Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

I. That prevenient grace adds moral powers is evident from what has been said. This moral power, if considered in itself alone, does not alter the physical power of acting. It is asked, therefore, whether grace also confers physical powers on us, so that through it the power of acting is physically greater. Physical power, or physical force, is the efficient principle of the act, so that without it that which is done through it can be brought about not merely with difficulty, but absolutely not at all. Physical power arises from the entitative perfection itself of the agent principle; indeed, it is that very perfection insofar as it is ordered to acting.

When, therefore, it is asserted that through grace physical powers for acting are added to the faculty, it is said 1) negatively, that the power absolutely necessary for eliciting salutary acts is not wholly from nature it is said 2) positively, that that power is also from grace; and therefore through grace formally existing in nature the physical power of the faculty is greater, so that the faculty can produce an act or effect more perfect in the order of being than without grace.

This, moreover, is what we defend, setting aside, however, the question that will have to be treated later, namely what and in what manner nature together with grace contribute to eliciting the salutary act. The demonstration for proving this must be sought from that concept of grace which all the Fathers, disputing about it accurately, formed in their minds and handed down to us.

II. Thus the manner of speaking of the divine witnesses concerning the power and efficacy of grace comes down to this: a) that without grace we do nothing that is expedient for salvation; that God works in us to will and to accomplish; that without grace we are not sufficient to think in a salutary manner; that through grace it is brought about that we are able to do what we have known to be done; that without grace we cannot fulfill the divine commandments; that it is brought about in us through the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit that we are able to act as we ought: that grace is given not only that we may be able to fulfill the commandments easily, but that we may be able to fulfill them at all; that by the mere vigor of nature we are not able, not to say all or more, but nor to do anything that pertains to the salvation of eternal life; that God, by preparing the will through His grace, confers the power: c) that without grace no good work can be done, not even the least: indeed d) that neither Adam in integral nature, nor the Angels in the state of the way, could do anything good without the actual help of God. Cf. the authorities of the Apostolic See cited by Celestine, the Councils of Carthage and Orange II, Augustine passim in the works against the Pelagians, Prosper adv. the Collator, etc. It is clear that in these formulas the discourse is not about some dignity alone of the act, which accrues to it from the grace of God, but of itself and directly the discourse is always about the power of acting, which is conferred through grace, through the help of God, and through the help of God alone, and about the powerlessness of nature alone to do the same. Therefore, unless we wish to play with words, or to judge that the Fathers played with words, a certain power and efficacy of grace for salutary works is asserted in these formulas. Now this power is either moral only, or also physical: and it must be one or the other, because between them there is no middle. But it is evident that it is not only moral. For it is manifest that, if only moral power were conferred, it would be false that without grace no salutary work is possible, even that work which suffers no difficulty from the corruption of nature, such as thinking, so that it would have been impossible even for integral and angelic nature: for if only moral powers were conferred through grace, the salutary work would be only difficult without it, and therefore not every work would be impossible; but some work, in which especially there is no difficulty and where nature is not corrupted, could be done, and in fact would be done, and not infrequently. Therefore the power which is asserted of grace is a physical power. You will say that without a fitting natural thought no natural good whatsoever can be brought about by the will, and yet that thought confers not physical, but moral powers. I answer that it is false that without that thought and the subsequent fitting indeliberate affection a good cannot be done, if another thought of the same thing is present: but only this is true, that it is not done, and for this reason it is not done, because the will does not will it. But the Fathers do not teach only that without grace nothing of salutary good is done, but that nothing can be done, that there is not in nature the vigor for eliciting any good, whether a pious thought or a pious love; even if other thoughts bearing toward it are present.

II. It may also be proved from the analogy of faith. For it must be held that actual grace is a principle of life seated in second act, which is proper to the supernatural order; and therefore that the same grace intrinsically pertains to the supernatural order. Now it is evident from what has been said in the Treatise on the Supernatural Order (de Deo Creant. Th. XXX. seq.) that this order, in respect of ontological perfection, exceeds the natural order; consequently, the power of acting proper to the supernatural order must ontologically surpass the power of the natural order: since, therefore, that power is conferred through grace, it is necessary that grace bestow on our faculties a more excellent ontological perfection, which is nothing other than to confer physical powers on them. How this is done we can declare from those things which we will establish in Th. seq.