Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

There inheres, however, of itself in the intellect of fallen man a physical power of knowing whatsoever truths natural to it taken distributively, and also whatsoever partial collections of them. This physical power, however, with respect to many natural intelligible objects, both in many intellects and in all, is physically prevented per accidens from act, and is joined with a certain moral inability of always avoiding errors.

I. Simply natural truths are those which, concerning the created substances of things and their properties, modes, and manifold relations, whether physical or moral, as well as concerning the uncreated substance and its powers, can be attained by some created or creatable intellect by the powers of its nature. Truths natural to someone are those which some intellect can attain according to the mode of its cognition. Wherefore truths natural to the human intellect are those which, by the help of intelligence and reasoning, can be gathered either immediately or mediately from the things which are exhibited to us through the senses.

Theologians are wont to ask whether fallen man can know all the truths natural to him taken collectively. We maintain that, even prescinding from the state of fallen nature, this cognition is impossible for the human intellect exercising itself according to its natural powers. And surely, unless this phrase: all natural truths taken collectively be wrongly understood, no doubt is allowed. For 1) this is clear on the part of the object: for the collection of all natural truths, if taken on the part of the object, is absurd; for even those truths alone which are natural to us are contained in an indefinite series (weigh, e.g., the mathematical truths): but it is repugnant that the indefinite be collected into one; therefore. 2) On the part of the subject: the human intellect is such that it exercises itself through several successive acts, determined by diverse objects: but by a successive cognition of truths, which are without end, a complete cognition of all can never be obtained; because the infinite cannot be traversed, whence there would always remain other and other truths to be known: therefore. Therefore the intellect can know all natural truths by natural power neither collectively in one act, nor collectively successively, so that at last none would remain.

II. It remains, therefore, that the truths natural to the intellect be taken distributively, that is, singly, or several of them separately. Concerning any one of them and any partial sum of them we affirm that it can and must be said that it can be known by the human intellect, even in the state of fallen nature, through the powers innate in and natural to that same intellect; that is, that there inheres in the intellect a physical power of knowing whatsoever natural truths. Since by its nature every faculty can necessarily do something; that power is called physical which necessarily belongs to the faculty, and by which, whether easily or with difficulty, something can be done without any gratuitous help. Now we suppose what we have demonstrated elsewhere

(De Deo Creant. Th. LXXXVIII.) that the powers of fallen nature do not differ ontologically from the powers of pure nature; and therefore sin existing in nature does not diminish nature and its powers with respect to natural objects. Wherefore, concerning the powers of fallen nature with respect to natural acts, we must reason in the same way as concerning the powers of pure nature. It is, moreover, so evident from the very terms that this physical power inheres in the intellect. For certainly some physical power of knowing belongs to the intellect, which in reality is the intellect itself: but knowing what? Only some truths natural to it? The rest, therefore, will have to be said not to be natural to it, since they have no proportion with its power. It is therefore a contradiction for truths to be natural to the intellect and for the physical power of knowing them to be lacking to the intellect:

And indeed in truth all concede that the intellect can physically know some natural truths: but if it can know some, it can know any whatsoever; for they are all of the same order, nor is there any reason why, if one is conceded, another should be denied. For the reason will at last come back to this, that certain truths require a longer and more accurate exercise of the intellect; but that argues not a physical but only a moral impossibility; for if the cognition of some truth can be acquired even by the most obstinate labor, then that cognition is in the physical power of the intellect.

Moreover, whoever would contend that only some, not any whatsoever, of the truths can be apprehended by the human intellect by natural power would have to be asked to designate which he thinks can be known and which cannot, at least in general. The lack of a sufficient reason, under which he would labor in determining the one or the other part, would persuade him that there is none of these truths to which the physical power of the intellect is not equal.

This is the doctrine of St. Thomas, Ia IIae q. CIX. a. 1, who says: «every form implanted in created things by God has efficacy with respect to some determinate act, into which it is able to act according to its own property, but beyond that it cannot except through some superadded form. Thus, therefore, the human intellect has some form, namely the intelligible light itself, which is sufficient for it to know certain intelligible objects, namely those into the knowledge of which we can arrive through sensible things. The human intellect, however, cannot know higher intelligible objects, unless it be perfected by a stronger light, such as the light of faith or...» of prophecy, which is called the light of grace, inasmuch as it is superadded to nature." That is, certain intelligible objects are not only some of the natural ones, but are all the natural ones, namely those into the knowledge of which we can arrive through sensible things; which, however, are not all intelligible objects, but certain ones; for besides them we can understand other things, i.e., supernatural ones, for which St. Thomas requires only a superadded light.

III. Nor is there anything that can with probability be opposed to this doctrine. For what is said concerning the wound of ignorance, which was inflicted on human nature through the sin of Adam, that looks to gratuitous knowledge, not to knowledge naturally owed or possible. The testimonies of Scripture and of the Councils, of which sort is this: We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God; speak of salutary cognition; nor can they be taken of any cognition whatsoever, even natural, except inasmuch as divine concurrence is required for all acts, which does not take away the natural power of the faculty.

Nevertheless, you will object 1) that no knowledge of the true can be had without a special help distinct from the gift of creation, and this help is grace. 2) that for the cognition of the true there is need of the free application of the will, which cannot be made without grace. 3) that if this physical power were present, its act would appear in many, or at least in some, which is known to be false. 4) Furthermore, the Council of Carthage, c. 4, says of knowledge and charity that each is a gift of God. 5) Augustine, 1 Retract. c. 9, teaches that «ignorance and difficulty, which man suffers from the beginning of his nativity, pertain to the misery of a just damnation, nor is he freed from this evil except by the grace of God». Christians are wont to pray to God for speculative knowledge of things; moreover, the help which is begged of God is a benefit of grace, as the Fathers argue everywhere against the Pelagians.

I answer to the 1st: A help distinct from the gift of creation, inasmuch as the latter could be without the former, is not always grace properly so called, that is, supernatural, but also natural, concerning which recall what was said in Thesis II. Now the dependence of the faculty on God with respect to this natural gratuitous help does not argue a defect of physical power in nature, but argues only the defect of some opportune condition, so that the faculty may actually act more easily according to its power.

To the 2nd, the answer a) will be clear from what will be said in the following Thesis, b) with that necessity of application admitted, let the answer be the same as in the preceding one.

To the 3rd, the reason why in this stage of mortality the full exercise of this power is lacking will be clear from what will be said in the following part of this Thesis.

To the 4th, the Fathers of Carthage speak of salutary, supernatural knowledge; nor should this be a wonder, even though they say that this knowledge puffs up; for even knowledge supernaturally infused can be an occasion of pride. Cf. what was said on p. 36.

To the 5th. The ignorance of which Augustine speaks is the privation of that cognition gratuitously conferred, which by the institution of the supernatural order ought to have been in nature.

To the 6th. Prayers prove that what we ask is supernatural grace, when we ask those things which order us to salvation. Cf. what we will say concerning a similar objection in the following Thesis, at b). Besides, we can also ask for natural graces and that help of which mention was made in the response to the 1st: indeed, we can ask for all things even through the merits of Christ; for in the state of providence, which is supernatural, these gifts intrinsically natural become extrinsically supernatural.

IV. That is first called morally impossible whose existence, since it depends also on the morals of men, never or almost never has in them a sufficient reason why it should be in act. That is, it is something too difficult, and from this it comes about that it almost never happens; for men generally love to pursue things that are too difficult. Then, indeed, on account of this kinship of the morally impossible with the too difficult, it has come into use that that is called morally impossible which is too difficult, so that it never or almost never happens, whether this depends on the morals of men or on other circumstances. What is called morally impossible is supposed to be physically possible: for what is physically repugnant has no reason to be called merely morally impossible.

It is wont to be said that the impotence which the intellect experiences in acquiring many and disparate sciences, in avoiding any error whatsoever, is a moral impotence or a very great difficulty; but for the sake of clarity we judge that a distinction must be made. Namely, some act is then said to be difficult for some faculty when the faculty exists in the occasion of acting and is applied to acting, and yet, although the act is contained in its physical power, it never or almost never proceeds from it. If the occasion of acting, if the application to acting is lacking, it cannot be judged whether the act is difficult; for in that hypothesis not even the easiest act could be elicited by the faculty. To be sure, although the physical power is present, a certain determination from without is nonetheless required, in order that the faculty elicit the act; but with that determination lacking, the act will be not merely difficult, but physically impossible. This physical impossibility, indeed, does not arise from the intrinsic nature of the faculty, which has physical power to the act, but proceeds from the defect of a physical condition which is required for the act. Wherefore this is a physical impossibility, not a mere difficulty: a physical impossibility, however, per accidens or from without; because it depends not on the nature of the faculty and necessarily, but contingently, on the defect of an extrinsic condition.

But if our intellect does not acquire many items of knowledge, this for the most part happens because it does not find itself in the opportune occasion of knowing, because it is not applied to the objects as it ought. Thus we have scanty knowledge of the heavenly bodies, although they are sensible objects and natural to us of themselves, for the reason that they are rarely applied to us as is fitting; whence, from the defect of this physical condition, the full knowledge of those things is physically impossible for us, as long as this defect lasts. Likewise, that the common run of men does not hold the sciences which the learned master, that comes from the fact that they have not given their effort to studies, or their intellect has not been applied to the objects of those sciences; moreover, whatever the cause why the intellect was not applied, it is certain that, that application not existing, the attainment of those sciences is physically impossible. Again, since the exercise of the intellect's activity depends first extrinsically on the ministry of the senses, which supply the matter of cognition, if the senses, badly disposed for this office, do not perform it as they ought; then even if there is in the intellect a power of knowing, yet from the defect of the due ministry of the senses, that progress in the sciences will be physically impossible, which requires that due ministry of the senses. This, indeed, can be seen in those whom we say lack talent, who in certain sciences, however much they strive, are able to attain nothing clear and distinct. Finally, since our intellect is such that it proceeds from one cognition to another and so successively acquires for itself knowledge of things, a certain space of time is required of it in order to learn several sciences; whence if only a scanty time is available to it, either because the time of life is in reality short, or because, even in a long life, the intellect exercises itself in knowing things only for a brief time, it cannot come about that it acquires several sciences: but this impossibility is not a mere difficulty, but a true physical impossibility arising from the defect of a physically necessary condition.

Therefore that impossibility which arises from the defect of the due application of the intellect to the objects, from the intrinsic imperfection of the senses, from the brevity of time, from the fact that one must attend to many other things and affairs, is not called by us a moral impossibility; because it depends neither on the morals of men nor is it a mere difficulty: but it is called a physical impossibility, extrinsic indeed and per accidens; because in those circumstances the cognition of the truths is really physically impossible.

V. But even when the intellect is applied to the objects and exercises itself, if at least the application be long, it is impossible for it always to avoid error. Common and constant experience, indeed, persuades us of this. This impossibility, however, is moral, i.e., a great or very great difficulty. For the intellect can physically always withhold assent, when the matter is not evident, and so avoid errors; but that this be always done is most difficult. For on the part of the intellect a continual attention to ideas is required, lest the notions of one thing be confused with the notions of another; on the part of the will there is required both tranquility, which would allow the free exercise of the intellect as long as is necessary, and freedom from affection which has already preoccupied some judgment. But it is most difficult that these conditions always be present. For from the multiplicity of ideas some confusion arises most easily, that continual attention is most laborious, frequently the necessity of forming a judgment urges, to which necessity one must do justice, and we are content with probable things, and we spontaneously affirm as true those things which we hold with anticipated affections, which are wont to determine the judgment of the intellect.

But for certain honest acts and for the observance of certain precepts of the law, free will is naturally equipped with power both physical and moral.

I. The observance of the whole natural law does not happen all at once, but successively; whence no total collection occurs here, which would be the object of the faculty; but to observe the entire natural law is the same as always observing the law, on the hypothesis, however, that each of its precepts, at least the more difficult ones, occur at some time. Now, in order that free will naturally possess the physical power of always observing the natural law, or of always acting honestly, these two things are required 1) that the power of free will be naturally proportioned to the individual acts of the virtues, which are required for the observance of the law, 2) that this power, which naturally belongs to free will, be not diminished through the exercise of acts; but both must be affirmed: therefore. The major is evident: for if the power is naturally present for the individual acts taken distributively, and this power is never diminished but always remains the same; since the precepts of the law to be observed occur only distributively or successively, free will will be able always to observe the law.

Therefore the minor is proved, and first as regards the first part.

a) Free will is essentially bound by the natural law and by each of its precepts, so that without this binding norm the essence of free will could not be itself; therefore free will can physically observe the individual precepts of the natural law. Proof of the consequence: for if it could not physically, there would not be this essential nexus and obligation.

β) Free will possesses all the constitutive elements of this power. For the elements are knowledge of the honesty of the act, indeliberate love of the same, and active indifference; for with these in place the will can will and elicit honest acts: but with respect to all honest acts, reason, which governs free will, can know the honesty of them, is established from the preceding thesis. This can also be confirmed by the testimony of Paul to the Romans II, 14. The Gentiles, who do not have the law, naturally do the things that are of the law: for the τò γὰρ naturaliter points to this, that the means may be indicated by which the Gentiles know the precepts of the law: for just as the Jews, who received the law through Moses, know it by the help of external revelation and carry it out under the norm of this revelation, so the Gentiles know the precepts of the law through the natural light of reason, by which the law is manifested to them, whence, following this norm, they themselves, or their nature, are a law to themselves. Therefore in nature itself there is the power of knowing the law, and therefore of knowing what is honest, what is shameful. But this knowledge can be followed by a simple and indeliberate love of the known honesty, because this is placed in the nature of the rational appetite itself; finally, the will enjoys active indifference with respect to all things which reason knows: therefore.

γ) At any instant, under whatever precept of the natural law urging, free will could sin even in the state of pure nature, which even those who deny the opinion we defend concede; therefore it could also observe the law: proof of the consequence, both because the indifference of free will is toward each opposite, and because if it could not observe, neither would not observing be a sin, and therefore it could not sin either.

Proof of the minor as regards the second part. That the physical power is not diminished by the exercise of virtue is evident; because this power is the very essence of free will and of the soul, which always remains the same. Moreover, on account of the exercise of virtue, if the matter is considered in itself, strength is rather increased than diminished; although this change affects the moral power rather than the physical, and this moral power can be diminished per accidens from another cause, as we shall say presently.

II. Moral impotence comes down to the greatest difficulty, so that what the faculty can do by physical power is nevertheless never or almost never done. The origin of this moral impotence in a free faculty endowed with physical power is to be sought from this, that the free faculty, in order to act, requires certain conditions, such as knowledge of the thing and a certain simple affection toward it. These, however, can be various and more or less opportune. For if for some object there are present knowledge and affection, even slight, and for the opposite a vehement affection, that will indeed suffice for the indifference of the will toward each and for the exercise of freedom and of physical power; but the moral power, which arises from physical power and from the conditions favoring the action, will be greater for that action which the conditions favor more, and lesser for the opposite. Now a moral power is said simply to be had for one action and a moral impotence for the opposite, not when for one only the conditions necessary for the act are present, but when for the one they are maximally opportune, but for the other little; for then this operation is maximally difficult. Now, however, we consider the will in the state of nature, prescinding from the gratuitous helps, which would also have had a place in pure nature: further, under the name of law we understand the collection of precepts obliging either under light or under grave matter; but even with only these considered, we defend the same.

III. Now that it is difficult, and maximally difficult, for free will left to itself always to observe the law and to fulfill each of its precepts, is established first by experience; for it is a matter of fact that men destitute of sanctifying grace, although they have actual graces, which are a help superadded to nature, do not persevere long without fault, nor always resist the gravest temptations, and that the same men experience in themselves this vehement difficulty: much less, therefore, will they be able to do this with the sole strength of nature. It is established, then, by reason drawn from the very nature of man. For through concupiscence man is drawn to sensible things, whose apprehension and delight is lively and adheres more and more. Hence it easily follows that the mind, having abandoned the counsel of reason, allows itself to be carried away by those things which the senses suggest. Since these moreover are frequently less honest; it is morally impossible that man always observe the law.

IV. These things indeed, established in general about the power or impotence of the will without grace toward natural good, can suffice for solving every question in this matter. But because not all theologians teach the same, and as regards special acts they deny the power of the will which we assert universally, relying chiefly on the authority of the Fathers; therefore what we have established in general must be confirmed more distinctly and more clearly. Thus 1) as regards the power of simply doing some good, they note a) that it is the doctrine of the Fathers and of the Councils that no good work can be done without grace, and that the opposite doctrine is Pelagian,that it is the custom of the faithful to pray to God for help for any good act, and that prayer is an indication of our impotence; for we do not ask for what is in our power, as the Fathers argue: c) moreover that in order that the will exercise an act of virtue, it must be prevented by God with some congruous thought, which is not only sufficient but efficacious: but this thought is unowed to nature and therefore grace (Vasquez in I. II. q. CXC. Gregorius Ariminensis in II. Dist. 28.). 2) As regards special acts, theologians everywhere teach that the human will cannot by the sole strength of nature a) overcome grave temptations, b) love God the author of nature above all things with efficacious love, c) and fulfill the entire natural law: s. Thomas Ia Ila q. CIX., aa. 3. 4. Suarez Op. T. VI. De Necessit. Gratiae L. I. c. 23. seqq. Gotti op. T. 2. Tract. VI. q. 1ª Dub. 6. segg. Vasquez in I. II. Dispp. CLXXXIX, CXC, CXCIV. Bellarminus De Grat. et lib. arbit. L. V. c. 5. seqq.

Now, in order that we may respond to this, we note first of all two things. The first is that the Fathers, when they teach that no good work can be done without grace, speak of works which have an order to eternal life, as we shall demonstrate in the first Thesis of the following article. The second, which we note, is that the theologians who for every good work require a grace distinct from the gift of creation, which is now given through the merits of Christ, do not demand a grace that is intrinsically supernatural, but deem sufficient a grace that is of the natural order according to substance (cf. Vasquez 1. c. D. CLXXXIX c. 4.). This grace, once posited, some (Vasquez ibid.) place in a thought preceding the will, and that a congruous thought, by which indeed the will is so drawn that it not only can but actually acts well. This thought, however, they call grace; because it is not owed even in the order of nature. Further, a help of this sort, which would not have been lacking even in the order of nature and under a certain respect would have been gratuitous, brings a remedy to moral, not physical, impotence. But this now does not pertain to our question; for we dispute about supernatural grace, which is not owed to nature even generically (Cf. Th. II.). Moreover, we dispute not about the act but about the power; the power, however, which we deny ever to be lacking, is physical: finally, the power of acting is present even then when the thought is not congruous but only sufficient. With these things posited, we respond to a) that the Fathers demand the grace of God, which they defend against the Pelagians, for any salutary work, that it may be as it ought to be for attaining salvation (cf. the first Th. of the following art.).

To b) For any help here and now unowed, it is fitting that we beseech God, just as also for rain and the fertility of the fields, which nevertheless no one will deny to be in the physical power of nature. Moreover, the Fathers from the prayers by which we ask of God virtues and good acts conducing to salvation rightly gathered that all these are a gift of God and are not in our power. For virtues are those goods which, if they are wholly in the power of nature, are by that very fact, unlike external goods, in the immediate power of the will, so that it suffices to will them that they may be: since therefore the will is never lacking, neither will its power be lacking; wherefore it would not be necessary to ask these goods of God, who already confers them all in potency, by conferring free will.

To c) The response is evident from what has been said: for that congruous thought need not be supernatural for natural acts, nor is it required for this, that there be in us the physical power of acting, but that the act be with facility. And indeed, even if the congruous thought is lacking, if nevertheless some apprehension of the honesty of the act of the precept and of the dishonesty of the opposite is present (for if this were lacking, then not even a free act would be possible), free will already enjoys the physical power of choosing either one, which he must concede who contends that it sins by choosing the dishonest.

Moreover, on the testimony of Suarez,l. c. cp. 28, it is contrary to the mind of all theologians that a man without grace cannot for a short time observe all the natural commandments, who suppose this to be beyond controversy.

VI. To the second, in order that the doctrine of the theologians may be understood, behold, it can be gathered from Suarez, who discusses it most amply, following the more common opinions. Thus l. c. he teaches that fallen man cannot without grace honestly overcome grave temptations and each one of them c. 23, and much less can he for a long time, not to say his whole life, resist all temptations and avoid all mortal sins c. 20, and fulfill the entire natural law gravely obliging c. 28. He teaches that the opinion is safe and sound which denies that man in the state of fallen nature can love God under the concept of author of nature above all things with efficacious love, namely a love which is equal to determining and effecting the entire observance of the law, although afterwards on account of the mutability of the will it may fail or be able to fail c. 33. Hence he gathers that even in pure nature man could not have loved God more than he now can in the fallen state, because the powers are in reality the same c. 36. (from which antecedent indeed it would have been better to gather an entirely different doctrine). Now Suarez himself warns that there are also many theologians, and those of great name, who think otherwise c. 32. 2) he denies that this doctrine seems to him to be of Faith cc. 26. 34, and he defends the last chapter on the impotence of the efficacious love of God above all things as more probable. 3) The grace which he requires for observing the entire law, and therefore also for the efficacious love of God above all things (for according to him it is the same difficulty), is not supernatural in substance cc. 21. 27. 35. 4) The impotence which he asserts for nature in overcoming grave temptations, and therefore also in overcoming all temptations always (for he says that the reason is the same c. 28.), he teaches to be not physical but moral (c. 23): the impotence, however, toward the efficacious love of God above all things and toward the perpetual observance of the entire law, he derives from the diminution of the executive power, at least on the part of the impediments (c. 34.), which is moral impotence. Finally, 5) he denies that these things which have been asserted can be proved effectively from the doctrine of the Fathers; because they speak universally of any good act, not only of the more difficult ones c. 26. 34: all theologians, however, in general, even those who defend these things with him, concede that fallen man can without grace do some good and overcome light temptations. With these things being so, it is clear that our opinion does not oppose the common opinion of the theologians; rather, that this is contained in those things which we taught in the Iª and IIª part of the Thesis, and in the response to the arguments of the preceding series. But the exposition which we have given of this doctrine, with physical and moral power distinguished, seems to us clearer, every equivocation of words being avoided. This is not, therefore, the opinion of Molina alone. Certainly, besides what is established from what has been said, Caietanus in IIª IIª q. 171. a. 2. says: «Man can by the strength of nature love God, but not meritoriously.» Bañez ibid. q. 24, a. 2. «Man can by nature love God. Dominicus Soto I. 1. De nat. et grat. c. 21. «One can have outside grace (sanctifying), indeed outside faith, an act of the love of God. For one can naturally have that affection of soul, which is: I will to please God in all things and through all things» and c. 24 «whatever act he who is in grace can have, the sinner can also have that same one as regards substance from purely natural powers.» Scotus in III. D. 27. q. unic. «Right reason dictates that only the supreme infinite good is to be supremely loved, and consequently the will can do this from purely natural powers; for the intellect can rightly dictate nothing toward which the rational will cannot naturally tend.»

VII. As regards s. Thomas, his first certain doctrine is that «neither man nor Angel through sin lost anything of the natural goods, nor was diminished in anything (in II. D. 30. q. I. a. I.)» likewise «to love God above all things is something connatural to man (I. II. q. 119. a. 3.).» He teaches ibid.2) that in the state of integral nature (i.e., considering only the integrity of nature, not also the elevation through grace, cf. art. seq.) man could without grace love God above all things:3) that in the state of corrupted nature, man needs for this the grace healing nature:4) the reason, however, is this; because in the state of integral nature man referred the love of himself to the love of God, but in fallen nature man fails in this according to the appetite of the rational will, which on account of the corruption of nature follows the private good, unless it is healed by the grace of God. He solves in the same way the question of the following art., whether man without grace can by his natural powers fulfill the precepts of the law. But if all these things are compared together, it is clear that the impotence which the holy Doctor asserts is nothing but moral; for the physical impotence is excluded by that which he asserts in the first place and by that which is affirmed in the fourth place in the adduced reason; unless you wish to say that s. Thomas teaches that man in corrupted nature must follow the private good, and follow it always (for he himself speaks universally): by which the very possibility of sin would be removed, and that would be asserted which is repugnant to his manifest doctrine (I. II. q. X, a. 3). Cf. Ripalda De Ente Supernat. D. CXIV. Sect. 6. segg. Livinum de Meyer in Responsione ad librum Henrici a s. Ignatio.

Rightly, therefore, were the two propositions of Baii proscribed:

«He agrees with Pelagius who acknowledges any natural good, i.e., that which takes its origin from the sole strength of nature.»It is a Pelagian error to say that free will avails for avoiding any sin.

VIII. Therefore, since the physical power of acting well is present, and since the honest things are not always difficult, or more difficult than the dishonest, it remains that for certain honest works there is in free will a power both physical and moral; which is, as we have already heard, the common doctrine of the theologians.

I. The first head of this doctrine occurs among the proscribed propositions of Baius, proposition 3: «Everything that the sinner or the servant of sin does is sin,» and proposition 40: «In all his acts the sinner serves the dominating concupiscence;» which propositions, however, are not found in his published books, nor is Baius said to have acknowledged them as his own, as Ripalda testifies in the introductory dissertation of his work against Baius. The second head of the doctrine is proposition 25 of Baius: «all the works of unbelievers are sins and the virtues of the philosophers are vices.» The third head of the doctrine is proposition 27 among the condemned Baian propositions. The Baianists strive to defend these propositions especially by the authority of St. Augustine.

II. Now concerning the first head of the doctrine. In this opinion the sinner is not taken reduplicatively in the act; for what is done by a sinner, insofar as he is such when he acts, is certainly sin; nor does anyone in the Church deny it. But he is taken materially, namely he who is in the state of habitual sin, whether original or personal. The reason why the Baianists affirm this is at hand. For a man of this kind lacks charity, and therefore does not act from charity; moreover, if he does not act from charity, he acts from vicious concupiscence, from which nothing but sin can come: therefore.

Now in this opinion one or other of the two following hypotheses can be supposed: either that sinners are destitute of actual grace, or that it is supplied to them; but, prescinding from the determination of either hypothesis, the proposition considered in itself is heretical and condemned by the Synod of Trent, Sess. VI. can. 7. »If anyone shall say that all works which are done before justification (and therefore while still in the state of sin), in whatever way they are done, are truly sins or merit the hatred of God, or that the more vehemently anyone strives to dispose himself for grace, the more gravely he sins, let him be anathema.« And surely it is certain that a sinful man can and ought to prepare himself and dispose himself by his own acts for justification, which acts are generally elicited in a certain successive series and can always be done in such a way that, after some interval of time running from the beginning, justification is obtained: but it is absurd that a man should dispose himself by sins to obtain the remission of sins: therefore. Wherefore, as often as the Scriptures exhort sinners to works of piety in order to obtain the mercy of God, so often do they teach that sinners can act well, and that it is false that all the works of sinners are sins. From this authority of the Scriptures you cannot extricate yourself unless you affirm that the first grace, by which the sinner begins to convert himself to God, is an inspiration of holy and perfect theological charity: which, to say the least, conflicts too much with experience, of which the Tridentine synod is also a witness, which takes its beginning from faith, fear, hope, Sess. IV. c. 5. If, however, the matter is considered generally, there can be considered in the sinner both the privation of the habitual friendship of God, and also, when someone has actually sinned and especially if he has frequently sinned the same sin, a certain habit induced from acts of relapsing into that same sin. Now the privation of the friendship of God indeed takes away the possibility of producing works meritorious of eternal life de condigno; but it does not take away the possibility of producing some morally good work. And first indeed, since it does not impede the actual helps, the sinner can through them do good and supernatural works. And even prescinding from actual helps, all the principles of an honest act remain in the sinner naturally, because by the privation of grace nature is not diminished; but we have proved that free will can naturally elicit good acts: moreover, in order that some act be not properly sin, it is not necessary that it be supernaturally good, but it is enough if it be naturally honest. Nor can the habitual aversion from God infect the act of the sinner; for this habitual aversion (unless it breaks out into act, which would then be a new sin) is nothing but the privation of a supernatural good, not however a defect of some principle or element of a naturally good act. Moreover, the habit of sinning induced by sin (which habit, however, is not generated from every sin) cannot be the reason why all the acts of the sinner are sins. First indeed because an acquired habit inclines only to certain sins, namely those from which it proceeded; then because habit does not determine the exercise of the faculty: whence it is not necessary that the faculty act according to that habit, but it can will and do diverse and opposite things. Therefore.

III. They say that the doctrine is Augustine's: that nothing good can be done without charity; for he says in De Gratia et lib. arb. c. 18: «The precepts of love, that is of charity, are so great and so many, that whatever man thinks he does well, if it is done without charity, is in no way done well.» And in de Gratia Christi c. 26: «We would not have whence to love Him, unless we received this from Him, since He first loved us. But what good would we do, unless we loved? or how do we not do good, if we love? For even if the commandment of God seems at times to be done not by those who love, but by those who fear, nevertheless where there is no love, no good work is imputed, nor is it rightly called a good work; because everything that is not from faith is sin, and faith works through love.» Hence in contr. 2. epistt. Pelagg. I. III. c. 8 he says: «free will, taken captive, avails only for sin: but for justice it can avail only when helped (namely by charity).» Moreover, by charity one is made holy and just; therefore nothing good can be done by a sinner.

I answer: To do well is, for Augustine, to do salutary works (Cf. Th. primam art. seq.): wherefore even if the power of doing anything salutary is denied to the sinner, there still remains the power of doing good natural works; whence it is not necessary that he sin. 2) That Augustine by the name of love, of charity, does not understand charity taken in the strict sense, which is the act of the theological virtue, but any love of justice and a good will, which is an effect of actual grace and can exist also in sinners. Surely Augustine is wont to speak in this way: «what is the desire of good, if not charity» (cont. duas epistt. Pelagg. I. 11. c. 9): «what is the love, which divine Scripture so greatly» praises and proclaims, if not the love of good (De Trinit. L. VIII, c. 10)as if a good will were something other than charity, which Scripture proclaims to us to be from God (De Gratia XI. c. 21) it is charity itself which is called good will (in Psal. XXXVI, Serm. 2. n. 13). And hence it is that he defines virtue (an act, indeed) in general: virtue is charity, by which that which is to be loved is loved (Epist. CLXVII, al. 29. c.4.), which definition therefore embraces every virtuous act of whatever virtue.

Therefore every good will, every love of good, every virtuous act is, for Augustine, charity; not, therefore, is only the act of the theological virtue understood by Augustine under this name. That this good will, with grace helping, can exist also in sinners is evident in itself from what has been said, and Augustine manifestly supposes it in Retract. I. I. c. 15 When the sin is such that it is at the same time also the punishment of sin, how much can the will do under the dominating concupiscence, unless perhaps, if it is pious, that it pray for help?. Therefore a pious will can exist even under the dominating concupiscence.

IV. Now with respect to the second head of the doctrine. The same twofold hypothesis as in the preceding question can be devised, namely that men still unbelieving are not destitute of supernatural actual graces, or that they lack them before those graces by which they are led to the faith of Christ. There is no reason for us to pass judgment now on this twofold hypothesis. In order that we may vindicate the second part of this thesis, we accept that hypothesis which can be the more unfavorable to us, and we say that unbelievers — not indeed positive ones, who are like the other sinners of whom we have already spoken, but negative ones, to whom the light of the Gospel has not yet been manifested — even destitute of supernatural grace, can act well, and that it is wholly false that all their works are sins.

And surely in the unbelieving man there is nature, which is a principle always physically sufficient and at times also morally sufficient for honest works of the natural order: faith is lacking and, as is supposed, all grace, through which he could elicit salutary acts; what therefore remains except that we say that unbelievers cannot indeed act salutarily, but can act naturally honestly? For the state of original sin, in which they are, does not impede them more than the state of any other personal sin, and actual concupiscence neither always urges nor imposes necessity on the will.

V. But, they say, this is the most certain and most clearly propounded doctrine of Augustine: all the works of unbelievers are sins; that it cannot be borne that any action be good without faith. And for this there is brought forward a long testimony, which is contained in the whole of chapter 3 Contra Iulianum, lib. IV, cap. 3. of book IV contra Iulianum. Among the several things which he disputes there, he has these in n. 14: «You are wont, denying that the virtues by which one lives rightly are gifts of God and attributing them to nature and the human will, not to the grace of God, to use this argument, that unbelievers sometimes have them, so attempting to make void what we say, that no one lives rightly except by faith through I. Ch. D. N.» And in n. 30, when Julian asked «If a pagan covered a naked man, is it a sin because it is not from faith?» he answers: «absolutely, inasmuch as it is not from faith, it is a sin.»

Moreover, in order that the doctrine of Augustine may be understood in this chapter and in similar places, we note these things in order. 1) That the name of sin is used by Augustine in the Pelagian question to signify not only that defect of rectitude in an action which constitutes properly so-called guilt, but also a defect of any rectitude mediately pertaining to the moral order, which ought to be in acts by divine institution and which would be there if Adam had not sinned, through which defect it comes about that acts lack that perfection which ought to be in them. This use of the appellation of sin proceeded from the Apostle himself, who calls habitual concupiscence — which is certainly not guilt, yet is a defect of a certain owed rectitude proceeding from the sin of Adam — sin (De Deo Creant. Th. XLIX.). This use of calling sin even a defect which in itself is not guilt but nevertheless opposes the perfection of justice (of which there was frequent discourse with the Pelagians), which excludes every imperfection, was familiar to the Pelagians themselves: who, when they said that man can be without sin, understood that he can be not only without guilt, but also without any disturbance of soul, without any imperfection which would oppose the perfection of justice, i.e. of consummate and most absolute justice, which they said to be possible in this life by the powers of nature. This is clear from the words of Jerome, who attacked this head of their doctrine in three dialogues. «For what other greater temerity can there be (says Jerome, epist. CXXXIII ad Ctesiphontem, num. 1. 2) than to claim for oneself, I will not say the likeness, but the equality of God, and in a brief sentence to embrace the poisons of all heretics, which have flowed from the fountain of the philosophers and especially of Pythagoras and of Zeno, the prince of the Stoics? For they assert that those things which in Greek are πάθη, we can call perturbations, can be extirpated from the minds and that no fibre or root of vices remains at all in man, by meditation and constant exercise of the virtues.» «How then, he concludes, can this stand, which is said: that man can be without sin, if he wills.» Where you see that those things which in themselves are not guilt but only a certain imperfection touching the moral order only dispositively, were called sins also by the Pelagians: although they judged it to be in the power of free will not only to restrain all those movements, but also to extirpate them radically from the soul; so that they therefore said that it came about from a certain fault of man that those defects persevere in us.

Hence the Fathers, denying that man can be without sin in this life, or at least, with Augustine, that he can be so by his own powers (De Perfectione iustitiae c. 7), objected to the Pelagians not only properly so-called faults, but also any imperfections touching the moral order even dispositively, which never cease at least entirely — concupiscence especially — in order to show that man in this life cannot attain the perfection of justice, that is, be without sin. Whence Augustine, De Perfect. iustitiae c. 8: «This is our justice in this very pilgrimage, that we tend to that perfection and fullness of justice, where in the sight of its beauty charity will already be full and perfect, now by the rectitude and perfection of the course itself, chastising our body and bringing it into subjection... since in the chastisement of the body concupiscence is bridled, which ought not to be bridled but not to exist at all, nor will it exist in that perfection of justice, where there will be no sin at all.»

VI. This being established, we say 2) that Augustine calls the works of unbelievers sins for a twofold reason: 1° with respect to all their works, because they lack salutary merit, i.e. because they lack that supernatural perfection which ought to be in them by divine institution, with which, when equipped, good works dispose men either remotely or proximately to the unique supernatural end to which they are destined; but by this aptness the works of unbelievers are destitute. In this way, moreover, Augustine takes sin improperly. The 2° reason is that which does not touch absolutely all the works of unbelievers. but only under a certain moral generality: Augustine considers, namely, the works of unbelievers according to what commonly happens, and which, as he himself supposes, almost always have an evil end; therefore Augustine calls them sins, because they are vitiated by an evil end: in this way, however, sin is taken properly by Augustine. For the same twofold reason Augustine denies that the virtues of unbelievers (the discourse is about acts, not about habits) are true virtues. What we say we can evidently demonstrate from this same c. 3. l. IV. cont. Iulianum. And with respect to 1°, Augustine, n. 19, says: «Not absurdly was virtue defined by those who said: virtue is a habit of the soul consistent with the mode and reason of nature. They spoke truly; but they did not know what is consistent with a nature to be liberated and beatified… This highest good cannot be conferred on men except through Christ… Therefore the just man lives by the faith of Christ. For from this faith he lives prudently, courageously, temperately and justly, and thereby with all these true virtues rightly and wisely, because he lives faithfully. If therefore for obtaining true beatitude, which the faith that is in Christ truly promises to us as immortal, virtues profit man nothing, in no way can they be true virtues.» Therefore Augustine understands as true virtues those which lead to supernatural beatitude. «Therefore we have true virtues, because that for which we act is true, that is, this is consistent with our nature unto salvation and true happiness,» n. 18. But Augustine speaks in the historical order, which is not the only order possible to human nature, as we have demonstrated elsewhere (De Deo Creant. l. XLII. XLII.).

With respect to proving the 2°, which we established above, these things can be brought forth from Augustine. a) When he answered (n. 30) «absolutely, (to cover a naked man) inasmuch as it is not from faith, it is a sin,» he adds, explaining it: «not because the very deed itself, which is to cover a naked man, is a sin: but that in such a work not to glory in the Lord, only the impious denies to be a sin.» Augustine therefore regards that action insofar as it is placed with an undue end, which he supposes to be had. b) The argument by which Augustine, n. 14, proves that the chastity of unbelievers is not a true virtue comes back to this: true virtue is in the soul; the soul of an unbeliever, as Scripture testifies, fornicates from God: but in a fornicating soul chastity cannot exist, or the same subject cannot at once be fornicating and chaste; therefore. Fornication indeed is here taken improperly, but it is nevertheless a positive recession from God through evil acts; for men of this kind, acting badly, by the very fact that they act badly, are said in the Scriptures to fornicate from God. Augustine, however, means to say that if, according to the divine manner of speaking (which is certainly true), a soul can truly be called fornicating, the same cannot truly be called chaste; because these things are repugnant, so that therefore either something is lacking for true chastity, inasmuch as it is not from faith, or there is some vice infecting it, because it is preserved from an evil end. c) He proves generally, n. 22, that the works of unbelievers are not good, because although some good things are done by them, they are nevertheless not done well: but the unbeliever does not do well «because he does it loving the glory of men more than that of God.»Editor's note: the print reads "fuent, bene: non autem bene infidelis facit", but the intended reading appears to be "fiunt, bene: non autem bene infidelis facit." But this act is positively evil from its end: therefore. But it must not be thought that Augustine judged this manner of acting from an evil end to be necessary for unbelievers, or that they cannot act except from an evil end: for he never asserts this, and the clear testimonies which we shall bring forth in what follows openly deny it: but what frequently happens and is true with a certain moral universality, Augustine considered. Which indeed was sufficient for him for the confutation of Julian; for Julian said to be true virtues not some only of the good actions of unbelievers, but universally all those which, having regard only to that which is done, would be according to reason — which are certainly very many and are frequently vitiated by an evil end. But when Augustine, teaching the end for which one must act, makes mention only of that end which we know by faith, this depends on the fact that he himself speaks in the hypothesis of the historical supernatural order and treats of the true virtues which are proper to Christians.

VII. Moreover, Augustine's aim in this chapter too is the refutation of a certain monstrous doctrine of Julian. For he taught that virtues are to be distinguished from vices not by their ends but by their offices: «an office, however, is what is to be done; the end, in truth, is that on account of which it is to be done.» Namely, he used to say, «for knowing whether virtues are true, only this is to be considered, what is done; nor is the cause to be sought why it is done (nn. 19, 21).» From this Julian himself inferred that there are some true virtues by which we are fruitfully good, when, namely, office and a right end come together at once: and that there are, besides, some true virtues by which we are sterilely good, when, to be sure, office is separated from a right end (nn. 19, 20, 21, 22). From which doctrine, indeed, Augustine observed so great an absurdity to follow, that «Julian would be compelled to call true justice even that of which he found avarice to be the mistress». This most absurd doctrine, which holds that a true virtue or an honest act exists with no account taken of the end on account of which it is done, and which holds that through true virtues we are sterilely good, is what Augustine impugns here. But it is clearly evident that this doctrine of Julian is not that which those defend, who will that the acts of the virtues can be exercised by the powers of nature. For neither do they will that the end ought to be prescinded from; and if they will those acts to be sterile with respect to eternal life, they do not, however, will them to be sterile for attaining the natural end, if it existed, or for attaining other natural goods. Nor do they call virtues of this kind, sterile with respect to the supernatural end, true virtues in such a way as to make them equal to Christian virtues, as Julian did, who appealed to the virtues of the pagans performed without grace, in order to prove that the virtues which Christians exercise are in the power of nature.

VIII. You will ask why any works of unbelievers are not formally sins, if, as we have said, they lack the perfection due to them. I answer that supernatural perfection is indeed due to acts, but not by a law prescribing the norm of morality, but by a law establishing the gratuitous supernatural order: but sin is that which is opposed to the norm of morality. Moreover, in order that acts be formally sins on account of some privation, it is necessary that this privation be culpable in those very ones who act; for this, however, it is required that they attend to and know that obligation of having it, and therefore know the obligation of having faith and of acting from faith; since, however, this is lacking without fault in negative unbelievers, their naturally good works indeed lack that perfection by which they would be fit for the supernatural end, but they are not faults. «The evil of an action ordered to some end, to which it does not relate in a due manner, is called sin both in voluntary and in natural things,» says St. Thomas in compend. Theolog.II. 119.

IX. But in order that what we have established concerning Augustine's opinion be beyond every doubt, we shall confirm that again, proving that Augustine truly acknowledged good and honest works in unbelievers and praised the same. Indeed, in De Spiritu et lit., c. 27. et 28., after he proposed his interpretation of the words of Paul, Rom. II: The Gentiles, who do not have the law, etc., he adds: «But if those who by nature do what is of the law are not yet to be counted in the number of those whom the grace of Christ justifies, but rather in the number of those whose certain deeds — even of the impious, who do not truly and justly worship the true God — we either read or know or hear of, which according to the rule of justice we not only cannot censure, but even rightly and justly praise (although if they be examined as to the end for which they are done, hardly any are found therefore at least sometimes which would merit the due praise and defense of justice): nevertheless, because the image of God in the human soul has not been so worn away by the stain of earthly affections that no, as it were, final lineaments have remained in it, whence it may rightly be said that even in the very impiety of their life they do or understand some things of the law; if this is what was said, The Gentiles, who do not have the law, i.e., the law of God, by nature do what is of the law, even so that difference will not be disturbed, by which the New Testament differs from the old» etc.

Again, in sermon CCCXLIX, n. 1: «Let us therefore, he says, render to your charity a sermon on charity. Charity is one thing divine, another human; human charity is one thing licit, another illicit... This, then, is my first division, that I said that charity is one thing human, another divine, and that the same human charity is divided into two, in that one is licit, another illicit. First, therefore, I speak of the human licit, which is not censured; then of the human illicit, which is condemned; thirdly, of the divine, which leads us to the kingdom.» Behold that very distinction on account of which, because we defend it, we are held to be inept theologians by the Jansenists. Augustine continues: «So that I may intimate briefly, licit is the human charity by which a wife is loved; illicit, that by which a harlot or another's wife is loved.» Consider here that the love of a wife is regarded by Augustine not materially; for in that way it also pertains to divine charity, but formally, i.e., under this motive, that she is a wife, and indeed with that motive exclusively taken, which of itself pertains to human charity; further, the love of a wife under this motive, because she is a wife, is called by Augustine licit charity, and therefore honest. Now indeed this love, although it be exercised supernaturally by the faithful with the help of grace, can nevertheless be stirred up by the powers of nature without faith. «Have, therefore, licit charity; it is human, but, as I said, licit. Not only, moreover, is it so licit that it is conceded, but so licit that, if it be lacking, it is censured: may it be lawful for you to love spouses with human charity, to love children, to love your friends, to love your fellow citizens. But you laugh that this charity can be also of the impious, that is, of pagans, of Ilarians, of heretics... etc." Human charity, therefore, if it is lacking, is censured, and the same is licit; it is, therefore, honest: further, it is found also in unbelievers; therefore. Likewise, Augustine requires for an act to be honest that end and mode of the work which can plainly be obtained by the sole guidance of nature without faith. Thus in De pecc. origin., c. 38: «Marital intercourse, which even the marriage records show to be done for the sake of begetting children, is good of itself absolutely, not in comparison with fornication; which, although on account of the body of death, which is not yet renewed by resurrection, it cannot be done without a certain bestial motion, of which human nature blushes; nevertheless the intercourse itself is not a sin, where reason uses lust for good, and is not overcome to evil.» And in serm. LI, c. 14: «Those are not led to the table except by concupiscence of the flesh, not by the need of refreshment. And so these fall into food and drink. But those who come down from the office of living do not live in order to eat, but eat in order to live. And so, if it were offered to these prudent and temperate ones that they might live without food and drink, with how great joy would they embrace this benefit?» In De peccat. mer. et remiss., L. I, c. 22, Augustine asks: «How does it come about that a man from early boyhood more modest, more talented, more temperate, to a great extent victor over his lusts, who hates avarice, detests luxury, and rises more advanced and more apt to the other virtues, and yet is in that place where Christian grace cannot be preached to him? Another, however, slow in talent, given to lusts, covered with crimes and misdeeds, is so governed that he hears, believes, is baptized, is snatched away, or, if he be detained here, lives here laudably? Where did these two contract merits so diverse — I do not say, that this one believes, that one does not believe, which is of his own will; but that this one hears what he may believe, that one does not hear: for this is not in man's power.» Augustine's aim evidently shows that here such an antithesis is set up, that in the unbeliever virtues are judged to be of such a kind, that the acts are good and in no way sins; otherwise there would be no distinction, and in no respect would the one excel the other.

Finally, he praises several works of unbelievers, as the continence of Polemon, epist. CXLIV, n. 2, and the continence of Alypius his friend, Confess. L. VI, c. 10, and of the Romans, epist. CXVIII, c. 3, from which letter, since we are addressing Romans, it will not be irksome to copy out the words. «You may bear with those, if we cannot correct them, who wish the commonwealth to stand with vices unpunished, which the first Romans established and increased with virtues, although not having true piety toward the true God, which could have led them even into the eternal city by a healthful religion (behold to what true piety, true justice looks): yet guarding a certain probity of their own kind, by which it could suffice for founding, increasing, and preserving the earthly city. For God thus showed in the most opulent and renowned empire of the Romans how much civic virtues avail even without true religion, so that it might be understood that, with this added, men become citizens of another city, whose king is truth, whose law is charity, whose measure is eternity.»

It is established, therefore, that Augustine approved several works of unbelievers as honest and as infected with no vice intrinsically; although not only in that chapter of L. IV. cont. Iulianum does he call the same sins, but also elsewhere, as in de Gestis Pelagii, c. XV: «However much the works of unbelievers may be praised, we know the true and unconquered saying of the same Apostle (Rom. XIV, 23): everything that is not from faith is sin.»¹ And in Tract. LXXXVI. in Ioan., n. 2: «You must not say: before I believed, I was already doing good works, therefore I was elected. For what is there of good work before faith, since the Apostle says: everything that is not from faith is sin?»

It remains, therefore, for us to say that the works of unbelievers are generally called sins by Augustine, and that they are denied to be true virtues, for those reasons which we indicated from the beginning.

X. As to the last part of the thesis. The falsity of this proposition — namely, that free will without the grace of God avails for nothing but sinning — ought already to be manifest from what has been demonstrated both in this Thesis and in the preceding one. Here it will be enough to unravel the arguments of the adversaries, who seek from Augustine and from the other Fathers a defense for their opinion. Thus Augustine, De Spir. et lit., c. 3, says: «Nor does free will avail for anything but sinning, if the way of truth lies hidden; and when what is to be done and whither one must strive has begun not to lie hidden, unless it also delights and is loved, it is not done, it is not undertaken, it is not lived well. But in order that it be loved, the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, not through free will, which rises from us, but through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us.» And in Cont. duas epistt. pelagg., L. II, c. 5: «By the sin of Adam we do not say that free will perished from human nature, but that it avails for sinning in men subject to the devil; but for living well and piously it does not avail, unless the will of man itself has been freed by the grace of God and aided to every good of action, speech, and thought.» And the Fathers of the Council of Orange, c. 22: «No one has of his own except lying and sin. But whatever a man has of truth and of justice, it is from that fountain which we ought to thirst for in this desert, so that, sprinkled from it as it were with certain drops, we may not fail in the way.» To this belongs what Celestine has among the Auctoritates Sedis Apostolicae, c. 4: «In the transgression of Adam all men lost natural possibility (i.e., the power of doing good) and innocence, and no one can rise from the depth of that ruin through free will, unless the grace of God taking pity has raised him up.»

Nevertheless, the doctrine expressed by that Baian proposition was proscribed by the Roman See; which ought to be an argument that the testimonies of the Fathers are not to be accepted as they are accepted by the Baians. And indeed the sense of Augustine's words here is this: the free will of fallen nature, deprived of grace, can sin, because for this the natural power suffices; but it cannot produce good acts — namely, those good acts which man in Paradise before sin could produce, i.e., acts equal to the attainment of his end — because for this the grace of Christ is required. Although, in truth, it can perform naturally good acts, 1) morally this happens only rarely, namely, that an act, all circumstances being considered, especially the circumstance of the end, is even naturally good 2) and even if it be such, since nevertheless it is not an act such as it ought to be, such as namely... were the acts of Adam in Paradise before sin, and this defect is in them at length on account of the sin of Adam; all these acts, useless for eternal life, can rightly, as such, be called sins: for even by the Apostle, that defect touching the moral order which is from the sin of nature is called sin in us. This interpretation, which is required by what has been said thus far, is confirmed by the clearest doctrine of Augustine Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, lib. I, cap. 2: «But who of us would say that the free will of the first man perished from the human race? Freedom indeed perished through sin, but that which was in paradise, of having full justice with immortality, on account of which human nature needs divine grace, the Lord saying: If the Son shall have freed you, then you will be truly free; certainly free for living well and justly.» Therefore by original sin there was lost only that freedom, or the power of operating justly and holily, just as Adam operated before sin: but full justice with immortality is supernatural justice.

Therefore the freedom that was lost is not the freedom of indifference to moral good and evil simply speaking, which is opposed to necessity, but it is the freedom of the children of God, that is, the power of acting well and salutarily, which is opposed to the servitude of sin. For men, made servants of sin and of the devil through transgression, lost the freedom of the children, and cannot perform works meritorious of salvation, unless they be freed by the Son.

Augustine again teaches that this freedom was lost by Adam through sin in the Enchiridion, cap. 30: «Using free will badly, man lost both himself and it.» Namely, the free will of the first man was sound and endowed with full freedom on account of the gifts of integrity and holiness with which it was furnished; but man, freely sinning, lost the soundness of free will, that is, lost sound free will. You will say that the free will which was lost is the very natural free will, namely, the freedom of indifference; for Adam lost that very thing of which he made bad use: but he did not make bad use of sound free will, i.e., of it insofar as it was sound, nor did he make bad use of grace; for no one can use these gifts badly: but he made bad use of the freedom of indifference; therefore this is what was lost. I answer that the difficulty arises from the word perdidit, which is taken as if it meant amisit; but it must be taken otherwise: for it is said: and he lost himself; just as elsewhere (epist. ad Vitalem, CCXVII, c. II) he says that Adam lost the whole nature, saying «this is the work of the grace which the second Adam brought to us, not of the nature, which the first Adam wholly lost in himself.» Namely, in a not infrequent active sense, the word perdidit here means he destroyed, he corrupted, he afflicted, or he brought perdition upon. And therefore this is the sense: Adam, using free will badly, destroyed himself and destroyed free will, insofar as he deprived it of grace, which was its soundness — deprived it, namely, of supernatural life and power, but not of natural life, which remained whole together with human nature itself.

The opinions of the other Fathers exhibit the same doctrine as the testimonies of Augustine; whence they are to be explained in the same way. And so let this be the end of this thesis and of the article.