necessity of help for acting salutarily, for the attainment of the supernatural end, is a necessity essentially bound up with nature, which by itself alone is physically impotent for acting: a necessity independent of any hypothesis, whether of sin, or of innocence, or of integrity, or of concupiscence. Moreover, of this kind is the necessity which the Fathers vindicated for that grace by which we are helped to act. We do not say that it is only this, and not also, under a certain respect, the moral necessity of which we have already spoken: but we defend that the Fathers certainly taught this physical and absolute necessity of grace against the Pelagians.

Before we demonstrate this, note 1°, what pertains to the matter to be demonstrated: that the necessity cannot be asserted of that help which is natural of itself, namely, the congruent thought exciting the will to a good act. For although without this thought, which actually obtains assent (whence it is called congruent), the act would never come to be, it is nevertheless false that it cannot come to be without it; for a sufficient power of assenting is present without that special thought. Moreover, where there is a sufficient power of acting well, another superadded help cannot be physically and absolutely necessary. Note 2°, what pertains to the method of demonstration. Namely, some doctrine can be confirmed by the testimonies of the Fathers either insofar as it is proposed by them in express and frequent words, or insofar as it is most certainly contained in those things which they teach. Since the Catholic intellect admits of progress, and the manner of expounding the same truths of the Faith has not always been the same: no Catholic ought to be struck by any difficulty, if, in order that the ancient tradition of some dogma be demonstrated, testimonies are not produced which affirm it in the same verbal formulas which the Catholic intellect has afterwards been accustomed to use. Let us come, therefore, to the proof of the thesis.

III. The proof of the thesis can be proposed in this way. If the Fathers 1) while conceding that human nature can do some morally good thing, deny to that same nature, without grace, even with suitable gratuitous moral helps applied, any possibility of salutary good, not merely for doing it more easily, but for doing it simply, whether for beginning or for perfecting it, if 2) they teach that grace was necessary even for the whole and sound man in order to act: if3) they affirm the same necessity also with regard to the Angels: if4) they teach that grace is necessary for any salutary action, even the least, to which no special difficulty can attach from concupiscence or any other vice of nature: if5) they compare salutary works with miracles, and under that respect in which miracles are above the power of nature: if6) they teach that the grace necessary for acting salutarily is such that it confers on man holiness and justice, restoring him to that perfection and that power of acting which he received from the beginning: if, I say, the Fathers hand down these things, they teach the same thing, that the necessity of actual grace for acting salutarily is physical and absolute: but these things they in fact hand down; therefore. The major and the minor are to be proved separately. The major is proved, which is conditional, and its consequence is to be proved. And so as to the first: for an impotence to be physical in nature with respect to something, it is required that nature not be able to do that thing intrinsically, even with the greatest difficulty, and that even extrinsically, namely, with suitable helps applied, which can be conferred gratuitously and by which the intellect is persuaded and the will is morally moved, it again not be able to do it; for when nature is so disposed, it labors not under moral impotence alone, but under physical; for if it were moral impotence alone, this would at length come down to a difficulty, and with suitable moral helps applied, that difficulty could be overcome by nature. Therefore, if the Fathers teach that there is in nature no possibility, not merely for doing more easily, but for doing at all the salutary good, and deny that it is in it even when gratuitous moral helps are applied, they in fact teach a physical impotence and consequently a physical necessity of grace, by which alone they say that possibility is conferred.

Likewise, if nature can do some morally good work, there is in it by this very fact a physical power of all the works of the same order as those which it can do: wherefore, if, that possibility of an honest work having been conceded to nature, any possibility of a salutary work is then denied to it, this must be said to be above the order of those things which nature can do; which are natural moral works; therefore the salutary work is above the order of natural works: but this is the same as saying that it is above the physical powers of nature. Therefore.

As to the second: If grace was necessary for the whole and sound man, such as Adam was created, in order that he could act salutarily at all: this surely is a physical and absolute necessity. For, given nature not merely complete in its own order, but also praeternaturally perfected, so that there would be no proneness to evil, no difficulty to good, no necessity of grace could arise except from nature itself, insofar as nature is finite and created; but this is a physical and absolute necessity.

As to the third: If grace is asserted to have been necessary also for the Angels, who are of a more perfect nature than the human, in whom there is no tinder of animal concupiscence by which they might be inclined to evil, in order that they could act salutarily at all, the reason for this necessity cannot be anything other than the physical and absolute impotence of created nature. And indeed, since the Fathers did not recognize certain degrees of perfection of the angelic nature, which nature is nevertheless more perfect in its kind than the other diverse possible natures, they could not have asserted that grace is necessary for the Angels too in order to act salutarily, unless they had thought that for any created nature, by the very fact that it is a created nature, grace is necessary. But this is a physical and absolute necessity. And if the necessity of grace for the Angels is physical and absolute, it will have to be said to be so also, and much more so, for man. Therefore.

As to the fourth: Likewise the necessity is physical and absolute, if grace is necessary for any salutary action, even the least, to which there is no special difficulty from concupiscence or any other vice of nature; for if it were only a moral impotence, something in that order could be done; if it were an impotence consequent upon concupiscence and some other vice of nature, those things could be done in which they offer no obstacle at all. Therefore.

As to the fifth: A divine operation not owed to nature is necessary with a physical and absolute necessity for working miracles; therefore divine grace also, necessary with the same necessity for salutary works, if these are to be compared with miracles.

As to the sixth: If the Fathers teach that grace is necessary for acquiring justice and holiness, for exercising actual justice, whether to be attained or to be conserved, and that justice and holiness which are supernatural, the necessity of grace is physical and absolute. holiness, which Adam lost; they surely do not derive the necessity of grace only from the difficulty that arises from the vice of concupiscence, but from the dignity and perfection of the work to be exercised through grace. Therefore they do not teach only some moral hypothetical necessity, which would at length arise from the vice of concupiscence, but they teach a physical, absolute necessity. For the justice and holiness of which Scripture and the Fathers speak is, according to them (as we here suppose from the Tract. De Ordine supernaturali, even independently of this special argument of the necessity of grace), above the physical powers and the exigency of any creature whatsoever.

Now the individual minors of the argument set forth above are proved. 1) That the Fathers conceded to nature the power for some moral work is clear from Ih. XX. et XXI. That they denied to it every possibility of the salutary work, not merely for doing it more easily, but for doing it simply, whether for beginning or for perfecting it, is clear from the condemnation of the Pelagian heresy, against which the Fathers always urged that saying, both separately and in the Councils, which Augustine states (cont. duas epistt. pelagg. I. II. c. 8.) «The Lord, in order to answer the future Pelagius, did not say: without me you can do with difficulty, but said: without me you can do nothing. And in order to answer even those future ones (who seemed to think that the perfection of the work alone was to be attributed to grace), in that same evangelical sentence He did not say: without me you can perfect nothing, but do.... For when the Lord said: without me you can do nothing, He comprehended the beginning and the end in this one word.» Likewise, that the Fathers denied to nature alone every possibility of salutary good is clear from can. 7 of Conc. Araus. II: «If anyone affirms that by the vigor of nature he can think as is expedient or choose, etc., some good which pertains to the salvation of eternal life, without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit ... he is deceived by a heretical spirit.» But that the same Fathers denied to nature, even aided by suitable and gratuitous moral helps, this possibility of good, is evident again from the condemnation of Pelagius, who admitted these helps, «by which the eyes of the heart are opened, by which we are illuminated by the multiform and ineffable gift of heavenly grace, by which the will, astonished, is aroused to the desire of God, by which everything that is good is persuaded» (De Gratia Christi cc. VII. X.), and yet the sufficiency of nature aided even by these supports is denied by Augustine (ibid.), and was denied by all who held Pelagius, confessing these helps, because he confessed these alone, to be a heretic. Therefore.

2. Augustine teaches the second in Enchirid. c. 106: «Just as it is in a man's power to die when he wills, but for keeping life the will does not suffice, if the helps, whether of foods or of any protections whatever, are lacking: so man in Paradise was capable by his will of killing himself by abandoning justice: but in order that the life of justice might be held by him, willing was not enough, unless He who had made him helped.» Cf. De Genes. ad lit. L. XI. c. 4. De Corrept. et Grat. c. II. epist. CLXXXV. c. 11. et De Genes. ad lit. L. VIII, cc. 10. 11. 12. The same is the opinion of Gelasius, Rom. Pontif., writing against the Pelagians: «If in the first men themselves, while they trusted, to be sure, in their own happiness, and yet, receiving the grace of God in vain — not praying, which indeed they are reported never to have done, nor giving thanks for what they had received, nor suppliantly imploring that those gifts might remain inviolate — they could not remain unharmed: how much more after the ruin of the transgression ... can they not stand without the divine gift (the discussion is about those who are already just, and therefore about the necessity of a help that is not habitual, but actual), without which not even the whole could have persisted.» The same is confirmed by the authority of the Fathers of the Synod of Arausic. II, who approved this canon. 19m «Human nature, even if it remained in that integrity in which it was created, would in no way preserve itself, its Creator not helping. Whence, since without grace it could not keep what it received, how, without the grace of God, will it be able to repair what it lost?»

Furthermore, let it be weighed that by these and many similar testimonies the necessity of grace for integral nature is handed down in the same formulas by which it is asserted for fallen nature, and that, a comparison being made, the same is affirmed of both states, namely, that man cannot act well without helping grace. Therefore not mere difficulty, but simple impotence inhered in integral nature for acting salutarily without grace, just as is affirmed of fallen man.

3. Augustine again teaches the third in De Civit. Dei L. XII, c. 9: «Who had made that (good will in the Angels) except Him who created them with a good will, that is, with chaste love, by which they would cleave to Him, at once both forming their nature and bestowing grace?... It must therefore be confessed with due praise...» of the Creator, that it pertains not to holy men alone, but can be said even of the holy Angels that the charity of God has been poured out in them through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to them.» Furthermore, to this testimony of the Apostle Augustine appeals six hundred times, in order to demonstrate the necessity of the grace of God, the grace of inspiration, without which nature is wholly impotent for good. This is also the doctrine of s. Anselm, De Casu diaboli c. 1: «It is sufficiently clear that it applies no less to the Angels than to man (the testimony of the Apostle: what have you that you have not received?). It is established, therefore, that that Angel who stood in the truth, just as he therefore persevered because he had perseverance, so he therefore had perseverance because he received it, and he therefore received it because God gave it.» But the same observation is to be made concerning this point of doctrine as concerning the preceding one.

4. The fourth is gathered from these testimonies of Augustine, De Corrept. et Grat. c. 2: «The grace of God through I. Ch. D. N. is to be understood, by which alone men are freed from evil, and without which they do absolutely no good, whether in willing and loving or in acting — not only so that, with it showing, they know what is to be done, but also so that, with it supplying, they do with love what they know.» Of Caelestinus, in Auctorr. Sedis Apost. c. 9: «Thus God works in the hearts of men, and in free will itself, so that holy thought, pious counsel, and every movement of a good will are from God, because through Him we can do some good, without whom we can do nothing.» Conc. Arausic. II, c. 7: «If anyone affirms that by the vigor of nature he can think as is expedient or choose... some good which pertains to the salvation of eternal life, without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who gives to all sweetness in consenting to and believing the truth, he is deceived by a heretical spirit.» Here every salutary operation is withdrawn from the power of nature, none is excepted, not even the lightest and easiest; for what is easier than some thought? but no pious thought at all, and therefore not even that which precedes the determination of the will, can be in us from the vigor of nature. Therefore.

5. The fifth is established from the doctrine of Augustine, De Spir. et lit. c. 1. ad Marcellinum: «It seems absurd to you that something should be said to be able to be done of which an example is lacking, since, as I believe, you do not doubt that it never happened that a camel passed through the eye of a needle, and yet He also said that this is possible for God; read also the twelve thousand legions of Angels could have fought for Christ, lest He suffer, and yet it was not done... Whence we ought not therefore deny that it can come to be that a man be without sin, because there is none among men, except Him who is not only man but also by nature God, in whom we could show this to be perfect. Here perhaps you may answer that those things which I have recalled were not done, and could have been done, are divine works; but that a man be without sin pertains to the work of man himself.... and therefore it is not to be believed that no one has been, or is, or will be in this life who fulfilled this work, if it can be fulfilled by man. But you ought to think that, although to do this pertains to man, this also is a divine gift, and therefore not to doubt that it is a divine work. For it is God who works in us, says the Apostle, both to will and to perfect.» And in c. J. he adds: «I wish, if I can, to show that what the Apostle said: the letter kills, but the spirit gives life, was said not of figurative locutions, although that too may be fittingly understood, but rather of the law openly forbidding what is evil. When I shall have shown this, it will certainly appear more manifestly that to live well is a divine gift, not only because God gave to man free will, without which one lives neither well nor badly, nor only because He gave a precept, by which He teaches how one ought to live; but because through the Holy Spirit He pours out charity in the hearts of those whom He foreknew in order to predestine, predestined in order to call, called in order to justify. But when this shall have appeared, you will see, as I think, that it is said in vain that those things alone are possible without example which are works of God, as we recalled concerning the passage of the camel through the eye of a needle, and whatever other things are impossible among us, but easy with God; and therefore that justice is not to be reckoned among these, because it ought to pertain not to the work of God but of man: whose perfection, if it is possible in this life, there is no reason why it should be believed to be without example. That this therefore is said in vain will sufficiently shine forth, when it has become clear that human justice itself is to be attributed to the operation of God, although it is not done without the will of man.» With this absolute demonstration, he concludes in c. 35.: It seemed absurd to you that a thing which can be done should be without an example. Hence arose the question of this book, and for this reason it pertained to us to show that something can be done, although an example is lacking. Hence from the Gospel and the Law we set forth certain things at the beginning of this discourse, as about the passage of the camel through the eye of a needle.... To these can be added also the case of that mountain, which faith would transfer into the sea, which nevertheless we neither read nor heard was anywhere done.... But because it can be said that those works are divine, while to live justly pertains to our works, I undertook to show that this too is a divine work, and I did this in this book, perhaps more verbosely than is enough; but against the enemies of the grace of God I seem even to have said too little, and nothing delights me to say so much as where His Scripture most supports me and it is brought about that he who glories, glories in the Lord, and that in all things we give thanks to the Lord our God, having our heart on high, whence from the Father of lights every best gift and every perfect gift is. For if on that account it is not the work of God, because it is done by us, or because we act while He gives, neither is that the work of God, that a mountain be transferred into the sea, because the Lord said that it could be done by the faith of men, and attributed this to their own work.... Behold how perfect justice is without example among men, and yet is not impossible. It would, however, be so great, if nothing of those things which pertain to justice were hidden, and they so delighted the mind, that that delight would overcome whatever other pleasure or pain impedes; that this is not so pertains not to impossibility, but to the judgment of God. For who does not know that it is not in a man's power what he knows, nor does it follow that what has been known as to be sought should be sought, unless it delights as much as it ought to be loved? But this belongs to the health of the soul."

It is evident that that is called a divine work which is above the power and exigency of nature, which can be done by God alone: that among these divine works there is also to be numbered, in Augustine's judgment, the perfection of justice, that is, justice excluding any sin whatever, even one improperly so called; and it is to be numbered among divine works in such a way that this is in no way hindered by the fact that justice is done by us, or because our cooperation is required.

Augustine adds nothing by which he might in some degree temper this comparison of perfect justice with divine works or miracles, and signify that he is using it improperly, but he affirms that parity absolutely, although this parity is the subject of the disputation of the whole book, which surely ought to have been determined accurately. Moreover, if perfect justice is a divine work, justice itself is to be called, without qualification, a divine work; indeed Augustine's proof comes back to this, namely, that perfect justice is a divine work because to live well is a divine work; but to live well is a divine work because the charity of God is poured out in our hearts, on which justice depends of itself. God therefore can, by a poured-out charity which delights as much as it ought, bestow also perfect justice: but by His just judgment this gift is not conferred at present.

6. Finally we wish to prove from a certain appellation given to grace, of which someone could abuse to prove the opposite. Thus it is the teaching of Augustine and of the other Fathers that the grace by which we are helped to operate as we ought is a medicinal and healing grace: for human nature was weakened and vitiated through the sin of the first parent, whereas it was whole and sound in the first man before sin. But grace healing from the infirmity contracted through guilt is a grace restoring to that health or that perfection in which man previously was, who was created just and holy. And in truth, according to the Fathers, the health which grace restores is not only that which cures the wound of concupiscence, but that which restores justice and holiness both formally and efficiently, by which we are made just, holy, and sons of God. Therefore when healing grace is spoken of, the perfection of that state is regarded, from which nature departed through the sin of the first parent, which perfection is not only of integrity, but also of holiness. For that reason, healing actual grace is a grace conferring powers not only for conquering or bridling concupiscence, which grace in itself is necessary with only moral necessity, and which in itself does not exceed the natural order; but it is a grace conferring powers for exercising actual justice and holiness and for either acquiring or conserving and promoting habitual justice. Therefore.

The major is proved, the minor is proved; it follows, therefore, that the Fathers asserted a physical, absolute necessity of actual grace.

Note. The proofs of the thesis are drawn principally from Augustine, and there is none of those six chapters which Augustine did not assert. It is evident, therefore, that Augustine acknowledged and proved the supernatural dignity of the salutary act. For he asserted the necessity of grace either only on account of the difficulty arising from concupiscence, or chiefly on account of the supernaturality of the act: but not the former, because that is not a physical and antecedent necessity: therefore.

IV. Against this physical and absolute necessity of interior immediate grace asserted by the Fathers, the rationalists argue ineptly. For they say that the character of an intelligent nature requires that it be moved objectively, but that subjectively it moves itself; for in this it differs from natures lacking reason, which are moved subjectively. Especially since subjective motion is repugnant to freedom, which ought to be the principle determining the act. Furthermore, if the immediate operation of God is necessary in order that one act well, whenever one does not act well, as when one sins, the cause of this will have to be sought in God, who denied grace, whence God would be had as the author of sins. Again, this doctrine of necessary immediate grace fosters the dreams of the mystics and teaches that each one's private sense is to be preferred to the public magisterium and to common opinions. Finally, it is a doctrine which we are unable to attain by reason; for it is not permitted to comprehend how God moves our faculties immediately.

To the first. It is indeed the nature of intelligent beings to be moved objectively; but they cannot be moved subjectively in such a way that a deliberate act is immediately excited or determined, which would not by that very fact be free: but they can be moved subjectively in such a way that indeliberate acts are excited in them, which are necessary and according to which they agree with non-intelligent beings, which can be moved subjectively. Moreover, when an intelligent being is to be elevated to an order exceeding the limits of its nature, it is fitting that it be subjectively affected and moved.

To the second. If God did not operate inwardly through His grace except in such a way as to determine the good act, and this operation of God were necessary in order that any good act come to be, what is objected could be conceded: but if God operates in such a way that He leaves the exercise of freedom intact and it is in man's power to follow or not to follow God calling, what is opposed must be denied.

To the third. We deny 1) the supposition. For they suppose that the immediate illuminations are true revelations, by which we are taught apart from the extrinsic magisterium. But we have shown this to be false. Moreover, 2) neither are those true revelations which foster the dreams of the mystics, but presumptuous and imaginary ones. revelations, and the spirit of pride, which deceives perverse men, fosters the same dreams.

To the fourth. Although reason cannot attain the immediate operation of God in our faculties, this is surely not a sufficient reason for denying it or doubting it; since it is proved most certainly by infallible authority. Moreover, from those things which were said in chapter 1 it is clear that a sufficiently clear concept of this matter can be formed in the mind.

V. You will object against the proof of the thesis. 1) The grace for which the Fathers disputed against the Pelagians is the grace which heals the wound of concupiscence; it is the grace which the first man did not need; August., De nat. et grat., c. 64: «But now the question concerns human nature, which is vitiated; the question concerns also the grace of God, by which it is healed through the physician Christ, which it would not need if it were sound, which is defended by him (Pelagius) as sound, or as sufficient to itself through the freedom of the will, able not to sin.» But the grace by which concupiscence, which is a vice of nature, is healed, which Adam did not need, is not a grace which is required with physical and absolute necessity: therefore.

I answer. That the grace about which the Fathers disputed is the grace by which the wound of concupiscence is healed and at the same time that from which concupiscence proceeded, i.e., sin, with man restored to the friendship of God and to the supernatural order — I concede; that it is a grace which only heals concupiscence — I deny. Wherefore Augustine in the same book, c. 59, says that human nature through the grace of Jesus Christ «is either healed because it is vitiated, or is helped because it does not suffice for itself.»

Again, Adam before sin did not need that grace which the Fathers defended against the Pelagians, i.e., he did not need that grace insofar as it is a fighting grace, a grace healing the infirmity of nature, insofar as it is the grace of the Redeemer — I concede; he did not need that grace insofar as it is illumination and inspiration, the existing principle of the supernatural salutary work, the grace of elevation — I deny.

That this response is fair ought to be manifest to those who consider that Augustine teaches that grace was necessary for Adam standing and for the Angels, teaches that the health which is restored through the grace of Christ looks to this, that the justice and holiness lost through sin be restored, teaches the impotence of nature for any salutary work, even the least, teaches namely that it is impossible without the grace of God to produce any good salutary work, teaches the physical and absolute impotence of nature for salutary works. These things cannot be composed with those which are objected by the adversaries, except through the response brought forward.

Of course, before sin there was in man a power of operating salutarily without difficulty, a power coalescing from sanctifying grace, the integrity of nature, and actual grace — which actual grace indeed was suited to that state, granted liberally, not mercifully, not healing, but following upon health.

But after sin was committed, to that easy power of operating salutarily succeeded a physical and absolute impotence of operating salutarily, on account of the loss of grace, and a moral impotence of operating rightly, on account of the concupiscence that had arisen. But this moral impotence is both a certain sign of the former impotence, because it is a certain sign of the loss of grace, and it is a part of the total impotence which followed sin in man. Indeed, the physical impotence of operating salutarily and the moral impotence of operating rightly are not, in man considered historically in the state of fall, the grace of God being set aside, two separable impotences, but together they necessarily constitute one total impotence: for the one could not exist without the other. Wherefore it can be said that concupiscence considered historically comprises also the defect of the physical and absolute power of operating salutarily, which power is to be recovered through grace mercifully granted to unworthy nature, and medicinal. Hence the grace healing concupiscence, necessary against concupiscence, is the grace by which not only some difficulty of the good arising from the inclination of nature to evil is overcome, or by which nature, which is vitiated through sin, is healed and restored to its pristine state, to which it had been elevated, by which consequently the physical and absolute power of operating salutarily is conferred. Moreover, cf. the Appendix at the end of this chapter.

And note that Jansenius admits that Augustine taught the physical and absolute necessity of grace for this state, but wills that Augustine taught that necessity not on account of the excellence (supernatural dignity) of the act, but for overcoming concupiscence. But in order that Jansenius might defend this, he was forced to assert that both concupiscence and grace have a power necessarily determining the will; for in this hypothesis, if namely the will is necessarily and antecedently determined by concupiscence to evil, grace is necessary to it with physical and absolute necessity, the grace by which the will is withheld from evil and bent to the good. But this opinion is not only false, but absurd, as we shall see in its own place. But with that opinion rejected, in order that the doctrine of Augustine on the physical and absolute necessity of grace may be understood, nothing remains except that we say that Augustine asserted that necessity on account of the excellence of the act: for the free will under concupiscence cannot suffer anything but moral impotence.

They insist, however. According to Augustine, the grace which we ask for is that by which a great will is made in us (De gratia et lib. arb., c. 17), through which we will as much as suffices that we may do by willing (ibid., c. 16), through which a man who willed and could not, can, provided he fully wills (Serm. 158), through which we will something the more vehemently the more ardently it delights us (De pecc. mer. et rem., Bk. II, 17), through which what did not delight becomes sweet (ibid., c. 19). But these things are well understood if grace is a delight which opposes concupiscence and conquers it; but if grace looks to this — that, a precision being made from concupiscence, it confer the power of operating salutarily — it cannot be understood to what end such a comparison of grace with concupiscence looks, namely that it be a sweetness, a delight, and a delight greater, more vehement, more ardent. For if grace confers simply the ability to operate salutarily, even when concupiscence does not exist, neither is it necessary that it be a delight, nor is that excess of delight over concupiscence required.

I answer that in grace a twofold power is to be distinguished, physical and moral (chap. I, art. 2). But physical power belongs both to the grace which is not followed by the consent of the will and is called sufficient, and to the grace which is joined with the act and is called efficacious. Moreover, the difference of each grace is not in the physical power, which is the same in both and cannot be different, but in the moral power, yet not necessarily in first act, but in second act; for the will acts because it freely delights it to act, which free delight indeed takes its origin from a preceding indeliberate delight. Hence one who, speaking of grace, considers it under that aspect by which it is efficacious and obtains consent, is inclined to view it chiefly from the side of the moral power, by which the will is so attracted that it freely chooses that which grace persuades. Moreover, Augustine disputing in general with the Pelagians speaks of efficacious grace: for the question was by the power of what the good acts which are done come to be: the discussion therefore concerned that grace by which they come to be; this, moreover, is efficacious.

You will object, 2. There can be a physical and absolute necessity even of some gift natural in itself, as in a sick man the necessity of some help for walking: so in nature vitiated through concupiscence there can be a physical and absolute necessity of medicinal grace.

I answer. The necessity of help for a sick man is not absolute for the nature of the sick man, but hypothetical, namely with the infirmity posited, apart from which there is no necessity of help. But grace is said to be necessary to nature not only as infirm, but also as sound: whence the reason is not the same.

VI. Therefore if you ask the reason why the necessity of actual grace is such, it is clear that this depends on the fact that the grace which is required must be proper to that order to which nature has been elevated. But since this order is above the physical powers of nature, which accordingly, for bringing forth the works of this order, labors of itself with physical impotence; therefore it demands by physical necessity itself the help by which it may be assisted in bringing forth such works. Which indeed will be more fully declared in the following thesis.

I. We say that in this doctrine of the Fathers, explained in the preceding thesis, is contained that grace is required on account of the entitative supernaturality of the act, which exceeds the physical power of nature. In order that this may be made clear, it is necessary to treat somewhat more fully of the supernaturality of the salutary act, which we presupposed in chapter 1° when treating of the nature of grace. Accordingly, these two things are to be established beforehand. Namely, it is certain 1) that the grace of adoption, by which we are named and are sons of God, and heavenly beatitude are absolutely supernatural and simply exceed the physical powers of nature: this is clear from what was discussed in the preceding Tract. de Deo Creante. It is certain 2) that the operations and acts of man, by which he disposes himself to the attainment of salvation, are proportioned to the dignity of the adopted son of God and to the excellence of the end, and therefore are found in the same order in which adoption and the end are found.

For actions of this kind are such as it behooves, as it is expedient for true piety, for preserving the grace of justification, for eternal life (cf. the doctrine of the Fathers in Th. XXI. n. 1a). These things being posited, if it be asked: A) why salutary acts are supernatural? it is answered: so that they may be proportioned to the supernatural life which the just live, and to the end to which all men ought to prepare themselves. But if it be asked B) in what their supernaturality is to be located: we answer that the generic reason (which of course holds for all acts) consists in this, that they are intrinsically, i.e., by their entity, supernatural, and are consequently above the physical powers of nature, and need, in order to be done, a special help of God unowed to nature, and are by their perfection proportioned to the dignity of divine adoption and to the dignity of the end. This, indeed, as far as possible, must be declared more fully.

Since it is agreed by all that salutary acts are supernatural, when this word is taken in a most confused notion, namely as it signifies acts that could not exist in pure nature — acts proportioned, in whatever way, to the attainment of the supernatural end; the question nevertheless is in what the supernatural character is determinately to be located. Let us premise the diverse opinions of certain authors.

II. There is therefore the 1st opinion: that the salutary act is supernatural because it is accepted by God as meritorious of eternal happiness, so that in itself it is indeed natural, but from this acceptance it receives the extrinsic denomination of a supernatural act. But this opinion cannot be received. For if it is so, the grace of God would not be required as the efficient principle of the salutary work, as an intrinsic principle in the one operating, since the work would not be elicited except by the powers of nature: but the grace of God is demanded as the efficient and intrinsic principle of the work, and it is denied that nature and the vigor of nature can produce these acts. Therefore. Moreover, Pelagius too, according to his heresy, could admit this free acceptance by God of a natural work: for when he said that adults merit by acts of nature the grace of adoption and the kingdom of heaven, he did not exclude that free acceptance of God, since he posited those things to be gifts which nature could lack; nor did he need to exclude that free acceptance of God; because even with it posited, if only it be posited, it is always true that man does not need intrinsic help by which powers are supplied to him: in which matter the heresy of Pelagius consists.

The 2nd opinion holds that salutary acts are indeed intrinsically supernatural in their becoming (in fieri), but not in their having been made (in facto esse); just as sight restored by a miracle is supernatural — which, as to the substance of the matter, is natural, but whose mode of acquisition is supernatural. But if it is so, the salutary act can be done equally perfectly even naturally; for this is proper to those things which are supernatural only as to mode, that they can also be done equally perfectly by nature; but the Catholic doctrine is that salutary acts can in no way be done by the powers of nature.

The 3rd opinion maintains that the salutary act is supernatural on account of some accidental, and therefore separable, mode inhering in the act, for instance a mode of greater intensity, duration, facility, which mode exceeds the powers of nature and depends on grace.

But, leaving aside the question of this theory of inhering modes, which is not philosophical, and leaving aside that the opinion demanding grace only for the facility of the act is plainly Pelagian: we note that these modes of intensity, duration and the like are not necessary in order that the act be salutary, but it is such per se even without any determinate degree of them; therefore grace would not be necessary per se in order that the act be salutary, as the Catholic definition teaches, but only per accidens: which comes back to a certain error of the Pelagians.

Again, that inhering mode is either entirely from grace alone, or from grace together with free will: if from grace alone, free will contributing nothing; 1) this mode can here avail nothing for salvation, because it is not done freely; 2) it is truly not a mode of the act, but a certain reality existing along with the act, because the mode of an act ought to proceed from the agent itself, from which comes the exercise of the faculty or act. But if the mode is from grace and free will together, since the act as to substance is natural, the mode too, proceeding from the one eliciting the moral act and proceeding from the same action (I say the same action; because if the action is diverse, that which is called a mode will not in reality be a mode of the act, but another act), and inhering in a natural subject, cannot be anything but natural, and to that extent can be said to exceed the powers of nature, insofar as that mode of acting is morally impossible to nature alone. But the salutary act is impossible to nature alone not morally only, but physically. Therefore.

The 4th opinion posits that the act is indeed natural as to substance, but is supernatural on account of the character of merit which is in it, and that this character of merit is borrowed from grace; so that by grace there is elicited indeed an intrinsically natural act, such as could also be elicited by nature alone, but because it is elicited from grace and is a special work of God, it obtains the character of merit for eternal life. But neither is this opinion sufficient. For 1) the Catholic doctrine is that grace is required in order that the act be able to become worthy of eternal life — not only that it be able to be done easily, but that it be able to be done at all — and consequently that by grace powers are added in order that the act be done; but the addition of powers looks to this, that the very substance of the act be done, not only that some extrinsic denomination be added to it, of which sort is this character of merit, which accrues to the act — no differently than to one that would be posited in pure nature — as natural from the fact that it is done with God as agent. 2) If the act can be done by nature equally perfect as to all its reality, it is asked why this act posited by nature is not accepted by God? For whether it be done from grace or not, when in itself it is an equally perfect act, there seems to be no reason why God should reject the one and accept the other.

But the opinion teaching that natural acts acquire the character of the supernatural from sanctifying grace, by which the operating subject is adorned, 1) does not hold for those acts which are done by sinners, 2) nor does it suffice for the acts of the just, since, as we shall teach, actual grace is required also for them, 3) nor do these two things sufficiently cohere: that the subject is in the supernatural order, and that its operation, which it produces, as such, is natural (Cf. Suarez. I. II. de Necessitate Gratiae cc. 4. seq.).

III. Therefore it remains that we say that the good act, as it behooves for salvation, enjoys that perfection which is intrinsically supernatural, i.e., intrinsically more excellent than that perfection which can be acquired for acts by the powers of nature; and therefore that the mode of perfection which is signified by the words sicut oportet is an intrinsic mode of the act, by which its essence is constituted; and that for this reason, on account of that perfection which is proper to an intrinsically supernatural act, grace is required in order that it may be done by us.

An act of this kind is wont to be called supernatural as to substance. In which matter, lest an equivocation creep in, take the words of Suarez C. c. 4. «If the substance of the act be taken for the genus, it is clear that supernatural acts are not supernatural in substance, but rather agree with natural acts, namely in the genus of knowledge or assent or love or hope or in some other similar genus. For if they did not have this agreement, they could not be acts elicited by our powers, because powers cannot be elevated beyond their objects, at least the most universal ones. With the substance of the act taken in this way, these acts will be called supernatural as to mode, insofar as the specific difference is said to modify the genus. But that the act as to substance is commonly wont to be taken for the act considered according to the general character of assent or love about such an object, Molina notes in Concordia q. 14. a. 13. Disp. XV.». Here, however, we do not speak in this sense, but we call those acts supernatural as to substance in which the genus of knowledge or love is essentially contracted by a difference of a higher order, that is, which pertains to a certain grade of things surpassing the natural order, and therefore elevates the acts themselves to it. Whence it comes about that they can be elicited neither by our powers, nor by angelic powers, nor perhaps (that ‘perhaps’ could have been omitted) by any creatable intellect through natural powers. But then such an act is wholly supernatural as to substance, that is, as to its entity; because the specific difference elevates the genus of knowledge or love to the supernatural order, and so the whole entity is supernatural; because in reality there is no actual distinction between genus and difference, and an indivisible entity cannot be in diverse orders, natural and supernatural.

IV. Now indeed it is certain that such supernaturality is possible. For if there were any difficulty, it would be this: that the act which is called supernatural is posited vitally by nature; for it is the intellect that believes, e.g., and the will that loves; but if it is posited vitally by nature, then it is exercised by the powers of nature; for nature and its power are the same thing: but that which is posited by the powers of nature, how can it be conceived as intrinsically, as to its entity, supernatural? But we concede that nature by its powers contributes to the production of every act, even the supernatural one, for every one of these acts must be vital; but it can contribute in two ways, namely either by natural powers only, or by elevated powers, i.e., powers which belong to it according to obediential potency and which are made ready for acting by a special operation of God unowed to it. When nature elicits acts in this second way, since they are acts of an elevated faculty existing in the supernatural order, they can borrow from it the same perfection, or obtain an intrinsic perfection greater than that which purely natural powers can confer; and therefore be intrinsically supernatural. For the intrinsically supernatural is not that to which nature contributes nothing, but that to which nature by itself alone, without the elevating help of God, cannot contribute.

Moreover, we have already proved in Tract. de Deo Creante Th. XXXVI, n. IV. the possibility of supernatural acts — a demonstration which, if you please, compare. According to it we indeed disputed Ib. iVI., when we excluded non-vital qualities from the census of actual graces. Furthermore, if the state of adoptive filiation, by which we are made partakers of the divine nature, is intrinsically supernatural (cf. Tract. cit. Th. XXXVII); since it is a certain state of life and operation, it is fitting that the acts also proportioned to it be intrinsically supernatural. Cf. Ripalda op. cit. disp. XLIV. Sect. 3.

And indeed that salutary acts are really intrinsically supernatural is proved from that necessity of grace which the Fathers assert, and to which we have seen that no other hypothesis about the nature of supernaturality gives satisfaction. From this demonstration it is clear that all salutary acts whatsoever are intrinsically supernatural: for the doctrine of the Fathers on the necessity of grace extends equally to all pious acts. Although, however, among the Fathers this appellation ‘intrinsically supernatural’ does not occur formally applied to acts, it occurs nevertheless equivalently, as is clear from the demonstration.

V. But if salutary acts are intrinsically supernatural, and therefore their entitative perfection is greater, why are not all salutary acts discerned, and indeed with certainty, from purely natural ones? Perhaps it could first be answered, according to a certain opinion (cf. Ripalda Disp. XX), that they are not discerned for this reason: because all good acts which are done in this order of providence, at least by the faithful, are supernatural; wherefore the term of comparison is lacking, i.e., a natural good act, with which we could compare the pious salutary acts. But this response in reality does not satisfy; for even with that granted, evil acts always remain, from which natural good acts do not differ as to entitative perfection, and with which, therefore, by reason of this perfection, salutary acts could be compared — between which, nevertheless, and those, no difference is discerned according to entitative perfection. Therefore, setting aside this opinion of Ripalda, which is not certain (cf. what is to be said in the Parergon at the end of Cap. II.), and which here served only to render the solution of the question obstructed, in order that we may settle the question according to the natures of things, we judge that these things are to be established.

1 1) It must be admitted that a natural act can be borne upon the same material and formal object upon which the supernatural act is borne. This is a sufficiently common opinion (cf. Molina in Concordia in q. XIV. a. 13. Disp. VII. XIV: Meyer Histor. de Auxiliis L. V. c. 6: Ripalda Disp. XLV. Sect. 1. 5. 6.). Indeed, we have already seen, with St. Thomas leading the way (Th. XX.), that man can naturally love God above all things on account of His goodness, which is the formal motive of charity; but if he can do this, why will the natural faculty not be able to be exercised about the material and formal objects of the other virtues, in which surely there is no greater difficulty? And in truth, when a herald of the Gospel has proposed and declared the mysteries of faith to unbelieving men and has confirmed his preaching by an evident miracle, it is denied only irrationally that it is in the natural power of reason then to believe those things to God testifying, whose testimony is made certain through a miracle. For if we can believe a man, why can we not believe God, whose authority is certain to reason, and whose revelation is also known with the help of reason on account of the miracle?

Suarez indeed denies this, contending that the supernaturality of the act of Faith proceeds from its formal motive, De Fide D. III. S. 3. But this doctrine of Suarez is interwoven with his opinion about the analysis of the act of Faith, which opinion is special and seems scarcely intelligible to not a few. Wherefore Lugo, unmoved by his arguments, thought otherwise: De virtute Fidei D. 1. S. 5. n. 65. «it is answered that the supernaturality of Faith does not proceed from the motive which it has; for about the same motive a natural act can perhaps turn: the supernaturality therefore proceeds from the nature of the assent itself, which in its entity» has proportion with the supernatural end”: and this very thing is what we defend. Cf. the same D. IX. S. 1ª. But what Suarez affirms about the faith of a heretic — and can equally be transferred to that faith of a Gentile man which we just proposed by way of example — namely, that the heretic does not resolve his faith into the authority of God, as the Catholic does, but into his own private persuasion, does not seem sufficiently aptly said. For the difference between either act (besides the fact that the faith of the Catholic is supernatural, that of the heretic natural) turns on that which is a condition for the act of Faith, not its formal object; the Catholic, namely, leans upon the authority of the Church manifesting divine revelation, the heretic upon his own private judgment interpreting the written word of God or the monuments of Tradition; whence it comes about that the faith of the Catholic is per se infallible, for always, under the magisterium of the Church, it attains that which is truly revealed by God and that alone; the faith of the heretic, on the contrary, is fallible, no differently than the judgment on which it leans. But, given this judgment, the assent of the heretic is borne upon something apprehended under this formal character, that it is revealed by God. Lugo indeed teaches that in the present order supernatural acts, even of the moral virtues, differ in some way on the part of the motive from natural acts, because by them the object is attained insofar as it falls under revelation and pleases God, ibid. D. IX. S. I. But I ask: does not, with revelation proposed externally, the same object with that mode first naturally come to be apprehended by the intellect? and after this apprehension, can there not follow a natural act of the will upon that same thing which is known to please God? Lugo himself does not deny this, who speaks of what is wont commonly to be done by those who lack revelation. Finally, that we may also bring forward the doctrine of the Church for our opinion: this is the reason why ecclesiastical definitions do not simply deny that we can believe, hope, love, etc. without grace, but deny that we can do this as it behooves, as it is expedient for salvation: by which limitation it is presupposed that we can, e.g., believe God: and who believes God unless moved by the formal motive of God revealing? Cf. the things said in Th. XXII. Nevertheless 2) it must be held that a natural act cannot be borne upon the same object of the supernatural act according to the same intrinsic perfection. The reason is that the supernatural act, by the very fact that it is such, since it is above the powers of nature, is intrinsically more perfect: for the more perfect is the principle of action, the more perfect is the action II. q. CXIV. a. 2. ad 2. The judgment of this matter is gathered, e.g., from the act of supernatural faith, of which sort is the faith of the Catholic, which is firmer and more efficacious; the same can be seen in the act of charity, which is borne upon God, beloved with the love of friendship, and to be united to man by an immediate union — which love is proper to the adopted son of God admitted to the participation of those goods which are proper to God. This mode is the intrinsic perfection of charity; but the natural love of God above all things lacks that perfection intrinsically. Nevertheless, upon all those things which are contained in the object of charity, with external revelation presupposed, the will can be borne even naturally; and although this act is intrinsically more imperfect, nevertheless the same perfection can be simulated by the effort of nature. Did not the heresies too have their martyrs? These things being posited, behold the solution of the proposed difficulty. Since we do not see our acts in themselves, and the intrinsic or entitative perfection of the act and of its very mode does not fall under the internal sense, but we discern our acts from the general mode of tending toward something (for instance, of knowing, of willing) and distinguish them from their objects; but upon the same objects, when they are sufficiently proposed externally, both a natural and a supernatural act can be borne; hence it comes about that we lack a criterion for discerning in the concrete natural acts from supernatural ones.

VI. But, you will say, if a natural act can attain the same formal objects which are attained by supernatural ones, it is natural to ask 1) why God does not accept natural acts too, which according to the moral dignity that depends on freedom can be equal to supernatural ones? 2. How can the judgment of the Church about the supernatural holiness of some man be certain?

I answer to the first. God does not accept those acts, not because that is repugnant, or because God could not, if He willed; but because God wills that the acts by which we tend to the end be in the same order in which the end is, which is intrinsically supernatural, and consequently wills that their principle be His grace. But what is said about moral dignity must be distinguished In Hie q. CXIV. a. 3. a meritorious work, according as it proceeds from free will and according as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit. If the work be regarded in the first way and in reality have only that mode. the work is not meritorious of the supernatural good on account of the greatest inequality. «If, however (the holy Doctor continues ibid.), we speak of a meritorious work according as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit (and therefore is supernatural), so it is meritorious of eternal life de condigno (worthily, by condign merit; he speaks of the works of the just). For the value of merit is weighed according to the power of the Holy Spirit moving us to eternal life. The price of the work is also weighed according to the dignity of grace, by which man, made a partaker of the divine nature, is adopted as a son, to whom the inheritance is owed from the very right of adoption.»

Hence the condemned 13th proposition of Baius: «The good works done by the sons of adoption do not receive the character of merit from the fact that they are done through the Spirit of adoption inhabiting the hearts of the sons of God, but only from the fact that they are conformable to the law, and that obedience to the law is rendered through them.»

To the second it must be said that, since the end is supernatural, and supernatural works are required for it, and these cannot be had without grace; it must be held that the grace of God is always at hand for the faithful, so that their works can be as it behooves, and that consequently all their good acts — at least those which are ruled by faith — are supernatural.

VII. That we may return to the demonstration itself of the thesis: there will not be lacking those who say: some natural help, e.g., a suitable thought, is truly the grace of God; it is moreover absolutely necessary for acting rightly: therefore the sayings of the Fathers, when they proclaim the necessity of grace, can be taken of this help, not of some supernatural help for supernatural acts. We have already forestalled this difficulty at the beginning of the preceding thesis: but that it may be completely demolished.

I answer. a) That which is done through helps of this kind can also be done naturally through other helps which lack the effect; whence there is in nature a physical power for those acts which would be done through those helps; which power, however, is denied to nature with respect to those acts which are done through grace.

b) This help is such that without it no natural good is ever done; but the grace which the Fathers defend is such that without it some natural good can be done and is done. Hence also the condemned 29th proposition of Baius: «Not only are those thieves and robbers who deny that Christ is the way and the door of truth and of life; but also whoever teaches that men can ascend from elsewhere than through Him into the way of justice, i.e., into some justice, or that man can resist any temptation without the help of His grace, so that he is not led into it, or is not overcome by it.”

c) Pelagius would not have recoiled from this natural help; rather he seems to have been content with those graces of knowledge conferred by God, which Pelagius admitted, by which the possibility of nature was helped to operate more easily. But those graces indeed do not suffice. See Vasquez in 1. 2. q. CIX. Disp. 189. c. 16.

VIII. You will say again: physical power or impotence is spoken of with respect to the ontological perfection of the effect: but the supernatural perfection which belongs to the act is a moral perfection; therefore either the impotence of nature is not physical, or the supernaturality of the act does not cohere with it.

I answer. Just as the perfection of the act of the vision of God, and of the charity consequent upon it, is an ontological perfection, so also the perfection of the salutary acts, which dispose to those acts, is ontological. Whence, to the argument, the major being granted: that the supernatural perfection is a moral perfection, i.e., of dignity and of proportion with the end to be attained, I concede; that it is a perfection consisting only in conformity with the law, I deny. This is established also from certain condemned propositions of Baius, 61. 62. 31., by the condemnation of which is established the distinction between the conformity of the work with the law and its goodness or rightness from the object and all circumstances, and a certain mode of works, i.e., a meritorious mode, from the fact that they are from a living member of Christ through the Spirit of charity. Cf. the doctrine of Thomas recited a little before.

This indeed must be certain for a Catholic, who knows that a doctrine preached and defined by the Church in any age can only be ancient. But, setting this extrinsic argument aside, the thesis is proved by proper arguments. And 1) it is evident immediately from the testimony of the Fathers of the fifth century, who testify that the Pelagian doctrine is new and that the Catholic doctrine was received from the preceding Fathers. Indeed, Augustine in De gratia et libero arbitrio, c. 4, says: «Such is the Pelagian heresy, not ancient, but arisen not long before our time.» And in Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum, Bk. IV, c. 8: «Let those be admonished who think that these men (the Pelagians) have something to say, how, before the new empty talk of these men, Catholic bishops followed the divine utterances in these matters, and let them know that by us the right and anciently founded Catholic faith is defended against the recent presumption and perniciousness of the Pelagian heretics.» Celestine in his epistle to the bishops of Gaul says: «Let novelty cease, if such is the case, to assail antiquity; let unrest cease to disturb the peace of the Churches.»

It is established 2) that the common sense of the faithful in the fifth century abhorred the doctrine of Pelagius; but this could not have come to pass unless the flock of Christ had been so instructed by the preceding pastors. Augustine in turn testifies to this in Serm. XXVI, c. 7: «We are often compelled to dispute with you against the new heresy that attempts to rise up... Those disputing against grace in favor of free will caused offense to pious and catholic ears. They began to be dreaded, they began to be avoided as certain ruin, it began to be said of them that they were disputing against grace.» Vincent of Lérins testifies the same in Common., c. 34: «Who ever, before that profane Pelagius, presumed so great a power of free will as not to think the grace of God necessary to assist it in good things through each single act?» The matter was therefore most thoroughly known to all before and after Pelagius.

There exist 3) direct testimonies of the preceding Fathers, of which it suffices to recite some from each side of the Church, the Western and the Eastern. From the Western Church. Clement of Rome in epist. 1 to Corinthians, n. 32, teaches that «all attained glory and increase not by themselves or by the power of their own works, but by the will of God», and in like manner that we obtain justice not by our own power or wisdom, nor by good works done by us with a pure heart, but through faith, by which God sanctified all from the beginning»; and accordingly in n. 38 he forbids the chaste man to be puffed up with pride, since he knows that it is another who bestows continence. Irenaeus, Bk. III, adv. haeres., c. 20, n. 3, says «Paul, announcing the infirmity of man, says: For I know that good does not dwell in my flesh, signifying that the good of our salvation is not from us but from God.»

»The Lord taught that no one can know God unless God teaches, that is, without God, God is not known.»Bk. IV, c. 6, n. 4. And in the same book III, c. 17, n. 2: «The Lord promised to send the Paraclete, who would fit us for God. For just as from dry wheat one mass cannot be made without moisture, nor one bread, so neither could we, being many, become one in Christ Jesus without the water which is from heaven. And just as dry ground, if it does not receive moisture, does not bear fruit, so also we, being at first dry wood, would never bear fruit unto life without the supernal voluntary rain.»

Tertullian, De Anima, c. 21: «A bad tree will not give good fruits if it is not grafted, and a good one will give bad ones if it is not cultivated. And the stones will become sons of Abraham if they are formed into the faith of Abraham. And the offspring of vipers will produce the fruit of penance if they spit out the poisons of malice. This will be the power of divine grace, more powerful indeed than nature, having in us the free power of the will lying subject to it.»

Cyprian (to whom Augustine appeals more than once, as in bk. IV contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum, c. 9) in the Epistle to Donatus: «You yourself know (the wonderful effects of baptism in me), and I do not proclaim them; boasting in one's own praises is an odious thing: although whatever is not ascribed to the power of man, but is proclaimed of the gift of God, can be not a boast but a grateful thing: so that not to sin has begun to be of faith, what before was sin, was of human error. Of God, I say, of God is all that we are able; from there we live, from there we prevail, from there, having received and conceived vigor while still placed here, we foreknow the signs of future things.»

And in bk. III of the Testimoniorum ad Quirinum he teaches that «one must glory in nothing, since nothing is ours.» Which he also proves by testimonies of Scripture: «What do you have that you have not received? etc. No one can receive anything unless it has been given to him from heaven.»

Arnobius the African, Contra Gentes, bk. II, c. 33: «You place the salvation of your souls in yourselves and trust that you are made gods by your own inward effort. But we promise ourselves nothing from our weakness, looking upon our nature as having no strength and as being overcome by its own affections in every contest of things. You, when once released from the knots of your members you have departed, think that wings will be at hand for you, by which you may proceed to heaven and fly to the stars; we dread so great audacity, nor do we think it to be placed in our own power to seek things above.»

Hilary in Psal. 118, v. 1: «The justifications are many...» and diverse, to be observed in the several kinds of duties; for the keeping of which, unless we are directed by the Lord, we shall always be weak through our nature. We must therefore be aided by his grace and directed, so that we may attain the order of the prescribed justifications ... Nor will anyone be able to attain the eternity of that blessed life by his own merit, unless he is borne forward by the mercies of him who is the Father of mercies. And in Psalm 123, n. 2: «What place of glorying is left to us who remember that all things are from God? If the mercy of God is not needed in all things, let us also claim all things for ourselves, as if they were from ourselves.» Ambrose (of whom Augustine relates several testimonies together with Cyprian in the cited book) in his commentary on Luke, Bk. II, n. 84, says «You see assuredly that everywhere the power of the Lord cooperates with human endeavors, so that no one can build without the Lord, no one can guard without the Lord, no one can begin anything without the Lord.» And in the exposition of the prophet Isaiah (cf. August. in the work now cited, c. 11) he teaches that, because human care without divine aid is weak for healing, it requires God as helper, and that to pray to God is a spiritual grace; for no one says Lord Jesus except in the Holy Spirit. And in the book De fuga seculi, c. 1: «Who is so blessed that he always ascends in his heart? But who can do this without the help of God? in no way indeed» and c. 3: «The law was able to stop the mouth of all, it was not able to convert the mind» and c. 7: «The law condemns the deed, it does not take away malice.»

From the Eastern Church. Ignatius to the Smyrnaeans, c. 1: «I glorify Jesus Christ God, who has made you so wise.» But how? gather it from what follows: c. 11: «according to the will (of God) I have been made worthy, not according to my own conscience, but through the grace of God, which I ask to be granted to me entirely, so that through your prayers I may attain God.» And in the epistle to Polycarp, n. 7: «That you devote yourselves to God is both the work of God and yours.» Justin in the Dialogue with Trypho, n. 102, citing the words of the Psalm: You are my God, depart not from me, teaches that we are taught by this prayer «that all ought to hope in God, who created all things, and to seek from him salvation and help.» Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech. XIII, n. 8, teaches that the act of faith is a gift of God and to be sought by prayers: «God, entreated by your prayers, will grant to believe both to us who speak the words and to you who hear.» Basil in Psalm 33, v. 3, teaches that «salvation consists not in the power or wisdom of man, but in the grace of God» and in the homily on humility, n. 3, says: «nothing is left to you, O man, of which you can glory; whose glorying and hope is placed in this, that you mortify all your own things and seek the future life in Christ, whose firstfruits we, having them, now live in these things wholly in the grace and gift of God. And it is God who works in us both to will and to accomplish for his good will.» Nazianzen, Orat. XXXVII, al. 31a, n. 31: «When you hear that: It is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy, I judge that the same must be thought by you. For since there are some who, on account of right deeds, are so lifted up in their minds that they ascribe all of it to themselves and attribute nothing to the Creator and author of their wisdom and supplier of all goods, Paul teaches them by these words that right willing itself also stands in need of divine help; nay, to speak more rightly, the will itself also and the choice of those things which are right and joined with duty is a certain divine benefit, flowing from the kindness of God. For it is necessary both that this be in our power and that we be saved through God. Therefore he says not of him who wills, that is, not of him who wills alone nor of him who runs alone, but also of God who shows mercy. Thus since a certain willing itself is from God, with the best right he assigned all to God.» Chrysostom, homil. XII on 1 Cor. IV, nn. 1, 2: «You have nothing of your own, but received from God. Why then do you carry yourself as having what you do not have?… You have received not this or that, but all things that you have. For these right deeds are not yours, but of the grace of God. Even if you speak of faith, it exists from the calling; and if you speak of the remission of sins… from there you received all things. What then, he says, do you have that you have not received? But you acted rightly of yourself: you cannot say this, but you received. And on that account do you exalt yourself and please yourself? For that very reason you ought to be kept within the bounds of modesty. For what has been given is not yours, but his who gave. For if you received, you received from him.» The same, hom. VIII on 1 Tim. III, teaches that all evil things come to pass by our will alone; but all good things from our will and his assistance.

II. Now if these testimonies are compared, it is indeed evident that there is lacking the more distinct manner of proposing the dogma, which is proper to the state of controversy; which defect accordingly also finds a place in the peaceful tradition of other dogmas: as regards the sum of the matter, although the tradition be less distinct, it is clear that the same heads of doctrine which were defended in the fifth century had been handed down from antiquity. For it is evident that the Fathers taught that Christian justice cannot be acquired by the powers implanted in nature, that grace is necessary, and that it is an interior grace of illumination and inspiration, by which God works the very willing itself and bestows faith itself, grace without which the law, or external grace, does not suffice, grace which begins good works in us and works them together with us, so that the works are gifts of God, while evils are only ours, that grace must be obtained by prayers, that all our good is from God, and that in nothing are we to glory, because nothing is ours. But this is the very doctrine of Augustine and of the others in the fifth century. Therefore.

I. We set apart those who lack any supernatural habit and are not yet converted to God, from others who are otherwise disposed. The reason for this distinction will appear from the treatise itself. The question is not whether grace is necessary, but what sort of grace is necessary. Some think that the immediate illumination of the intellect alone suffices, because (as they suppose) a deliberate act of the will can immediately follow upon the knowledge of the intellect (cf. Suarez De Gratia L. III. c. 7). But the assertion is certain (says Suarez ibid.) and in it all modern writers agree, for it is the manifest doctrine of Augustine that exciting grace is infused not only into the intellect, but also into the will, before deliberate consent. In this demonstration there is no need that the testimonies which we shall bring speak determinately of those men alone: but it is enough that they certainly include them, wherefore it will be necessary that, after the testimonies of Tradition have been recited, we show that they certainly hold good in the case of men of this sort.

II. Therefore first it is established that the grace of God necessary for acting salutarily is an interior grace. For this is established from the appellations by which it is frequently distinguished (which we have already set forth above, cf. Th. VIII. and the historical Synopsis n. 111.); for it is called the infusion of the Spirit, the diffusion of charity in our hearts through the Holy Spirit, the operation of God in our hearts and in free will itself, and the like, which signify an immediate inrush of God, or an immediate operation of God. from the fact that, besides the external grace of the law and of doctrine and of the examples of Christ, certainly admitted by the Pelagians, the Fathers professed another, by which the will and action would be helped; but this other cannot be anything but immediately interior. Whence Augustine Cont. duas epistt. pelagg. I. I. c. 19. «You however think that man is so helped by the grace of God in good work, that in the exciting (the excitation supplying strength) of his will to the good work itself, you believe that it works nothing.» «And when he had refuted this with the example of Paul, he concludes: «The will is therefore drawn in marvelous ways to will, by Him who knows how to work inwardly in the very hearts of men, not that men, which cannot be, should believe unwillingly, but that from unwilling they should become willing.»» And hence in the Synod of Diospolis was proscribed the doctrine of Caelestius, that the grace of God and help are not given for individual acts, but are in free will, or in the law and doctrine.

III. Moreover, this necessary grace, interior or immediate, is twofold: namely, immediate illumination and immediate inspiration. In this matter note carefully that each grace consists of a twofold element: namely, an elevation of the faculty, by which the faculty is made capable of producing supernatural acts, and a vital act of a certain knowledge and volition, by which (if this element be considered in itself, apart from the first) the will is morally bent to the free salutary act. Now indeed the necessity of the former element for both faculties, and also of the latter for the intellect, is more evident, and the arguments which we are about to bring demonstrate it beyond any doubt. But the necessity of the latter element for the will is established from the doctrine of the Fathers, if, speaking of the necessary grace of the will, they exhibit it under the aspect of some vital act of the will inspired by God.

We have already dealt with this matter in the 1° chapter, where we proved the existence of this twofold grace; now the necessity of each is to be proved. The arguments will indeed have to be drawn from the same sources, which however can be set forth more distinctly.

First, therefore, we prove the necessity of immediate illumination. Indeed, immediate illumination of the mind has been asserted as necessary in the Councils. 1) In the Council of Carthage, ch. 4, we are taught that the grace by which the understanding of the commandments is revealed and opened to us is a gift of God together with charity, by which it is granted to us that we may do them. Moreover, the grace by which the understanding of the commandments is revealed and opened — which is that grace which Pelagius conceded was to be sought by prayers — is a grace immediately affecting the intellect, as we have already demonstrated elsewhere. But the formula by which knowledge of this sort is said to be a gift of God signifies that this knowledge is not in the power of nature, but is conferred on us by God; and because the understanding of the commandments is necessary for fulfilling them, therefore by that formula is signified the necessity of this gift of God, which is so exhibited that it is an opening of the understanding, that is, an immediate grace of the intellect.

2. In the Second Council of Orange, ch. 7, we are taught that the illumination of the Holy Spirit is necessary that we may be able to consent to the evangelical preaching, as is expedient. But this illumination is wholly distinguished from the preaching of the Gospel; for on account of the former we consent to the latter, and it is supposed that the former can be lacking, although the latter be had. Nor can it be another grace equally external; because if evangelical preaching does not suffice, by the same reason neither will another external grace illuminating the intellect suffice; it is therefore a grace of immediate interior illumination. Whence this is proved by the Council from the words of Paul: that our sufficiency of thinking is from God, by which words we said (Th. VII.) that some immediately subjective help is signified.

3. In the Council of Trent, Sess. VI, capp. 5. 6., we are taught that the beginning of justification in adults is to be taken from the prevenient grace of God, which is the grace exciting and aiding men to their own conversion, which grace is called the illumination of the Holy Spirit, by which God touches the heart of man; men however, excited and aided by this divine grace, conceiving faith from hearing, are freely moved toward God, etc. Thus here a twofold grace is manifestly distinguished: the illumination of the Holy Spirit by which the heart is touched by God, and faith, which is received from hearing and therefore the preaching of faith; but that illumination, whether you regard its distinction from the preaching of faith, or whether you regard the formula by which it is described — God touching the heart of man through the illumination of the Holy Spirit (which is the same as that by which the African Fathers signified interior immediate grace in the letters to Zosimus, as Caelestinus reports, c. 8. Auctorr. Sedis Apost.) — that illumination, I say, is interior and immediate. Now indeed in these chapters the Tridentine Fathers hand down that which is necessary for justification: whence it is said that the beginning of justification is to be taken. Therefore.

4. The same grace was asserted as necessary by Caelestinus and confirmed by the authority of Zosimus. For he says, c. 9. «That God so works in the hearts of men and in free will itself, that a holy thought, a pious counsel, and every movement of a good will is from God; because through Him we can do some good, without whom we can do nothing. For to this profession the same doctor (Zosimus) trained us, who, when he spoke to the bishops of the whole world about the help of divine grace: what time, he said, intervenes in which we do not need His help? In all acts therefore, causes, thoughts, movements, the helper and protector is to be prayed to.» It is therefore a question of necessary grace, of grace necessary also for any holy thought whatsoever. Moreover, this grace is so described that God is said so to work in the hearts of men that a holy thought is from God; but the heart, whence thought comes, is not the will alone, but also the intellect: but the operation of God in hearts, which is the same as that by which He works in free will itself, is an immediate operation. Therefore.

5. That the Fathers asserted the same doctrine is clear from the testimonies which we gave in Th. VII., from which it is also established that this doctrine is contained in the Scriptures. Now indeed from these testimonies it is clear 1) that the grace of illumination consists of a twofold element, namely both of some thought, in which the illumination of the mind is situated, excited by God, and of the elevation of the faculty; because it is the illumination of the Holy Spirit, who through it gives the power of thinking which is not in nature. And indeed both graces are certainly required. The elevation of the faculty is required, because grace is given that the mind may be able to think supernaturally, to assent to the preaching, to believe, etc.: some actual knowledge excited by God is required, because the elevation of the faculty alone does not suffice. For even an elevated faculty can still act naturally, since the powers of pure nature remain, and if it be determined by an object in a natural way (as always happens) it is prone to act only according to natural powers. It is necessary therefore that the exercise of the supernatural powers be determined by divine power, or that the intellect be moved to some thought by the Holy Spirit. But if the things which the Fathers assert in general hold good in general for all, they certainly hold good for those who are not yet converted to God and lack any supernatural habit. For the only reason for doubting whether that necessity of grace as regards both elements holds for all would be this: because those already converted to God can be determined from a pious preceding thought to another, and those having a habit, say of faith, already have the mind elevated to the supernatural order. But these things are lacking in those who are not yet converted to God and as yet obtain no supernatural habit: therefore.

IV. Now the necessity of immediate inspiration is to be proved. It is proved thus. 1) In the Pelagian controversy the question concerned the grace of the will (cf. Synop. hist. q. ult.), which is distinct from the grace of knowledge and greater than it (Conc. Carth. c. 4. Aug. de Gratia Christi c. 26., and de Gratia et lib. arb. c. 19). Thus the Fathers contended against the Pelagians that another grace was necessary besides the grace of knowledge admitted or conceded by the Pelagians. But 1) the Pelagians conceded interior knowledge, that is, immediate illumination, as we proved in the Synopsis. 2) Making abstraction of this hypothesis, if the Fathers, speaking of the necessary help of the will, had thought that the help of immediate illumination alone sufficed, by which the will is mediately inspired, they would not have opposed it to the grace of knowledge, since it too would formally be a grace of knowledge, but they would only have opposed it to external grace, as having this as its own property, that it is interior. Nor from that head could they have opposed it to the grace of knowledge, because it is a help of the will; for immediate illumination itself is a certain help of the will: for it is given for this reason, and for this reason alone it is given, that the will may be able to act. Nor again from that head could they have set up that opposition, because mediate inspiration is subjectively in the will; for this is not a new help, but a necessary effect of the help of knowledge.

And in very truth 2) in can. 4. of the Council of Carthage there occurs explicit mention both of eternal grace (the divine commandments), and of immediate illumination (by which the understanding of the commandments is opened), and of the grace of immediate inspiration (namely, of charity, which builds up and ensures that knowledge cannot puff up); and against those who admitted only the grace of illumination it is defined that the grace of charity is also necessary and that both are a gift of God, charity and knowledge. now indeed, if the grace of the will is nothing other than the grace of illumination, which extends itself also to exciting the will, since this excitation arises of its own accord and naturally from the illumination of the mind, it is natural to ask: how are those who are said to admit the grace of illumination said to deny the grace of the will, and why, besides that grace, is another demanded? At most it could be required that the Pelagians confess this also to be an effect of the same grace in the will. But the Pelagians could not deny this effect, which necessarily arises from that cause, nor did they in fact deny it — indeed they confessed it; for Pelagius taught that by the grace of knowledge the will is aroused by God in astonishment. Cf. in the historical Synopsis IV.B.

But in this canon there is distinguished not another effect of the same grace in the individual, but a twofold grace: knowledge and charity, without which knowledge can puff up. Therefore, on the hypothesis of the sufficiency of mediate inspiration, that canon has no sufficient reason of itself: but; therefore.

3. That grace of the will was asserted by the Fathers which would supply strength to free will, through which it could do something not only more easily but simply, and without which it could do nothing. But this prerogative cannot belong to mediate inspiration alone. For since the latter is formally in the intellect alone and is formally only knowledge, and does not move the will except morally, it leaves the will formally in its own powers: wherefore that grace can indeed be the reason why the will can do something more easily from that special moral motion, but not why it can simply do something, which without that grace it could in no way do: but; therefore. This argument discloses the intrinsic reason for the necessity of this grace.

Now indeed from this argument it is clear that the grace of the will, which is necessary, certainly comprises the elevation of the faculty. That the other element also — which is indeed a vital act by which the will itself is immediately excited — belongs to the grace of the will is proved thus. This grace, whose necessity is defended by the Fathers, is called inspiration: moreover, this appellation signifies a certain motion impressed on the soul, that is, the excitation of some act. But an act of this sort is either a deliberate act or an indeliberate one. Since a deliberate act also can be a grace (Th. X.), the inspiration of a deliberate act can likewise be a grace of the will for another subsequent deliberate act. But inspiration is also a prevenient grace, by which namely the will is prepared; for such is the grace of the will whose necessity Augustine defends, which preparation of the will the Pelagians denied (cf. cont. duas epistt. pelagg. L. IV. c. 6. L. II. c. 5), so that consequently this inspiration is to be called necessary for any act whatsoever. Among prevenient graces, moreover, there is also the purely prevenient, which cannot be situated in a deliberate act. If therefore inspiration is the motion of the will to any act whatsoever, not every inspiration will be the motion of a deliberate act, but also of an indeliberate one in the will; and therefore in general the grace of the will will comprise its motion to some act, whether indeliberate or deliberate, which has been prevented by some indeliberate one.

Indeed it is the doctrine of Augustine that God, by the inspiration of an indeliberate act of the will, besides interior illumination, prepares the will. De Spiritu et litera c. 3. «We say that the human will is so divinely helped to the doing of justice, that besides doctrine... it receives the Holy Spirit, by whom there is made in its soul the delight and love of the supreme Good.» Which he then explains thus: «When that which is to be done has begun not to be hidden (but according to Augustine it begins not to be hidden through the interior illumination of the Holy Spirit, cf. his words in Th. VII. IV.), unless it also delights and is loved, it is not done, it is not undertaken, it is not lived well.» Cf. Suarez de Gratia L. III. c. 7.

We conclude therefore that the grace proper to the will, which is necessary for acting, comprises both elements: both the elevation of the faculty and the excitation of a vital act. Now indeed, that we may reason once more in the same way: if these things are true in general, they must certainly be true as regards those who are not yet converted to the faith and lack every supernatural habit. For the same reason occurs which was adduced above in the preceding part, nor is there need to renew the argument. The Thesis is therefore proved.

V. Nevertheless, against the doctrine of two distinct helps some things can be objected. For you will say 1) in the Council of Orange, ch. 6, this formula is used: through the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit; and in ch. 4: through the infusion and operation of the Holy Spirit: but infusion does not seem to signify something else distinct from inspiration or operation. Therefore, although the names are diverse, the thing can be the same: whence it seems that both illumination and inspiration can be said to be the same grace.

I answer 1) that we do not derive the distinction of these graces from the diverse names only, but from the diverse things which we have proved to be represented by these names. Wherefore, although we concede the first part of the consequence, we nevertheless deny the other. Moreover, that we may declare those formulae of the Council of Orange, we note that the operation of which there is speech in cn. 4. is determined from the context to signify the inspiration of the will: for to prove it these testimonies are adduced; the will is prepared by the Lord, and God works in us the willing. We have therefore infusion and inspiration placed together. Now indeed nothing hinders the infusion of the Spirit from being taken for illumination itself, so that the same things are exhibited through these two formulae: infusion and inspiration, and illumination and inspiration. For the infusion of the Spirit, which is made through actual grace, is in itself transient. Moreover, if only the operations excited in us by the Holy Spirit are considered and compared with each other, the first transient operation which the Spirit excites in us is illumination; wherefore through it the infusion of the Spirit is formally obtained, which is already presupposed by the other operation, that is, by inspiration, whence through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit He is not properly infused, but is already infused. Since therefore it is proper to illumination that through it the Spirit is transiently infused into us, that is, works in us exciting the soul to the first act, illumination can be signified by the name of infusion. If these things hold, infusion really signifies something distinct from inspiration.

You will say again that in the Council of Trent, Sess. VI, cap. 5., the same thing which is called illumination is presently called inspiration: «so that, God touching the heart of man through the illumination of the Holy Spirit, man himself does not do nothing at all, receiving that inspiration;» therefore illumination and inspiration are the same thing.

I answer. Inspiration is signified not only by the word 'illumination', but also by the other words, 'God touching the heart of man', in indirect speech; for since the heart is not only the intellect but chiefly the will, when the touching of the heart is spoken of, there is signified not only the illumination, which precedes the movement of the heart, but also the inspiration, which begets that movement; wherefore illumination is not that by which the will is formally touched, but that by which it is touched dispositively.

Moreover, Augustine himself more than once signified the immediate grace of the will, which he certainly taught, by the single name of light, and not undeservedly; since light not only illuminates but also warms, whence it can be transferred to signify metaphorically the grace proper to the will. Let him be heard, De Natura et gratia c. 26: «Just as, for example, one who is lame is therefore healed by a wound, so that, the past evil being healed, his future walk may be directed; so our heavenly Physician heals our evils not only to this end, that they may no longer be, but that for the rest we may be able to walk uprightly: which indeed even we who are healthy will not be able to do unless He helps... For just as the eye of the body, even when most fully healthy, cannot see unless aided by the brightness of light; so man, even when most perfectly justified, cannot live rightly unless divinely aided by the eternal light of justice. God therefore heals, not only that He may blot out what we have sinned, but that He may also grant that we do not sin.»

VI. You will object against the asserted necessity of interior immediate grace the doctrine of the Scriptures, by which the Word of God preached through its ministers is commended. For it is called the Word in which one is saved: Actuum XI, 14. The word of reconciliation: 2. Cor. V, 18. The word not of men, but truly the Word of God: 1. Thessal. II, 13. The word which works in those who believe: ibid. The power of God unto salvation: Rom. I, 16. The word of life: Act. V, 20, by which we are begotten in Christ: 1. Cor. IV, 15; and those who announce the Word are said to beget and to have children: ibid. Therefore they are sent that they may open the eyes of men and thus men be converted from darkness to light and from the power of Satan to God, that they may receive remission of sins and a lot among the saints through faith, which is in Christ: Act. XXVI, 18. Now indeed formulae of speech of this sort signify a certain efficacy proper to the Word of God, which is immediately connected with salutary acts, so that on account of the Word of God itself heard there is excited in the soul a supernatural illumination and inspiration, almost in the way the Sacraments effect grace in us. Moreover, if the matter stands thus, there is no longer need of illumination and inspiration which are immediately from God.

Against the necessity of immediate illumination, however, Augustine seems to be, who in I. I. ad Simplicianum q. 2. n. 2. says: «But man begins to perceive grace from the time he begins to believe in God, moved to faith either by an internal or by an external admonition.» Whence presently, concerning Cornelius, he adds: that he «would in no way have believed unless he had been called either by secret admonitions through visions of the mind or of the Spirit, or by more manifest ones through the senses of the body.» Cf. also de Spir. et lit. c. 34.

I answer 1) The formulae adduced from the Scriptures certainly do not admit that interpretation which some of the Protestants would wish to impose, and which seems to be excluded by the objection itself: namely, that the illumination and inspiration of the mind are contained in acts which are naturally excited from the Gospel heard; for this is the heresy which the Fathers reprobated in the Pelagians, who reduced the help of God to the law and to doctrine.

I answer 2) The argument of the adversaries, even granted (which indeed we do not concede) all those things which they contend, proves nothing against the thesis. For that efficacy which in the objection is attributed to the Word heard for exciting supernatural acts in us either does not exceed the limits of a mere condition, or has some reason of causality properly so called. If the first, therefore an immediate interior operation of God is required. If the second, that efficacy cannot be physical, since not even such efficacy belongs to the Sacraments, but at most in the word heard it will be moral, insofar as, namely, from divine institution the preaching of the Word of God moves God to infuse into the soul of the hearer supernatural illuminations and inspirations. But in this hypothesis there is again demanded an illumination and inspiration which are immediately from God; therefore.

3. But if it be asked whether the preached Word is only a condition, or also a cause of the supernatural act, we reply this. Since the preached Word of God is something sounding outwardly and sensible, it is related in the manner of efficacy for moving the intellect just like other natural utterances. But, that preaching being posited, God is present, who inwardly gives the increase, illuminating and inspiring. Wherefore the interior act, viewed ontologically, is an effect of God; but the preaching of the Word is related both as a condition that the supernatural act may exist, and it is also a determining cause why the act is such objectively: such, namely, an apprehension, such a love, etc., since the divine immediate illumination is not of itself revelation (Th. VII.). This, moreover, and nothing more, is demanded by those formulae taken from Scripture which are adduced in the objection. For of a moral causality, placed in a certain dignity of the preached Word derived to it from the Word of God, which would move God infallibly to infuse actual graces — of this causality, I say, to be asserted we do not see a sufficient reason in those testimonies of Scripture and the like. Concerning which testimonies and formulae, by which the efficacy of the preached Word is expressed, two things are to be noted. First, that Scripture is wont to ascribe the effect which depends on several causes to one cause, the other causes not being mentioned. Second, that Scripture, frequently commending the efficacy of the Word, does not consider it separately, but together with those things which from the law of God are connected with it, that is, with the interior graces by which the preached Word itself, as it were, paves the way.

Finally, it will not be beside the point to note that that efficacy which is ascribed to the preached Word is to be attributed also to the other extrinsic means, which are able to excite pious thoughts and pious affections, and on the existence of which God bestows actual grace. That efficacy is to be attributed, I say, to those means at least analogically, that is, insofar as they represent the preached Word of God more or less and more or less equal it.

As for the testimonies of Augustine, comparing those things which were adduced from him in Thesis VII. and having examined the Catholic doctrine on the necessity of immediate illumination, from which Augustine certainly did not depart, indeed which he himself professed in Canon 4. of the Council of Carthage, whose author he himself was, or which he certainly approved, it must be answered that Augustine does not deny in the testimonies adduced the necessity of immediate illumination. Therefore the terms which are opposed in this disjunction, internal or external admonition, are not immediate interior illumination and mediate interior illumination, but immediate illumination with a preceding extrinsic ministry — which illumination is called an extrinsic admonition — and immediate illumination without extrinsic ministry, through an internal excitation either of phantasms or of ideas recalled into memory, or through a simple revelation, which can be.

It must further be held that for the just, too, actual grace, prevenient and helping, both of illumination and of inspiration, is necessary for all their salutary acts; although not in exactly the same way as for those who are destitute of supernatural habits.

I. What we put in the first place depends on those things which we taught in Th. X. Namely, when there exists a series of salutary acts, of which the later is determined by the earlier, that which precedes has the character of prevenient grace for the one that follows, and all depend immediately or mediately on purely prevenient grace, which was conferred at the beginning of the series. We call new grace in that series that grace which, consisting in the inspiration of an indeliberate act, would excite and prepare the will independently of preceding free acts. Now, although prevenient grace is said to be necessary for all acts, it is not by that very fact said that new prevenient grace is necessary for each individual act even of a man who is not just; for the former can be given without the latter. For in a continued series of salutary acts, of which the preceding determines the following, each of the subsequent acts comes to be from the grace of God preventing and preparing the will, and yet no new prevenient grace intervenes. Nor does any necessity of it appear; for it is not required as elevating, since by the prior act the faculty has been elevated, and that elevation can remain when the prior act is continued with the later one and determines it. Nor is it required as exciting the will to act, because the will existing in a deliberate act is sufficiently excited formally to the other acts which are connected with it. Taken in this sense, the opinion of Bellarmine can be defended, De Grat. et lib. arb. l. VI, c. 15.Sent. 13.) namely, that the just man does not ordinarily stand in need of new exciting grace, which is also suggested by the last canon of the Second Council of Orange. Therefore, when in the Thesis we defend the necessity of grace, even prevenient, for all and each of the acts of the just, it will have to be taken with the aforesaid limitation.

II. In disputing about the necessity of grace, Suarez, l. c., c. 8, sets up several hypotheses regarding the state of a man already excited, which with a moderate change we can propose thus: 1) that an unbelieving man has not yet consented to any grace of God calling him, 2) that he has consented to some, 3) that he has the habit of faith and of hope, 4) that he is just and has all the supernatural habits. We distinguish the second hypothesis from the following one, because since the first grace is not faith, a man can be prepared by several graces to obtain it—as if by an interior calling he is called to hear the preaching, then to investigate the truth, then to pray, so that at length he may believe. The same Suarez recounts several opinions in this question, ibid., which you may, please, consult; the difference of these opinions depends also on this, that not all put the same meaning under the names of exciting or prevenient and helping grace. Cf. Th. XVIII.

It can therefore be asked whether in each of these hypotheses actual grace is necessary for all good acts, and which grace; and the question is chiefly about the grace immediate to the will, and that one prevenient. For that the will is helped by grace when it acts, no one doubts. It is manifest, however, that if we have demonstrated that for the just themselves, with regard to all salutary acts, grace is necessary not only as helping but also as prevenient, of illumination and of inspiration, the same will have been demonstrated with regard to the others as well. It will therefore be enough for us to demonstrate this explicitly and of set purpose.

III. The demonstration briefly comes down to this. a) If actual grace—the same of which there is speech in Tradition—is asserted to be necessary indiscriminately for all, for all acts, with no distinction made of the states of men or of the condition of the acts, but with regard had only to the salutary act; it must be said that that grace, which, with no one dissenting, is necessary for some persons for some acts, is equally necessary for the just for all acts: but; therefore. Or b) if in Tradition grace is asserted to be necessary for the just in such a way that that which is said to be necessary for them for acting is that same grace which is affirmed to be necessary for others who are not just and who are called to faith, and which is said to be the grace of illumination and of inspiration, preparing and helping; the same is to be held as wholly necessary for the just as well: but; therefore.

If it is explicitly asserted by express testimonies that give assurance that for the just, for all salutary acts, grace prevenient and helping, of illumination and of inspiration, is necessary; that grace certainly must be said to be necessary for them: but; therefore.

d) If it is demonstrated by theological reason that for the just, too, both graces are necessary in both ways; there will be no reason why this should be denied: but; therefore.

The minors of these arguments must be proved. And first let this always be kept before one's eyes: that the Fathers in their writings and decrees of the Pelagian age always preached and defended the same grace—namely, the grace which the Pelagians denied, i.e., the grace of the will, the grace by which the will is called, excited, and prepared to will, and is helped when the will wills and works, as Augustine most frequently explains; just as the African Bishops also explain it to Zosimus (cf. c. 8. Auctorr. Apost. Sedis), and the Fathers of the Second Council of Orange, c. 4.

Now, as regards the minors of the first and second argument, which differ only in form, it has been affirmed that grace is necessary for all acts. Thus indeed the Roman Pontiff Zosimus, in the dogmatic epistle by which he proscribed the Pelagian dogmas throughout the whole world, and to which all catholic bishops subscribed: »what time, he says, intervenes in which we do not need his help? In all acts, therefore, causes, thoughts, motions, the helper and protector is to be prayed to."

Likewise, that grace is necessary for all has been preached, and to this all the decrees published in that age look. Auctorr. c. 6. Hence they prove the necessity of grace not from the special state of men but from the dignity of the salutary act. For this is why they assert that there is no vigor in nature (Council of Orange, c. 7) for doing any good that pertains to the salvation of eternal life, for acting as one ought for salvation, for the good works of piety (cf. Th. XXII.).

And hence it is that, with no distinction of men being made, they assert in general that the grace of God is given for individual acts (Council of Diospolis), so that without grace we can have, think, say, or do nothing of true and holy piety (the African Fathers to Zosimus, in Prosper, adv. Coll., c. 5): of which testimonies, in the first there is speech about the just as well, in the other directly about the just. And from this it came about that, to prove the necessity of grace for the first conversion, they brought forward those words of the Apostle Philipp. II, 13: It is God who works in us to will and to accomplish (Council of Orange, c. 4), which of themselves refer directly to those already converted. Therefore.

As for the minor of the third argument, it is evidently proved by these testimonies; for, first, it is clear in those things which have just been recited from Zosimus and the African Fathers that the speech is directly about Christians, that is, those converted to God, whom the Fathers certainly did not suppose to be all sinners—indeed they are to be presumed just. In the same way Augustine speaks, De Grat. et lib. arb., c. 17: «Without him either working that we may will, or cooperating when we will, we avail nothing for the good works of piety.» There you see that both graces, prevenient and helping, are said to be necessary for pious works without qualification. The same, De nat. et grat., c. 20: «The heavenly physician heals our evils not only to this end, that they already be not, but that we may be able to walk rightly for the rest, which indeed even the healthy will not be able to do except with him helping.» Which he declares in this way: «Just as the eye of the body, even when most fully healthy, cannot see unless it is helped by the brightness of light, so also a man, even when most perfectly justified, cannot live rightly unless he is divinely helped by the eternal light of justice.» Weigh that the light precedes vision and is necessary for each individual act of seeing. Cf. also what we gave in the preceding Thesis, n. IV, from the doctrine of Augustine. Among the Auctorr. Apost. Sedis brought forward by Celestine, this is brought forward in c. 8 from the African Fathers: «The will is prepared by the Lord, and that they may do something good, he himself touches the hearts of his faithful with paternal inspirations. For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are the sons of God, so that we may not feel our own free choice to be lacking, and in each and every good motion of the human will we may not doubt that his help prevails (by which, namely, the will is prepared and helped by the Lord).» Second Council of Orange, c. 9 (although here, rather than a canon, it is held by the learned as a certain sentence excerpted from the Fathers, in confirmation of the preceding canons, just as also many others follow; it is nevertheless a sentence which the Fathers of Orange make their own and to which they subscribe): «as often as we do good, God operates in us and with us (you have prevenient and helping grace) that we may work.» And en. 10: «The help of God is always to be implored even by the reborn and the holy, that they may be able to arrive at a good end or persevere in good work.» Council of Trent, Sess. VI, ep. 16: «Christ Jesus himself, as head into the members and as vine into the branches, continually infuses virtue into the justified themselves, which virtue always precedes, accompanies, and follows their good works.» In these testimonies you have mention of grace not only helping but also prevenient. Moreover, if you apply the observation made above—namely, that the grace which the Fathers defended was the grace of the will besides the grace of interior knowledge (cf. at the same time the historical synopsis of the Pelagian heresy given above), i.e., both graces were asserted to be necessary; it will have been abundantly demonstrated that, from the mind of Tradition, for the just too, for all their acts (cf. the first part of this Thesis), the grace of illumination and of inspiration is necessary, both prevenient and helping.

IV. There remains the demonstration to be set forth from the artificial theological argument. And indeed that 1° some prevenient actual grace is necessary for the just man too is demonstrated even by the intrinsic argument. For, as Ripalda argues,q. sect. 3 every salutary act elicited even from the influx of the habits necessarily presupposes a preceding knowledge and also affection (see what was said in Thesis XIV), and both supernatural, about the object toward which the will is freely affected: but that knowledge and affection is actual grace; therefore. The minor is evident from what was said in Ch. I. The major, as regards what it says that knowledge must precede, is evident: as regards the affection born of knowledge, it depends on what was said in Th. XIV: as regards what we add—namely, that this kind of knowledge which precedes (let the same be said of affection, if it is judged to be necessary per se for every act) is supernatural—it is clear 1) because the knowledge and affection by which the will is disposed to the act, and which are certain beginnings of the act itself, must be in the same order in which the act is: 2) because it is the doctrine of the Fathers that the will is prepared by acts of this kind; but the Fathers acknowledge no acts by which the will is prepared that are not simply grace, above the powers of nature, i.e., supernatural; therefore. Thus exciting grace is necessary.

But that 2° a divine excitation purely prevenient (cf. 1. p. Th.), actual even in the will, is necessary for the just man equipped with the habits by which nature and the faculties are elevated, can be demonstrated by this reason. For by sanctifying grace and the infused habits nature is indeed elevated, the faculties are elevated, and there is conferred on them the potency to the supernatural act, that is, the efficiency of operative power: whence that divine operation by which we said the faculties are transiently elevated (Th. XVI) is no longer necessary. But the faculties even thus elevated, when objects are proposed from without, can exercise themselves about them naturally, even if the objects are supernatural; because those objects, once they have been proposed, the force of nature can in some way attain. Nor does it matter that the faculty is elevated, and that a necessary faculty, such as the intellect and also the will as regards indeliberate acts, acts as much as it can; for this principle is to be taken thus: that a faculty acts as much as it can according to what the circumstances in which it is engaged and the object which it attains require; besides, this principle has been gathered from the analysis of those faculties which can act in only one specific way. But the elevated faculties can act both supernaturally and also naturally, because nature does not cease, whence they can also sin, which is a purely natural action; 2) the objects by which they are struck can be attained also by a natural operation, and attained in such a way that the faculty is exercised naturally as much as it can about them. Therefore, even in an elevated faculty there is not yet a sufficient reason why it should attain the objects supernaturally rather than naturally, or why it should elicit supernatural acts rather than natural ones. Nor can this be determined through freedom; for the exercise of freedom already presupposes indeliberate supernatural acts, and it belongs to freedom indeed to determine the existence of the act with regard to this or that, but not to determine the state in which it acts, whether natural or supernatural; for this pertains to God. Therefore, even granted the elevation of nature and of the faculty, the proximate principle of the supernatural work still remains to be completed, that is, there is still required on the part of God a determination that the faculty act supernaturally rather than naturally. But this determination must precede the act; hence it cannot be a simple concurrence, which of itself accompanies the act. It is necessary, therefore, that God by his operation excite in the intellect and in the will vital supernatural acts. Thus the grace of illumination and of inspiration is necessary for the just as well. It is not indeed any longer necessary for them that the faculty be elevated; with regard to this, the infused habit is already sufficient; but it is necessary for determining the supernatural exercise of the faculties. This prevenient grace certainly governs the consenting will; for what else is helping grace than prevenient grace joined with its effect? cf. Th. XVIII.

From what has been said you have why we said that grace is not necessary for the just in exactly the same way as for those who lack the supernatural habits. What is said of the just, however, must also be said of those who are equipped with some habits, as regards the acts of their habits. In one lacking the habit, the operation of God is required that excites vital acts and at the same time elevates the faculty; in one having the habit, this latter office is not necessary.

You see, therefore, that the necessity of grace for the just is not drawn only from the infirmity of nature, which remains even in the justified. From it indeed arises a moral necessity of some help (cf. Thomas, 1. II. q. 109. a. 9.); but the necessity of supernatural grace must be drawn from the supernatural dignity of the act. And indeed the Fathers, who defend the physical and absolute necessity of grace, speak indiscriminately of the just and of sinners, and assert the same grace necessary for both in the same way. There is therefore no reason why for the just the necessity of grace should be sought only from the vice of concupiscence. For even to overcome the temptations arising thence, to resist concupiscence not in any way whatsoever but salutarily, grace properly so called, supernatural, is required.

BRIEF HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS ON PELAGIAN IMPECCABILITY AND APATHY.

I. Augustine, as often as he deliberately enumerates the errors of the Pelagian heresy, also makes mention of impeccability, τῆς ἀναμαρτησίας: De haeresibus, n. 88. «They even go so far as to say that the life of the just in this world has no sin at all, and that from these the Church of Christ is perfected in this mortality, so that it is altogether without spot and wrinkle: as if the Church of Christ were not that which cries to God throughout the whole world, forgive us our debts.» And Against Julian, Bk. III, c. 1, he testifies that they say «that a man in this life can have no sin, so that what the whole Church says in the Lord's Prayer, forgive us our debts, is not necessary for him.» And Against the Two Epistles of the Pelagians, Bk. III, c. 8, he says that the Pelagians are pressed by the testimonies of truth, lest they say «that in a mortal man, however holy and well-doing, there is so great a justice that even after the laver of regeneration, until he ends this life, the remission of sins is not necessary for him.» Jerome, who was among the first to assail the Pelagians in his writings, refuted this error above all in three dialogues.

This error differs from the error of Jovinian. For, as Augustine testifies, De haeresibus, n. 82, Jovinian denied that a man could sin after receiving the laver of regeneration. Pelagius, however, taught that a man could, if he willed, be entirely without any sin. Cf. however Garnerius, Op. cit., p. 1, Diss. VII, c. 6, § 3.

II. The character of this Pelagian error is manifested to us by Jerome and Augustine. For the former, in the letter to Ctesiphon, says: «What other greater rashness can there be, than to claim for oneself the likeness of God—I will not say equality—and to embrace in a brief sentence the poisons of all heretics, which flowed from the font of the philosophers, and especially of Pythagoras and of Zeno, the prince of the Stoics? For they assert that those things which in Greek are πάθη, and which we can call perturbations..., can be rooted out of the minds, and that no fiber and root of vices remains at all in man, by meditation and assiduous exercise of the virtues.»¹ Augustine, Against Julian, Bk. II, c. 8: «Hence you wish man to be perfected—and would that it were by the gift of God and not by the free, or rather servile, choice of his own will... How much better we hear Ambrose in the book On the Flight from the World saying: what is worse, the allurement of earthly desires frequently creeps in.» and the obscuring of vanities occupies the mind, so that what you strive to avoid, that you think and turn over in your mind, which is difficult for a man to guard against, but impossible to put off... For our heart and our thoughts are not in our power, which, suddenly rushing in, confound the mind and the soul and draw them elsewhere than you had proposed. If you do not suffer these things, forgive us; we do not believe you, but rather in these words of St. Ambrose we recognize a certain mirror—and this, if we profit—of the common human infirmity. But even if we believed you and said: pray for us, that we too may not suffer these things, we find you so elated and savoring lofty things, that you would answer us not only that you do not suffer these things, but also that it is in man's power not to suffer them, and that there is no reason why the help of God should be sought for this.» Moreover, from these words of Jerome and Augustine it is clear that the Pelagians asserted not only that man has the power of always resisting concupiscence, but also of restraining all the first motions of concupiscence and of preventing them from arising, or of rooting them out from the depths and plucking out every fiber and root of the vices. This latter is proper to apathy, that is, to the absence of perturbations; but this apathy was either the same as, or certainly a part of, that impeccability which the Pelagians defended. Indeed, the Pelagians expressed this power in this formula: that a man can be without sin. Whence Jerome, in the cited place, after he has proved that it cannot come about that a man is free of perturbations, concludes: «How then can this stand which is said, that a man can be without sin, if he wills?» And Augustine, when he recounts the errors of Pelagius, embraces this certain error of his in the same formula: that a man can be without sin. The amplitude of which is indicated by the same Augustine, Contr. duas epistt. pelagg., Bk. IV, c. 11, in these words: «the Pelagians say that there are or have been just men in this life who have lived without any sin, to such an extent that the future life, which is to be hoped for as a reward, could not be more advanced and more perfect.»

II. Nor should it be a matter of wonder that the Pelagians embraced this portent of error; for they exalted too much the powers of human nature and were too much imbued with the false doctrines of the philosophers, who claimed this power for nature. Augustine indeed sets forth this argument of Caelestius in de Gestis Pelagii c. 18: «He placed the testimony of the Apostle Peter: that we are partakers of the divine nature. And he is said to make a syllogism: since if the soul cannot be without sin, then God also is subject to sin, whose part, i.e. the soul, is liable to sin:which is nothing other than to interpret Scripture in accordance with the opinion of the Stoics. And ibid. c. 35: «In the eleventh chapter of the book, which does not indeed bear the title of its author, but which is reported to be Caelestius's, I myself read this set down in these words — How, he says, has anyone taken up a share in that thing, from whose state and power he is defined to be a stranger? — Therefore the brethren, who had objected these things, understood him in this way, as though he had said that the soul and God are of the same nature and that the soul is a part of God: for they had accepted it in this way, that he thought it to be of the same state and power with God.»

IV. This impeccability, or the state of this impeccability, was called the perfection of justice. This is most frequent in Augustine. De Natura et Gratia c. 62: «To do justice, therefore, is to fight in the true worship of God with an internal conflict against the internal evil of concupiscence; but to perfect it is to have no adversary at all.» And in the book de Perfectione iustitiae c. 11: «It is not the doing of good that is not at hand, but the perfecting of it. For in that he does not consent, he does good, and in that he hates his concupiscence, he does good... but to perfect the good is not at hand to him, which will then be the case, when that concupiscence which dwells in his members will be no more.» And in the same place he thus answers Caelestius in c. 3: «If God did not will man to be without sin, he would not send his Son without sin, who healed men from sins. This is done in believers and those making progress, by the renewal of the inner man from day to day, until perfect justice is made, like full health... Then, therefore, will justice be full, when health is full; then will health be full, when charity is full.» Moreover in ep. CLXVII. c. 5 he says: «Then we are perfect in charity, when nothing remains of infirmity.» For, as he says in the book de Perfect. iustitiae c. 8: «While there is still something of carnal concupiscence, which is restrained even by continence, God is not loved in every way with the whole soul. For the flesh does not covet without the soul; although the flesh is said to covet, because the soul covets carnally. Then will he be just without any sin at all, when there will be no law in his members repugnant to the law of his mind; but he will love God wholly with his whole heart, whole soul, whole mind, which is the first and greatest commandment.»

V. This doctrine of Pelagius was reprobated by the Fathers on a twofold account:namely, that he asserted that the perfection of justice can be obtained by the powers of nature, without the grace of God; for this was the sense of that formula: that man can be without sin, if he wills, i.e. that this is placed in his will alone; although he would afterwards add, to avert ill-will: not without the grace of God; which grace, however, he placed in free will. Read Epist. Hieronymi ad Ctesiph. and Dialogue 1 cont. pelagg. Then indeed, that Pelagius taught the very fact or possibility of the perfection of justice in this mortal life. About this second point Augustine was less concerned at the beginning of the dispute, and although even then the negative opinion was more approved by him; nevertheless, provided it were conceded that perfection can be had not otherwise than through the grace of God, he judged that one ought not to fight very much with the heretics about this matter, but rather that the question should be held among Catholics, namely whether the perfection of justice can be obtained only in the other life, or also in this life, and is sometimes obtained. Cf. De Spiritu et litera c. 2. De Nat. et Grat. c. 42 and c. 60. But after the Carthaginian canons were published, of which the sixth, seventh and eighth contain the condemnation of this error, he absolutely attacked this error together with the rest and numbered it among the heresies. Thus in Lib. IV. Contra duas epist. Pelagianorum c. 10 he says: «Let us now see that third point, which (no less than the preceding ones, i.e. the denial of original sin and of the necessity of grace) makes every member of Christ and his whole body shudder in those men, because they contend that there are or have been just men in this life having no sin at all. By which presumption they most openly contradict the Lord's Prayer, in which all the members of Christ cry out with a truthful heart and daily voices: forgive us our debts.»

VI. In order to rout this error, Jerome in his dialogues against the Pelagians, and Augustine in almost all his works against the same men, draw their argument also (I do not say only, but this too) from the indeliberate and necessary motions of concupiscence, «which ought not to be restrained, but not to exist at all,» as Augustine says in De Perfect. iustitiae c. 8. For, as he again says in Retract. L. I. c. 15: «The perfection of good is that not even the concupiscence of sin itself be in man, to which indeed, when one lives well, the will does not consent; nevertheless he does not perfect the good, because the concupiscence, to which the will is repugnant, is still within.» They draw likewise from the ignorance by which we generally labor, also of positive law, concerning those things which are to be done or omitted by us so that we may live justly; likewise from those things which we commit through ignorance: for these in reality are opposed to that perfection of justice about which the question was. To these same ignorant things the appellation of sin was also given, both because in reality they are effects of original sin, and because they were called by the name of sin by the Pelagians too, who, teaching that that perfection is possible which would tear out all the perturbations and the roots of the vices, said that man can be without sin. But nothing is more frequent with Jerome and Augustine than to draw the argument against this Pelagian dogma from Rom. c. VII, 15. seqq.

VII. Now, with the state of the controversy between the Fathers and the Pelagians thus understood, as is fitting, many things will be most clear and subject to no difficulty, which through the Jansenist fraud have seemed to some almost unintelligible and absurd. Surely it is understood 1) that it was truly said by Augustine that there are certain necessary sins, namely those which cannot be avoided, and which hinder us from being perfect — sins, that is, placed in the indeliberate motions of concupiscence, in those things which are done through ignorance, and in ignorance itself; for these stand in the way of the perfection of justice and have a certain character of sin. In this sense Augustine said in de Perfect. iustitiae c. 6: ›Sin is when either the charity which ought to be is not, or it is less than it ought to be, whether this can be avoided by the will or not; because if it can, the present will does this; if it cannot, a past will did it." And ibid. c. 8, concerning concupiscence, he says »that it ought not to be restrained, but not to exist at all, nor will it be in that perfection of justice, where there will be no sin at all." From this doctrine of Augustine it does not follow that men sin with formal sin even in those things which they do necessarily; for it is not sin properly so called, but sin improperly so called and material, that is urged by Augustine against Pelagian impeccability.

It is understood 2) how Augustine truly said that there are certain precepts of God impossible for us in this life. For in order that Augustine might exclude the Pelagian dogma, when it was objected to him that it is a precept that we love God with our whole heart, with our whole soul, with our whole mind, with all our strength, and that we not covet; for in these precepts the perfection of justice is contained, and the exclusion of every motion of concupiscence, and that what God commands us is certainly possible; Augustine judged that two kinds of precepts are to be distinguished, namely the precept of doing justice and the precept of perfecting justice. He conceded that these precepts: You shall love the Lord with your whole heart etc. and you shall not covet contain the precept of perfecting justice, but he denied that those precepts, taken in their whole amplitude, are to be fulfilled in this life, and he asserted that grace is given that they be fulfilled, and that they are to be fulfilled in the other life: but that they are now proposed to us so that we may know whither we must strive, so that now, by loving God, although still imperfectly, and by resisting concupiscence, we may merit at last to arrive at that state in which we love God with our whole heart, with our whole soul etc., no concupiscence existing in us. De Perfect. iustitiae c. 8: «It is not asked whether it is a precept, which is very manifest; but this very thing, which is agreed to be a precept, whether it can be fulfilled in this body of death, where the flesh lusts against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh, so that we do not the things which we will... As long, therefore, as we walk by faith, being absent from the Lord... this is our justice in this very pilgrimage, that we now tend by the rectitude and perfection of the course itself toward that perfection and fullness of justice, where in the sight of its beauty charity will already be full and perfect, chastening our body and bringing it into subjection etc.» Cf. the testimony adduced above from the book de Perfect. iust. c. 8, where he denies that God is loved with the whole soul while concupiscence still exists. Then de Nat. et Grat. c. 62: «It is one thing not to have sin, another not to obey its desires. It is one thing to fulfill what is commanded: you shall not covet; and another, by a certain effort of abstinence, at least to do that which is likewise written: do not go after your concupiscences. To do justice, therefore, is to fight in the true worship of God with an internal conflict against the internal evil of concupiscence; but to perfect it is to have no adversary at all. For he who fights is still in danger and is sometimes struck, even if he is not laid low: but he who has no adversary rejoices in full peace. And he himself is most truly said to be without sin in whom no sin dwells, not he who, through abstinence from evil work, says: I now do not that thing, but the sin that dwells in me...» The same is the opinion of Jerome in Dialogue 1.

Therefore, according to Augustine, the perfection which God requires of us in this stadium of mortality is the perfection of the course, which is to do justice; it is not the perfection of peace or of rest, which is to perfect justice. One may say that, in Augustine's opinion, we are thus commanded to love God with our whole heart etc. and not to covet (with the tinder of concupiscence also extinguished), just as we are commanded to save our soul, which salvation, however, is obtained not in this but in the other life. And just as by that precept we are now obliged only to those things by which salvation can be procured, so by that precept of the love of God we are now obliged only to doing justice, so that we may be able to attain the perfection of justice, which we certainly ought to attain. Whence perfect justice is said to be received not as something to be cast in the mandate, but as something to be received in the reward. Contr. duas epistt. pelagg. L. IV, c. 10. It can happen that Augustine's interpretation of the precepts: you shall love the Lord with your whole heart etc. and you shall not covet, is not approved by many: but this now matters nothing. Nevertheless the doctrine which Augustine hands down through this interpretation is most true. Moreover, with that interpretation established and posited, Augustine most truly said that certain precepts are now impossible and that the grace by which they are fulfilled is now lacking; for these are those precepts which show that perfection is not to be exercised in this life, but to be attained in the other life — attained, however, not through acts which are of the same perfection as those which will be in the other life, but through more imperfect acts. So that by those precepts we are now obliged not to the having of that perfection, but to tending toward it. Whence the lack of this perfection in this life is not imputed to man, nor does man sin in any way by not now fulfilling the precepts of perfecting justice. Tract. XLI in Ioann. n. 12: «To will, he says, is at hand to me, but to perfect the good is not. Did he say: it is not at hand to me to do good? If he had said this, there would be no hope. He does not say: it is not at hand to me to do, but it is not at hand to me to perfect. For what is the perfection of good, unless the consumption and end of evil? And what is the consumption of evil, unless what the law says: you shall not covet? Altogether not to covet is the perfection of good, because it is the consumption of evil. That man was saying this: to perfect the good is not at hand to me; because he could not bring it about that he would not covet: he did only so much as to rein in concupiscence, not to consent to concupiscence, and not to offer the members of concupiscence for its service. To perfect, therefore, he says, the good is not at hand to me; I cannot fulfill what is said: you shall not covet. What need, then, is there that you fulfill? Do not go after your concupiscences. Do this in the meantime, as long as illicit concupiscences are in your flesh. Remain in the servitude of God, in the freedom of Christ; with your mind serve the law of your God; do not give yourself to your concupiscences."

Note that the difference between doing justice and perfecting justice is as it were specific, since the former is contained in battle, the latter in peace; but in the very perfection of justice there can be infinite degrees, which, however, differ only accidentally. Augustine, however, considering the essential or specific difference, distinguishes only two ways of fulfilling the law, namely either by doing or by perfecting justice.

It follows from what has been said, first, that Luther and Calvin err, who gather from the doctrine of Augustine that the just man sins formally in every work, for the reason that it is impossible for him to observe these two precepts: you shall love the Lord your God with your whole soul, and you shall not covet. For the precept about the perfection of justice is entirely different from that which commands the action of justice; for while the latter has a single object, the former has a double object: one mediate or ultimate, which is the extinction of all concupiscence; the other immediate and proximate, which is the care and endeavor of diminishing the forces of concupiscence through the exercise of virtue. And this is what is to be observed by us now.

It follows, secondly, that Jansenius errs, who attributes to the action of justice what St. Augustine affirms about the perfection of justice, so as to conclude from this that certain precepts are impossible for man in this state, and in relation to the powers which he has: whereas the holy Doctor and the Fathers speak not of the action of justice, but of the perfection, and teach that this is not so commanded that we should now carry it out, but that we should only tend to it through the action of justice.

It is understood, thirdly, why Jerome and Augustine called every ignorance in any matter which pertains to duty, whether of natural or positive law, a sin, and said that those sin who act from ignorance, even invincible. For whatever is of this kind is a defect, is a misery which cannot be composed with perfect justice. Wherefore, since the Pelagians were compelled to confess that ignorance is at times invincible, in order to defend their dogma about the possibility of the perfection of justice, they denied that a work done from invincible ignorance is any evil, even materially, as we say; nay, they wanted it to be good and to agree with the most perfect justice no less than works done from knowledge of the law. August. cont. Iulianum L. II. c. 19: «Proceed to the rest and weave things vainer than the vain... since you say — that from this it should be understood that perfect ignorance is to be called justice, because God said to Abimelech, who was about to lie with Sarah, not knowing that she was another man's wife: and I knew that you did this in a clean heart. And therefore the state of those who are born is not harmed by the will of those who beget; because even if it were evil, you say, yet it would in no way reach their knowledge. — Why, then, do you not name them just, if perfect ignorance is to be called by the name of justice? For nothing is more perfect than the ignorance of little ones; let nothing, therefore, be called more just either. Where is what you thought should be asserted above — that little ones are born neither just nor unjust, which they will be by their own acts, but only that infancy is rich with the dowry of innocence?... Are you going to say that virtue is not justice? How, then, is the infant not yet full of virtue, but capable, when he is full of ignorance, which you say is justice, unless you deny that virtue is justice?» And it was the opinion of Caelestius, reported and condemned in the Council of Diospolis: that forgetfulness and ignorance are not subject to sin; because they do not happen according to the will, but according to necessity. Therefore the Fathers, in order to show the vanity of that perfection of justice which the heretics promised to men, showed that ignorance and the things which are done from ignorance are sins, namely those which are opposed to the perfection of justice. Augustine De Spir. et lit. c. 35: «Behold how perfect justice is without example among men, and yet it is not impossible. For it would be done, if so great a will were applied as suffices for so great a thing. And it would be so great, if none of those things which pertain to justice were hidden from us, and if it so delighted the mind that the delight would overcome whatever other pleasure or pain impeded.» Jerome cont. Pelag. Dialogue 1: «Now I must traverse the testimonies of the Scriptures very widely, to teach that error and ignorance are sin.» And he brings into the midst the ignorance of Jacob, who did not know what had been done to Joseph, the ignorance of Samuel, who did not know which of the sons of Jesse was to be anointed king, and things of this sort. Augustine likewise De Peccat. merit. et remiss. L. I. c. 23: «Is there no evil of ignorance and therefore nothing to be purged? And what does that voice do: do not remember the sins of my youth and my ignorances?» And he brings forward as an example the ignorance of little ones. Jerome *Dialog. II. cont. pelag.*Give me (says the Pelagian) a testimony of the New Testament, where error and ignorance and the impossibility of a mandate are held in crime. The Catholic answers: «I will bring forward one, to which certainly you will not be able to contradict.» Moreover he adduces Rom. VII, 15. seq. and subjoins: hear the Apostle preaching most openly: for I do not know what I do, for I do not do what I will, but I do what I hate. But if I do what I do not will, I consent to the law, that it is good. Now, however, it is no longer I who do that, but the sin that dwells in me.»

Hence these Fathers in this controversy never distinguished, as Jansenius wishes to distinguish, between ignorance of natural law and ignorance of positive law; nay, they are wont to argue more frequently from ignorance of positive law; and certainly any ignorance whatever of those things which pertain to our duties, whatever it may be, is opposed to the perfection of justice.

Therefore the sin from which invincible ignorance does not excuse is a sin opposed to the perfection of justice, not a sin opposed to the action of justice, from which invincible ignorance, according to Augustine, certainly excuses, or rather does not prevent that justice from being and producing its effects. (Cf. Iacobum Merlini S. I. Vera Clavis operum s. Augustini, parte 2ª.)

VIII. We said under n° V that the Fathers, against Pelagian impeccability, drew their argument also from the indeliberate and necessary motions of concupiscence. It is asked whether they were content with that alone, namely whether, according to the Fathers, the perfection of justice is therefore impossible in this life, because it is impossible to prevent all the indeliberate motions of concupiscence, so that they concede that man, with the grace of God, can rein in all the motions of concupiscence or resist them, but because he cannot prevent them, he therefore falls short of the perfection of justice: or whether, besides, the Fathers deny that man in this life, except by some special privilege, can resist all the motions of concupiscence in such a way that he never sins, even venially. It must be answered that it is the doctrine of the Fathers that the perfection of justice is impossible in this life, not only because the indeliberate motions of concupiscence exist, but also because to motions of this kind the will of man sometimes consents, at least lightly.

Surely the Fathers of the Council of Carthage, in canons 6. 7. 8., by which the Pelagian ἀναμαρτησία is proscribed, speak of sins which need remission, on account of which we truly say in the Lord's Prayer forgive us our debts: but nothing is remitted by God except what has been admitted voluntarily and freely; therefore the discourse was about sins which are contained also in the deliberate motions of concupiscence.

And in truth, when Augustine objects the indeliberate motions of concupiscence, he frequently also looks to the deliberate motions which follow upon them, and he supposes as certain that those deliberate motions sometimes follow. It is clear from the testimony cited above from the book de Natura et Gratia c. 62: «For he who fights, he says, is still in danger and is sometimes struck, even if he is not laid low; but he who has no adversary rejoices in full peace.» Moreover Augustine in Lib. II. De peccatorum meritis et remissione (which is the first work written by him against the Pelagians, in the year 412) treats this question expressly, namely he attacks Pelagian impeccability. Further, in c. 6 he proposes or distinguishes four questions; for he says «one question is whether (man in this life) can be (without sin); another, whether he is; another, if he is not, when he can be, why he is not; another, whether he who has never at all had any sin — not only whether anyone is, but also whether he could at some time have been or can be.» Now, with it conceded in answer to the first question that he can be through the grace of God; to the second he answers in c. 7: «If it is asked whether he is, I do not believe that he is.» But asking in the third question why he is not, he answers that which sufficiently signifies that Augustine considers also the more or less deliberate consents which follow upon concupiscence, and on account of them teaches that man cannot be without sin. For he says in c. 17: «I could easily answer, because men are unwilling; but if it is asked of me why they are unwilling, we go on at length. Nevertheless I will also say this briefly, without prejudice to a more diligent inquiry. Men are unwilling to do what is just, either because it is hidden whether it is just, or because it does not delight. For we will each thing the more vehemently, the more certainly we know how good it is, and we are delighted by it the more ardently. Ignorance, therefore, and infirmity are vices which impede the will, that it be not moved to do a good work or to abstain from an evil work." Augustine therefore distinguishes two things, i.e. the more ardent delights of concupiscence and the will following upon them, which either does not will the good or wills the evil. Moreover this will is a free will; and indeed in that will is placed by Augustine that sin about which it was asked why man cannot be without sin; for the delights of concupiscence are adduced as the reason of existing sin; sin, therefore, is some effect of them, which effect is indicated to be that will.

Moreover Augustine De Perfect. inst. c. 21 concludes his disputation thus: «Whoever says that after receiving the remission of sins any man has lived or lives so justly in this flesh that he has no sin at all, contradicts the Apostle John, who says: If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us. For he does not say: we have had, but we have. But if anyone asserts (let these things be noted) that this is said of that sin (namely concupiscence) which dwells in our mortal flesh according to the vice that was contracted by the will of the first man sinning, to whose desires the Apostle Paul commands us not to obey; and that he does not sin who, to that same sin, although dwelling in the flesh, consents to no evil work at all, either of deed or of word or of thought, although the concupiscence itself is moved, which received the name of sin in another way, because to consent to it is to sin, and it is moved in us against our will: he indeed distinguishes these things subtly, but let him see what is to be made of the Lord's Prayer, where we say: forgive us our debts — which, unless I am mistaken, we would not need to say, if we never consented a little to the desires of that same sin, even in a slip of the tongue or in a delightful thought; but we would only have to say, lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil. Nor would the Apostle James say: in many things we all offend. For one does not offend, unless when great concupiscence, by seeking or avoiding against the reason of justice, persuades, whether deceiving or prevailing, that something be done or said or thought which ought not.» The opinion of Augustine, therefore, was that men are at times led by concupiscence into some illicit consents or into some venial sins, and that this is proved from the words of the Lord's Prayer. The same, therefore, is to be understood when, after the publication of the Carthaginian canons, he absolutely affirms that the words of the Lord's Prayer are opposed to the Pelagian opinion, as in book IV cont. duas epistt. pelagg., which we gave under n. V. Most clearly cont. Iulianum L. II. c. 10: «Laboring in this war, as long as human life upon earth is a temptation, we are not therefore without sin, because this which is called sin in that way (namely, as he had said a little above, because it has been made from the guilt of the first man, and by rebelling strives to draw us to sin) works in the members, fighting against the law of the mind, even in those not consenting to it for illicit things; for as far as concerns us, we would always be without sin, until this evil were healed, if we never consented to it for evil: but in those things in which we are conquered by that rebelling one, although not lethally, yet venially, in these we contract a debt, whence we daily say: forgive us our debts.»

Jerome is to be thought to have held the same, who in dialogue II against the Pelagians, in order to prove that no man is ἀναμάρτητον, enumerates several sins of the just, which have the true character of guilt; and in the epistle to Ctesiphon, at the end, teaches that the just are said to be just in the Scriptures not because they lack every vice, but because they are commended by the greater part of the virtues. But the vice which, existing in the just, is the reason why all the virtues are not in them, cannot be only that which is naturally and necessarily in us; for that would exclude either no virtue or all virtues equally, since it is opposed to all: it is, therefore, something existing in us freely.

IX. Therefore, although the Fathers, in order to refute the Pelagians and to refute their ἀναμαρτησίαν, also brought into the midst the indeliberate motions of concupiscence, which certainly are opposed to the perfection of justice which the Pelagians claimed as possible for themselves, they nevertheless also added this: that these indeliberate motions at times drag just men into certain sins which are truly and properly sins, and that no man's life is passed in this mortal flesh without some sin which would need remission. But this doctrine of the Fathers, which embraces all the just in general, does not exclude some special privilege which God may wish to confer gratuitously upon someone. Augustine expressly signifies this exception, disputing with the Pelagians about this same matter, i.e. about the perfection of justice, in the book de Natura et Gratia c. 36: «Except, therefore, the holy Virgin Mary, concerning whom, for the honor of the Lord, I wish no question at all to be had when sins are treated: for from this we know that more grace was conferred upon her for overcoming sin in every part, who merited to conceive and bring forth him whom it is certain had no sin.» Cf. the treatise De Immaculato Virginis conceptu.

VI. Since Canon 230 declares that a justified man cannot in his whole life avoid all sins, even venial ones, unless by special privilege, the Fathers' teaching on this matter against the Pelagians being also taken into account; it must be held 1°) that the just generally do not avoid all venial sins through the whole time of their life, unless the time be per accidens quite short. By the name of venial sin those sins also are to be understood which are committed with imperfect deliberation and, as they say, by surreption. It must be held 2°) that a certain antecedent impotence, albeit only moral, is in the just for always avoiding those sins. Moreover, the reason for this impotence seems to be sought from the weakness of nature or the defect of integrity. Therefore a special privilege is necessary, which is not certainly known to have been granted to anyone else besides the Immaculate Mother of God.

I. First of all, the words of the definition must be explained. It is asked, therefore, first, what comes under the name of venial sin, or how great is the extension of this name. We answer that, since this word is used by the Synod without any addition, it must be taken indefinitely and comprehend any moral act which has the character of venial sin. Now indeed a twofold venial sin is wont to be distinguished by theologians: namely, that which is venial by reason of its matter, which is light in itself, so that, even with full advertence and full deliberation present, it is venial; and that which is venial on account of the defect of full advertence and full deliberation, which indeed can happen both in a light matter and in a grave matter. Moreover, for an act to be a sin, some advertence and deliberation suffice; for on account of them the act is in the moral order and difform from the law. Cf. on this matter the moral theologians. A specimen of sins of this kind you have in Augustine, De Natura et Gratia c. 38, where he himself warns that it was not to have been cited from Scripture: «if Abel, although deservedly called just, sometimes laughed a little too immoderately, or joked in the relaxation of the mind, or saw something for concupiscence, or plucked fruits somewhat too immoderately, or was more indisposed from a somewhat larger meal, or, while he prayed, thought of something by which his intention would be called away to something else — and how often those and many similar things stole upon him. Or are they perhaps not sins, against which we are generally admonished to beware and to restrain by the apostolic precept, where it says: let not sin reign in your mortal body to obey its desires. For indeed, lest we obey these for those things which are not permitted or are less decent, we must fight with a daily and perpetual struggle.» Therefore, since those acts also which are committed with imperfect advertence and imperfect deliberation are and are called venial sins, the words of the Council must also comprehend them: namely, for that proposition to be true, it is enough that all venial sins which are done from imperfect advertence and deliberation, and which are wont to be said to be done by surreption, cannot be avoided.

It is asked, secondly, about which impossibility the discourse is, when it is said that the just man cannot. We answer that not physical impossibility is signified, but moral. The reason is that when it is said that the just man cannot avoid all sins, it is supposed that he actually sins when he does not avoid some sin, which indeed must necessarily happen if it is impossible to avoid all: he could not, however, sin, if the physical power to avoid each one whatsoever were lacking; therefore the physical power to avoid all is had; hence the discourse is not about physical impossibility. The discourse, consequently, is about a certain moral impossibility, of what sort it is we shall see afterwards.

It is asked, thirdly, what space of time is understood when 'whole life' is said. It must be noted that the Canon speaks of that time of life which runs after the first justification; for it speaks of the justified man. We say, however, 'after the first justification' (i.e., after man has been made just for the first time by the infusion of sanctifying grace, which sanctity he can again lose through lethal sins and again recover through penance); because there is no reason for limiting the words of the Council, universal in themselves: for man justified for the first time is in reality a justified man; then because the Council speaks of the whole life, which therefore is not to be narrowed to that part which runs after man has returned for the last time into the grace of God; then because the words of Canon 23 correspond to the doctrine contained in chapters 11 and 12, in which the discourse is directly about the first justification. Again it must be noted that the Council did not say 'through a long time of life,' but simply 'through the whole life.' Hence theologians ask whether through some long space of life every sin can be avoided, and they answer that it is not so certain that through some, albeit long, space of life sins cannot be avoided, just as it is certain that they cannot be avoided through the whole life: indeed some add that through some short space of life, say of one day, all sins can be avoided (see Suarez De Grat. L. IX. c. 8. n. 29).

But the matter must be declared. For if it is asked what properly has been defined, it must be said that this one thing has been defined, that the whole life cannot be spent by the just man without sin without a special privilege; and therefore he is not a heretic who would contend that a long space of life, although not the whole life, can be passed without sin. Nevertheless, if the question is raised, what aptly coheres with that definition, what can be gathered from it by reasoning, it must be said that the opinion teaching that a long space of life, say several years, can be passed without sin apart from a special privilege, is not easily composed with that same definition, or rather that that opinion is to be excluded from the sense of the definition. Surely if that opinion can be received, it will also be permissible to say that the just man who lived 60 years could have lived 30 and more years without any interruption without sin; but if he could, why will not so many others be able, whose whole life is of 30 or fewer years? for it does not appear what the prolongation of the subsequent life could contribute to this. Besides, if he can keep himself immune from sin for 30 continuous years, why will he not be able in the subsequent years? for he does not seem to experience great difficulty in the continual resistance to temptations and suggestions, which occur frequently. The matter, therefore, would seem to be without sufficient reason. Again, if this canon 23 is compared with chapter 11, it is clear that the canon comprehends those sins also which are enumerated in that chapter, which are called light and daily, into which the Council testifies that men, however holy and just, fall. The discourse, therefore, in the canon is about sins whose occasions occur daily and which, on account of the frequency of these occasions, can all be avoided only with difficulty; it is therefore alien to the mind of the Council to think of some long space of time passed without any sin, especially since it expressly teaches that the just fall into daily sins. That opinion, therefore, does not sufficiently cohere with the doctrine of the canon.

But because the just man does not always sin, the just man can, without a special privilege, pass some short time without any sin. But he would be inept who wished to define the quantity of this time. For in moral matters of this kind certain limits posited in the indivisible are not to be sought, as they can be had in natural things. This depends very much on the circumstances in which man is placed, on acquired habits, on the fervor of spirit with which he works, on the more or less copious grace by which he is helped by God. Having considered, however, those things which the Council hands down in chapter 11, it seems to be said that that time, according to the mind of the Council, cannot be anything but quite short, if it is compared with the common space of human life. Whence if it happens that someone, after justification, lives only that short space, the definition of the Council will not, per accidens, regard him, because it, using these words, 'whole life,' signified some space not too short; for when we say 'whole life,' we commonly are wont to understand some long space.

And these things suffice for the fuller understanding of the canon on this matter. But what we defend in the Thesis in the first place is a thing placed in fact: that the just generally do not abstain through the whole time of their life from any sin whatsoever, with that exception, however, added, unless the time of life be quite short. The question, therefore, is first one of fact, and of this fact, namely, that the just do not abstain from any sin whatsoever through the whole life. But whether it must also be denied that the just keep themselves immune from sin through some long space of their life will be disputed afterwards, according to those things which we have already premised.

II. Concerning this question of fact Suarez thus decides, De Gratia L. IX. c. 8. n. 18: «It must be said absolutely that just and holy men, however perfect, have not avoided all venial sins in this life. This assertion under these terms is not only true, but also theologically certain.» We add, in the enunciation of the Thesis, that little word 'generally,' by which we signify that our assertion is not hindered if that exception exists in certain persons, which coheres with the character of a special privilege. The exception which we add, unless the time of life be quite short, aims at this, that we declare that we do not include in our conclusion those whose time of life is quite short, which indeed is not the same as affirming that they do not sin in that short space of life. Therefore, that the fact stands thus is proved 1) by the analysis made of the cited canon. For it says that the just cannot avoid all sins through the whole life without a special privilege; therefore it is a special privilege or the effect of a special privilege that the just man admits no sin at all through the whole life. But a privilege, and a special one, is something departing from the common law or the common manner of living of the community; therefore to avoid all sins, which is a special privilege or the effect of a special privilege, is not something common: therefore commonly just men do not live immune from any sin. You will say that it is called a special privilege on account of the excellence of the benefit. But a privilege by itself signifies something private, rare, not common; nor does the excellence of the benefit suffice that it be called a privilege, just as adoptive filiation and the beatific vision are not called privileges, than which nothing among created benefits is more excellent: for a privilege is an exception from the law insofar as it is common or universal. This is confirmed from the words immediately following of the same canon, 'as the Church holds concerning the Blessed Virgin.' Namely, the Church holds that to the Blessed Virgin, on account of her most special dignity, special graces and special prerogatives were granted, among which this one too is numbered, as we have heard Augustine teaching at the end of the preceding Synopsis; but it is abhorrent to the Christian sense to deem common those things which were conferred on the Blessed Mother of God on account of her most special dignity; therefore 'privilege' is taken under that proper character by which it is opposed to the common.

And in truth this is the doctrine of the Fathers, who profess to have drawn it from the Scriptures. For the Fathers of the Council of Carthage teach that, not only on account of humility, but because it is true, the just ought to say that they have sin, and that he speaks falsely who has denied that he has sin. They say that the petition of the Lord's Prayer, 'forgive us our debts,' is necessary for the just, so that they say this not only for others but also for themselves. The Fathers indeed appeal to the testimonies of Scripture, James III, 2: in many things we all offendIac. III, 2., 1ª Ioan. I, 8: if we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us1 Ioan. I, 8., and to the Lord's Prayer, which is also to be recited by the just and by which they are commanded to say forgive us our debts. Similar to these are Prov. XX, 9: *who can say: my heart is clean, I am pure from sin?*Prov. XX, 9. and Eccles. VII, 21: There is no just man on earth, who does good and does not sinEccles. VII, 21.. These are universal in themselves and exhibit that truth to which indeed some exception can be made by special privilege, but which is nevertheless common in itself.

Augustine exhibits the doctrine of the Fathers both in many other places and in De Natura et Grat. c. 36, where, after he had excepted the Blessed Virgin, he says: «With this Virgin therefore excepted, if we could gather all those holy men and holy women, while they lived here, and ask them whether they were without sin, what do we think they would have answered? Whether this which that man (Pelagius) says, or what the apostle John says? I ask you, however great the excellence of sanctity in this body may have been, if they could have been asked this, would they not have cried out with one voice: If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us. Or would they answer that thing more humble, perhaps, than truer? But to this man (Pelagius) it now pleases, and rightly pleases, not to place the praise of humility in a part of falsity. And so, if they said this truly, they would have sin, which, because they humbly confessed it, the truth would be in them; if, however, they lied about this, they would none the less have sin, because the truth would not be in them.» And De Peccator. meritt. et remiss. L. II, c. 14: «Thus, therefore, all who in this life have been proclaimed by the testimonies of the Divine Scriptures in good will and in acts of justice, and all who were such after them, although not proclaimed and praised by the same testimonies, or even now are such, or will be so hereafter, are all just, all truly praiseworthy, but they are not without some sin; since by the testimonies of the Scriptures, by which we believe concerning their praises, we also believe this, that no one living is justified in the sight of God, therefore He is asked not to enter into judgment with His servants and not...» only universally for all the faithful, but also for each individual is the Lord's Prayer necessary, which He handed down to His disciples.Moreover, the Fathers then distinguished crime from sin, the former comprising grave faults, the latter any sins whatever, even light ones. August. Cont. duas epistt. pelagg. L. I. c. 14: «Many indeed baptized faithful are without crime, but without sin in this life I should say no one, however much the Pelagians, because we say these things, may swell and burst against us in their madness; not because some sin remains which is not remitted in baptism, but because, while we remain in the infirmity of this life, sins do not cease to be done daily, which are remitted daily to those who pray faithfully and work mercifully. This is the soundness of the catholic faith, which the holy Spirit everywhere sows, not the vanity of heretical depravity and the presumption of the spirit.»

III. Since the Pelagians, together with Jovinian, appealed to the testimony of 1ae Ioannis III, 9: Whoever is born of God does not commit sin; because his seed abides in him and he cannot sin; because he is born of God: the Fathers observed, first, that it cannot happen that the apostle contradicted himself; for he had said at the beginning of the epistle, c. II, 1: if we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us. Then they interpreted the words of the Apostle in such a way that he cohered with himself and with the rest of Scripture. «Charity (Augustine says, De Gratia Christi c. 21), which is a virtue, is for us from God, not from ourselves, Scripture being witness, which says: Charity is from God, and everyone who loves is born of God and has known God, because God is charity (1a. Ioann. IV, 7. 8). According to that charity the saying is better understood: he who is born of God does not sin and cannot sin. That charity, according to which he is born of God, does not act wrongly, does not think evil. When, therefore, man sins, he sins not according to charity but according to cupidity, according to which he is not born of God.»

Insofar, therefore, as one has the grace of adoption and charity, and follows its lead, he does not sin nor can he sin. Moreover, since the Apostle in v. 8 said that he who commits sin is of the devil, he subjoins in the following verse that he who is born of God does not sin, cannot sin, because the seed of God abides in him: by which surely we are taught that sin is not from God, but is the work of the devil, who sinned from the beginning, and that the divine grace, by which

we are regenerated, excludes sin by itself, and that sins are also excluded in act, if we allow ourselves to be ruled by grace. Cf. A. Lapide in h. l.

Therefore, both from the canon of the Council of Trent and from the canons of Carthage and from Scripture, with the Fathers' interpretation employed, the truth of this fact is gathered most certainly, namely, that the just generally do not avoid through the whole life all sins, even venial ones.

Furthermore, from what has been said it is also clear what must be answered to the question whether a just man lives for a long time without any sin. For this, as we have already seen in the declaration, does not cohere with the canon of the Council of Trent, does not cohere with the doctrine of chapter III of the same session; moreover, it does not cohere with the canons of the Council of Carthage, with the testimonies of Scripture and the interpretation of the Fathers, which, all of them sources of revealed doctrine, exhibit to us the frequency of those sins, which cannot be reconciled with a long span of life passed without any sin.

IV. You will ask whether what has been proved thus far in this part pertains to the faith. I answer that this fact, namely, that the just in general do not avoid all sins, even venial ones, throughout the whole time of their life, is a truth which is certainly contained in the deposit of revelation. This is clear from what has been demonstrated. The same seems to be said of the other truth: that the just in general do not avoid all venial sins over a long span of their life. For it is handed down both explicitly and implicitly together with the former. Moreover, if you ask whether the former truth is defined by the authentic magisterium and pertains to the dogmas necessarily to be believed; I answer that in the canon of the Council of Trent this definition is not contained in express words; for the discourse is about a power separated from a special privilege. If, however, the force of the meaning of the canon is considered, in it must be said to be contained also the affirmation of this fact, namely, that the just in general do not abstain through their whole life from every venial sin. For this is truly said, albeit in other words, by him who affirms that this cannot happen without a special privilege; for if it happened in general among the just, although it would happen by the help of grace, it would be false that it happened by the help of a special privilege, since the gift would be common; and therefore it would be absurd that a special privilege be required for this effect. From the fact, however, that this definition is not had in express words, Suarez calls this truth only theologically certain. But although this may be said, if only the reason of the Tridentine canon is considered; if, nevertheless, the Canons of the Council of Carthage are considered, it seems it cannot be denied that this truth is defined; for this truth is openly handed down in those canons: moreover those canons, the Apostolic See approving, obtained infallible authority in the universal Church.

V. It is of faith, defined by the cited canon of the Council of Trent, that a just man cannot, apart from a special privilege, avoid all sins, even venial ones. There inheres, therefore, in the just a certain impotence. But impotence can be distinguished as twofold: one consequent or concomitant, another antecedent. Consequent is that which has its reason in the free act itself; for he who does a thing cannot at the same time not do it, and he who does not will to do a thing cannot at the same time will to do it. Antecedent is that which is the reason, whether adequate or inadequate, of the omission of an act; insofar as something is therefore not done, because it cannot be done. Now indeed it is inept to judge that only consequent impotence is signified by the words of the canon; both because he who cannot for this reason alone is not simply said not to be able, and chiefly because to remove this impotence a special privilege would not be required, such as was granted to the Blessed Virgin; for the will, which is common to all, would suffice. And although Augustine seems frequently to assert only the fact — nay, to refer its necessary affirmation back to the knowledge of God, when he says: «But since by the divine Spirit, who much better than we knows all things of the human race, whether past or present or future, such human life was foreknown and foretold that no one living is justified in the sight of God, it happens that through ignorance or infirmity, not having exerted against it the whole forces of the will, we yield even to some unlawful things, the more and the more frequently the worse we are, the less and the more rarely the better we are»De Peccatorum meritis et remissione, L. I, c. ult.; nevertheless this is not to be taken exclusively, as if there were no antecedent reason of this matter in us. For even in this same place some such reason is indicated, namely ignorance and infirmity, and elsewhere, at least after the canons of Carthage were enacted, the holy Doctor teaches that no one here can live without sin... no one can be without sins in this land, and of this matter he indicates an intrinsic reason in man, when he says: «Insofar as we are united to our God by faith, hope, and charity and imitate him, insofar as we are able, we do not sin, but we are sons of God: insofar, however, as from the occasion of carnal infirmity, because the body is not yet dissolved by death, not yet changed by the resurrection, reprehensible and wicked movements creep in, we sin: which indeed it befits us to confess, lest with a stiff neck we merit not the healing of our weakness but the damnation of pride. Whence both are most truly written: he who is born of God does not sin, and if we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves. For the former was said from the firstfruits of the new man, the latter from the remnants of the old.Serm. CCCLI. c. 3. And certainly of this most universal and constant fact, that no just man always abstains from any sin whatsoever, some reason must exist; but this reason cannot be the sole will itself of the just. For since in individual men the wills are so diverse, the circumstances diverse, the inclinations diverse, and in reality at least several just men would will to avoid all sins, why nevertheless do all agree in this, that individuals sometimes sin? Certainly he would say nothing who placed the reason of this matter in the sole act of the will. There will be, therefore, something besides the act itself of the will. But this is either some decree of God, or the very antecedent impotence of the will; but the first is absurd: therefore the other remains. There is, therefore, an antecedent impotence. But we have already proved in the declaration that the impotence of which there is speech here is a moral impotence. Namely, the difficulty of the act, or the defect of moral power, is the reason why that perfect observance of the law is not done.

VI. How great, however, is this moral impotence? Namely, does that which is said to be impossible so behave that it happens only most rarely, or also that it never happens? It must be said with Suarez, l. c. n. 14. seq., that it is a moral impotence such that what is said to be impossible never happens. Moreover, it is said to be impossible to avoid all sins without a special privilege; therefore it never happens that some just man without a special privilege avoids all sins. «This assertion, as Suarez says, is sufficiently proved; because it is necessary that the definition of the Council have absolute truth. Because if even in one man it could happen that those two things were joined, namely, to lack a special privilege and nevertheless to guard against every venial sin through the whole life, the proposition of the Council would be simply false; for it is absolute and universal, for whose falsity it is enough that it fail in one: then chiefly because if it could happen that someone avoid all venial sins through the whole life without any special privilege, it would be an argument that many others also could morally do it and through their negligence and sloth do not do it.This impotence, which is never joined with its opposite, the same author n. 17. calls impotence simply; «whence, he says, although it may rightly be called moral, so that it does not exclude physical potency nor freedom regarding individual sins, it is nevertheless not moral in that sense that it is only in a qualified way, because the opposite happens rarely and with difficulty. For it can be moral impotence and be simply impotence, because the impediments and occasions from which it arises are such that they must be freely and morally overcome, and human powers still do not suffice, not only alone, but even aided only by the common help of grace; for although those helps suffice for individual and for several acts, they do not, however, collectively for all.» Moreover, when the necessity of repeatedly falling is spoken of, nothing else is said than this moral impotence of always guarding against any sins whatsoever; it is not some necessity from law, but just as what is impossible to be is necessary not to be, so when it is morally impossible to avoid all sins, it is morally necessary to fall sometimes.

VII. It is asked what is the reason of this sort of impotence. Certainly he does not satisfy who answers that it must be placed in the sole defect of some act, namely of a congruous thought or a congruous inclination of the will; for again the reason of this defect would have to be rendered, or the reason why the thought and inclination which is had is not congruous for the agent, who has the power of acting provided some cognition precedes: which reason must be in the very nature of the operating subject. The reason, therefore, of this impotence must be placed in something habitual: but this seems to be nothing other than what is indicated by St. Thomas in these words, Ia. IIae. q. CIX, a. 8: «Man cannot abstain from every venial sin on account of the corruption of the lower appetite of sensuality, whose movements reason can indeed repress individually, and from this they have the character of sin and of the voluntary, but not all of them; because while it strives to resist one, perhaps another arises, and also because reason cannot always be watchful to avoid (i.e., to restrain) movements of this sort.» Namely, on account of concupiscence (which must be taken broadly, inasmuch as it comprises both the concupiscible part and the irascible; for they are together the sensitive appetite, and it also comprises the indeliberate movements of the will, by which it is borne toward whatever is set before it under the aspect of some apparent good), whose movements continually anticipate reason and draw the assent of the will toward those things which are not fitting, there exists a necessity of a certain continual struggle, by which the free will is engaged in combat with concupiscence itself. Moreover, in this struggle, in order that every consent, even imperfectly deliberated, be guarded against, a most prompt free aversion of the will from all those things which natural inclination suggests as less befitting reason is necessary. But a most prompt aversion of the will, especially in sudden matters, presupposes a habit, i.e., a habitual aversion of the will from those things which natural inclination suggests; because in sudden matters we operate according to a preconceived end and according to a preexisting habit (Aristot. Eth. L. III. c. 8). Now indeed a habit of aversion of this sort, and one constant and prevailing with respect to some or several objects, could indeed be acquired through the exercise of virtue; but a prevailing habitual aversion, which has always been and always lasts and which extends itself to all things, cannot be had; because, on the contrary, there is had a habitual inclination toward those objects unbefitting to reason, which inclination is habitual concupiscence itself, which always remains. This certainly is the opinion of Augustine, who appeals to the infirmity of nature, in order to demonstrate this impossibility of guarding against any sin whatsoever, as can sufficiently be clear from the testimonies adduced in this Thesis and in the preceding Synopsis.

Therefore it cannot happen that the free will always resists, as is fitting, all the movements of the appetite by which it is allured to unlawful things.

VIII. The question, however, is how these two things are reconciled: that the just man cannot keep himself immune always from sin, and yet formally sins when he falls; for that is what is asserted: that it cannot happen that the just man at some time does not sin, namely formally. It is answered that the just man cannot avoid all sins collectively, but can avoid individual ones. This response is true, but needs a declaration. For 1) we do not say only that there is a power with respect to individual sins, if they are considered abstractly and absolutely, but also in the concrete, even on the hypothesis made that one has already avoided other sins. 2) That moral impotence therefore does not exist in the concrete with respect to individual acts; namely, for avoiding individual determined sins a moral impotence is not had; but only for avoiding all: in order, however, that there be a moral impossibility of avoiding all sins, or of always acting rightly without any stain, there must indeed be a moral necessity that some sin be committed; but it is not necessary that there be a moral necessity of some determined sin in the real series of acts; but it is enough that there be a moral necessity that some indeterminate sin be committed. For, this being posited, it is already false that all sins can be avoided. Moreover 3) this sort of necessity does not consist in this, that on account of the exercise of virtue the power of acting well should at length at some time fail, but it comes back to this, that on account of the habitual infirmity of human nature, which is prone to that which is not befitting reason, it cannot morally happen over a long time that the will always freely opposes the habitual inclination of nature, or that it does not from time to time freely yield to it. this sort of necessity does not consist in this, that on account of the exercise of virtue the power of acting well should at length at some time fail, but it comes back to this, that on account of the habitual infirmity of human nature, which is prone to that which is not befitting reason, it cannot morally happen over a long time that the will always freely opposes the habitual inclination of nature, or that it does not from time to time freely yield to it. Namely, it cannot morally happen that over a long time there does not exist some free act conformable to the habitual and spontaneous inclination of nature, especially in sudden matters, in which we act according to habit. Just as it cannot morally happen that generating nature, when generations are multiplied, does not bring forth in some nation some defective fetus; although there is no determined fetus in which it is necessary that the defect occur, and at each occurrence there could be a perfect generation. But just as this difficulty depends on the infirmity of the human species, so that of avoiding any sin whatsoever depends on the infirmity remaining in individual men, or the evil inclination of nature, which cannot morally always, over a long time, operate in a determined way repugnant and perfectly repugnant to that inclination. Because indeed 4) from this infirmity of nature it follows with moral necessity that the will from time to time freely yields to it; for it is an inclination to deliberate acts: hence the character of sin is not taken away but remains. from this infirmity of nature it follows with moral necessity that the will from time to time freely yields to it; for it is an inclination to deliberate acts: hence the character of sin is not taken away but remains.

Hence God does not command impossibilities. Certainly at each single time sufficient power is present: nor is there ever (as we have already warned) with respect to individual determined sins that greatest difficulty, namely that moral impossibility which is had with respect to all; but at each single time there is had a physical power, which although it is from time to time joined with a certain moral impotence or difficulty, great or small, can nevertheless overcome it, if man applies all the effort which he can exert. For since there is nothing that can impose necessity on the will, its active indifference always avails for willing and doing the good, and therefore he sins, if he acts badly.

Therefore if the argument is proposed in form: what is necessary is not free, what is not free is not sin; therefore either man does not sin when he falls, or there is no necessity: it is lawful to answer: what is necessary with physical necessity, that is not free — I concede. What is necessary with moral necessity — I subdistinguish: if this necessity determinately affects the act itself — let it pass; if it does not determinately affect the act itself, but only some act indeterminately, that is not free — I deny. For the rest, if the reason is asked why God does not impart a more abundant grace, it can be answered that since this is not necessary for obtaining salvation and sanctity and is of itself proper to the state of integrity, God is not bound to confer a help of this sort, and just as in pure nature this impotence would be without any fault of the creator, so the same, although diminished, remains in the order of a nature elevated but not yet perfect. Augustine, de Spir. et lit. c. 35., says that this «pertains not to impossibility, but to the judgment of God.» Suarez adds (l. c. n. 12.) that it «could have been done justly by God, either as a punishment of original sin, or for the custody of the humility of the just, or for the manifestation of his grace and justice.»

Note. What we have said about the moral impotence of the just to avoid all venial sins can also be taken of the moral impotence of men destitute of grace to observe the whole law for a long time.

IX. If through ordinary grace the just cannot morally avoid all venial sins, therefore a special grace conferred beyond the common providence is required: if the reason of this moral impossibility is habitual concupiscence, therefore a healing from this infirmity is required, which certainly would be a special privilege. Now indeed this healing can be obtained either by the restitution of habitual integrity, or by a certain continuous series of efficacious actual helps, which series with respect to effect is equivalent to a habitual gift.

Of what sort, however, this privilege is, Suarez declares, l. c. n. 11., distinguishing a threefold special help or gift of grace: one according to the law, another above the law, a third against the law. As an example of the first he sets the gift of perseverance; for it is special, but it is given according to the ordinary law. As an example of the second he adduces confirmation in grace, which neither pertains to the ordinary providence of grace nor is against any general law. An example of the third is conception without original sin, which is against the law. Moreover, in this third class of gifts the privilege properly has its place, whose office it is to derogate in some respect from the law. Suarez, however, judges that the privilege of avoiding all venial sins, both deliberate and surreptitious, through the whole life pertains to this third order, and that in this sense the Council spoke. The reason is that the general rules of Scripture are that no one lives in this life without sin, and therefore such a privilege is an exception from the rule, and in this way it is said to be against the law. Moreover, the same author warns, ibid. n. 12., that it is not necessary that it be a law of God that man sometimes sin, but it suffices that the law of God be in all things to permit this, or that it be a law of God that man receive grace in such a measure according to the established providence, from which it follows that individuals are not prevented from sometimes falling from fragility, at least venially.

The same Suarez testifies, ibid., that in his age it was the common opinion of the theologians that this privilege was granted to no one besides the Blessed Virgin. And certainly this is the opinion which is spontaneously gathered from the testimonies of Scripture and from the canons of the Council of Carthage; for from these we know that it is a universal law that no one lives without sin; moreover, an exception against so certain a universal law is not to be admitted without authority, which is almost none with respect to all the rest besides the Blessed Virgin. And this certainly is the opinion of Augustine, as can be established from his already recited testimonies. For Augustine's doctrine is that concupiscence is bound up with original sin, and with concupiscence the impossibility of avoiding all sins. Whence the privilege of immunity from any actual sin whatsoever is bound up with the privilege of immunity from the original stain and from concupiscence, which is certainly known to have been granted to the Mother of God alone.