Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

Moreover, from this it follows 1) that free will itself, elevated, is constituted in the supernatural order and is made capable of acting in that order according to the reason of its nature. It follows 2) that the concurrence of God for the deliberate act is had in the supernatural order no differently than in the natural, which concurrence therefore does not pertain to the first act of the faculty but only to the second act. It follows 3) that the deliberate salutary act is wrongly regarded as the effect of a double and diverse cause, namely human will and grace. It follows 4) that the deliberate salutary act is wholly of the will acting according to powers gratuitously received and wholly of God elevating and helping the will. It follows 5) that the will can be called a partial cause of any salutary act, by partiality indeed not of the effect, but of the cause, insofar as it is composed with God, by whom it is gratuitously elevated and excited to act. But if 6) there is regarded in the human will only that which it, left to itself, can do naturally, and the will so regarded is compared with grace, or, what comes to the same, is compared with itself elevated, illuminated, inspired; it is rightly said that in the salutary order nothing is to be referred to us, but all to God, in the things received.

I. We are about to demonstrate the matter briefly, referring the things that could be brought against it to the following theses, where the question will be concerning the efficacy of grace. And so in the first place this is to be established: that physical and moral powers are added to the will, which is clear from what was said in Art. praec. We are speaking, however, as you see, in this thesis of the will alone.

Moreover, these powers are so gratuitously superadded that they are powers of the will itself; for through them the will is constituted intrinsically capable of operating supernaturally: for it is man who performs the works of salvation and performs them by willing. Hence it is clear that these powers are not said to be of the will itself, as if they inhered in it naturally or were demanded by it, but are said to be its powers, because they are indeed conferred on it gratuitously, yet so as to be its own, namely that through them it may itself become intrinsically capable of operating salutarily. And this is Augustine's manner of speaking; who in De Peccat. merit. et remis. L. I. c. ultimo, discussing the impotence of the just man to avoid all sins, says: «But since by the divine Spirit, who knows much better than we all things of the human race, whether present or future, such human life was foreknown and foretold, that no one living is justified in the sight of God: it happens that through ignorance or infirmity, not having put forth against it (concupiscence) all the powers of the will (namely gratuitously conferred), we yield also to some illicit things, all the more and the more frequently the worse we are, all the less and the more rarely the better we are.» Cf. also L. II, c. 2.

And indeed these powers come down to this, that they are both an intrinsic elevation of the faculty and acts elicited from the faculty according to this power, God exciting, in which the illumination and inspiration consist; but the elevation is proper to both the intellect and the will, since it is gratuitously conferred; for it is a mode of it: the elicited acts, since they are vital, cannot but be of the one from whom they are elicited; therefore the powers which grace formally confers are powers of the will, whether grace is regarded which formally inheres in the will, or grace is regarded which formally inheres in the intellect, which is conferred for this reason, that the will, or man through the will, may be able to operate.

Indeed the operation of God itself also pertains to grace. Regarded subjectively, or as it is in God, it is the volition of God efficacious of itself; and with respect to grace a threefold special operation of God can be distinguished: namely 1) the active elevation of the faculty, 2) the excitation of the illumination and inspiration, and 3) the supernatural concurrence to the salutary act. But regarded objectively, the operation of God, that is, in its term or effect, is 1) the passive elevation of the faculty or the power of producing supernatural acts under God exciting and concurring beyond the exigency of nature, is 2) the passive illumination and inspiration placed in vital acts, 3) is the salutary act itself elicited by the soul elevated, illuminated and inspired. Wherefore the soul so operates with God, that the principle of the operation is in it; and this principle existing in it is that which is called created grace.

But now, if the powers which grace formally confers are powers of the will itself and consist in the elevation of nature, the illumination and the inspiration; the complete created principle of the pious and salutary act will be, in the concrete, the will elevated, illuminated, inspired. But since this principle embraces a twofold element, namely the nature of the will which is elevated, illuminated and inspired, and the gratuitous elevation, illumination and inspiration itself, it follows that from the will and grace there is constituted one complete power, or complete principle, of the deliberate salutary act.

II. From these things, however, it follows that free will itself is elevated and constituted in the supernatural order; for free will is the will itself: therefore when the will is elevated, and is elevated so as to perform meritorious works, the will is elevated as free and insofar as it is free. Grace therefore does not destroy free will, but perfects it. For the elevation of the faculty amplifies the power of the will, does not diminish it; the illumination and inspiration, insofar as they are cognitions and affections, in no way oppose the exercise of freedom, indeed they are necessary that it may be able to exist; insofar as they are excited in a special way by God, they are supernatural thoughts and affections drawing the free will to supernatural acts; therefore free will is perfected by grace. Surely the elevated will remains free in the supernatural order, otherwise it would not be itself which would be elevated, and it attains this through grace, that it can exercise itself in that order, just as by the natural powers alone it can exercise itself in the natural order.

Wherefore, since to any cognition and affection by which the free exercise of the will is prevented, the will, when it consents, consents because it wills, and can dissent, if it wills, and can will that; so too the elevated will, when it consents to any prevenient grace, consents because it wills, being able to dissent, if it wills, and can will that. This is the doctrine of Conc. Trid. Sess. VI. cap. 5. «Through his exciting and helping grace, they are disposed to convert themselves to their own justification, freely assenting and cooperating with that same grace: so that, God touching the heart of man through the illumination of the Holy Spirit, man himself does not do nothing at all, receiving that inspiration, since he can also reject it; nor yet without the grace of God can he move himself to justice before him by his free will.» To this corresponds can. 4: «If anyone shall say that the free will of man, moved and excited by God, cooperates in nothing by assenting to God exciting and calling, whereby it disposes and prepares itself to obtain the grace of justification, nor can dissent, if it wills, but like something inanimate does nothing at all and behaves merely passively: let him be anathema.» These things indeed are universal and embrace every assent of grace; but they were set forth specifically in the Synod for asserting freedom under the first prevenient grace, from which the justification of adults takes its beginning; ibid. cap. 5.

III. We say that it follows 2) that the concurrence of God is had for the deliberate act in the supernatural order no differently than in the natural. By elevating and prevenient grace the will is constituted in the supernatural order: but when it is about to act freely, about to use supernatural powers, it is subject to that law to which every creature is subject, that it act with God concurring. Wherefore that concurrence required by this universal law does not differ from that which is rendered in the natural order, if you regard the mode of God's acting; for God concurs that the cause may act, whether it be a natural or a supernatural cause. Since therefore the concurrence of God then exerts itself when the agent, already constituted in first act, goes forth into second act, so that accordingly the concurrence supposes the first act constituted, does not constitute it; this too will hold in the supernatural order for the deliberate act. Wherefore the concurrence of God is not to be confused with the grace preventing and preparing the will. But what the concurrence has in common with the helping grace, we shall say in the following.

IV. It follows 3) that the deliberate salutary act is wrongly regarded as the effect of a double and diverse cause, namely will and grace. Certainly the cause of the deliberate salutary act is the will elevated, illuminated, inspired: but the elevation, illumination and inspiration are something of the will itself, they are not something able to exist apart from it, but are its modes; therefore the cause of the salutary act is the will modified in a special way, that is, supernaturally; but the subject which acts and the mode according to which it acts are not two diverse causes: therefore. Hence you will gather that the supposition in that question can and must also be denied, in which it is asked whether in the illumination and inspiration grace and the faculty act together, or a certain order of priority obtains between them, and whether grace or the faculty is prior; for this question can have a place when there are really two causes which act. How, e.g., can the grace of illumination and inspiration be prior to the faculty, since the illumination and inspiration themselves are acts elicited by the faculty? They are indeed prior to the deliberate act, which is the effect of grace.

V. But if 4) the cause is considered which elevates, illuminates and inspires the will and concurs with it, then indeed a double and diverse cause of the deliberate salutary act can and must be distinguished, namely the will and God. But to each cause the whole effect is to be ascribed: to the will indeed acting according to powers gratuitously received, because according to these powers it is the complete principle of the same; to God, however, both mediately, because he is the cause of these powers in the will, and immediately, because by his concurrence, which here is the concurrence in the supernatural order, he immediately produces the act together with the will using its powers.

VI. Theologians are wont to ask whether nature is or is not a partial cause with grace of the salutary act. In a twofold way a cause is called partial; by partiality of cause and by partiality of effect. In a twofold way, namely, can something be constituted a partial cause of an effect. First, by partiality of effect, so that part of the effect proceeds from one cause, part from the other cause. Second, by partiality of cause only, so that into the whole effect both indeed influence, but the power of neither, which is exerted, is by itself a sufficient reason of the effect, but the one produces the whole effect insofar as it operates with the other.

Moreover, note that the question is so frequently set up that the will is compared with grace, which comparison we have already 3) disapproved. The question, however, can be made with greater clarity if the will is compared with God. The question indeed is now for us concerning the deliberate act, whether with respect to it the will is a partial cause; but since the same question can be made concerning indeliberate acts, and the solution of this question can conduce to the solution of that one too; something must first be said by us concerning this.

Therefore 5) since the first indeliberate acts suppose (by priority of nature) the elevation of nature made by God and the active excitation of those same acts by God: nature is to be compared with God, who actively elevates it and excites in it the indeliberate acts. But now God, who thus acts supernaturally in nature, is 1) the total cause of the elevation by totality of effect and of cause: 2) but as to the acts which he excites, he is not the total cause by totality of cause of these acts; which, because they are vital, demand to proceed intrinsically from nature. Wherefore to the existence of these acts the activity of the elevated nature contributes, the activity of God elevating contributes; but neither would produce the effect by itself. Both, therefore, are a partial cause. Both, moreover, produce the whole effect by totality of effect. For whatever is in the act is attained by the activity of nature operating with God, and equally is attained by the activity of God operating in nature. For the act is wholly as great as it is, and it is vital and it is supernatural. But since neither attains the effect by totality of cause; both are a partial cause by partiality of cause. Nor should it seem wonderful to you that God is a partial cause of some effect; for this does not derogate from his dignity, just as it does not derogate from it that secondary causes really effect something by their activity. Moreover, the general concurrence of God also has a place here, concerning which Molina in the Concordia. Disp. XXVI: «When we say that neither God through the universal concurrence nor the secondary causes are integral, but partial causes of effects, this is to be understood of the partiality of cause, as they call it, not indeed of the partiality of effect: for the whole effect is both from God and from the secondary causes; but neither from God nor from the secondary causes as from a whole cause, but as from a part of the cause, which simultaneously requires the concurrence and influx of the other.»

So much concerning the question regarding indeliberate acts.

But as for the salutary deliberate acts, these suppose the will elevated and furnished with illumination and inspiration; for the cause of those acts is, as we have said, the will elevated, illuminated and inspired. Therefore since 1) God is the author of the elevation, illumination and inspiration, he himself also, together with the will which he elevates, illuminates and inspires, will have to be called the cause of an act of this kind, insofar as he is the cause of the elevation, illumination and inspiration: and thus God is the mediate cause of the deliberate salutary act. Moreover, God is the cause of the act insofar as he concurs with the will operating, furnished with these powers: and thus God is the immediate cause of the deliberate act; for the concurrence is immediate. But when it is asked whether God is the total cause by totality of cause of the salutary act, the concurrence of God is regarded; because then the question has a place when two causes operate simultaneously. Moreover, insofar as God concurs, he is an immediate partial cause by partiality of cause; because he alone does not make, nor can make, acts of this kind, which must not only proceed vitally from a living being, but also be determined by the free will.

Wherefore from these things it is clear that the human will, if it is compared with God cooperating, is, with respect to all salutary acts, their partial cause by partiality of cause.

So far we have considered nature operating together with God.

VII. But 6) when the question is instituted whether the effect, which is the salutary act, is to be attributed wholly to grace or to God, or partly to grace, partly to the will, the comparison can also be so instituted that on the one side is placed the will as it is nature alone, according to which it is distinguished from and opposed to grace, and it is considered what the will alone, left to itself, can do by itself; on the other side, however, is placed grace, not indeed alone, which would be a certain abstraction, but grace with nature, or nature augmented by grace. This comparison indeed is legitimate; for nature can indeed be alone and operate alone; it can therefore be distinguished from itself elevated: but grace does not operate except in nature and with nature; wherefore when grace is regarded which really operates, nature cannot be prescinded from in the consideration of grace.

But now if the comparison is instituted in this way, nature alone is compared with itself elevated, illuminated, inspired. But with the comparison so instituted, it can rightly be said: the whole effect is of grace, nothing is of nature. For when the effect is denied to be entirely of nature, there is not excluded from its efficiency nature simply, but nature alone; moreover nature alone can indeed do nothing in the salutary order. By that formula, therefore, nothing else is signified than the physical and absolute impotence of nature to those same acts. And it is signified accordingly that salutary acts exist in us for this reason, because nature is gratuitously elevated, because by gratuitous illuminations the will of man is prepared, and, prepared, is helped. Which is the doctrine asserted by the Fathers, who used that formula.

Note that in another way too it can be said that all is of God; because God gave and conserves nature itself and the natural powers: but God is not regarded in this way by the Fathers, who attribute all to God. For the Fathers assert all to God in the order of salvation on account of the grace by which he operates in us; the same, however, exclude nature from the census of grace, opposing themselves to the Pelagians, who for this reason ascribed our good work to God, because God gave nature; but the Fathers consider God operating gratuitously and supernaturally in nature. And in this way too God is considered by us in this question, as can be clear to one attending. Moreover, when the Fathers attribute all to God, they intend especially to teach that every good action, even the beginning of Faith, is the work of the grace of God; so that accordingly we claim nothing for ourselves, but give all to God, who prepares the will to be helped and helps it prepared.