Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

Domenico Palmieri

Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

Domenico Palmieri (1829–1909)

First published 1885

Dominicus Palmieri, S.J.'s Tractatus de gratia divina actuali (Gulpen, 1885) is a systematic Roman-school treatise on actual grace. After defining grace and its divisions, Palmieri examines its effects, necessity for fallen humanity, gratuitous character, efficacy, distribution, and relation to predestination, engaging Augustine, the Fathers, councils, Jansenism, and the scholastic disputes over physical predetermination. The sixty-two-thesis format exemplifies late nineteenth-century neo-scholastic dogmatic method: historical authorities are gathered into tightly argued theological conclusions. Schola presents the Latin work from the 1885 edition.


Prolegomenon I: Prolegomenon. De notione et partitionibus praecipuis gratiae divinae

Thesis I: Gratia, prout dicitur de bono aliquo alteri collato, definitur: beneficium ex benevolentia collatum citra exigentiam eius, cui confertur: ad quam definitionem redit illa communis Scholasticorum: donum gratis datum.

Thesis II: Gratia creata tum in donum naturale tum in donum supernaturale dispesci potest: supernaturale tamen donum potiore iure et magis proprie gratia dicitur; ita ut ea dona in ipsa ratione gratiae specifice differant.

Thesis III: Ratione habita tum status sive integritatis sive lapsus creaturae rationalis, tum principii meritori, quod proprium est alterius status, gratia supernaturalis distinguitur in gratiam Dei et gratiam Christi.

Thesis IV: Gratia supernaturalis alia est externa, alia interna.

Thesis V: Rursus gratia supernaturalis dividi debet in gratiam gratis datam, et gratiam gratum facientem, quae potior est illâ.

Thesis VI: Gratia gratum faciens alia est in habitu sita et permanens, alia actualis et transiens.

Caput I: De Gratiae actualis natura

Articulus I: De iis, quibus gratiae actualis ratio competit

Thesis I: Ad gratias actuales spectant mentis illustrationes tum quae tantum ab extrinseco excitantur in nobis, tum potissimum quas operatur quoque immediate Spiritus in mente nostra.

But in order that such an immediate illumination of the mind may exist in us, there is required, by the ordinary law of Providence, an object proposed from without, which is able to determine a pious thought.

I. That the illuminations of the mind, taken generally, pertain to actual graces, the whole Catholic tradition bears witness. For we are taught that God is He who gives the spirit of wisdom and of revelation and the enlightened eyes of the heart Ephes. I, 16. seq., that He Himself shines in our hearts 2ª Cor. IV, 6., that He Himself opens the eyes of men, that they may be converted from darkness to light Act. XXVI, 16. seq., that He illuminates our eyes and our darkness Psal. XII, 4. XVII, 20., that we hear and learn from the Father Ioan. VI, 45., and that our sufficiency of thinking (salutarily) is from God 2ª Cor. III, 5.. According to these things the Fathers teach that the Father does not send us the knowledge of His Son by sound or by voice, but by the illumination and enlightenment of the mind Cyril. Alex. in Ioan. L. IV. c. 7.; that the divine Word, as our pedagogue, admonishes, reproves, convicts, threatens us Clemens Alex. Pedag. L. I. c. 9.; and that God acts by the persuasions of things seen so that we will and believe, whether extrinsically through evangelical exhortations, or intrinsically, where no one has it in his power what comes into his mind Aug. De Spir. et lit. c. 34.. And indeed «when we beseech from Him His help for the doing and the perfecting of justice, what else do we beseech but that He open what lay hidden and that what did not delight become sweet?»Idem. de pecc. merit. et remiss. L. II. c. 19. «For it is not in the power of men but of God that men have the power to become sons of God: from...» for they indeed receive it from Him, who gives pious thoughts to the human heart.»Idem De Spir. et lit. c. 8. Hence in the Council of Arausic. II, c. 7 it was defined: «if anyone asserts that by the vigour of nature he can think, as is expedient, or choose some good which pertains to the salvation of eternal life, or consent to the salutary, that is, evangelical preaching, without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, he is deceived by a heretical spirit.»

It is established, therefore, that among the divine helps by which we are aided to act piously the illuminations or enlightenments of the mind have a place: but the help of God by which we are aided to act is actual grace: therefore. You will perhaps say that it must still be proved that those helps are grace, that is, given freely (gratis) or unowed to nature. But it must be noted that at present the question is not about the gratuitousness of grace, but about its nature; wherefore it must now be supposed — which, however, will be proved afterwards — that in the cited places there is question of those helps which are unowed to nature and are given freely. Besides, this is sufficiently clear from the adduced testimony of Augustine and from the definition of the council.

Furthermore, that actual helps of this kind, consisting in the illuminations of the mind, are had, reason taught by faith demonstrates, showing their necessity. For supernatural life in second act cannot be explained apart from the grace of God, since it is a work above the powers of nature; again, life in second act, which consists in knowledge and love, cannot begin without the illumination of the mind; therefore for supernatural life consisting in knowledge and love, a gratuitous illumination of the mind proceeding from God is required. Moreover, this gratuitous illumination is actual grace: therefore the illumination of the mind pertains to actual graces.

I. A twofold illumination of the mind must be distinguished, mediate and immediate. It is called mediate when God excites in the mind a knowledge or some apprehension only through extrinsic objects or means, just as by many things seen our mind can be moved to think something. Immediate illumination is called that apprehension or knowledge which God, with an object indeed proposed from without, Himself excites by His own power, physically acting in the mind and Himself touching the hearts of men by His own virtue, not indeed revealing anything, but strengthening the mind with unowed light so that it rightly apprehends the truth. There is a difference between the two. The first knowledge, when an extrinsic means is employed, arises naturally in the mind and therefore corresponds to the natural powers of the intellect: the other, inasmuch as it is immediate, is owed to God alone gratuitously acting physically in the intellect and illuminating it. Hence the former knowledge, considered subjectively and efficiently, is connected with extrinsic objects sufficiently proposed by a connection of natural consequence, so that, when these exist, it also exists. The other, however, again considered subjectively and efficiently, since it is from God gratuitously exciting it in us, does not cohere with the extrinsic object by the aforesaid connection of consequence. Considered objectively, however, it coheres with the extrinsic object. That these things may be explained at once, consider that the actual grace of illumination does not of itself aim at disclosing something new to us. For the revelation of those things which must be known in order to act rightly, and which is therefore necessary for all, is public and social, made by Christ to the Church through the Apostles; it is not private. Moreover, the actual grace of illumination is necessary to each one and is conferred on each one individually. I said 'of itself'; for God can, if He wills, by illuminating the intellect of someone, manifest something new to him. But this is a special grace pertaining to the gift of prophecy. Since, therefore, the actual grace of illumination does not of itself aim at revealing something new, it will aim at this: that the mind rightly, as it ought, apprehend and think that which is proposed to it from elsewhere for thinking. This extrinsic proposition of truth» therefore is required, in order that the immediate illumination of the mind may exist. And indeed naturally the intellect is determined to act by an extrinsic object; supernaturally, however, the preaching of the word of God is divinely instituted, so that through it men may be led to faith, to justification, and to the exercise of holiness (we take the word of God preached in all its amplitude, that is: whether simply preached, or equivalently, that is, whether written or recalled to memory or manifested in any way whatsoever or represented in sacred symbols and rites or in similar things). Since, therefore, only in this way is something new to be thought proposed to the mind by ordinary providence, it follows generally that an object naturally determining, which can excite a pious thought, is required by the law of ordinary Providence, in order that immediate illumination may be in us. Therefore the mediate illumination of the mind is not that which is excited in us by an object proposed from without; for this also belongs to the immediate; but it is that which is excited naturally in us by an extrinsic object divinely proposed: the immediate, however, is that which, given that condition, is excited by the power of God gratuitously acting in us and illuminating our faculty, elevating our faculty for acting more excellently, is excited in us. In this matter there is of itself room for a twofold question. The first is whether in the order of actual grace both illuminations are possible; the other, whether in the order of present providence both illuminations, one distinct from the other, are in fact given. But the solution of this second question also depends on certain principles which we shall bring forward later, from which it seems to be concluded that there is no grace of illumination that is only mediate. But because we are now treating only of the essence of actual grace, it is permissible to prescind for a little while from the examination of those principles, so that, if the negative opinion in this matter is true, what we say about the mediate illumination may be taken as said hypothetically and as pertaining to the order of possibility. We defend, therefore, that within the amplitude of actual graces there are contained not only mediate illuminations, but also and chiefly immediate ones.

III. As for the mediate ones, if only the question of possibility is raised, there is no difficulty. For divine revelation, the word of God daily heard or read, the examples of Christ and of the Saints, the other things instituted by God in the Church, and similar things aim at this: to excite in us salutary knowledges; and when these means have been rightly applied, they are able to excite those knowledges naturally, even with any other gratuitous help whatsoever set aside: but because these means are unowed and pertain to the supernatural order, all those knowledges are so many gratuitous illuminations, that is, graces of illumination. And indeed the extrinsic revelation itself is a grace of illumination in first act: but when from its application a knowledge is excited in us, this is a grace of illumination in second act, which, if it arises only naturally from the application of the object, is only a mediate illumination. To this place can be referred the testimonies of Scripture, as Psal. XVIII, 9: The law of the Lord is immaculate, converting souls; the testimony of the Lord is faithful, giving wisdom to little ones; the justices of the Lord are right, rejoicing hearts; the commandment of the Lord is lightsome, enlightening the eyes; and I Petri II, 21: Christ suffered for us, leaving you an example, that you may follow his footsteps. Perhaps Augustine speaks of the same thing in De Spiritu et littera, c. 31: «By the persuasions of things seen God acts so that we will and so that we believe, whether extrinsically through evangelical exhortations... or intrinsically, where no one has it in his power what comes into his mind.»

IV. As for the immediate illuminations, first of all it is clear that such gratuitous illuminations of the mind are possible; for, even with every question about the mode by which God can immediately illuminate the mind set aside, it must be certain antecedently to reason both that God can by Himself immediately do that which He does through secondary non-vital causes, of which kind are objects, and that the creator himself of the intellect can immediately modify it, and consequently also illuminate it. But moreover it is established that in fact immediate illuminations are also to be numbered among the actual graces of the illuminations of the mind. Indeed, Scripture speaks not infrequently of these. For a) in 2. Cor. III, 5 the Apostle says: Not that we are sufficient to think (the discourse is about salutary thought) anything from ourselves, as of ourselves: but our sufficiency is from God. It must be noted that the sufficiency of thinking is something subjective, like a power; when, therefore, our insufficiency of thinking is spoken of, it is signified that the force of the intellect is not, of itself, subjectively equal to thinking as it ought. This interpretation, indeed, must first be defended. Surely it was approved by the Latin Fathers in the Pelagian controversy and confirmed by the decrees of the synods in a matter of faith (Syn. Arausic. II, c. 7): what, therefore, prevents us from judging this to be the sense of the Apostle, account being had also of the original text? The distinguished interpreter Iustinianus says that the sense of the Greek words οὐχ ὅτι ἱκανοί ἐσμεν, ἀφ’ ἑαυτῶν λογίσασθαί τι is this: that we can arrogate nothing to ourselves, impute nothing to ourselves, that we are not worthy to attribute anything to ourselves, because all our dignity ἐν ἱκανότητι is from God. He confirms this interpretation by the authority of Chrysostom, Theophylact, and Oecumenius. He adds, moreover, that it coheres with the preceding, as the Apostle had said that he has confidence through Christ toward God.

But ἡ ἱκανότης is certainly also sufficiency, and ἱκανός means sufficient in the idiom also of the N. T. and of Paul: let there be compared in the same epistle c. II, 6; or, which comes to the same, ἱκανὸς means fit, as ibid. v. 16 and 2. Tim. II, 2. Likewise λογίζεσθαι is also to think or to meditate, 1. Cor. XIII, 5 and more evidently Philipp. IV, 8. And yet this interpretation, in our passage 2. Cor. III, 5, coheres with the preceding; indeed, it is demanded by the context. For the sense of the whole discourse comes back to this: we glory before God concerning our ministry toward you, meanwhile claiming nothing for ourselves, since from ourselves we are not even able to think anything. The particle xai in the following verse — «But our sufficiency is from God, who also made us fit ministers of the new testament» — would be redundant, supposing the other interpretation. For in that interpretation the dignity which is from God would be this very dignity of the ministry: but the particle et teaches that one thing and another are different, namely that we are said to have been made fit in the preceding verse and in the following one, which we clearly understand, if the discourse is first about sufficiency or fitness for thinking, then about fitness for the ministry.

These things being posited, it is certain that here there is discourse about thought in the salutary order, that is, about salutary thought: for the Apostle also seeks the proof or the declaration of his insufficiency from this: that God made him a fit minister of the New Testament; surely the insufficiency is in that order in which there is confidence (v. 1) toward God, who makes us sufficient and fit; but this confidence is had through Christ; confidence, however, leaning on the merits of Christ, pertains to the order of salvation.

But now our mind is said to be insufficient for thinking from itself either on account of that common reason — because God also created us, and without God conserving and cooperating we can do nothing — or on account of some special reason. The first cannot be admitted. For the sufficiency of which Paul speaks depends on the merits of Christ and is of the same order as the sufficiency for the ministry of the Apostleship: but sufficiency of this kind is not from creation, nor from that operation of God owed to nature, such as is conservation and cooperation. Moreover, the sufficiency which the Apostle says is from God is said by him at the same time also to be ours: «we think, namely, from ourselves, ἀφ’ ἑαυτῶν»; we have, therefore, the power of thinking, yet in such a way that we have this very thing from God, not as of ourselves, οὐκ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν: but this is more than the simple cooperation of God. But the special reason is either in this, that we need the extrinsic proposition of a thinkable object, or, moreover, an intrinsic illumination. The first, again taken separately, is not enough; for in reality that which we cannot think solely because the proposition of the object is lacking, and which, once the object has been proposed, we are able to think, with regard to that, speaking at least in human fashion, we are said to be sufficient by ourselves. Therefore this sufficiency of thinking, which is from God, must be said to be some intrinsic gift perfecting the mind, so that the mind, furnished with it, is able to do what by itself alone it could not do: this, however, is that which is called immediate illumination. Therefore we are taught that, even though the object exists, unless God helps, supplying strength from within, the mind cannot think as it ought.

b) 1. Cor. III, 7: Neither he who plants is anything, nor he who waters, but God who gives the increase. What is signified by the metaphor of planting and watering is evident: namely, to exhibit the institution of the Faith, or the erudition of the intellect in the order of salvation, through an extrinsic ministry. But to give the increase is to effect that the plant unfolds and grows, namely to effect that whole which is the end of the planting and of the watering. God, therefore, ὡς ἀληθῶς giving the increase, performs all that both he who plants and he who waters intend. «He who gives the increase does not strengthen the tree or the vine, but creates. For by that increase it comes about that even the planted wood produces and fixes a root. By that increase it comes about that the cast seed sends forth a shoot.» (Aug. L. III. cont. epist. Petiliani). Wherefore in this business God alone is said to be something, namely something great, achieving (cf. Philipp. II, 13). But how does God provide increase of this kind? Consider that that which is done through the extrinsic ministry, that same thing God, as principal cause, works through His ministers. Moreover, besides that, God giving the increase works another thing, and indeed a more excellent one, without external ministry. I say without external ministry: for if He did that also through ministers, just as the two former things, which God does as principal cause, are attributed to the ministers because God acts through them, so there would be no reason why this third also should be denied to the ministers, if this too were done by God through them. Therefore this increase is supplied by God through something else besides the mediate illumination, which is had through the extrinsic ministry. It is supplied, namely, the very subjective sufficiency of thinking and of willing as one ought, by which it comes about that the seeds cast are rightly received and cultivated and grow in us. Wherefore again it is rightly said that he who plants and he who waters is nothing, namely, that he confers little and something by itself alone insufficient in this business, but that he who gives the increase is something; not because they confer nothing under God, but because they do not supply the powers, nor are they related to the work as efficient cause, but only as a condition. «He Himself (says August., De Grat. Christi c. 19) works the fruit in the good trees, who both waters and cultivates from without through any minister whatsoever, and by Himself gives the increase intrinsically.» c) 1a. Ioan. II, 20: You have the unction (χρῖσμα) from the Holy One and you know all things; and 27: His unction (χρῖσμα) teaches you about all things. But now, comparing Act. IV, 27; X, 38; Hebr. I, 9; 2a. Cor. I, 21, χρῖσμα is indeed received in many ways by the interpreters, an ointment but one poured out (for otherwise, what would it confer? whence the Vulgate rightly rendered it unctio): yet it easily agrees among all that there is signified by it some infused gift, a gift, however, of wisdom or of prudence; for there is question of doctrine.

Moreover, this unction is first interior as to its effect; namely, it is the intellect that is taught: moreover, it is also interior as to its efficiency, so that the Spirit teaches the intellect not only through the extrinsic legitimate and authentic magisterium, but also, and moreover, by an immediate interior efficiency or operation. The reason is that the operation of God which is the extrinsic magisterium of His ministers cannot be called the unction of the Spirit teaching; for unction represents an immediate operation upon the subject which is said to be anointed, which here is the intellect, which is taught. Therefore the intellect is steeped in an immediate interior unction, that is, it is illuminated by an immediate illumination. August. on this passage, Tract. III in I. Ioann.: «Do not think that anyone learns anything from a man. We can admonish through the sound of our voice; if there is not one who teaches, our sound is vain.... Where His inspiration and unction is not, words resound vainly from without.» «For man hears (says the same, de peccat. merit. et remiss. I. I. c. 25) a man or an angel speaking; but that he may feel and know that what is said is true, his mind is sprinkled within by that light which is eternal, which also shines in darkness.»

Finally, if the testimonies of Scripture adduced in the preceding part, from the epistle to the Ephesians and from the Psalms, are compared, it is manifest that the illumination of the mind is besought from God for those who have already received and hold the extrinsic revelation, and it is besought that the due knowledge may be had, lest they be overtaken by the darkness of death; therefore, besides the mediate illumination, mention is made of some other interior one, which proceeds immediately from God. Therefore.

V. The Fathers also teach this expressly. Besides Augustine already cited, Prosper sings thus in Carm. de ingratis c. 14: Not by counsel alone and by benign exhortation — persuading and teaching, as though it had the form of law — does Grace work, but changing the mind within and reforming it, and fashioning a new vessel from the broken one by the power of creating.» The Author of De Vocatione omnium gentium, L. 1, c. 3: «When, therefore, the word of God is brought to the ears of the flesh through the ministry of those preaching, the operation of divine power is mingled with the sound of the human voice, and He who stirred up the office of the evangelizer also strengthened the affection of the hearer; for the food of the soul, the Word, grows sweet, the old darkness is driven out by new light, and the interior gaze is stripped of the darkness of ancient error.» Because, namely, «the divine discourse sounds in vain to the outward ears, unless God opens the hearing of the interior man by a spiritual gift:» as, with Fulgentius in the conclusion of the book De Incarn. et Grat., teach Gregory the Great, hom. VIII in Ezechielem, Bernard, De Conver. ad Clericos c. 1, Thomas, Lect. VI in Ioan. XIV, 26, and those who above all are to be heard, the Fathers of the Council of Arausic. II, cn. 7, by which we are taught that for believing as one ought the illumination of the Holy Spirit is necessary. Moreover, let it be noted that this definition was laid down against the Semi-Pelagians and the Pelagians, who readily admitted the external grace of revelation and the mediate illumination.

VI. It remains to be proved that the immediate illumination is more excellent than the mediate. Indeed, if you consider each separately, a comparison cannot truly be made; because the immediate is never given alone, and alone it would accomplish nothing: but they must be considered as they are in the concrete. Moreover, with the immediate inspiration supervening, a more excellent effect is obtained; for it is this which intrinsically elevates the faculty and supplies the power and the strength for thinking as one ought, and this is what, according to the Fathers, is required in order that we may operate rightly. Therefore.

Thesis II: Ad gratiam actualem spectant quoque inspirationes voluntatis tum mediatae tum immediatae atque inspirationes immediatae inter gratias actuales enumeratas principem obtinent locum.

Thesis III: Gratiae actuales illustrationis et inspirationis continentur certe actibus vitalibus intellectus et voluntatis.

Thesis IV: Actus vitales, quibus continetur gratia actualis illustrationis et inspirationis, quae principium est deliberati actus et operis boni, sunt primo quidem actus indeliberati utriusque facultatis tum vero etiam actus deliberati.

Thesis V: Ex quo corollarii instar consequitur inter auxilia, quibus voluntas adiuvatur, aliqua exsistere, quae sint per se efficacia.

Thesis VI: Ratio gratiae actualis extendi potest etiam ad actus indeliberatos sensus et appetitus sensitivi.

Thesis VII: Ratio gratiae actualis ad universam quoque providentiam externam tum positivam tum negativam, qua ad opera salutaria et ad beatitudinem homines promoventur, extendi debet. 1.

Articulus II: De viribus quas gratia actualis confert

Thesis I: Gratia actualis confert vires morales voluntati ad honeste agendum.

Thesis II: Tenendum est actualem gratiam nedum morales, sed physicas quoque vires addere facultatibus nostris ad actus salutares eliciendos.

Thesis III: Non demonstratur inter gratias actuales recensendas esse qualitates quasdam reales, non vitales et suapte natura fluentes, quae principium intrinsecum sint actus vitalis indeliberati supernaturalis: tenere autem licet quod actualis gratia absolvatur tum actibus vitalibus tum divina operatione elevante facultatem et cum ea producente actus supernaturales.

Articulus III: De generali habitudine gratiae ad voluntatem

Thesis I: Constat ita addi per gratiam formaliter vires tum physicas tum morales voluntati, ut ex voluntate et gratia unum constituatur principium actus deliberati salutaris, quod est nempe voluntas elevata, illustrata, inspirata.

Thesis II: Gratia actualis interior multipliciter dividitur, nempe in excitantem seu vocantem et adiuvantem, in operantem et cooperantem, in praevenientem et subsequentem, in antecedentem et concomitantem.

Caput II: De Gratia actuali necessaria hominibus lapsis

Articulus I: De potestate naturae ad actus ordinis naturalis

Thesis I: In ipsa natura intellectus humani positum est, ut per solas naturae vires sit ei impossibile cognoscere veritates sibi naturales omnes simul collective sumptas.

Thesis II: Liberum quoque arbitrium gaudet naturaliter potestate physica semper honeste agendi servandique legem naturalem; quamvis ad idem praestandum impotentia quadam morali laboret.

Thesis III: Merito proscripta est doctrina, quae statuit omne, quod agit peccator, peccatum esse et omnia opera infidelium esse peccata liberumque arbitrium sine gratiae Dei adiutorio non nisi ad peccandum valere.

Articulus II: Quid natura humana per se sola non possit

Thesis I: Certum est, quoties in monumentis Ecclesiasticis doctrinam revelatam proponentibus legimus credendum esse quod bonum aliquod esse non possit in nobis vel actus aliquis fieri a nobis non possit citra auxilium gratiae, id de bonis et actibus salutaribus intelligendum esse.

Thesis II: Cum testificatione catholica satis constet citra gratiam nihil boni et salutaris in hominibus esse posse, speciatim affirmamus gratiae quoque deberi fidem saluturam eisdemque pium quodvis initium spiritumque precum.

Thesis III: Necessitas gratiae actualis ad agendum sicut oportet asserta a Patribus contra pelagianos, est necessitas non solum moralis, sed physica et absoluta.

Thesis IV: Ex qua doctrina Patrum consequitur actus salutares esse intrinsece h. e. entitate sua supernaturales.

Thesis V: Eamdem doctrinam necessitatis gratiae, quae saeculo V. a Patribus contra pelagianos propugnata est, iam Patres praecedentium saeculorum in Oriente et Occidente continenter tradiderant. 1.

Thesis VI: Gratia porro necessaria ad salutariter agendum iis, qui necdum sunt conversi ad Deum et quovis habitu supernaturali carent, est gratia duplex interior immediata, nempe illustrationis mentis et inspirationis voluntatis.

Thesis VII: Ut tandem de necessitate gratiae actualis pro iustis quoque disseramus, primum advertendum est quod cum gratia praeveniens dicitur necessaria ad omnes actus salutares, non eo ipso dicitur quod ad singulos actus nova gratia praeveniens sit necessaria.

Thesis VIII: Praestituto Tridentinae Synodi Sess.

Appendix I: De sententia Augustini circa necessitatem gratiae actualis in statu integritatis

Parergon I: De quadam sententia Ripalda

Caput III: De Gratiae actualis gratuitate et de praeparatione ad gratiam

Thesis I: Distincto merito operis condigno et congruo, docemus nullum esse posse in natura meritum, quo gratia comparetur atque utrumque pariter meritum naturae condignum et congruum a Patribus fuisse reiectum. 1.

Thesis II: Negandum est quoque naturam viribus suis posse sibi positivam dispositionem ad gratiam comparare.

Thesis III: Neque precibus naturae adseri potest vis impetratoria gratiae, ratione saltem habita huius, in quo versamur, providentiae ordinis.

Thesis IV: Calumnia est plurimos graecos Patres et nominatim Chrysostomum primas partes in ordine salutis tribuisse naturae et idcirco gratiam merito cuidam naturae congruo rependi affirmasse. 1.

Thesis V: Etsi illius theologici effati: *Facienti quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam*; interpretatio, quae statuit facientem quod in se est viribus naturae, se disponere negativa dispositione ad gratiam, permitti possit tanquam non derogans dignitati gratiae; attamen animadvertendum^[15.

Thesis VI: Gratuitas gratiae optime componitur cum impetrutione et meritis ope praecedentis gratiae comparatis.

Thesis VII: Formalis perseverantia, licet sit per gratiam, quae ex divina ordinatione ipsis debetur, in potestate omnium iustorum; est tamen adhuc donum Dei, distinctum a donis tum iustificationis tum illius potestatis divinitus collatae, ideoque donum speciale atque est donum iustis gratuitum; quod tamen iustus potest suppliciter emereri.

Caput IV: De Gratiae actualis efficacia

Articulus I: Synopsis historica controversiae Patres inter et Massilienses

Thesis I: Massilienses negarint ad salutare fidei initium necessariam esse gratiam interiorem immediatam praevenientem.

Thesis II: Gratia, quam Massilienses ad cetera opera necessariam fussi sunt, si in se spectetur prout est auxilium ad operandum, est illa eadem gratia, quam Augustinus contra pelagianos defendit.

Articulus II: Controversia circa gratiae efficaciam

Controversia cum haereticis

Thesis I: Haeretica est sententia, quae statuit ita voluntatem humanam per gratiam Dei antecedenter moveri, ut libertate indifferentiae sub eadem gratia sit destituta.

Thesis II: Sententia Iansenii: gratiam Dei ita esse efficacem, ut inter ipsam et libertatem exsistat habitus line quidem delectationis inde liberatae praevenientis victricis, inde autem voluntatis victae et ad unum insuperabiliter determinatae, qua parte statuit gratiam necessitatem inferentem, haeretica est nec a praecedente differt; quatenus vero gratiam, quae necessitatem infert, in delectatione collocat, falsa est.

Thesis III: Haeretica est haec divinae gratiae notio, quam Quesnellus systema Iansenii emendaturus tradidit, ut sit nempe ipsa omnipotens Dei voluntas vel operatio manus sive voluntatis Dei omnipotentis.

Thesis IV: Inepte vero ad plures Scripturarum locutiones provocant haeretici, ut suam haeresim tueantur.

Thesis V: Perperam ex iis, quae pelagiani ac massilienses contra Augustini doctrinam obiciebant atque ex difficultate, quam ipse Augustinus se experiri fatebatur in conciliando utroque dogmate libertatis et gratiae, colligunt haeretici sententiam, quam ipsi defendunt, esse ipsam Augustini doctrinam.

Thesis VI: Neque proficiunt magis afferentes doctrinam Augustini, qua traditur et explicatur sive gratiam operari ipsum velle, facere ut velimus, dare bonam voluntatem, dare omnia merita, totum esse gratiae, sive gratiam esse, quae nos discernit et opus bonum non esse volentis aut currentis, sed miserentis Dei, sive gratiam esse omnipotentissimam, efficacissimam, insuperabilem, indeclinabilem et a nullo duro corde respui.

Thesis VII: Inscite quoque Jansenius abutitur Augustini doctrina in Expositione Epistolae ad Galatas: quod amplius nos delectat, secundum id operemur necesse est atque appellatione victricis facta gratiae, ut evincat a maiori delectatione voluntatis consensum necessario extorqueri.

Thesis VIII: Falsa est doctrina, quam Iansenius asserit, enarrans distinctionem ab Augustino (*De Correp. et Grat.* cc. 10. 11. 12.) traditam duplicis adiutorii, nempe adiutorii sine quo non et adiutorii quo; falsaque est pariter interpretatio ab eodem Iansenio adlibita in Augustini locis.

Thesis IX: Gratia omnis potestatem tribuens operandi est vere sufficiens ad id propter quod datur, sive operatio consequatur sive non.

Thesis X: Ut gratiae pure sufficientis doctrina catholica impugnetur, frustra obiicitur 1) quod Augustinus aliam gratiam non agnoverit nisi efficacem sive praeter hanc non agnoverit nisi naturalem possibilitatem pelagianam, quod docuerit gratiam Dei nullo duro corde respui negaveritque gratiam Dei omnibus dari; 2) quod idem censuerit frequenter gratiam deesse, qua tentationes superari ac praecepta servari possint.

Controversia inter scholasticos

Thesis I: Sunt qui putant gratiam efficacem, per quam Deus praestat ut velimus, esse motionem Dei in voluntate receptam eamque praeviam prioritate saltem naturae ad actum secundum, quae ex ipsa sua natura sit efficax ita, ut eam necessario necessitate consequentiae sequatur voluntatis consensus atque ita necessario sequatur, ut quamvis voluntas libere vere agat, attamen contradictionem implicet ea gratia praeparari voluntatem eandemque voluntatem ei gratiae non consentire.

Thesis II: Omissa, quia non amplius necessaria, responsione ad argumenta quae ex testimoniis Scripturarum petuntur, ad Augustinum quod spectat, cui praecipue vel unice ex Patribus innituntur Thomistae, docemus Augustinum eam tradere notionem gratiae, quae theoriam gratiae physice praedeterminantis prorsus excludat.

Thesis III: Ex principio philosophico, cui sententia gratiae praedeterminantis innititur, petito ex dignitate causae primae, necessario consequitur Deum praedeterminare ad entitatem actus mali, quod nequit admitti.

Thesis IV: Alterum principium philosophicum, cui doctrina gratiae praedeterminantis innititur: nempe voluntatem, utpote facultatem indifferentem, indigere determinatione accepta ab alio, si eo intelligatur sensu, quo in hac quaestione adhiberi solet, infert libertatis interemptionem et est idcirco prorsus falsum.

Thesis V: Immerito tandem Thomistae obiiciunt nobis doctrinam s.

Thesis VI: lisdem pene omnibus argumentis hactenus allatis reiiciendum censemus quoque systema illud circa gratiam, quod Augustinianum audit. 1.

Thesis VII: Suppositis principiis fidei in hac materia: gratiam nempe interiorem praevenire et adiuvare nostram voluntatem, omnium actuum salutarium principium esse gratiam Dei, gratiam Dei vere sufficientem dari, liberum arbitrium integrum manere sub gratia gratiamque Dei abiicere posse seu Dei gratiae resistere: ita doctrinam catholicam hanc explicandam censemus.

Thesis VIII: Infallibilis proinde connexio futura gratiae, si haec datur, cum bono opere non est adaequate petenda ex efficacia virtutis gratiae et ex divina omnipotentia, sed ea supposita, formaliter petenda est ex divina praescientia, quae noscit quid sub qualibet gratia actura sit voluntas creata, si ea gratia ipsi donetur.

Thesis IX: Quum non modo bene agendi facultas, sed ipse bonus actus et consensus voluntatis a gratia pendeant, si fiat, quippe qui est a voluntate non per se sed per gratiam praeparata ut fiat; pronum est colligere, eum, qui bene operatur, nihil habere quod non acceperit Deumque esse qui illum discernit.

Thesis X: Talis autem explicatio doctrinae catholicae idoneis fundamentis innititur.

Caput V: De distributione gratiarum

Thesis I: Nulla Dei praecepta hominibus iustis volentibus et conantibus secundum praesentes, quas habent, vires, sunt impossibilia: praesto quoque illis est semper gratia necessaria, qua possibilia fiant.

Thesis II: Nemo est in hac vita adeo obstinatus in malo, ut quavis gratia sufficiente ad resipiscendum et salutem consequendam sit destitutus.

Thesis III: Nullis hominibus adultis vel infidelibus media opportuna aut gratiae sufficientes negantur, quibus ad agnitionem valeant venire veritatis salutemque tandem obtinere.

Thesis IV: Quemadmodum Deus nemini neget auxilia sufficientia ad salutem assequendam, non eadem tamen est quoad singulos distributio gratiarum.

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