Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

There inheres, however, of itself in the intellect of fallen man a physical power of knowing whatsoever truths natural to it taken distributively, and also whatsoever partial collections of them. This physical power, however, with respect to many natural intelligible objects, both in many intellects and in all, is physically prevented per accidens from act, and is joined with a certain moral inability of always avoiding errors.

I. Simply natural truths are those which, concerning the created substances of things and their properties, modes, and manifold relations, whether physical or moral, as well as concerning the uncreated substance and its powers, can be attained by some created or creatable intellect by the powers of its nature. Truths natural to someone are those which some intellect can attain according to the mode of its cognition. Wherefore truths natural to the human intellect are those which, by the help of intelligence and reasoning, can be gathered either immediately or mediately from the things which are exhibited to us through the senses.

Theologians are wont to ask whether fallen man can know all the truths natural to him taken collectively. We maintain that, even prescinding from the state of fallen nature, this cognition is impossible for the human intellect exercising itself according to its natural powers. And surely, unless this phrase: all natural truths taken collectively be wrongly understood, no doubt is allowed. For 1) this is clear on the part of the object: for the collection of all natural truths, if taken on the part of the object, is absurd; for even those truths alone which are natural to us are contained in an indefinite series (weigh, e.g., the mathematical truths): but it is repugnant that the indefinite be collected into one; therefore. 2) On the part of the subject: the human intellect is such that it exercises itself through several successive acts, determined by diverse objects: but by a successive cognition of truths, which are without end, a complete cognition of all can never be obtained; because the infinite cannot be traversed, whence there would always remain other and other truths to be known: therefore. Therefore the intellect can know all natural truths by natural power neither collectively in one act, nor collectively successively, so that at last none would remain.

II. It remains, therefore, that the truths natural to the intellect be taken distributively, that is, singly, or several of them separately. Concerning any one of them and any partial sum of them we affirm that it can and must be said that it can be known by the human intellect, even in the state of fallen nature, through the powers innate in and natural to that same intellect; that is, that there inheres in the intellect a physical power of knowing whatsoever natural truths. Since by its nature every faculty can necessarily do something; that power is called physical which necessarily belongs to the faculty, and by which, whether easily or with difficulty, something can be done without any gratuitous help. Now we suppose what we have demonstrated elsewhere

(De Deo Creant. Th. LXXXVIII.) that the powers of fallen nature do not differ ontologically from the powers of pure nature; and therefore sin existing in nature does not diminish nature and its powers with respect to natural objects. Wherefore, concerning the powers of fallen nature with respect to natural acts, we must reason in the same way as concerning the powers of pure nature. It is, moreover, so evident from the very terms that this physical power inheres in the intellect. For certainly some physical power of knowing belongs to the intellect, which in reality is the intellect itself: but knowing what? Only some truths natural to it? The rest, therefore, will have to be said not to be natural to it, since they have no proportion with its power. It is therefore a contradiction for truths to be natural to the intellect and for the physical power of knowing them to be lacking to the intellect:

And indeed in truth all concede that the intellect can physically know some natural truths: but if it can know some, it can know any whatsoever; for they are all of the same order, nor is there any reason why, if one is conceded, another should be denied. For the reason will at last come back to this, that certain truths require a longer and more accurate exercise of the intellect; but that argues not a physical but only a moral impossibility; for if the cognition of some truth can be acquired even by the most obstinate labor, then that cognition is in the physical power of the intellect.

Moreover, whoever would contend that only some, not any whatsoever, of the truths can be apprehended by the human intellect by natural power would have to be asked to designate which he thinks can be known and which cannot, at least in general. The lack of a sufficient reason, under which he would labor in determining the one or the other part, would persuade him that there is none of these truths to which the physical power of the intellect is not equal.

This is the doctrine of St. Thomas, Ia IIae q. CIX. a. 1, who says: «every form implanted in created things by God has efficacy with respect to some determinate act, into which it is able to act according to its own property, but beyond that it cannot except through some superadded form. Thus, therefore, the human intellect has some form, namely the intelligible light itself, which is sufficient for it to know certain intelligible objects, namely those into the knowledge of which we can arrive through sensible things. The human intellect, however, cannot know higher intelligible objects, unless it be perfected by a stronger light, such as the light of faith or...» of prophecy, which is called the light of grace, inasmuch as it is superadded to nature." That is, certain intelligible objects are not only some of the natural ones, but are all the natural ones, namely those into the knowledge of which we can arrive through sensible things; which, however, are not all intelligible objects, but certain ones; for besides them we can understand other things, i.e., supernatural ones, for which St. Thomas requires only a superadded light.

III. Nor is there anything that can with probability be opposed to this doctrine. For what is said concerning the wound of ignorance, which was inflicted on human nature through the sin of Adam, that looks to gratuitous knowledge, not to knowledge naturally owed or possible. The testimonies of Scripture and of the Councils, of which sort is this: We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God; speak of salutary cognition; nor can they be taken of any cognition whatsoever, even natural, except inasmuch as divine concurrence is required for all acts, which does not take away the natural power of the faculty.

Nevertheless, you will object 1) that no knowledge of the true can be had without a special help distinct from the gift of creation, and this help is grace. 2) that for the cognition of the true there is need of the free application of the will, which cannot be made without grace. 3) that if this physical power were present, its act would appear in many, or at least in some, which is known to be false. 4) Furthermore, the Council of Carthage, c. 4, says of knowledge and charity that each is a gift of God. 5) Augustine, 1 Retract. c. 9, teaches that «ignorance and difficulty, which man suffers from the beginning of his nativity, pertain to the misery of a just damnation, nor is he freed from this evil except by the grace of God». Christians are wont to pray to God for speculative knowledge of things; moreover, the help which is begged of God is a benefit of grace, as the Fathers argue everywhere against the Pelagians.

I answer to the 1st: A help distinct from the gift of creation, inasmuch as the latter could be without the former, is not always grace properly so called, that is, supernatural, but also natural, concerning which recall what was said in Thesis II. Now the dependence of the faculty on God with respect to this natural gratuitous help does not argue a defect of physical power in nature, but argues only the defect of some opportune condition, so that the faculty may actually act more easily according to its power.

To the 2nd, the answer a) will be clear from what will be said in the following Thesis, b) with that necessity of application admitted, let the answer be the same as in the preceding one.

To the 3rd, the reason why in this stage of mortality the full exercise of this power is lacking will be clear from what will be said in the following part of this Thesis.

To the 4th, the Fathers of Carthage speak of salutary, supernatural knowledge; nor should this be a wonder, even though they say that this knowledge puffs up; for even knowledge supernaturally infused can be an occasion of pride. Cf. what was said on p. 36.

To the 5th. The ignorance of which Augustine speaks is the privation of that cognition gratuitously conferred, which by the institution of the supernatural order ought to have been in nature.

To the 6th. Prayers prove that what we ask is supernatural grace, when we ask those things which order us to salvation. Cf. what we will say concerning a similar objection in the following Thesis, at b). Besides, we can also ask for natural graces and that help of which mention was made in the response to the 1st: indeed, we can ask for all things even through the merits of Christ; for in the state of providence, which is supernatural, these gifts intrinsically natural become extrinsically supernatural.

IV. That is first called morally impossible whose existence, since it depends also on the morals of men, never or almost never has in them a sufficient reason why it should be in act. That is, it is something too difficult, and from this it comes about that it almost never happens; for men generally love to pursue things that are too difficult. Then, indeed, on account of this kinship of the morally impossible with the too difficult, it has come into use that that is called morally impossible which is too difficult, so that it never or almost never happens, whether this depends on the morals of men or on other circumstances. What is called morally impossible is supposed to be physically possible: for what is physically repugnant has no reason to be called merely morally impossible.

It is wont to be said that the impotence which the intellect experiences in acquiring many and disparate sciences, in avoiding any error whatsoever, is a moral impotence or a very great difficulty; but for the sake of clarity we judge that a distinction must be made. Namely, some act is then said to be difficult for some faculty when the faculty exists in the occasion of acting and is applied to acting, and yet, although the act is contained in its physical power, it never or almost never proceeds from it. If the occasion of acting, if the application to acting is lacking, it cannot be judged whether the act is difficult; for in that hypothesis not even the easiest act could be elicited by the faculty. To be sure, although the physical power is present, a certain determination from without is nonetheless required, in order that the faculty elicit the act; but with that determination lacking, the act will be not merely difficult, but physically impossible. This physical impossibility, indeed, does not arise from the intrinsic nature of the faculty, which has physical power to the act, but proceeds from the defect of a physical condition which is required for the act. Wherefore this is a physical impossibility, not a mere difficulty: a physical impossibility, however, per accidens or from without; because it depends not on the nature of the faculty and necessarily, but contingently, on the defect of an extrinsic condition.

But if our intellect does not acquire many items of knowledge, this for the most part happens because it does not find itself in the opportune occasion of knowing, because it is not applied to the objects as it ought. Thus we have scanty knowledge of the heavenly bodies, although they are sensible objects and natural to us of themselves, for the reason that they are rarely applied to us as is fitting; whence, from the defect of this physical condition, the full knowledge of those things is physically impossible for us, as long as this defect lasts. Likewise, that the common run of men does not hold the sciences which the learned master, that comes from the fact that they have not given their effort to studies, or their intellect has not been applied to the objects of those sciences; moreover, whatever the cause why the intellect was not applied, it is certain that, that application not existing, the attainment of those sciences is physically impossible. Again, since the exercise of the intellect's activity depends first extrinsically on the ministry of the senses, which supply the matter of cognition, if the senses, badly disposed for this office, do not perform it as they ought; then even if there is in the intellect a power of knowing, yet from the defect of the due ministry of the senses, that progress in the sciences will be physically impossible, which requires that due ministry of the senses. This, indeed, can be seen in those whom we say lack talent, who in certain sciences, however much they strive, are able to attain nothing clear and distinct. Finally, since our intellect is such that it proceeds from one cognition to another and so successively acquires for itself knowledge of things, a certain space of time is required of it in order to learn several sciences; whence if only a scanty time is available to it, either because the time of life is in reality short, or because, even in a long life, the intellect exercises itself in knowing things only for a brief time, it cannot come about that it acquires several sciences: but this impossibility is not a mere difficulty, but a true physical impossibility arising from the defect of a physically necessary condition.

Therefore that impossibility which arises from the defect of the due application of the intellect to the objects, from the intrinsic imperfection of the senses, from the brevity of time, from the fact that one must attend to many other things and affairs, is not called by us a moral impossibility; because it depends neither on the morals of men nor is it a mere difficulty: but it is called a physical impossibility, extrinsic indeed and per accidens; because in those circumstances the cognition of the truths is really physically impossible.

V. But even when the intellect is applied to the objects and exercises itself, if at least the application be long, it is impossible for it always to avoid error. Common and constant experience, indeed, persuades us of this. This impossibility, however, is moral, i.e., a great or very great difficulty. For the intellect can physically always withhold assent, when the matter is not evident, and so avoid errors; but that this be always done is most difficult. For on the part of the intellect a continual attention to ideas is required, lest the notions of one thing be confused with the notions of another; on the part of the will there is required both tranquility, which would allow the free exercise of the intellect as long as is necessary, and freedom from affection which has already preoccupied some judgment. But it is most difficult that these conditions always be present. For from the multiplicity of ideas some confusion arises most easily, that continual attention is most laborious, frequently the necessity of forming a judgment urges, to which necessity one must do justice, and we are content with probable things, and we spontaneously affirm as true those things which we hold with anticipated affections, which are wont to determine the judgment of the intellect.