Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

I. We supposed in the preceding theses that powers are conferred on man by actual grace, as the very definition of this same grace teaches; now we ask whether this is true and of what kind these powers are. This thesis is not exclusive; for we shall teach in the following Thesis that grace also confers powers of another order.

It is certain that actual grace exercises a moral causality with respect to the human will. For it calls, stirs, draws, and allures the will to the good: indeed, because it is itself the calling, stirring, etc., it obtains this moral causality after the manner of a form: but God, who is the author of the calling, stirring, etc., namely He who calls, stirs, etc., is under this respect the efficiently moral cause of the acts of those who are done because of that calling, stirring, etc. However, this moral causality of grace must be distinguished, at least in concept (whether it is really distinct we shall discuss at the end of the thesis), from those moral powers which in the thesis we say are conferred on the will by grace. For the moral power of grace is called that power by which it comes about that it is more or less easy to overcome the difficulties arising from the inclination innate in us to those things whose love is not conformable to reason; insofar as because of certain thoughts and affections toward the good implanted in us by God we are able to overcome those difficulties, whether because the inclination to the good is increased, or because the inclination to evil is diminished. This power is therefore called moral, because it is situated in a certain knowledge, delight, inclination, etc., by which, as such, not a physical but a moral faculty for the act is obtained, for the reason that a certain difficulty is removed and facility is procured, while even without it there exists in us the physical power for the act.

But now it is manifest that actual grace provides such powers to the will. For it is itself the knowledge opportune for acting honestly, it is itself the delight, the sweetness of the good, the affection of soul and the inclination to acting honestly, it is itself the love and complacency in the good, the ardor of charity and the inclination toward the good; but when these exist, the proneness to evil is at least diminished and facility to the good is added or increased: therefore the soul formally equipped with these obtains moral powers for the good. Certainly experience teaches us that when we experience difficulty in acting honestly, this proceeds from the fact that we feel a certain inclination, more or less vehement, to dishonest things, which if some supervening light of truth and affection and sweetness of the honest should occupy the soul, immediately the difficulty vanishes, at least in great part, and we feel ourselves eager for performing every arduous honest deed: but this is done through actual graces: therefore.

III. But it will not be inopportune to discuss something about the force and necessity of indeliberate acts in the natural order itself, so that the analogous character of grace may be understood more fully.

a) Do such indeliberate movements of the will, then, always exist in us before deliberate acts? If we consult experience first, it is certain that most frequently from the knowledge of the intellect indeliberate movements are stirred up in the will, which are an affection toward that which is proposed as good or an aversion from that which is proposed as evil, and it is frequently certain that both movements are stirred up at the same time in the will, according as the objects proposed together are diverse, or the diverse respect which is considered by the intellect in one object. But the eliciting cause of these movements is not free; because the exercise of liberty is not yet present, but it is a necessary cause; the will elicits these movements, namely, insofar as it is nature. But a necessary cause in the same circumstances always acts in the same way: therefore such movements always exist in those circumstances. But the circumstances in which experience shows those indeliberate movements to exist are either the mere knowledge of some thing going before, or at most the knowledge of a thing which in some respect regards us and can procure for us some good or evil. Therefore, as often as such knowledge goes before, such spontaneous movements must exist.

b) But if the question be raised why these acts exist, we first answer that this is the nature of the human will, that when it passes from potency to act it proceeds gradually, as it were by steps, and therefore before deliberate acts it bursts forth into such imperfect spontaneous acts, which are a certain way and disposition to those deliberate acts. We answer secondly that the final cause of these indeliberate movements, or that which nature itself intends through them (which indeed is that which naturally follows from them), is the preparation of the will for deliberate acts, whether it be a preparation necessary simply that a deliberate act may exist, or necessary in a certain respect, namely, that the deliberate act may exist in a sweet and easy manner. We certainly experience this in ourselves, that unless something pleases us under some respect, we do not choose it. And indeed the will, even when it acts most orderly, seeks its own good, for the good is proper to each one; therefore it is necessary that the intellect propose that which is to be chosen also as a good of the will. But now, whether because from this proposition of the intellect that spontaneous complacency of the will follows necessarily, or because it is required that the will choose (for one or the other must be the case, since these acts exist, as we have seen, with natural necessity), it will always be true that these acts are the natural element of the disposition and preparation of the will for deliberate acts.

Nevertheless, just as some knowledge is indeed required for the exercise of liberty, but it is not necessary that that be chosen which is apprehended with clearer and more certain knowledge, so although some spontaneous complacency be required, it is nevertheless not necessary that the will, which is mistress of its own act, follow the more vehement one: although this not infrequently happens.

c) But concerning the necessity of this spontaneous affection or complacency excited in the will from the knowledge that goes before, Augustine speaks in L. I. ad Simplician. 9. II, n. 21: «Who, he says, would embrace in his mind something that does not delight him?» and in the following n. «the will itself, unless something occurs that delights and invites the mind, can in no way be moved: but that this should occur is not in man's power.»

From these considerations moreover it follows that when the spontaneous affection toward something is weak and, on the contrary, vehement toward another, it is difficult and rarely happens that the will is freely borne toward the former.

IV. This grace, insofar as it bestows sweetness and facility on the will, is healing grace, insofar as this is understood as that grace which heals the wound, namely of concupiscence, whose necessity arises from the loosened rein of concupiscence; for a certain impotence of acting honestly has been introduced because of the relaxed concupiscence in us from the sin of the first parent. This impotence, with respect to individual acts, is diminished or removed by healing or medicinal grace, about which Augustine speaks so frequently. In this matter, lest you be deceived, note that this grace is in the present order supernatural, and besides this office of healing the wound of concupiscence it also performs another, about which in the following Th. But in the state of integrity, in place of this grace insofar as it is medicinal against the movements of concupiscence, there was the habitual gift of integrity, which was itself also gratuitous.

V. Briefly now the question is to be settled which above we left in the middle: namely, whether the moral causality of grace is the same as the moral power which it confers. We answer, however, that in reality they are the same. For moral causality belongs formally to grace, insofar as it is formally a calling, a stirring, and the like: but this calling, stirring, etc. is in reality nothing other than knowledge, persuasion, delight, complacency, sweetness, etc., which are all vital acts; moreover, the will equipped with these is formally made morally more powerful for acting: therefore. But they differ in concept; because the moral causality of grace is regarded insofar as grace is from God provoking man to the good, while the powers are regarded insofar as grace itself, existing formally in the faculty, makes it expedite for acting.

VI. But what we have taught about the moral powers conferred by actual grace is not so universally and exclusively to be taken, as if we wished to say that there are no moral powers for acting honestly without actual grace, or that any actual grace by itself alone confers powers sufficient for the perfection of the work: but we have affirmed only that actual grace, when it is conferred, provides moral powers, and indeed any actual grace confers some moral powers toward something.

APPENDIX.

The perfection of the indeliberate movements, which God excites in the soul to obtain some consent of the will, can be so great that the opposite dissent of the will becomes morally impossible.

I. We call morally impossible that which, although it is physically possible, is nevertheless extremely difficult for our nature and therefore, considering the common manner of acting of men, either never or almost never happens. Now with these principles laid down which we stated in the preceding Thesis, it is manifest that when knowledge either represents two opposite objects, or one object both under the respect of the eligible and under the respect of the non-eligible, it can happen that the indeliberate movement of the will toward one object or toward one respect of the object is most vehement, and the indeliberate movement toward the opposite is very slight. In this hypothesis, however, it is morally impossible, i.e. extremely difficult, that the will choose that toward which there exists a very slight indeliberate movement. But by not choosing that, it will choose that toward which it is borne most vehemently; for the will constituted in first act necessarily does something, liberty existing toward either alternative. But God can excite indeliberate movements toward some eligible good in such a way that they are most vehement and the movements toward the opposite are very slight: therefore. The physical possibility nevertheless remains, because that very slight movement toward the opposite is sufficient for the will, because of its own indifference, to embrace it, but the moral possibility is lacking.

Indeed Ripalda, De Ente Supern. D. CIX. Sect. 2. says that this is the common opinion of the Theologians and that he knows no one who denies it. He brings forth, however, from authority, to prove this, an argument from Prov. XXI, 1: The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will, He shall turn it — and from August. Enchir. c. 98. «Who would so impiously rave as to say that God cannot convert the evil wills of men, which He wills, when He wills, into the good?» and other similar testimonies of the same author. Moreover, for this to be true, it is necessary that this power be ascribed to grace, by which, with the physical possibility indeed remaining, the moral impossibility of dissent can be engendered. Suarez, in the posthumous work De vera Intelligentia auxilii efficacis c. 35., proves that God can impose a certain necessity on the will toward the act: he disputes, however, how this could come to be; he supposes that some quality is possible, but he says it is more probable that it would come about through the action of God, n. 12. Then in n. 17. he makes mention of the kind of necessity which we have explained.

1. Indeed if it be supposed that the will cannot freely will that toward which it has not first been affected (at least by nature) with a spontaneous movement, it must also be said, speaking of the possible, that the divine excitation of indeliberate movements of this kind can also be such a cause, that together with these the deliberate movement of the will toward the opposite is physically impossible. Namely, God can bring it about not only that a most vehement indeliberate movement of inclination toward something exists, but also that any indeliberate movement of inclination toward the opposite ceases or is not excited, but rather that only a movement of aversion toward it exists: but in this hypothesis the dissent of the will is impossible not only morally, but physically; because, no natural indeliberate inclination existing toward something, there is lacking — as we suppose from the preceding Th. n. III. — the sufficient reason of the free consent of the will toward it. But if in this the will does not consent, it will certainly consent in that; because it must will something, as we have already reminded. Cf. Ripalda ibid. Sect. 3.

III. Note that when we claim this power for God and His grace, we do not teach that God in reality acts thus, much less that this is the ordinary and common manner of divine Providence, but we wish only to show what the grace of God can do, so that its moral efficacy may be thoroughly understood. But we think it is not absurd to judge that God has repeatedly so acted and acts with His Saints; for whom if at that time the expedite power of meriting is actually lacking, this defect (which otherwise is present in us very frequently, as when e.g. we sleep) will be compensated by that good which is a certain foretaste of heavenly beatitude. Cannot God grant to some wayfarer the vision of Himself for some brief space of time? Or will it be judged impossible or illicit for God, because then the power of meriting would cease?

Moreover, there must be ascribed to God the power of bringing it about, short of the communication of His immediate vision and with no coercion applied, that sin be physically impossible in the will. It is proved from the fact that natural beatitude is possible; but with the certainty and inamissibility of beatitude, the expedite physical power for the act of sinning cannot cohere; and God does not seem able to impede this in any better way than that which we have now proposed. Therefore.

Note. The doctrine on the moral efficacy of grace delivered in the preceding Th. is to be held accurately; because, as we shall teach later, the distinction between congruous and non-congruous grace, between efficacious and purely sufficient grace, depends on that moral efficacy of grace.

I. That prevenient grace adds moral powers is evident from what has been said. This moral power, if considered in itself alone, does not alter the physical power of acting. It is asked, therefore, whether grace also confers physical powers on us, so that through it the power of acting is physically greater. Physical power, or physical force, is the efficient principle of the act, so that without it that which is done through it can be brought about not merely with difficulty, but absolutely not at all. Physical power arises from the entitative perfection itself of the agent principle; indeed, it is that very perfection insofar as it is ordered to acting.

When, therefore, it is asserted that through grace physical powers for acting are added to the faculty, it is said 1) negatively, that the power absolutely necessary for eliciting salutary acts is not wholly from nature it is said 2) positively, that that power is also from grace; and therefore through grace formally existing in nature the physical power of the faculty is greater, so that the faculty can produce an act or effect more perfect in the order of being than without grace.

This, moreover, is what we defend, setting aside, however, the question that will have to be treated later, namely what and in what manner nature together with grace contribute to eliciting the salutary act. The demonstration for proving this must be sought from that concept of grace which all the Fathers, disputing about it accurately, formed in their minds and handed down to us.

II. Thus the manner of speaking of the divine witnesses concerning the power and efficacy of grace comes down to this: a) that without grace we do nothing that is expedient for salvation; that God works in us to will and to accomplish; that without grace we are not sufficient to think in a salutary manner; that through grace it is brought about that we are able to do what we have known to be done; that without grace we cannot fulfill the divine commandments; that it is brought about in us through the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit that we are able to act as we ought: that grace is given not only that we may be able to fulfill the commandments easily, but that we may be able to fulfill them at all; that by the mere vigor of nature we are not able, not to say all or more, but nor to do anything that pertains to the salvation of eternal life; that God, by preparing the will through His grace, confers the power: c) that without grace no good work can be done, not even the least: indeed d) that neither Adam in integral nature, nor the Angels in the state of the way, could do anything good without the actual help of God. Cf. the authorities of the Apostolic See cited by Celestine, the Councils of Carthage and Orange II, Augustine passim in the works against the Pelagians, Prosper adv. the Collator, etc. It is clear that in these formulas the discourse is not about some dignity alone of the act, which accrues to it from the grace of God, but of itself and directly the discourse is always about the power of acting, which is conferred through grace, through the help of God, and through the help of God alone, and about the powerlessness of nature alone to do the same. Therefore, unless we wish to play with words, or to judge that the Fathers played with words, a certain power and efficacy of grace for salutary works is asserted in these formulas. Now this power is either moral only, or also physical: and it must be one or the other, because between them there is no middle. But it is evident that it is not only moral. For it is manifest that, if only moral power were conferred, it would be false that without grace no salutary work is possible, even that work which suffers no difficulty from the corruption of nature, such as thinking, so that it would have been impossible even for integral and angelic nature: for if only moral powers were conferred through grace, the salutary work would be only difficult without it, and therefore not every work would be impossible; but some work, in which especially there is no difficulty and where nature is not corrupted, could be done, and in fact would be done, and not infrequently. Therefore the power which is asserted of grace is a physical power. You will say that without a fitting natural thought no natural good whatsoever can be brought about by the will, and yet that thought confers not physical, but moral powers. I answer that it is false that without that thought and the subsequent fitting indeliberate affection a good cannot be done, if another thought of the same thing is present: but only this is true, that it is not done, and for this reason it is not done, because the will does not will it. But the Fathers do not teach only that without grace nothing of salutary good is done, but that nothing can be done, that there is not in nature the vigor for eliciting any good, whether a pious thought or a pious love; even if other thoughts bearing toward it are present.

II. It may also be proved from the analogy of faith. For it must be held that actual grace is a principle of life seated in second act, which is proper to the supernatural order; and therefore that the same grace intrinsically pertains to the supernatural order. Now it is evident from what has been said in the Treatise on the Supernatural Order (de Deo Creant. Th. XXX. seq.) that this order, in respect of ontological perfection, exceeds the natural order; consequently, the power of acting proper to the supernatural order must ontologically surpass the power of the natural order: since, therefore, that power is conferred through grace, it is necessary that grace bestow on our faculties a more excellent ontological perfection, which is nothing other than to confer physical powers on them. How this is done we can declare from those things which we will establish in Th. seq.

I. Certain theologians, especially the Thomists, teach that besides actual exciting grace placed in vital acts, another really distinct actual grace is to be admitted, which precedes the acts themselves and is their principle, and which is properly exciting grace. Grace of this kind would inhere in the faculty to which it is conferred after the manner of a quality, whence it is called a quality — a quality, however, not vital, because it is not an act, but precedes the act; moreover a quality flowing by its own nature, because it is conferred for the sake of acts; since therefore the acts flow and do not remain, it itself also flows with them, i. e. ceases to be. From this quality the faculties, being informed, attain that they can elicit any supernatural act whatsoever, whence these qualities together with the faculties are the principle of the supernatural act. And indeed a twofold genus of these qualities is distinguished by certain theologians, one which is the principle of indeliberate acts, the other of deliberate acts. But at present we dispute properly about the former genus, because with it excluded, the other also, with easy work, having regard to deliberate action under grace, can be excluded.

But this is to be considered, that these qualities are judged necessary when the infused supernatural habits are lacking; for with these existing, the faculties are already elevated and powerful for supernatural acts. When therefore it is asked whether qualities of this kind, dead qualities, pertain to actual grace, the question is about actual grace which precedes justification and with respect to those acts for which infused habits do not yet pre-exist.

II. That we may proceed in order, we will first set forth the arguments of those who defend these qualities; then we will vindicate our opinion and at the same time satisfy their arguments.

Their arguments come back to this. 1) The idea of actual grace which the Fathers exhibit comes back to this, that through it God excites, draws, knocks at, calls, touches the heart of man: but excitation, drawing, knocking, calling, touching are not effectively from the one who is excited, drawn, etc., but only from the one exciting, drawing, etc.; therefore actual grace is something other than the vital acts; for these are effectively from man.

2. In order that the faculties may operate salutarily, they must be elevated supernaturally; and therefore the elevation of the faculty is presupposed to the act. Moreover an elevation of this kind must be real and intrinsic; but this cannot be done except through some real form or quality superadded. For the faculty must be really and intrinsically changed: but according to the common doctrine, nothing can be really and intrinsically changed except through something new existing in it which was not there before; for if nothing new is in it, it itself will be the same in the same way as before; but if it is the same and in the same way, no real change has occurred.

3. Grace is such that without it nature is essentially impotent to elicit acts; wherefore it itself confers new powers upon the faculties and is the cause — if not adequate, at least principal — of the acts; but that which confers new real powers on the faculty, which is the principal cause of the acts, is certainly something more perfect than the faculty itself, and distinct from it and inhering in it as a form: therefore.

4. Grace is in us from God without us — not only without us freely willing and meriting, but without us producing it by our own power. Therefore it is something altogether distinct from our acts and from our natural power. But if it is such, since it is certainly something real in us, it is necessary that it be some real transient quality, for any mode or modal quality is not really distinct from the acts themselves and from the power of nature.

III. Our opinion is that qualities of this kind, really distinct, infused into the faculty, are not to be admitted, but that the elevation of the faculty to elicit a supernatural act (since the faculty is to be elevated only transiently) is not made through such qualities, but is made immediately through the divine power operating in the faculty.

As to the first, this is first the opinion of Suarez (De div. Gratia I. III. c. 4): «We suppose,» he says, «that the acts are supernatural and therefore cannot be elicited by the natural potency alone through its own power: for it is chiefly for this reason that the authors were moved to say that another grace prior to these acts is infused into us, which is their principle, which they will to be a created thing inhering in the potency, really distinct from the act of grace and its principle (behold the clearly expressed opinion about which our question is), which they call a pure virtuous motion, so that it is not a quality: others say that it is an actual or transient quality received by us and in no way made by us;» he adds further: «But I indeed judge that no such entity is infused which is prior in time or nature to the very act of exciting grace or is its proximate principle, but that the Holy Spirit alone immediately and through himself infuses these acts, elevating the potency to accomplish them.» He teaches the same in c. 19. Moreover in these words three things are contained: a) no entity is infused into the faculty so that the act of exciting grace, for example a pious thought, can be elicited: b) that which others will to be done by God through the mediation of this entity, God brings about immediately through himself: c) God acting thus is not only the author of the supernatural acts, the potency being left in its natural order, as certain persons, I know not why, dream that Suarez judged, but at the same time elevates the potency to accomplish those supernatural acts, i. e. places it in the supernatural order. Cf. the same, de fide III. S. 3. n. 11. This and nothing else is our opinion.

We draw the first argument from the authority of the Fathers. Such a real quality, existing as the principle of supernatural, indeliberate acts — of pious thought, of delight, etc. — would be the principal actual grace, or rather it alone would be actual grace, and the vital acts would rather have to be counted among the effects of grace, as Card. Gotti readily concedes in II. p., Tract. VI. g. 2. ad 2. § 2. But, if this is so, it would also be necessary that with those witnesses of revelation who spoke and disputed most frequently and abundantly about grace, some mention of this quality, whether under this or some other equivalent name, should occur, especially then when they strive to indicate the first grace by which God prevents us. But it is certain 1) that concerning such a quality there is a deep silence among those witnesses2) that when they will to indicate the first grace, on which the whole work of justification depends, they so exhibit it as to signify clearly that it is placed both generally in the operation of God and specifically in some vital act.

Since therefore neither the operation of God nor the vital acts are such real dead qualities; yet from those witnesses we are to be taught what grace is, nor is it lawful for us to invent new and unheard-of things at our pleasure; it is manifest that the champions of the real quality are destitute of the authority of the ancients. This is the argument of Suarez, loc. cit. «In the councils,» he says, «and in the Fathers we find no trace of such grace; rather they posit the inspiration itself as the first grace, and moreover indicate that it is infused immediately by the Holy Spirit himself and not through the mediation of some quality.»

The last minor of the argument brought forward is therefore proved. And indeed as to the first part the proof comes back to this, that we show that what is brought forward by the Thomists from the Fathers as indications and arguments of this quality does not really signify it. This we will accomplish by at the same time solving the preceding arguments, which contain reasonings collected from those things which the Fathers assert about actual grace.

Therefore let us first dispatch the argument drawn from the appellations given to grace. They say (arg. 1) that it is the doctrine of the Fathers that God through grace excites, draws, knocks at, calls, touches the heart of man: moreover excitation, calling, knocking, touching are not effectively from the one who is excited, knocked at, touched, called, but from the extrinsic agent; grace therefore is the effect of God alone: but the vital acts are also an effect of the faculty: likewise the prevenient grace of God is in us without us; but the vital acts are from us (arg. 4): therefore some grace besides the vital acts is indicated clearly enough by the Fathers; which grace cannot be anything but a real quality. But 1) it is certain that excitation, calling, knocking, touching are to be taken metaphorically. 2) It is also certain that by these appellations — God excites, calls, etc. — two things are signified, namely the formal excitation, calling, etc. and the efficient cause of this calling, excitation, etc. existing formally in man. It is certain 3) that the efficient and extrinsic cause is God, who by the efficacy of his will produces this effect. It is certain 4) that the act of the mover in the mobile is nothing but the motion of the mobile itself, as s. Thomas teaches in 1. 2. g. CX. a. 2., and that excitation, calling, etc. are a certain intentional motion or vital act of the soul: for just as a mechanical force is excited formally through a motion existing in it from an extrinsic agent, which motion is an act both of the mover and of the moved, so the vital faculties, the intellective and the volitive, whose motion is nothing but some vital act of themselves, are excited formally through vital acts of cognition and delight or similar ones, which exist in them from the special efficacy of God acting.

And indeed 5) to what, according to the Fathers, does this excitation, calling, touching of the heart, etc. come back? Surely to this: that it is a certain illumination of the intellect, a certain inspiration of love, of delight, or of the like. August. in Psal. CII. n. 16: «He calls on every side to correction, he calls on every side to penance.... he calls through intimate knowledge.» In Ioan. Tract. XXVI. n. 7: «Everyone who has heard from the Father and has learned comes to me. See how the Father draws: by teaching he delights, not by imposing necessity.» Ad Simplic. I. I. q. 2. n. 21: «Who can believe unless he is touched by some calling, i. e. by some testimony of things? who has it in his power that his mind be reached by such a sight, whereby his will is moved to faith?» The African bishops to Zosimus: «The will is prepared by the Lord, and that they may do something good, he himself touches the hearts of his faithful with paternal inspirations.» But by the inspiration of what? Surely of that of which Augustine frequently speaks, namely of love, of delight, of sweetness; just as also the Fathers of the Second Synod of Orange, c. 7, call the grace necessary for doing any good that pertains to the salvation of eternal life an illumination and an inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who gives to all sweetness in consenting and in believing the truth. Therefore when it is said that God calls us through his grace, etc., if by the name of grace some created gift is understood, that grace is not distinct from the calling; but if by the name of grace the efficient cause of the calling is understood, it is God, who indeed alone calls and excites us. In the locutions of the Fathers, indeed, something is signified which precedes the vital acts; as when the same Arausican Fathers, cc. 4 and 6, teach that it is brought about in us through the infusion and operation of the Holy Spirit that we will to be cleansed from sin, that we believe and can do all good things: yet that is nothing which persuades that there is some real quality implanted by God; but it is the very operation of God, by which the faculty is elevated and rendered capable of acting supernaturally: of which operation we are about to speak shortly. But to that which is brought forward from the same Fathers — that prevenient grace is in us without us — we easily respond by distinguishing. The grace of God is in us without us freely acting and meriting — I grant; without us acting by the power of our nature — I further distinguish: by elevated nature — I deny; by pure nature — I further distinguish, i. e. it alone does not suffice — I concede; that it, when elevated, does not really act — I deny. Hence Bernard, De Grat. et lib. arbitr.: «God works in us these three things, i. e. to think, to will, to perfect. The first indeed without us, the second with us, the third through us.» Thought, which is a vital act, cannot come to be without us physically acting: therefore the rò 'without us' does not exclude the physical activity of the faculty. The other arguments we will weigh a little later.

The same minor of our argument is proved as to the other part. The question of the Fathers was with the Massilians concerning the beginning of Faith, that is, concerning the beginning of man's conversion to God; and the Fathers maintained that the beginning is from the grace of God: moreover this grace, of which the Fathers spoke in this controversy, is the first grace, which no salutary act precedes, which in the order of execution is the first principle of salvation. Now of what nature is this grace? It is a certain knowledge, it is a certain will (or volition). Thus Augustine in de Praedestinatione Sanctorum, c. 2, discourses: «Commending (Paul) that grace which is not given according to any merits, but effects all good merits — not because we are fit, he says, to think anything as from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God. Let those attend here and weigh these words who think that the beginning of faith is from us and the supplement of faith is from God. For who does not see that to think is prior to believing? surely no one believes anything unless he has first thought that it is to be believed... What therefore pertains to religion and piety (about which the Apostle was speaking), if we are not fit to think anything as from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God, certainly we are not fit to believe anything as from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God.» — not from ourselves, since without thought we cannot believe, but our sufficiency, by which we begin to believe, is from God Cont. duas epist. pelagg. I. II. c. 9: »But truly what is written, it is man's to prepare the heart and from the Lord the answer of the tongue (Prov. XVI. 1.), they are deceived by not understanding well, so that they think that to prepare the heart, i. e. to begin good, pertains to man without the help of the grace of God. Far be it that the children of promise so understand, that... when they have heard from Paul: not because we are fit to think anything as from ourselves, they should convict him, saying: behold, we are fit from ourselves to prepare the heart, and thereby also to think something good. For who can prepare a good heart without a good thought?.... Man prepares the heart, yet not without the help of God, who so touches the heart that man prepares the heart.» And c. 12: »Grace is at work not only that we may know the things to be done, but also that we may do the things known; not only that we may believe the things to be loved, but also that we may love the things believed. This grace, if it is to be called doctrine, certainly let it be so called that God be believed to infuse it more deeply and inwardly with ineffable sweetness, so that he not only shows the truth, but also imparts charity. For thus God teaches those who are called according to the purpose, at once giving them both to know what they do and to do what they know.» And c. 20: »That possibility (namely of nature), not as he opines, is one and the same root. For charity is one root of goods, cupidity another root of evils, and they differ from each other as much as virtue and vice. But plainly that possibility is capable of both roots; because man can not only have charity, by which he is a good tree, but can also have cupidity, by which he is an evil tree. But the cupidity of man, which is the vice of man, has man as its author... but charity, which is the virtue of God, is from God for us.» Now it is manifest that in these testimonies grace is set forth by Augustine as placed in thought, in will, in love; and it is equally manifest that in these testimonies — of which very many others most similar could be brought forward — that grace is indicated which is the root of supernatural life, which is immediately superadded to the possibility of nature, through which Faith begins in us, through which love begins in us, through which the heart is prepared; but this is the grace which no other genus of grace precedes; but it is that from which the operation of God in us takes its beginning: therefore.

The second argument is taken from the very nature of the thing. Such a quality involves a contradiction. For by the very fact that it is a really distinct quality, it is a certain permanent thing: for it is not motion or action: but whatever is not of this kind is permanent, or does not cease to be except through a contrary or through the positive action of some cause: therefore this actual grace would be a permanent thing. But the nature of actual grace requires that it be something transient, not otherwise than the action of the faculty, ceasing without any action of a contrary or of one expelling it: therefore actual grace placed in a real quality really distinct is made up of contradictory notes. This is the argument of Suarez: «Perhaps a spiritual quality is not possible which is not a vital act, but is after the manner of a first act and yet by its nature is transient and as it were dependent on its effect: for if it does not depend on it, why, when it ceases, is it immediately corrupted, since it is in an incorruptible subject and is expelled by no contrary?» To this argument indeed no satisfaction is given if you say that this is the nature of this quality, that it suffers these two things at once: with these words you indeed repeat your thesis, but you leave intact the contrary argument, which shows that this nature is repugnant.

The third argument is situated in this, that we demonstrate that without a quality of this kind, through the divine efficiency alone, that is obtained for which those authors demand this quality, i. e. the elevation of the faculty to the supernatural order. It is supposed that the faculty, not yet furnished with supernatural habits, is to be elevated transiently, when it is prepared, by God. When we have demonstrated that, that will be accomplished which we enunciated in the second place from the beginning (n. III.), which in itself is not altogether distinct from the preceding, and thus we will also give satisfaction to arguments 2 and 3.

Therefore let us first hear s. Thomas, I. II. q. CX. a. 2: «Man is helped in two ways by the gratuitous will of God. In one way, inasmuch as the soul of man is moved by God to know or will or do something. And in this way the gratuitous effect itself in man is not a quality, but a certain motion of the soul: for the act of the mover in the moved is motion.» And thus in all these questions about grace the holy Doctor speaks, mention of quality being made only then, when the discourse is about permanent grace.

It confirms what has been said thus far, and likewise paves the way for us to that which is now to be declared by us.

The holy Doctor speaks of salutary and therefore supernatural acts; for it is a question of the gratuitous will of God helping: but the soul is helped by God to place these acts; therefore the soul is made powerful to elicit these acts and thereby is constituted in the supernatural order; yet no quality is infused: therefore 1) s. Thomas judged that the faculty is elevated supernaturally through actual grace, without the ministry of any quality. But how can this be done? The holy Doctor compares 2) the action of God exciting pious thoughts, volitions, etc. in the soul to the action of the mover upon the mobile. The saying has been repeated so often by s. Thomas, that the act of the mover (not the activity) is the very motion of the mobile. When the soul is moved by God, the act of the mover will be a certain motion of the soul: but the motions of the soul are nothing but vital acts of cognition or volition; that therefore is what proceeds from the activity of God moving. Indeed a body, as mobile, is only passive: but the soul, since it is living, its motion is a vital act, to eliciting which by its own vital power it is moved by God. It is necessary therefore that the very power of the soul be subject to the activity of God moving. And indeed in the very motion of a body, before the action of motion, there exists a contact of the mover and the mobile, through which the application of the prior activity to the latter is made. Something similar is to be supposed in the divine motion, nor is there any reason why you should deny that it is supposed by s. Thomas. Namely, the created power to be moved is united, with priority of nature, to the divine mover, so that there exists one adequate principle of the motion or act that is to follow. And it is quite certain that a principle which is subordinate and excited to act by a superior cause and operating under it and with it, can not only do that which it could by itself alone, but also that to which it is borne by the superior cause, or that for which it has potency, provided it be moved by the superior cause. But God, moving the human soul, can by the efficacy of his power move it either only to that to which the soul is naturally borne, or also to that which the soul can do under the power of God moving the soul above the exigency of its nature. Under such efficacy of the divine power is explained that which is called the obediential potency of the soul (de Deo creante, Th. XII.), so that the soul operating under God and with God can bring forth acts which with natural power alone, together with the natural concurrence of God, it could not accomplish, i. e. it can elicit supernatural acts. Wherefore in this matter the faculty is not to be regarded as operating alone, but as joined to God acting in it and at the same time with it, and acting beyond and above the exigency of its nature. On account of this conjunction in activity the soul can no longer remain within the bounds of its natural powers, but is truly and really elevated, acquiring a new manner of acting which responds to its obediential potency, even though there is no other reality besides God acting and the soul operating under him and with him.

When therefore the adversaries say: if there is no real insita quality, we have only nature, which cannot bring forth supernatural acts, they do not reason well, and they impute to us that which we vehemently deny. For the principle of the act is not nature alone, but nature with God not only concurring but preventing and moving it to act; and because God prevents and moves the faculty above its natural exigency, rendering by the efficacy of his power its obediential potency ready to act; the powers by which the faculty acts are not natural but supernatural. Here it seems to us is the concept of the doctrine of s. Thomas, who under actual grace supposes supernatural acts and denies that qualities are infused by God. The necessity, therefore, of any quality, when the question is of the permanent or habitual elevation of the faculty, must be sought or demonstrated from elsewhere; but of this matter we do not treat here. Moreover by these things satisfaction has also been given to the remaining difficulties brought forward above; therefore let this be the end here.

Corollary. From this and the preceding Thesis gather that physical causality belongs to grace.