Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

I. By the name of inspiration there is understood in general that help by which the will is aroused and rendered capable of willing and operating as it ought. A twofold divine inspiration is distinguished, insofar as the will is affected, namely mediated and immediate. Of course, on account of the ontological connection between the exercise of the intellect and the exercise of the will, it comes about that, the illumination of the mind existing, a certain motion arises of itself in the will proportionate to that illumination. Wherefore he who illuminates the mind is also to be said, through this illumination, to move and arouse the will. This is the mediated motion or inspiration. That divine inspiration of the will is therefore called mediated which exists in the will on account of the divine illumination of the intellect. The reason why it is called mediated inspiration is that through it God does not act upon the will except through the mediation of the intellect, which, since it is already in act on account of the identity of the thinking and willing subject and on account of the natural connection of both operations, moves the will objectively. Mediated inspiration can be distinguished as twofold: extrinsic, namely that which takes place through an extrinsic and mediated illumination; and intrinsic, that which takes place through an immediate illumination.

Moreover, besides this twofold mediated inspiration, which we have described thus far, there is another, which is called immediate, namely that by which God acts physically upon the very principle of willing and perfects and elevates it. This other inspiration is a grace distinct from the illumination of the mind; and by the nature of the case, the illumination of the mind could be had without this inspiration of the will, and, conversely, the immediate inspiration of the will could be had without the immediate illumination of the intellect. It must be proved that both inspirations are to be numbered among actual graces.

II. Mention of that grace which we call inspiration of the will is most frequent among the Fathers. Indeed, just as in Augustine there occur appellations proper to that grace which is formally in the intellect, such as pious thought De bono persev. c. 8., high and secret calling Epist. ad Vitalem CCXVII, speech in thought Serm. XI, de Elia et Vidua Sarept., certain knowledge De pecc. merit. et remis I. II. c. 18, opening what lay hidden Ibid. c. 19., «knowledge of the truth»Serm. XVII in Psal. CXVII, 11. 3: so likewise there occur most frequently formulas by which is signified the grace that formally inheres in the will, such as infusion of charity Cont. duas epistt. pelag. L. II. c. 8., inspiration of love Ibid. I. IV. c. 5, spirit of charity ad Simplic. L. I, q. I., the grace by which the charity of God is poured out in our hearts De Grat. Christi c. 20, delight De Spirit. et lit. cap. 29, heavenly delight Serm. XLII. de verbis Isaiae n. 3, joyfulness in Psalm. LXXXV, condelectation de Nupt. et Concup. L. I. c. 38, pleasure in Ioann. Tract. 20, inspiration of sweetness Serm.

XVII in Psalm. CXVIII. n1. 3) desire for the good (Cont. duas epistt. pelagg. I. II. c. 9) holy desire (Cont. Maxim. L. I. c. 9) good will (De Gratia Christi. c. 24). Now, that mediated inspiration pertains to actual grace is left certain from the preceding thesis. For mediated inspiration is necessarily connected with the illumination of the mind; for, this being posited, by the nature of the case a certain motion follows in the will: since therefore the illumination of the mind pertains to actual grace, the mediated inspiration of the will will also necessarily pertain to it, since the illumination of the intellect itself is given for the sake of operation. Wherefore also the interior mediated inspiration must be certain. The question, therefore, cannot properly be about anything but the immediate inspiration.

III. It must therefore be proved that the interior immediate inspiration also is to be numbered in the class of actual graces. But it must be noted that the question now is not about the necessity of this grace, but it is only asked whether it is contained in the class of actual graces: which question indeed, as we said above about the illumination, can be raised either about the mere possibility or about the fact. Now, that it is possible, i.e., that in the order of possible actual graces this immediate inspiration also has a place, is easily clear. Immediate inspiration is that which, God acting physically in our will, exists in respect of some object proposed by the intellect. But it is certain that God can act physically upon the will by exciting acts both natural and supernatural; which indeed God brings about in the simplest way, i.e., by the command of His efficacious will; therefore.

But that inspirations of this kind are found also in the real order of actual graces is demonstrated from the fact that Tradition speaks of them as of graces which God confers. Indeed, in the Council of Carthag., ch. 4, it is defined that we are helped not only by the grace of God »because through it the understanding of the commandments is revealed and opened to us; but also through it it is granted to us that what we have known must be done we may also love and be able to do.... since both are a gift of God, both to know what we ought to do and to love so that we do it, so that, charity building up, knowledge may not be able to puff up. A twofold grace is therefore distinguished, namely the one by which the understanding of the commandments is revealed and opened to us; the other by which it is granted to us that what we have known must be done we may be able to love and to do.

But the former is the interior grace of immediate illumination; which is thus proved. For that which is placed by the Fathers in the lower position (not only), namely that the understanding of the commandments is revealed and opened to us, comprises whatever Pelagius conceded to the grace of God; but, as we shall say shortly and will certainly prove in its place, Pelagius also conceded the grace of interior illumination: therefore. Indeed, the very force of the words to reveal and open the understanding of the commandments designates that operation of God which acts upon the intellect, the commandments of God being present, i.e., proposed from without or in whatever way taken up for thought. Therefore here the Fathers speak of this immediate illumination.

Moreover, that is already of itself the grace of mediated inspiration. But besides this grace, which is knowledge and already the interior mediated inspiration, another grace is asserted, which is called charity, by which it comes about that we love those things which we have known must be done. That this is indeed another grace distinct from the former is evident even from this, that this latter builds up lest that one puff up, which cannot be said of one and the same grace merely having several effects. This other grace, moreover, besides the interior illumination, which is already the interior mediated inspiration, will necessarily be the grace of immediate inspiration. To this also pertains the statement adduced by Celestine among the authorities of the Apostolic See, ch. 8, namely «that God so works in the hearts of men and in the very free will itself, that holy thought, pious counsel, and every movement of good will are from God.» The emphasis is in that phrase, and He works in the very free will itself, by which the immediate action of God in the will is signified.

IV. Nor is the doctrine of Augustine different, who, having distinguished a twofold grace of illumination and of inspiration, calls the one greater than the other and supposes that the former can be without the latter. Indeed, it is certain that Augustine admitted the necessity of the interior grace of immediate illumination. It is established from his testimonies cited in the preceding Th., p. 20 ff. Therefore, although Augustine more frequently and chiefly inculcated the help of the will, because the principal question was about it, nevertheless, when occasion was given, Augustine also both taught and vindicated the immediate illumination, as is clear from the cited testimonies. Now, the certain opinion of Augustine, which he defended against the Pelagians, is that the grace of God is twofold, namely of knowledge and of love, the one distinct from the other. De Grat. Christi. c. XXVI. «Let Pelagius too manifestly confess that grace of God which is manifest in the divine utterances.... Let him distinguish knowledge and love, as they are to be distinguished. Nay, knowledge puffs up, charity builds up. And then knowledge does not puff up, when charity builds up. And since both are a gift of God, but one is less, the other greater, let him not so exalt our justice above the praise of our justifier, as to attribute the lesser of these two to divine help, and usurp to the human free will the greater.»Cf. also De Gratia et lib. arb. c. 19. But if the inspiration of the will is that which exists naturally in the will from the illumination of the intellect, besides the fact that, as we have said, in the order of favor there is not a twofold but one grace; it does not appear how the grace of illumination is the lesser, which is that which is done immediately by God and through which God is properly the principle of good works. And indeed it cannot be conceived how Augustine could have thought that the grace of illumination was conceded by God to Pelagius, and yet that love is vindicated for the powers of the free will, if Augustine had thought of that gift in the will which naturally follows upon the illumination. You will say that the grace of knowledge, of which Augustine speaks, is the external grace of the law and of doctrine. That is false; for if Augustine spoke only of an external grace of knowledge, and, as must be supposed in this objection, he thought the mediated inspiration sufficient, which is formally the interior grace of knowledge, he would not oppose the grace of knowledge to the grace of love, but the external grace of illumination to the simply internal grace of illumination. Since, moreover, he himself admitted and vindicated the immediate illumination, it is easy to infer from these things that the grace of knowledge, of which Augustine speaks, comprises also the immediate illumination of the mind. This indeed is a gift of God no less than the immediate inspiration of the will, although it is less; moreover, Augustine simply numbers both under the notion of a gift of God. And in very truth here Augustine proposes that grace of knowledge of which the Fathers of Carthage also spoke in canon 4.Moreover, it is, as we have seen, an interior grace. The grace is therefore twofold for Augustine according to the very notion of grace and favor; for the one is a lesser grace, the other a greater. Hence he also thinks that the former can be without the latter, De peccat. merit. et remiss. L. III, c. 17: «Men do not will to do what is just; either because it is hidden whether it is just, or because it does not delight.» (to be sure, even if it is not hidden). But that what lay hidden may become known, and what did not delight may become sweet, is of the grace of God.»

But you will say: can it come about that grace puffs up? First, it is certain that knowledge is exhibited not as a cause but simply as an occasion of elation. Now what forbids such an occasion from being also the grace of interior illumination? Is it because it is a gift of God? but that is common to all other things: is it because it is an entirely gratuitous gift of God? but that also befits revelation: moreover, you will at least accept the words of the Fathers about this, if you reject our interpretation: is it because it is an interior gift and, as we shall see in its place, intrinsically supernatural? but even if this is known by the one possessing it, I do not see what it contributes, unless it be that one puffs up more easily, unless charity stand in the way. In sum, the vice of such elation in no way redounds upon the gifts of God but upon our weakness or malice; and just as one can be puffed up, undeservedly indeed, on account of the graces freely given, so too on account of others. But charity brings it about that it checks elation, and true actual charity cannot coexist with that sense of swelling.

V. What we have vindicated thus far borrows evident light from the following observation upon the heresy of Pelagius. Namely, Pelagius at length conceded the help of interior illumination, although not as necessary simply, but as opportune for acting more easily; but, this help being posited, the mediated help of the will also followed necessarily; and nevertheless Pelagius was always reprobated by Augustine, not only because he wanted grace to be given only for acting more easily, but because he denied simply the help of the will. This we shall place in its own light in its place, when we shall give the historical synopsis of the Pelagian heresy. For now cf. Petavius, De Pelag. et semip. haer., c. 4, n. 2; Livinus De Meyer, De pelagg. et massill. erroribus, c. 6.

Thus indeed, if the error of Pelagius is well weighed, it consisted in this, that he distinguished these three things, possibility or power, will (i.e., volition), and action, conceded that possibility is helped, but denied that the help of will and of action is necessary (August., De grat. Christi, c. 3 ff.). What, moreover, is it that possibility is helped, not the will? Namely, the power implanted in the nature of free will, in order to be constituted in proximate first act, needs certain extrinsic aids by which it may be made known what it is necessary or expedient to do: wherefore a help of this sort is referred by Augustine to the law and doctrine. The will, however, is not helped according to Pelagius, because the power of free will, constituted in first act through those things which are extrinsic to it, is already of itself capable of willing and acting well. On the contrary, the Fathers contended that the will itself is helped, because the good will itself (the volition) is a gift of God, who not only gives the power, but gives the very act, inasmuch as by His illumination and inspiration He prepares free will, and, prepared, helps it to will. Now, if the immediate inspiration of the will is not admitted, that Pelagian error does not appear to be sufficiently excluded, namely that only possibility is helped, but not the will; for the interior illumination itself, since it is extrinsic to the will, pertains rather to those aids by which possibility is helped, and it could be admitted by Pelagius and indeed at some time actually was admitted, without his confessing the help of the will.

VI. But a help of the will of this sort, whose profession the Fathers defended so strenuously, someone would wrongly and unskillfully confound with that concurrence of God which is necessary for all actions by the law of nature, so that a created operation may exist. Indeed, since Pelagius placed the grace of God in this, that God gave us the power of acting well, i.e., free will, Augustine pointed out (De Gratia Christi, c. 17 ff.) that this power implanted in free will is indifferent to good and to evil, and therefore is capable of both roots, namely of the good tree and of the evil tree; but the grace of God is the cause of nothing but good; through it we are made good trees, receiving from God the good will or charity: but we ourselves make ourselves evil trees through free will, falling away from the unchangeable good. Just as, therefore, it is false that the grace of God, by which we are helped to will and to act rightly, is that which we use both when acting well and when acting badly, so it is false that free will is grace. Now, those things which exclude free will from the dignity of grace exclude also that natural concurrence; for it too is indifferent, and it is at hand for those acting well and badly. Wherefore, when free will is excluded from the dignity of grace, that concurrence too, which is its necessary sequel, must be deemed excluded. Of it, however, Pelagius is never read to have made a detailed mention, nor were the Fathers solicitous about it (cf. what we shall say in the Synopsis of the Pelagian heresy under n. IV.).

VII. Having premised that observation which we gave in the preceding Th., n. VI, we demonstrate the last part of this thesis. Among actual graces, those hold the principal place to which the others are ordered as means, those which are the efficacious principle of salutary works: but such are the immediate inspirations of the will, which render the will powerful for meriting, and to which the illuminations of the mind are ordered as means. Whence Augustine, and chiefly about a grace of this sort, speaks against the Pelagians and prefers it to the former, and with him the Council of Carthage, as may be seen in the places cited above.