Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

But for certain honest acts and for the observance of certain precepts of the law, free will is naturally equipped with power both physical and moral.

I. The observance of the whole natural law does not happen all at once, but successively; whence no total collection occurs here, which would be the object of the faculty; but to observe the entire natural law is the same as always observing the law, on the hypothesis, however, that each of its precepts, at least the more difficult ones, occur at some time. Now, in order that free will naturally possess the physical power of always observing the natural law, or of always acting honestly, these two things are required 1) that the power of free will be naturally proportioned to the individual acts of the virtues, which are required for the observance of the law, 2) that this power, which naturally belongs to free will, be not diminished through the exercise of acts; but both must be affirmed: therefore. The major is evident: for if the power is naturally present for the individual acts taken distributively, and this power is never diminished but always remains the same; since the precepts of the law to be observed occur only distributively or successively, free will will be able always to observe the law.

Therefore the minor is proved, and first as regards the first part.

a) Free will is essentially bound by the natural law and by each of its precepts, so that without this binding norm the essence of free will could not be itself; therefore free will can physically observe the individual precepts of the natural law. Proof of the consequence: for if it could not physically, there would not be this essential nexus and obligation.

β) Free will possesses all the constitutive elements of this power. For the elements are knowledge of the honesty of the act, indeliberate love of the same, and active indifference; for with these in place the will can will and elicit honest acts: but with respect to all honest acts, reason, which governs free will, can know the honesty of them, is established from the preceding thesis. This can also be confirmed by the testimony of Paul to the Romans II, 14. The Gentiles, who do not have the law, naturally do the things that are of the law: for the τò γὰρ naturaliter points to this, that the means may be indicated by which the Gentiles know the precepts of the law: for just as the Jews, who received the law through Moses, know it by the help of external revelation and carry it out under the norm of this revelation, so the Gentiles know the precepts of the law through the natural light of reason, by which the law is manifested to them, whence, following this norm, they themselves, or their nature, are a law to themselves. Therefore in nature itself there is the power of knowing the law, and therefore of knowing what is honest, what is shameful. But this knowledge can be followed by a simple and indeliberate love of the known honesty, because this is placed in the nature of the rational appetite itself; finally, the will enjoys active indifference with respect to all things which reason knows: therefore.

γ) At any instant, under whatever precept of the natural law urging, free will could sin even in the state of pure nature, which even those who deny the opinion we defend concede; therefore it could also observe the law: proof of the consequence, both because the indifference of free will is toward each opposite, and because if it could not observe, neither would not observing be a sin, and therefore it could not sin either.

Proof of the minor as regards the second part. That the physical power is not diminished by the exercise of virtue is evident; because this power is the very essence of free will and of the soul, which always remains the same. Moreover, on account of the exercise of virtue, if the matter is considered in itself, strength is rather increased than diminished; although this change affects the moral power rather than the physical, and this moral power can be diminished per accidens from another cause, as we shall say presently.

II. Moral impotence comes down to the greatest difficulty, so that what the faculty can do by physical power is nevertheless never or almost never done. The origin of this moral impotence in a free faculty endowed with physical power is to be sought from this, that the free faculty, in order to act, requires certain conditions, such as knowledge of the thing and a certain simple affection toward it. These, however, can be various and more or less opportune. For if for some object there are present knowledge and affection, even slight, and for the opposite a vehement affection, that will indeed suffice for the indifference of the will toward each and for the exercise of freedom and of physical power; but the moral power, which arises from physical power and from the conditions favoring the action, will be greater for that action which the conditions favor more, and lesser for the opposite. Now a moral power is said simply to be had for one action and a moral impotence for the opposite, not when for one only the conditions necessary for the act are present, but when for the one they are maximally opportune, but for the other little; for then this operation is maximally difficult. Now, however, we consider the will in the state of nature, prescinding from the gratuitous helps, which would also have had a place in pure nature: further, under the name of law we understand the collection of precepts obliging either under light or under grave matter; but even with only these considered, we defend the same.

III. Now that it is difficult, and maximally difficult, for free will left to itself always to observe the law and to fulfill each of its precepts, is established first by experience; for it is a matter of fact that men destitute of sanctifying grace, although they have actual graces, which are a help superadded to nature, do not persevere long without fault, nor always resist the gravest temptations, and that the same men experience in themselves this vehement difficulty: much less, therefore, will they be able to do this with the sole strength of nature. It is established, then, by reason drawn from the very nature of man. For through concupiscence man is drawn to sensible things, whose apprehension and delight is lively and adheres more and more. Hence it easily follows that the mind, having abandoned the counsel of reason, allows itself to be carried away by those things which the senses suggest. Since these moreover are frequently less honest; it is morally impossible that man always observe the law.

IV. These things indeed, established in general about the power or impotence of the will without grace toward natural good, can suffice for solving every question in this matter. But because not all theologians teach the same, and as regards special acts they deny the power of the will which we assert universally, relying chiefly on the authority of the Fathers; therefore what we have established in general must be confirmed more distinctly and more clearly. Thus 1) as regards the power of simply doing some good, they note a) that it is the doctrine of the Fathers and of the Councils that no good work can be done without grace, and that the opposite doctrine is Pelagian,that it is the custom of the faithful to pray to God for help for any good act, and that prayer is an indication of our impotence; for we do not ask for what is in our power, as the Fathers argue: c) moreover that in order that the will exercise an act of virtue, it must be prevented by God with some congruous thought, which is not only sufficient but efficacious: but this thought is unowed to nature and therefore grace (Vasquez in I. II. q. CXC. Gregorius Ariminensis in II. Dist. 28.). 2) As regards special acts, theologians everywhere teach that the human will cannot by the sole strength of nature a) overcome grave temptations, b) love God the author of nature above all things with efficacious love, c) and fulfill the entire natural law: s. Thomas Ia Ila q. CIX., aa. 3. 4. Suarez Op. T. VI. De Necessit. Gratiae L. I. c. 23. seqq. Gotti op. T. 2. Tract. VI. q. 1ª Dub. 6. segg. Vasquez in I. II. Dispp. CLXXXIX, CXC, CXCIV. Bellarminus De Grat. et lib. arbit. L. V. c. 5. seqq.

Now, in order that we may respond to this, we note first of all two things. The first is that the Fathers, when they teach that no good work can be done without grace, speak of works which have an order to eternal life, as we shall demonstrate in the first Thesis of the following article. The second, which we note, is that the theologians who for every good work require a grace distinct from the gift of creation, which is now given through the merits of Christ, do not demand a grace that is intrinsically supernatural, but deem sufficient a grace that is of the natural order according to substance (cf. Vasquez 1. c. D. CLXXXIX c. 4.). This grace, once posited, some (Vasquez ibid.) place in a thought preceding the will, and that a congruous thought, by which indeed the will is so drawn that it not only can but actually acts well. This thought, however, they call grace; because it is not owed even in the order of nature. Further, a help of this sort, which would not have been lacking even in the order of nature and under a certain respect would have been gratuitous, brings a remedy to moral, not physical, impotence. But this now does not pertain to our question; for we dispute about supernatural grace, which is not owed to nature even generically (Cf. Th. II.). Moreover, we dispute not about the act but about the power; the power, however, which we deny ever to be lacking, is physical: finally, the power of acting is present even then when the thought is not congruous but only sufficient. With these things posited, we respond to a) that the Fathers demand the grace of God, which they defend against the Pelagians, for any salutary work, that it may be as it ought to be for attaining salvation (cf. the first Th. of the following art.).

To b) For any help here and now unowed, it is fitting that we beseech God, just as also for rain and the fertility of the fields, which nevertheless no one will deny to be in the physical power of nature. Moreover, the Fathers from the prayers by which we ask of God virtues and good acts conducing to salvation rightly gathered that all these are a gift of God and are not in our power. For virtues are those goods which, if they are wholly in the power of nature, are by that very fact, unlike external goods, in the immediate power of the will, so that it suffices to will them that they may be: since therefore the will is never lacking, neither will its power be lacking; wherefore it would not be necessary to ask these goods of God, who already confers them all in potency, by conferring free will.

To c) The response is evident from what has been said: for that congruous thought need not be supernatural for natural acts, nor is it required for this, that there be in us the physical power of acting, but that the act be with facility. And indeed, even if the congruous thought is lacking, if nevertheless some apprehension of the honesty of the act of the precept and of the dishonesty of the opposite is present (for if this were lacking, then not even a free act would be possible), free will already enjoys the physical power of choosing either one, which he must concede who contends that it sins by choosing the dishonest.

Moreover, on the testimony of Suarez,l. c. cp. 28, it is contrary to the mind of all theologians that a man without grace cannot for a short time observe all the natural commandments, who suppose this to be beyond controversy.

VI. To the second, in order that the doctrine of the theologians may be understood, behold, it can be gathered from Suarez, who discusses it most amply, following the more common opinions. Thus l. c. he teaches that fallen man cannot without grace honestly overcome grave temptations and each one of them c. 23, and much less can he for a long time, not to say his whole life, resist all temptations and avoid all mortal sins c. 20, and fulfill the entire natural law gravely obliging c. 28. He teaches that the opinion is safe and sound which denies that man in the state of fallen nature can love God under the concept of author of nature above all things with efficacious love, namely a love which is equal to determining and effecting the entire observance of the law, although afterwards on account of the mutability of the will it may fail or be able to fail c. 33. Hence he gathers that even in pure nature man could not have loved God more than he now can in the fallen state, because the powers are in reality the same c. 36. (from which antecedent indeed it would have been better to gather an entirely different doctrine). Now Suarez himself warns that there are also many theologians, and those of great name, who think otherwise c. 32. 2) he denies that this doctrine seems to him to be of Faith cc. 26. 34, and he defends the last chapter on the impotence of the efficacious love of God above all things as more probable. 3) The grace which he requires for observing the entire law, and therefore also for the efficacious love of God above all things (for according to him it is the same difficulty), is not supernatural in substance cc. 21. 27. 35. 4) The impotence which he asserts for nature in overcoming grave temptations, and therefore also in overcoming all temptations always (for he says that the reason is the same c. 28.), he teaches to be not physical but moral (c. 23): the impotence, however, toward the efficacious love of God above all things and toward the perpetual observance of the entire law, he derives from the diminution of the executive power, at least on the part of the impediments (c. 34.), which is moral impotence. Finally, 5) he denies that these things which have been asserted can be proved effectively from the doctrine of the Fathers; because they speak universally of any good act, not only of the more difficult ones c. 26. 34: all theologians, however, in general, even those who defend these things with him, concede that fallen man can without grace do some good and overcome light temptations. With these things being so, it is clear that our opinion does not oppose the common opinion of the theologians; rather, that this is contained in those things which we taught in the Iª and IIª part of the Thesis, and in the response to the arguments of the preceding series. But the exposition which we have given of this doctrine, with physical and moral power distinguished, seems to us clearer, every equivocation of words being avoided. This is not, therefore, the opinion of Molina alone. Certainly, besides what is established from what has been said, Caietanus in IIª IIª q. 171. a. 2. says: «Man can by the strength of nature love God, but not meritoriously.» Bañez ibid. q. 24, a. 2. «Man can by nature love God. Dominicus Soto I. 1. De nat. et grat. c. 21. «One can have outside grace (sanctifying), indeed outside faith, an act of the love of God. For one can naturally have that affection of soul, which is: I will to please God in all things and through all things» and c. 24 «whatever act he who is in grace can have, the sinner can also have that same one as regards substance from purely natural powers.» Scotus in III. D. 27. q. unic. «Right reason dictates that only the supreme infinite good is to be supremely loved, and consequently the will can do this from purely natural powers; for the intellect can rightly dictate nothing toward which the rational will cannot naturally tend.»

VII. As regards s. Thomas, his first certain doctrine is that «neither man nor Angel through sin lost anything of the natural goods, nor was diminished in anything (in II. D. 30. q. I. a. I.)» likewise «to love God above all things is something connatural to man (I. II. q. 119. a. 3.).» He teaches ibid.2) that in the state of integral nature (i.e., considering only the integrity of nature, not also the elevation through grace, cf. art. seq.) man could without grace love God above all things:3) that in the state of corrupted nature, man needs for this the grace healing nature:4) the reason, however, is this; because in the state of integral nature man referred the love of himself to the love of God, but in fallen nature man fails in this according to the appetite of the rational will, which on account of the corruption of nature follows the private good, unless it is healed by the grace of God. He solves in the same way the question of the following art., whether man without grace can by his natural powers fulfill the precepts of the law. But if all these things are compared together, it is clear that the impotence which the holy Doctor asserts is nothing but moral; for the physical impotence is excluded by that which he asserts in the first place and by that which is affirmed in the fourth place in the adduced reason; unless you wish to say that s. Thomas teaches that man in corrupted nature must follow the private good, and follow it always (for he himself speaks universally): by which the very possibility of sin would be removed, and that would be asserted which is repugnant to his manifest doctrine (I. II. q. X, a. 3). Cf. Ripalda De Ente Supernat. D. CXIV. Sect. 6. segg. Livinum de Meyer in Responsione ad librum Henrici a s. Ignatio.

Rightly, therefore, were the two propositions of Baii proscribed:

«He agrees with Pelagius who acknowledges any natural good, i.e., that which takes its origin from the sole strength of nature.»It is a Pelagian error to say that free will avails for avoiding any sin.

VIII. Therefore, since the physical power of acting well is present, and since the honest things are not always difficult, or more difficult than the dishonest, it remains that for certain honest works there is in free will a power both physical and moral; which is, as we have already heard, the common doctrine of the theologians.