Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

I. Certain theologians, especially the Thomists, teach that besides actual exciting grace placed in vital acts, another really distinct actual grace is to be admitted, which precedes the acts themselves and is their principle, and which is properly exciting grace. Grace of this kind would inhere in the faculty to which it is conferred after the manner of a quality, whence it is called a quality — a quality, however, not vital, because it is not an act, but precedes the act; moreover a quality flowing by its own nature, because it is conferred for the sake of acts; since therefore the acts flow and do not remain, it itself also flows with them, i. e. ceases to be. From this quality the faculties, being informed, attain that they can elicit any supernatural act whatsoever, whence these qualities together with the faculties are the principle of the supernatural act. And indeed a twofold genus of these qualities is distinguished by certain theologians, one which is the principle of indeliberate acts, the other of deliberate acts. But at present we dispute properly about the former genus, because with it excluded, the other also, with easy work, having regard to deliberate action under grace, can be excluded.

But this is to be considered, that these qualities are judged necessary when the infused supernatural habits are lacking; for with these existing, the faculties are already elevated and powerful for supernatural acts. When therefore it is asked whether qualities of this kind, dead qualities, pertain to actual grace, the question is about actual grace which precedes justification and with respect to those acts for which infused habits do not yet pre-exist.

II. That we may proceed in order, we will first set forth the arguments of those who defend these qualities; then we will vindicate our opinion and at the same time satisfy their arguments.

Their arguments come back to this. 1) The idea of actual grace which the Fathers exhibit comes back to this, that through it God excites, draws, knocks at, calls, touches the heart of man: but excitation, drawing, knocking, calling, touching are not effectively from the one who is excited, drawn, etc., but only from the one exciting, drawing, etc.; therefore actual grace is something other than the vital acts; for these are effectively from man.

2. In order that the faculties may operate salutarily, they must be elevated supernaturally; and therefore the elevation of the faculty is presupposed to the act. Moreover an elevation of this kind must be real and intrinsic; but this cannot be done except through some real form or quality superadded. For the faculty must be really and intrinsically changed: but according to the common doctrine, nothing can be really and intrinsically changed except through something new existing in it which was not there before; for if nothing new is in it, it itself will be the same in the same way as before; but if it is the same and in the same way, no real change has occurred.

3. Grace is such that without it nature is essentially impotent to elicit acts; wherefore it itself confers new powers upon the faculties and is the cause — if not adequate, at least principal — of the acts; but that which confers new real powers on the faculty, which is the principal cause of the acts, is certainly something more perfect than the faculty itself, and distinct from it and inhering in it as a form: therefore.

4. Grace is in us from God without us — not only without us freely willing and meriting, but without us producing it by our own power. Therefore it is something altogether distinct from our acts and from our natural power. But if it is such, since it is certainly something real in us, it is necessary that it be some real transient quality, for any mode or modal quality is not really distinct from the acts themselves and from the power of nature.

III. Our opinion is that qualities of this kind, really distinct, infused into the faculty, are not to be admitted, but that the elevation of the faculty to elicit a supernatural act (since the faculty is to be elevated only transiently) is not made through such qualities, but is made immediately through the divine power operating in the faculty.

As to the first, this is first the opinion of Suarez (De div. Gratia I. III. c. 4): «We suppose,» he says, «that the acts are supernatural and therefore cannot be elicited by the natural potency alone through its own power: for it is chiefly for this reason that the authors were moved to say that another grace prior to these acts is infused into us, which is their principle, which they will to be a created thing inhering in the potency, really distinct from the act of grace and its principle (behold the clearly expressed opinion about which our question is), which they call a pure virtuous motion, so that it is not a quality: others say that it is an actual or transient quality received by us and in no way made by us;» he adds further: «But I indeed judge that no such entity is infused which is prior in time or nature to the very act of exciting grace or is its proximate principle, but that the Holy Spirit alone immediately and through himself infuses these acts, elevating the potency to accomplish them.» He teaches the same in c. 19. Moreover in these words three things are contained: a) no entity is infused into the faculty so that the act of exciting grace, for example a pious thought, can be elicited: b) that which others will to be done by God through the mediation of this entity, God brings about immediately through himself: c) God acting thus is not only the author of the supernatural acts, the potency being left in its natural order, as certain persons, I know not why, dream that Suarez judged, but at the same time elevates the potency to accomplish those supernatural acts, i. e. places it in the supernatural order. Cf. the same, de fide III. S. 3. n. 11. This and nothing else is our opinion.

We draw the first argument from the authority of the Fathers. Such a real quality, existing as the principle of supernatural, indeliberate acts — of pious thought, of delight, etc. — would be the principal actual grace, or rather it alone would be actual grace, and the vital acts would rather have to be counted among the effects of grace, as Card. Gotti readily concedes in II. p., Tract. VI. g. 2. ad 2. § 2. But, if this is so, it would also be necessary that with those witnesses of revelation who spoke and disputed most frequently and abundantly about grace, some mention of this quality, whether under this or some other equivalent name, should occur, especially then when they strive to indicate the first grace by which God prevents us. But it is certain 1) that concerning such a quality there is a deep silence among those witnesses2) that when they will to indicate the first grace, on which the whole work of justification depends, they so exhibit it as to signify clearly that it is placed both generally in the operation of God and specifically in some vital act.

Since therefore neither the operation of God nor the vital acts are such real dead qualities; yet from those witnesses we are to be taught what grace is, nor is it lawful for us to invent new and unheard-of things at our pleasure; it is manifest that the champions of the real quality are destitute of the authority of the ancients. This is the argument of Suarez, loc. cit. «In the councils,» he says, «and in the Fathers we find no trace of such grace; rather they posit the inspiration itself as the first grace, and moreover indicate that it is infused immediately by the Holy Spirit himself and not through the mediation of some quality.»

The last minor of the argument brought forward is therefore proved. And indeed as to the first part the proof comes back to this, that we show that what is brought forward by the Thomists from the Fathers as indications and arguments of this quality does not really signify it. This we will accomplish by at the same time solving the preceding arguments, which contain reasonings collected from those things which the Fathers assert about actual grace.

Therefore let us first dispatch the argument drawn from the appellations given to grace. They say (arg. 1) that it is the doctrine of the Fathers that God through grace excites, draws, knocks at, calls, touches the heart of man: moreover excitation, calling, knocking, touching are not effectively from the one who is excited, knocked at, touched, called, but from the extrinsic agent; grace therefore is the effect of God alone: but the vital acts are also an effect of the faculty: likewise the prevenient grace of God is in us without us; but the vital acts are from us (arg. 4): therefore some grace besides the vital acts is indicated clearly enough by the Fathers; which grace cannot be anything but a real quality. But 1) it is certain that excitation, calling, knocking, touching are to be taken metaphorically. 2) It is also certain that by these appellations — God excites, calls, etc. — two things are signified, namely the formal excitation, calling, etc. and the efficient cause of this calling, excitation, etc. existing formally in man. It is certain 3) that the efficient and extrinsic cause is God, who by the efficacy of his will produces this effect. It is certain 4) that the act of the mover in the mobile is nothing but the motion of the mobile itself, as s. Thomas teaches in 1. 2. g. CX. a. 2., and that excitation, calling, etc. are a certain intentional motion or vital act of the soul: for just as a mechanical force is excited formally through a motion existing in it from an extrinsic agent, which motion is an act both of the mover and of the moved, so the vital faculties, the intellective and the volitive, whose motion is nothing but some vital act of themselves, are excited formally through vital acts of cognition and delight or similar ones, which exist in them from the special efficacy of God acting.

And indeed 5) to what, according to the Fathers, does this excitation, calling, touching of the heart, etc. come back? Surely to this: that it is a certain illumination of the intellect, a certain inspiration of love, of delight, or of the like. August. in Psal. CII. n. 16: «He calls on every side to correction, he calls on every side to penance.... he calls through intimate knowledge.» In Ioan. Tract. XXVI. n. 7: «Everyone who has heard from the Father and has learned comes to me. See how the Father draws: by teaching he delights, not by imposing necessity.» Ad Simplic. I. I. q. 2. n. 21: «Who can believe unless he is touched by some calling, i. e. by some testimony of things? who has it in his power that his mind be reached by such a sight, whereby his will is moved to faith?» The African bishops to Zosimus: «The will is prepared by the Lord, and that they may do something good, he himself touches the hearts of his faithful with paternal inspirations.» But by the inspiration of what? Surely of that of which Augustine frequently speaks, namely of love, of delight, of sweetness; just as also the Fathers of the Second Synod of Orange, c. 7, call the grace necessary for doing any good that pertains to the salvation of eternal life an illumination and an inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who gives to all sweetness in consenting and in believing the truth. Therefore when it is said that God calls us through his grace, etc., if by the name of grace some created gift is understood, that grace is not distinct from the calling; but if by the name of grace the efficient cause of the calling is understood, it is God, who indeed alone calls and excites us. In the locutions of the Fathers, indeed, something is signified which precedes the vital acts; as when the same Arausican Fathers, cc. 4 and 6, teach that it is brought about in us through the infusion and operation of the Holy Spirit that we will to be cleansed from sin, that we believe and can do all good things: yet that is nothing which persuades that there is some real quality implanted by God; but it is the very operation of God, by which the faculty is elevated and rendered capable of acting supernaturally: of which operation we are about to speak shortly. But to that which is brought forward from the same Fathers — that prevenient grace is in us without us — we easily respond by distinguishing. The grace of God is in us without us freely acting and meriting — I grant; without us acting by the power of our nature — I further distinguish: by elevated nature — I deny; by pure nature — I further distinguish, i. e. it alone does not suffice — I concede; that it, when elevated, does not really act — I deny. Hence Bernard, De Grat. et lib. arbitr.: «God works in us these three things, i. e. to think, to will, to perfect. The first indeed without us, the second with us, the third through us.» Thought, which is a vital act, cannot come to be without us physically acting: therefore the rò 'without us' does not exclude the physical activity of the faculty. The other arguments we will weigh a little later.

The same minor of our argument is proved as to the other part. The question of the Fathers was with the Massilians concerning the beginning of Faith, that is, concerning the beginning of man's conversion to God; and the Fathers maintained that the beginning is from the grace of God: moreover this grace, of which the Fathers spoke in this controversy, is the first grace, which no salutary act precedes, which in the order of execution is the first principle of salvation. Now of what nature is this grace? It is a certain knowledge, it is a certain will (or volition). Thus Augustine in de Praedestinatione Sanctorum, c. 2, discourses: «Commending (Paul) that grace which is not given according to any merits, but effects all good merits — not because we are fit, he says, to think anything as from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God. Let those attend here and weigh these words who think that the beginning of faith is from us and the supplement of faith is from God. For who does not see that to think is prior to believing? surely no one believes anything unless he has first thought that it is to be believed... What therefore pertains to religion and piety (about which the Apostle was speaking), if we are not fit to think anything as from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God, certainly we are not fit to believe anything as from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God.» — not from ourselves, since without thought we cannot believe, but our sufficiency, by which we begin to believe, is from God Cont. duas epist. pelagg. I. II. c. 9: »But truly what is written, it is man's to prepare the heart and from the Lord the answer of the tongue (Prov. XVI. 1.), they are deceived by not understanding well, so that they think that to prepare the heart, i. e. to begin good, pertains to man without the help of the grace of God. Far be it that the children of promise so understand, that... when they have heard from Paul: not because we are fit to think anything as from ourselves, they should convict him, saying: behold, we are fit from ourselves to prepare the heart, and thereby also to think something good. For who can prepare a good heart without a good thought?.... Man prepares the heart, yet not without the help of God, who so touches the heart that man prepares the heart.» And c. 12: »Grace is at work not only that we may know the things to be done, but also that we may do the things known; not only that we may believe the things to be loved, but also that we may love the things believed. This grace, if it is to be called doctrine, certainly let it be so called that God be believed to infuse it more deeply and inwardly with ineffable sweetness, so that he not only shows the truth, but also imparts charity. For thus God teaches those who are called according to the purpose, at once giving them both to know what they do and to do what they know.» And c. 20: »That possibility (namely of nature), not as he opines, is one and the same root. For charity is one root of goods, cupidity another root of evils, and they differ from each other as much as virtue and vice. But plainly that possibility is capable of both roots; because man can not only have charity, by which he is a good tree, but can also have cupidity, by which he is an evil tree. But the cupidity of man, which is the vice of man, has man as its author... but charity, which is the virtue of God, is from God for us.» Now it is manifest that in these testimonies grace is set forth by Augustine as placed in thought, in will, in love; and it is equally manifest that in these testimonies — of which very many others most similar could be brought forward — that grace is indicated which is the root of supernatural life, which is immediately superadded to the possibility of nature, through which Faith begins in us, through which love begins in us, through which the heart is prepared; but this is the grace which no other genus of grace precedes; but it is that from which the operation of God in us takes its beginning: therefore.

The second argument is taken from the very nature of the thing. Such a quality involves a contradiction. For by the very fact that it is a really distinct quality, it is a certain permanent thing: for it is not motion or action: but whatever is not of this kind is permanent, or does not cease to be except through a contrary or through the positive action of some cause: therefore this actual grace would be a permanent thing. But the nature of actual grace requires that it be something transient, not otherwise than the action of the faculty, ceasing without any action of a contrary or of one expelling it: therefore actual grace placed in a real quality really distinct is made up of contradictory notes. This is the argument of Suarez: «Perhaps a spiritual quality is not possible which is not a vital act, but is after the manner of a first act and yet by its nature is transient and as it were dependent on its effect: for if it does not depend on it, why, when it ceases, is it immediately corrupted, since it is in an incorruptible subject and is expelled by no contrary?» To this argument indeed no satisfaction is given if you say that this is the nature of this quality, that it suffers these two things at once: with these words you indeed repeat your thesis, but you leave intact the contrary argument, which shows that this nature is repugnant.

The third argument is situated in this, that we demonstrate that without a quality of this kind, through the divine efficiency alone, that is obtained for which those authors demand this quality, i. e. the elevation of the faculty to the supernatural order. It is supposed that the faculty, not yet furnished with supernatural habits, is to be elevated transiently, when it is prepared, by God. When we have demonstrated that, that will be accomplished which we enunciated in the second place from the beginning (n. III.), which in itself is not altogether distinct from the preceding, and thus we will also give satisfaction to arguments 2 and 3.

Therefore let us first hear s. Thomas, I. II. q. CX. a. 2: «Man is helped in two ways by the gratuitous will of God. In one way, inasmuch as the soul of man is moved by God to know or will or do something. And in this way the gratuitous effect itself in man is not a quality, but a certain motion of the soul: for the act of the mover in the moved is motion.» And thus in all these questions about grace the holy Doctor speaks, mention of quality being made only then, when the discourse is about permanent grace.

It confirms what has been said thus far, and likewise paves the way for us to that which is now to be declared by us.

The holy Doctor speaks of salutary and therefore supernatural acts; for it is a question of the gratuitous will of God helping: but the soul is helped by God to place these acts; therefore the soul is made powerful to elicit these acts and thereby is constituted in the supernatural order; yet no quality is infused: therefore 1) s. Thomas judged that the faculty is elevated supernaturally through actual grace, without the ministry of any quality. But how can this be done? The holy Doctor compares 2) the action of God exciting pious thoughts, volitions, etc. in the soul to the action of the mover upon the mobile. The saying has been repeated so often by s. Thomas, that the act of the mover (not the activity) is the very motion of the mobile. When the soul is moved by God, the act of the mover will be a certain motion of the soul: but the motions of the soul are nothing but vital acts of cognition or volition; that therefore is what proceeds from the activity of God moving. Indeed a body, as mobile, is only passive: but the soul, since it is living, its motion is a vital act, to eliciting which by its own vital power it is moved by God. It is necessary therefore that the very power of the soul be subject to the activity of God moving. And indeed in the very motion of a body, before the action of motion, there exists a contact of the mover and the mobile, through which the application of the prior activity to the latter is made. Something similar is to be supposed in the divine motion, nor is there any reason why you should deny that it is supposed by s. Thomas. Namely, the created power to be moved is united, with priority of nature, to the divine mover, so that there exists one adequate principle of the motion or act that is to follow. And it is quite certain that a principle which is subordinate and excited to act by a superior cause and operating under it and with it, can not only do that which it could by itself alone, but also that to which it is borne by the superior cause, or that for which it has potency, provided it be moved by the superior cause. But God, moving the human soul, can by the efficacy of his power move it either only to that to which the soul is naturally borne, or also to that which the soul can do under the power of God moving the soul above the exigency of its nature. Under such efficacy of the divine power is explained that which is called the obediential potency of the soul (de Deo creante, Th. XII.), so that the soul operating under God and with God can bring forth acts which with natural power alone, together with the natural concurrence of God, it could not accomplish, i. e. it can elicit supernatural acts. Wherefore in this matter the faculty is not to be regarded as operating alone, but as joined to God acting in it and at the same time with it, and acting beyond and above the exigency of its nature. On account of this conjunction in activity the soul can no longer remain within the bounds of its natural powers, but is truly and really elevated, acquiring a new manner of acting which responds to its obediential potency, even though there is no other reality besides God acting and the soul operating under him and with him.

When therefore the adversaries say: if there is no real insita quality, we have only nature, which cannot bring forth supernatural acts, they do not reason well, and they impute to us that which we vehemently deny. For the principle of the act is not nature alone, but nature with God not only concurring but preventing and moving it to act; and because God prevents and moves the faculty above its natural exigency, rendering by the efficacy of his power its obediential potency ready to act; the powers by which the faculty acts are not natural but supernatural. Here it seems to us is the concept of the doctrine of s. Thomas, who under actual grace supposes supernatural acts and denies that qualities are infused by God. The necessity, therefore, of any quality, when the question is of the permanent or habitual elevation of the faculty, must be sought or demonstrated from elsewhere; but of this matter we do not treat here. Moreover by these things satisfaction has also been given to the remaining difficulties brought forward above; therefore let this be the end here.

Corollary. From this and the preceding Thesis gather that physical causality belongs to grace.